postgresql/contrib/ltree/ltree--1.0--1.1.sql

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/* contrib/ltree/ltree--1.0--1.1.sql */
-- complain if script is sourced in psql, rather than via ALTER EXTENSION
\echo Use "ALTER EXTENSION ltree UPDATE TO '1.1'" to load this file. \quit
-- Update procedure signatures the hard way.
-- We use to_regprocedure() so that query doesn't fail if run against 9.6beta1 definitions,
-- wherein the signatures have been updated already. In that case to_regprocedure() will
-- return NULL and no updates will happen.
Make contrib modules' installation scripts more secure. Hostile objects located within the installation-time search_path could capture references in an extension's installation or upgrade script. If the extension is being installed with superuser privileges, this opens the door to privilege escalation. While such hazards have existed all along, their urgency increases with the v13 "trusted extensions" feature, because that lets a non-superuser control the installation path for a superuser-privileged script. Therefore, make a number of changes to make such situations more secure: * Tweak the construction of the installation-time search_path to ensure that references to objects in pg_catalog can't be subverted; and explicitly add pg_temp to the end of the path to prevent attacks using temporary objects. * Disable check_function_bodies within installation/upgrade scripts, so that any security gaps in SQL-language or PL-language function bodies cannot create a risk of unwanted installation-time code execution. * Adjust lookup of type input/receive functions and join estimator functions to complain if there are multiple candidate functions. This prevents capture of references to functions whose signature is not the first one checked; and it's arguably more user-friendly anyway. * Modify various contrib upgrade scripts to ensure that catalog modification queries are executed with secure search paths. (These are in-place modifications with no extension version changes, since it is the update process itself that is at issue, not the end result.) Extensions that depend on other extensions cannot be made fully secure by these methods alone; therefore, revert the "trusted" marking that commit eb67623c9 applied to earthdistance and hstore_plperl, pending some better solution to that set of issues. Also add documentation around these issues, to help extension authors write secure installation scripts. Patch by me, following an observation by Andres Freund; thanks to Noah Misch for review. Security: CVE-2020-14350
2020-08-10 16:44:42 +02:00
DO LANGUAGE plpgsql
$$
DECLARE
my_schema pg_catalog.text := pg_catalog.quote_ident(pg_catalog.current_schema());
old_path pg_catalog.text := pg_catalog.current_setting('search_path');
BEGIN
-- for safety, transiently set search_path to just pg_catalog+pg_temp
PERFORM pg_catalog.set_config('search_path', 'pg_catalog, pg_temp', true);
UPDATE pg_catalog.pg_proc SET
proargtypes = pg_catalog.array_to_string(newtypes::pg_catalog.oid[], ' ')::pg_catalog.oidvector,
pronargs = pg_catalog.array_length(newtypes, 1)
FROM (VALUES
Make contrib modules' installation scripts more secure. Hostile objects located within the installation-time search_path could capture references in an extension's installation or upgrade script. If the extension is being installed with superuser privileges, this opens the door to privilege escalation. While such hazards have existed all along, their urgency increases with the v13 "trusted extensions" feature, because that lets a non-superuser control the installation path for a superuser-privileged script. Therefore, make a number of changes to make such situations more secure: * Tweak the construction of the installation-time search_path to ensure that references to objects in pg_catalog can't be subverted; and explicitly add pg_temp to the end of the path to prevent attacks using temporary objects. * Disable check_function_bodies within installation/upgrade scripts, so that any security gaps in SQL-language or PL-language function bodies cannot create a risk of unwanted installation-time code execution. * Adjust lookup of type input/receive functions and join estimator functions to complain if there are multiple candidate functions. This prevents capture of references to functions whose signature is not the first one checked; and it's arguably more user-friendly anyway. * Modify various contrib upgrade scripts to ensure that catalog modification queries are executed with secure search paths. (These are in-place modifications with no extension version changes, since it is the update process itself that is at issue, not the end result.) Extensions that depend on other extensions cannot be made fully secure by these methods alone; therefore, revert the "trusted" marking that commit eb67623c9 applied to earthdistance and hstore_plperl, pending some better solution to that set of issues. Also add documentation around these issues, to help extension authors write secure installation scripts. Patch by me, following an observation by Andres Freund; thanks to Noah Misch for review. Security: CVE-2020-14350
2020-08-10 16:44:42 +02:00
(NULL::pg_catalog.text, NULL::pg_catalog.text[]), -- establish column types
('ltree_consistent(internal,internal,int2,oid,internal)', '{internal,SCH.ltree,int2,oid,internal}'),
('ltree_same(internal,internal,internal)', '{SCH.ltree_gist,SCH.ltree_gist,internal}'),
('_ltree_consistent(internal,internal,int2,oid,internal)', '{internal,SCH._ltree,int2,oid,internal}'),
('_ltree_same(internal,internal,internal)', '{SCH.ltree_gist,SCH.ltree_gist,internal}')
) AS update_data (oldproc, newtypestext),
LATERAL (
SELECT array_agg(replace(typ, 'SCH', my_schema)::regtype) as newtypes FROM unnest(newtypestext) typ
) ls
WHERE oid = to_regprocedure(my_schema || '.' || replace(oldproc, 'SCH', my_schema));
UPDATE pg_catalog.pg_proc SET
Make contrib modules' installation scripts more secure. Hostile objects located within the installation-time search_path could capture references in an extension's installation or upgrade script. If the extension is being installed with superuser privileges, this opens the door to privilege escalation. While such hazards have existed all along, their urgency increases with the v13 "trusted extensions" feature, because that lets a non-superuser control the installation path for a superuser-privileged script. Therefore, make a number of changes to make such situations more secure: * Tweak the construction of the installation-time search_path to ensure that references to objects in pg_catalog can't be subverted; and explicitly add pg_temp to the end of the path to prevent attacks using temporary objects. * Disable check_function_bodies within installation/upgrade scripts, so that any security gaps in SQL-language or PL-language function bodies cannot create a risk of unwanted installation-time code execution. * Adjust lookup of type input/receive functions and join estimator functions to complain if there are multiple candidate functions. This prevents capture of references to functions whose signature is not the first one checked; and it's arguably more user-friendly anyway. * Modify various contrib upgrade scripts to ensure that catalog modification queries are executed with secure search paths. (These are in-place modifications with no extension version changes, since it is the update process itself that is at issue, not the end result.) Extensions that depend on other extensions cannot be made fully secure by these methods alone; therefore, revert the "trusted" marking that commit eb67623c9 applied to earthdistance and hstore_plperl, pending some better solution to that set of issues. Also add documentation around these issues, to help extension authors write secure installation scripts. Patch by me, following an observation by Andres Freund; thanks to Noah Misch for review. Security: CVE-2020-14350
2020-08-10 16:44:42 +02:00
prorettype = (my_schema || '.ltree_gist')::pg_catalog.regtype
WHERE oid = pg_catalog.to_regprocedure(my_schema || '.ltree_union(internal,internal)');
UPDATE pg_catalog.pg_proc SET
Make contrib modules' installation scripts more secure. Hostile objects located within the installation-time search_path could capture references in an extension's installation or upgrade script. If the extension is being installed with superuser privileges, this opens the door to privilege escalation. While such hazards have existed all along, their urgency increases with the v13 "trusted extensions" feature, because that lets a non-superuser control the installation path for a superuser-privileged script. Therefore, make a number of changes to make such situations more secure: * Tweak the construction of the installation-time search_path to ensure that references to objects in pg_catalog can't be subverted; and explicitly add pg_temp to the end of the path to prevent attacks using temporary objects. * Disable check_function_bodies within installation/upgrade scripts, so that any security gaps in SQL-language or PL-language function bodies cannot create a risk of unwanted installation-time code execution. * Adjust lookup of type input/receive functions and join estimator functions to complain if there are multiple candidate functions. This prevents capture of references to functions whose signature is not the first one checked; and it's arguably more user-friendly anyway. * Modify various contrib upgrade scripts to ensure that catalog modification queries are executed with secure search paths. (These are in-place modifications with no extension version changes, since it is the update process itself that is at issue, not the end result.) Extensions that depend on other extensions cannot be made fully secure by these methods alone; therefore, revert the "trusted" marking that commit eb67623c9 applied to earthdistance and hstore_plperl, pending some better solution to that set of issues. Also add documentation around these issues, to help extension authors write secure installation scripts. Patch by me, following an observation by Andres Freund; thanks to Noah Misch for review. Security: CVE-2020-14350
2020-08-10 16:44:42 +02:00
prorettype = (my_schema || '.ltree_gist')::pg_catalog.regtype
WHERE oid = pg_catalog.to_regprocedure(my_schema || '._ltree_union(internal,internal)');
PERFORM pg_catalog.set_config('search_path', old_path, true);
END
$$;
ALTER FUNCTION ltree_in(cstring) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION ltree_out(ltree) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION ltree_cmp(ltree, ltree) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION ltree_lt(ltree, ltree) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION ltree_le(ltree, ltree) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION ltree_eq(ltree, ltree) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION ltree_ge(ltree, ltree) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION ltree_gt(ltree, ltree) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION ltree_ne(ltree, ltree) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION subltree(ltree, int4, int4) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION subpath(ltree, int4, int4) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION subpath(ltree, int4) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION index(ltree, ltree) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION index(ltree, ltree, int4) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION nlevel(ltree) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION ltree2text(ltree) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION text2ltree(text) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION lca(_ltree) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION lca(ltree, ltree) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION lca(ltree, ltree, ltree) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION lca(ltree, ltree, ltree, ltree) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION lca(ltree, ltree, ltree, ltree, ltree) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION lca(ltree, ltree, ltree, ltree, ltree, ltree) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION lca(ltree, ltree, ltree, ltree, ltree, ltree, ltree) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION lca(ltree, ltree, ltree, ltree, ltree, ltree, ltree, ltree) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION ltree_isparent(ltree, ltree) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION ltree_risparent(ltree, ltree) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION ltree_addltree(ltree, ltree) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION ltree_addtext(ltree, text) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION ltree_textadd(text, ltree) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION ltreeparentsel(internal, oid, internal, integer) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION lquery_in(cstring) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION lquery_out(lquery) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION ltq_regex(ltree, lquery) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION ltq_rregex(lquery, ltree) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION lt_q_regex(ltree, _lquery) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION lt_q_rregex(_lquery, ltree) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION ltxtq_in(cstring) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION ltxtq_out(ltxtquery) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION ltxtq_exec(ltree, ltxtquery) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION ltxtq_rexec(ltxtquery, ltree) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION ltree_gist_in(cstring) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION ltree_gist_out(ltree_gist) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION ltree_consistent(internal, ltree, int2, oid, internal) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION ltree_compress(internal) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION ltree_decompress(internal) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION ltree_penalty(internal, internal, internal) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION ltree_picksplit(internal, internal) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION ltree_union(internal, internal) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION ltree_same(ltree_gist, ltree_gist, internal) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION _ltree_isparent(_ltree, ltree) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION _ltree_r_isparent(ltree, _ltree) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION _ltree_risparent(_ltree, ltree) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION _ltree_r_risparent(ltree, _ltree) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION _ltq_regex(_ltree, lquery) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION _ltq_rregex(lquery, _ltree) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION _lt_q_regex(_ltree, _lquery) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION _lt_q_rregex(_lquery, _ltree) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION _ltxtq_exec(_ltree, ltxtquery) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION _ltxtq_rexec(ltxtquery, _ltree) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION _ltree_extract_isparent(_ltree, ltree) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION _ltree_extract_risparent(_ltree, ltree) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION _ltq_extract_regex(_ltree, lquery) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION _ltxtq_extract_exec(_ltree, ltxtquery) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION _ltree_consistent(internal, _ltree, int2, oid, internal) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION _ltree_compress(internal) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION _ltree_penalty(internal, internal, internal) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION _ltree_picksplit(internal, internal) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION _ltree_union(internal, internal) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION _ltree_same(ltree_gist, ltree_gist, internal) PARALLEL SAFE;