I really want to get rid of the `executor' process hack for CGI scripts
and its escalation to allow fastcgi and proxying to work on non-OpenBSD.
This drops the CGI support and the `executor' process entirely and is
the first step towards gmid 2.0. It also allows to have more secure
defaults.
On non-OpenBSD systems this means that the sandbox will be deactivated
as soon as fastcgi or proxying are used: you can't open sockets under
FreeBSD' capsicum(4) and I don't want to go thru the pain of making it
work under linux' seccomp/landlock. Patches are always welcome however.
For folks using CGI scripts (hey, I'm one of you!) not all hope is lost:
fcgiwrap or OpenBSD' slowcgi(8) are ways to run CGI scripts as they were
FastCGI applications.
fixes for the documentation and to the non-OpenBSD sandboxes will
follow.
libevent2 can still somehowe call client_read even in code paths
that never enable reading from the evbuffer. Can't reproduce on
the libevent in base on OpenBSD. It's a bit ugly, but it's a small
workaround for something that otherwise *always* make gmid crash
when linked against libevent2. (client_read works under the
assumption that c->host != NULL, matched_proxy crashes otherwise.)