Call the certificates .pem and the keys .key; use contrib/gencert
to generate the certificates and provide a GENCERT_FLAGS knob so
that regress can be run with EC keys (GENCERT_FLAGS=-e). Still no
automatic way of testing with both RSA and EC keys.
gmid (like all other daemons that want to do privsep crypto) has a
very close relationship with libtls and need to stay in sync with
it.
OpenBSD' libtls was recently changed to use OpenSSL' EC_KEY_METHOD
instead of the older ECDSA_METHOD, on the gmid side we have to do
the same otherwise failures happens at runtime. In a similar manner,
privsep crypto is silently broken in the current libretls (next
version should fix it.)
The proper solution would be to complete the signer APIs so that
applications don't need to dive into the library' internals, but
that's a mid-term goal, for the immediate bundling the 'little'
libtls is the lesser evil.
The configure script has gained a new (undocumented for the time
being) flag `--with-libtls=bundled|system' to control which libtls
to use. It defaults to `bundled' except for OpenBSD where it uses
the `system' one. Note that OpenBSD versions before 7.3 (inclusive)
ought to use --with-libtls=bundled too since they still do ECDSA_METHOD.
add `log style <style>'; The old default is called `legacy' now, a
new default format is added called `condensed', and `common' and
`combined' to mimick Apache httpd and nginx (respectively) are also
added.
Listening by default on all the addresses is so bad I don't know
why I haven't changed this before. Anyway.
Add a `listen on $hostname port $port' syntax to the config file
and deprecate the old "port" and "ipv6" global setting. Still try
to honour them when no "listen on" directive is used for backward
compatibily, but this will go away in the next next version hopefully.
At the moment the `listen on' in server context don't filter the
host, i.e. one can still reach a host from a address not specified
in the corresponding `liste on', this will be added later.
we can use cmp to tell if two files are different, which also has
the benefit of being available everywhere and reporting the byte
offset of the first difference. Reduces the test dependencies on
some systems.
Was temporarly disabled during the transition to real privsep.
While here, fix a memory leak when using `require client ca'.
Also, avoid leaking info about the parent address space layout to
server processes by not sending pointer values.
It uses the 'common' proc.c from various OpenBSD-daemons.
gmid grew organically bit by bit and it was also the first place where I
tried to implement privsep. It wasn't done very well, in fact the
parent process (that retains root privileges) just fork()s a generation
of servers, all sharing *exactly* the same address space. No good!
Now, we fork() and re-exec() ourselves, so that each process has a fresh
address space.
Some features (require client ca for example) are temporarly disabled,
will be fixed in subsequent commits. The "ge" program is also
temporarly disabled as it needs tweaks to do privsep too.
I really want to get rid of the `executor' process hack for CGI scripts
and its escalation to allow fastcgi and proxying to work on non-OpenBSD.
This drops the CGI support and the `executor' process entirely and is
the first step towards gmid 2.0. It also allows to have more secure
defaults.
On non-OpenBSD systems this means that the sandbox will be deactivated
as soon as fastcgi or proxying are used: you can't open sockets under
FreeBSD' capsicum(4) and I don't want to go thru the pain of making it
work under linux' seccomp/landlock. Patches are always welcome however.
For folks using CGI scripts (hey, I'm one of you!) not all hope is lost:
fcgiwrap or OpenBSD' slowcgi(8) are ways to run CGI scripts as they were
FastCGI applications.
fixes for the documentation and to the non-OpenBSD sandboxes will
follow.