and while there replace SAFE_SETENV with an inline function. LOG is
more difficult to transform into an inline function, given the string
concatenations it does. The other LOG* and FATAL macros are fine as
they already are.
SIGHUP is sent when the tty is detached and by default kills the
process. When we run in the background we don't care anymore about
the tty, so it should be safe for us to ignore SIGHUP. (frankly,
I expected daemon(3) to do stuff like this for us).
This extends the URI parser so it supports full IRI (Internationalized
Resource Identifiers, RFC3987). Some areas of it can/may be improved,
but here's a start.
Note: we assume UTF-8 encoded IRI.
Up until now I used a "poor man" approach: the uri parser is barely a
parser, it tries to extract the path from the request, with some minor
checking, and that's all. This obviously is not RFC3986-compliant.
The new RFC3986 (URI) parser should be fully compliant. It may accept
some invalid URI, but shouldn't reject or mis-parse valid URI. (in
particular, the rule for the path is way more relaxed in this parser
than it is in the RFC text).
A difference with RFC3986 is that we don't even try to parse the
(optional) userinfo part of a URI: following the Gemini spec we treat
it as an error.
A further caveats is that %2F in the path part of the URI is
indistinguishable from a literal '/': this is NOT conforming, but due
to the scope and use of gmid, I don't see how treat a %2F sequence in
the path (reject the URI?).
before the -d option only accepted absolute paths, and this wasn't
documented. Even more, with the default value of "docs" it won't
work. Now it transforms all relative paths to absolute paths before
going on.
internally, gmid doesn’t care if the client issued a certificate, but
now we pass that information to the CGI script in some new environment
variables.
enhance the CGI scripting support so that script can take path
parameters. That is, a script at /cgi/foo is called when the request
path is /cgi/foo/bar/...
This commit also introduce some backward incompatible changes as the
default env variables set for the CGI script changed.
change the meaning of the -x flag: now it takes a string and executes
CGI scripts only if they are inside a directory with the given name,
relatively to the document root.
This is a first try at implementing CGI scripting. The idea is that,
if CGI is explicitly enabled by the user, when a user requires an
executable file instead of serving it to the client, that file will be
executed and its output fed to the client.
There are various pieces that are still lacking, the firsts that comes
to mind are:
- performance: the handle_cgi just loops ignoring the
WANT_POLLIN/POLLOUT and blocking if the child process hasn’t
outputted anything.
- we don’t parse query variable (yet)
- we need to set more variables in the child environment
side question: it’s better to set the variables using setenv() or
by providing an explicit environment?
- document what environment the CGI script will get
- improve the horrible unveil/pledge(cgi ? …)
but now I can serve “hello-world”-tier script from gmid!