Listening by default on all the addresses is so bad I don't know
why I haven't changed this before. Anyway.
Add a `listen on $hostname port $port' syntax to the config file
and deprecate the old "port" and "ipv6" global setting. Still try
to honour them when no "listen on" directive is used for backward
compatibily, but this will go away in the next next version hopefully.
At the moment the `listen on' in server context don't filter the
host, i.e. one can still reach a host from a address not specified
in the corresponding `liste on', this will be added later.
Incorporate the OpenSMTPD' privsep crypto engine. The idea behind
it is to never load the certificate' private keys in a networked
process, instead they are loaded in a separate process (the `crypto'
one) which signs payloads on the behalf of the server processes.
This way, we greatly reduce the risk of leaking the certificate'
private key should the server process be compromised.
This currently compiles only on LibreSSL (portable fix is in the
way).
Don't have all the processes read gmid.conf. The parent needs to do
that, and the will send the config to the children (already
happening.) The other processes were reading the config anyway to
figure out the user and the chroot (if enabled); make the parent pass
additional flag to propagate that info.
We dissociate a bit from the "usual" proc.c but it's a change worth
having.
It uses the 'common' proc.c from various OpenBSD-daemons.
gmid grew organically bit by bit and it was also the first place where I
tried to implement privsep. It wasn't done very well, in fact the
parent process (that retains root privileges) just fork()s a generation
of servers, all sharing *exactly* the same address space. No good!
Now, we fork() and re-exec() ourselves, so that each process has a fresh
address space.
Some features (require client ca for example) are temporarly disabled,
will be fixed in subsequent commits. The "ge" program is also
temporarly disabled as it needs tweaks to do privsep too.
I really want to get rid of the `executor' process hack for CGI scripts
and its escalation to allow fastcgi and proxying to work on non-OpenBSD.
This drops the CGI support and the `executor' process entirely and is
the first step towards gmid 2.0. It also allows to have more secure
defaults.
On non-OpenBSD systems this means that the sandbox will be deactivated
as soon as fastcgi or proxying are used: you can't open sockets under
FreeBSD' capsicum(4) and I don't want to go thru the pain of making it
work under linux' seccomp/landlock. Patches are always welcome however.
For folks using CGI scripts (hey, I'm one of you!) not all hope is lost:
fcgiwrap or OpenBSD' slowcgi(8) are ways to run CGI scripts as they were
FastCGI applications.
fixes for the documentation and to the non-OpenBSD sandboxes will
follow.
add_mime nows allocate dinamically copies of the passed strings, so
that we can actually free what we parse from the config file.
This matters a lot especially with lengthy `types' block: strings that
reach the internal mapping are never free'd, so every manual addition
is leaked.
Omar Polo
Anna “CyberTailor”