Was temporarly disabled during the transition to real privsep.
While here, fix a memory leak when using `require client ca'.
Also, avoid leaking info about the parent address space layout to
server processes by not sending pointer values.
It uses the 'common' proc.c from various OpenBSD-daemons.
gmid grew organically bit by bit and it was also the first place where I
tried to implement privsep. It wasn't done very well, in fact the
parent process (that retains root privileges) just fork()s a generation
of servers, all sharing *exactly* the same address space. No good!
Now, we fork() and re-exec() ourselves, so that each process has a fresh
address space.
Some features (require client ca for example) are temporarly disabled,
will be fixed in subsequent commits. The "ge" program is also
temporarly disabled as it needs tweaks to do privsep too.
The FreeBSD and Linux' sandbox can't deal with `fastcgi' and `proxy'
configuration rules: new sockets needs to be opened and it's either
impossible (the former) or a huge pain in the arse (the latter).
The sandbox is still always used in case only static files are served.
I really want to get rid of the `executor' process hack for CGI scripts
and its escalation to allow fastcgi and proxying to work on non-OpenBSD.
This drops the CGI support and the `executor' process entirely and is
the first step towards gmid 2.0. It also allows to have more secure
defaults.
On non-OpenBSD systems this means that the sandbox will be deactivated
as soon as fastcgi or proxying are used: you can't open sockets under
FreeBSD' capsicum(4) and I don't want to go thru the pain of making it
work under linux' seccomp/landlock. Patches are always welcome however.
For folks using CGI scripts (hey, I'm one of you!) not all hope is lost:
fcgiwrap or OpenBSD' slowcgi(8) are ways to run CGI scripts as they were
FastCGI applications.
fixes for the documentation and to the non-OpenBSD sandboxes will
follow.
add_mime nows allocate dinamically copies of the passed strings, so
that we can actually free what we parse from the config file.
This matters a lot especially with lengthy `types' block: strings that
reach the internal mapping are never free'd, so every manual addition
is leaked.
The `map' rule is powerful but quite annoying to use if you have/need
lots of entries (and clutters the configuration file too.)
The `type' block is blatantly stolen from httpd(8) and allows for a way
more nice usage:
type {
include "/usr/share/misc/mime.types"
}
or even
type {
text/markdown md markdown
text/x-perl pl pm
# ...
}
it doesn't make any sense to keep the proxying info per-location:
proxying only one per-vhost. It can't work differently, it doesn't make
sense anyway.
Add to gmid the ability to forwad a request to another gemini server and
thus acting like a reverse proxy. The current syntax for the config
file is
server "example.com" {
...
proxy relay-to host:port
}
Further options (like the use of custom certificates) are planned.
cf. github issue #7
Currently dogfooding this patch at gemini.sgregoratto.me. To test,
run the following command and look for the "OCSP response" header:
openssl s_client -connect "gemini.sgregoratto.me:1965" -status
This adds a barebone dumping of the parsed configuration. It is not
complete, but I'm interested in dumping the full path to `cert' and
`key' in order to write some scripts that can inspect the
configuration, extract the certificates and renew them when expired
automatically.
It's not easy to parse gmid configuration otherwise because the syntax
is flexible and users can use macros. Instead, the idea is to run
gmid and let it dump the configuration once it's been parsed in a
static and predictable format.
Now is possible to parse gmid configuration with, say, awk or perl.