From 7e2d614bd7cf0965a05988da9d60931cea2f837b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Archer Date: Thu, 2 May 2024 19:05:59 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] Prevent automatic OAuth grants for public clients (#30790) This commit forces the resource owner (user) to always approve OAuth 2.0 authorization requests if the client is public (e.g. native applications). As detailed in [RFC 6749 Section 10.2](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749.html#section-10.2), > The authorization server SHOULD NOT process repeated authorization requests automatically (without active resource owner interaction) without authenticating the client or relying on other measures to ensure that the repeated request comes from the original client and not an impersonator. With the implementation prior to this patch, attackers with access to the redirect URI (e.g., the loopback interface for `git-credential-oauth`) can get access to the user account without any user interaction if they can redirect the user to the `/login/oauth/authorize` endpoint somehow (e.g., with `xdg-open` on Linux). Fixes #25061. Co-authored-by: wxiaoguang --- routers/web/auth/oauth.go | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/routers/web/auth/oauth.go b/routers/web/auth/oauth.go index 79f4711c26..93565ccc31 100644 --- a/routers/web/auth/oauth.go +++ b/routers/web/auth/oauth.go @@ -468,8 +468,9 @@ func AuthorizeOAuth(ctx *context.Context) { return } - // Redirect if user already granted access - if grant != nil { + // Redirect if user already granted access and the application is confidential. + // I.e. always require authorization for public clients as recommended by RFC 6749 Section 10.2 + if app.ConfidentialClient && grant != nil { code, err := grant.GenerateNewAuthorizationCode(ctx, form.RedirectURI, form.CodeChallenge, form.CodeChallengeMethod) if err != nil { handleServerError(ctx, form.State, form.RedirectURI)