postgresql/contrib/pgcrypto/pgp-pgsql.c

Ignoring revisions in .git-blame-ignore-revs. Click here to bypass and see the normal blame view.

1002 lines
21 KiB
C
Raw Permalink Normal View History

/*
* pgp-pgsql.c
* PostgreSQL wrappers for pgp.
*
* Copyright (c) 2005 Marko Kreen
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
2010-09-20 22:08:53 +02:00
* contrib/pgcrypto/pgp-pgsql.c
*/
#include "postgres.h"
#include "catalog/pg_type.h"
#include "common/string.h"
#include "funcapi.h"
#include "lib/stringinfo.h"
#include "mb/pg_wchar.h"
#include "mbuf.h"
#include "pgp.h"
#include "px.h"
#include "utils/array.h"
#include "utils/builtins.h"
/*
* public functions
*/
PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(pgp_sym_encrypt_bytea);
PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(pgp_sym_encrypt_text);
PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(pgp_sym_decrypt_bytea);
PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(pgp_sym_decrypt_text);
PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(pgp_pub_encrypt_bytea);
PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(pgp_pub_encrypt_text);
PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(pgp_pub_decrypt_bytea);
PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(pgp_pub_decrypt_text);
PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(pgp_key_id_w);
PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(pg_armor);
PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(pg_dearmor);
PG_FUNCTION_INFO_V1(pgp_armor_headers);
/*
* returns src in case of no conversion or error
*/
static text *
convert_charset(text *src, int cset_from, int cset_to)
{
int src_len = VARSIZE_ANY_EXHDR(src);
unsigned char *dst;
unsigned char *csrc = (unsigned char *) VARDATA_ANY(src);
text *res;
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
dst = pg_do_encoding_conversion(csrc, src_len, cset_from, cset_to);
if (dst == csrc)
return src;
res = cstring_to_text((char *) dst);
pfree(dst);
return res;
}
static text *
convert_from_utf8(text *src)
{
return convert_charset(src, PG_UTF8, GetDatabaseEncoding());
}
static text *
convert_to_utf8(text *src)
{
return convert_charset(src, GetDatabaseEncoding(), PG_UTF8);
}
static void
clear_and_pfree(text *p)
{
px_memset(p, 0, VARSIZE_ANY(p));
pfree(p);
}
/*
* expect-* arguments storage
*/
struct debug_expect
{
int debug;
int expect;
int cipher_algo;
int s2k_mode;
int s2k_count;
int s2k_cipher_algo;
int s2k_digest_algo;
int compress_algo;
int use_sess_key;
int disable_mdc;
int unicode_mode;
};
static void
fill_expect(struct debug_expect *ex, int text_mode)
{
ex->debug = 0;
ex->expect = 0;
ex->cipher_algo = -1;
ex->s2k_mode = -1;
ex->s2k_count = -1;
ex->s2k_cipher_algo = -1;
ex->s2k_digest_algo = -1;
ex->compress_algo = -1;
ex->use_sess_key = -1;
ex->disable_mdc = -1;
ex->unicode_mode = -1;
}
#define EX_MSG(arg) \
ereport(NOTICE, (errmsg( \
"pgp_decrypt: unexpected %s: expected %d got %d", \
CppAsString(arg), ex->arg, ctx->arg)))
#define EX_CHECK(arg) do { \
if (ex->arg >= 0 && ex->arg != ctx->arg) EX_MSG(arg); \
} while (0)
static void
check_expect(PGP_Context *ctx, struct debug_expect *ex)
{
EX_CHECK(cipher_algo);
EX_CHECK(s2k_mode);
EX_CHECK(s2k_count);
EX_CHECK(s2k_digest_algo);
EX_CHECK(use_sess_key);
if (ctx->use_sess_key)
EX_CHECK(s2k_cipher_algo);
EX_CHECK(disable_mdc);
EX_CHECK(compress_algo);
EX_CHECK(unicode_mode);
}
static void
show_debug(const char *msg)
{
ereport(NOTICE, (errmsg("dbg: %s", msg)));
}
static int
set_arg(PGP_Context *ctx, char *key, char *val,
struct debug_expect *ex)
{
int res = 0;
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
if (strcmp(key, "cipher-algo") == 0)
res = pgp_set_cipher_algo(ctx, val);
else if (strcmp(key, "disable-mdc") == 0)
res = pgp_disable_mdc(ctx, atoi(val));
else if (strcmp(key, "sess-key") == 0)
res = pgp_set_sess_key(ctx, atoi(val));
else if (strcmp(key, "s2k-mode") == 0)
res = pgp_set_s2k_mode(ctx, atoi(val));
else if (strcmp(key, "s2k-count") == 0)
res = pgp_set_s2k_count(ctx, atoi(val));
else if (strcmp(key, "s2k-digest-algo") == 0)
res = pgp_set_s2k_digest_algo(ctx, val);
else if (strcmp(key, "s2k-cipher-algo") == 0)
res = pgp_set_s2k_cipher_algo(ctx, val);
else if (strcmp(key, "compress-algo") == 0)
res = pgp_set_compress_algo(ctx, atoi(val));
else if (strcmp(key, "compress-level") == 0)
res = pgp_set_compress_level(ctx, atoi(val));
else if (strcmp(key, "convert-crlf") == 0)
res = pgp_set_convert_crlf(ctx, atoi(val));
else if (strcmp(key, "unicode-mode") == 0)
res = pgp_set_unicode_mode(ctx, atoi(val));
2015-05-24 03:35:49 +02:00
/*
* The remaining options are for debugging/testing and are therefore not
* documented in the user-facing docs.
*/
else if (ex != NULL && strcmp(key, "debug") == 0)
ex->debug = atoi(val);
else if (ex != NULL && strcmp(key, "expect-cipher-algo") == 0)
{
ex->expect = 1;
ex->cipher_algo = pgp_get_cipher_code(val);
}
else if (ex != NULL && strcmp(key, "expect-disable-mdc") == 0)
{
ex->expect = 1;
ex->disable_mdc = atoi(val);
}
else if (ex != NULL && strcmp(key, "expect-sess-key") == 0)
{
ex->expect = 1;
ex->use_sess_key = atoi(val);
}
else if (ex != NULL && strcmp(key, "expect-s2k-mode") == 0)
{
ex->expect = 1;
ex->s2k_mode = atoi(val);
}
else if (ex != NULL && strcmp(key, "expect-s2k-count") == 0)
{
ex->expect = 1;
ex->s2k_count = atoi(val);
}
else if (ex != NULL && strcmp(key, "expect-s2k-digest-algo") == 0)
{
ex->expect = 1;
ex->s2k_digest_algo = pgp_get_digest_code(val);
}
else if (ex != NULL && strcmp(key, "expect-s2k-cipher-algo") == 0)
{
ex->expect = 1;
ex->s2k_cipher_algo = pgp_get_cipher_code(val);
}
else if (ex != NULL && strcmp(key, "expect-compress-algo") == 0)
{
ex->expect = 1;
ex->compress_algo = atoi(val);
}
else if (ex != NULL && strcmp(key, "expect-unicode-mode") == 0)
{
ex->expect = 1;
ex->unicode_mode = atoi(val);
}
else
res = PXE_ARGUMENT_ERROR;
return res;
}
/*
* Find next word. Handle ',' and '=' as words. Skip whitespace.
* Put word info into res_p, res_len.
* Returns ptr to next word.
*/
static char *
getword(char *p, char **res_p, int *res_len)
{
/* whitespace at start */
while (*p && (*p == ' ' || *p == '\t' || *p == '\n'))
p++;
/* word data */
*res_p = p;
if (*p == '=' || *p == ',')
p++;
else
while (*p && !(*p == ' ' || *p == '\t' || *p == '\n'
|| *p == '=' || *p == ','))
p++;
/* word end */
*res_len = p - *res_p;
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
/* whitespace at end */
while (*p && (*p == ' ' || *p == '\t' || *p == '\n'))
p++;
return p;
}
/*
* Convert to lowercase asciiz string.
*/
static char *
downcase_convert(const uint8 *s, int len)
{
int c,
i;
char *res = palloc(len + 1);
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
{
c = s[i];
if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z')
c += 'a' - 'A';
res[i] = c;
}
res[len] = 0;
return res;
}
static int
parse_args(PGP_Context *ctx, uint8 *args, int arg_len,
struct debug_expect *ex)
{
char *str = downcase_convert(args, arg_len);
char *key,
*val;
int key_len,
val_len;
int res = 0;
char *p = str;
while (*p)
{
res = PXE_ARGUMENT_ERROR;
p = getword(p, &key, &key_len);
if (*p++ != '=')
break;
p = getword(p, &val, &val_len);
if (*p == '\0')
;
else if (*p++ != ',')
break;
if (*key == 0 || *val == 0 || val_len == 0)
break;
key[key_len] = 0;
val[val_len] = 0;
res = set_arg(ctx, key, val, ex);
if (res < 0)
break;
}
pfree(str);
return res;
}
static MBuf *
create_mbuf_from_vardata(text *data)
{
return mbuf_create_from_data((uint8 *) VARDATA_ANY(data),
VARSIZE_ANY_EXHDR(data));
}
static void
init_work(PGP_Context **ctx_p, int is_text,
text *args, struct debug_expect *ex)
{
int err = pgp_init(ctx_p);
fill_expect(ex, is_text);
if (err == 0 && args != NULL)
err = parse_args(*ctx_p, (uint8 *) VARDATA_ANY(args),
VARSIZE_ANY_EXHDR(args), ex);
if (err)
Replace PostmasterRandom() with a stronger source, second attempt. This adds a new routine, pg_strong_random() for generating random bytes, for use in both frontend and backend. At the moment, it's only used in the backend, but the upcoming SCRAM authentication patches need strong random numbers in libpq as well. pg_strong_random() is based on, and replaces, the existing implementation in pgcrypto. It can acquire strong random numbers from a number of sources, depending on what's available: - OpenSSL RAND_bytes(), if built with OpenSSL - On Windows, the native cryptographic functions are used - /dev/urandom Unlike the current pgcrypto function, the source is chosen by configure. That makes it easier to test different implementations, and ensures that we don't accidentally fall back to a less secure implementation, if the primary source fails. All of those methods are quite reliable, it would be pretty surprising for them to fail, so we'd rather find out by failing hard. If no strong random source is available, we fall back to using erand48(), seeded from current timestamp, like PostmasterRandom() was. That isn't cryptographically secure, but allows us to still work on platforms that don't have any of the above stronger sources. Because it's not very secure, the built-in implementation is only used if explicitly requested with --disable-strong-random. This replaces the more complicated Fortuna algorithm we used to have in pgcrypto, which is unfortunate, but all modern platforms have /dev/urandom, so it doesn't seem worth the maintenance effort to keep that. pgcrypto functions that require strong random numbers will be disabled with --disable-strong-random. Original patch by Magnus Hagander, tons of further work by Michael Paquier and me. Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqRy3krN8quR9XujMVVHYtXJ0_60nqgVc6oUk8ygyVkZsA@mail.gmail.com Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqRWkNYRRPJA7-cF+LfroYV10pvjdz6GNvxk-Eee9FypKA@mail.gmail.com
2016-12-05 12:42:59 +01:00
px_THROW_ERROR(err);
if (ex->debug)
px_set_debug_handler(show_debug);
pgp_set_text_mode(*ctx_p, is_text);
}
static bytea *
encrypt_internal(int is_pubenc, int is_text,
text *data, text *key, text *args)
{
MBuf *src,
*dst;
uint8 tmp[VARHDRSZ];
uint8 *restmp;
bytea *res;
int res_len;
PGP_Context *ctx;
int err;
struct debug_expect ex;
text *tmp_data = NULL;
init_work(&ctx, is_text, args, &ex);
if (is_text && pgp_get_unicode_mode(ctx))
{
tmp_data = convert_to_utf8(data);
if (tmp_data == data)
tmp_data = NULL;
else
data = tmp_data;
}
src = create_mbuf_from_vardata(data);
dst = mbuf_create(VARSIZE_ANY(data) + 128);
/*
* reserve room for header
*/
mbuf_append(dst, tmp, VARHDRSZ);
/*
* set key
*/
if (is_pubenc)
{
MBuf *kbuf = create_mbuf_from_vardata(key);
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
err = pgp_set_pubkey(ctx, kbuf,
NULL, 0, 0);
mbuf_free(kbuf);
}
else
err = pgp_set_symkey(ctx, (uint8 *) VARDATA_ANY(key),
VARSIZE_ANY_EXHDR(key));
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
/*
* encrypt
*/
if (err >= 0)
err = pgp_encrypt(ctx, src, dst);
/*
* check for error
*/
if (err)
{
if (ex.debug)
px_set_debug_handler(NULL);
if (tmp_data)
clear_and_pfree(tmp_data);
pgp_free(ctx);
mbuf_free(src);
mbuf_free(dst);
Replace PostmasterRandom() with a stronger source, second attempt. This adds a new routine, pg_strong_random() for generating random bytes, for use in both frontend and backend. At the moment, it's only used in the backend, but the upcoming SCRAM authentication patches need strong random numbers in libpq as well. pg_strong_random() is based on, and replaces, the existing implementation in pgcrypto. It can acquire strong random numbers from a number of sources, depending on what's available: - OpenSSL RAND_bytes(), if built with OpenSSL - On Windows, the native cryptographic functions are used - /dev/urandom Unlike the current pgcrypto function, the source is chosen by configure. That makes it easier to test different implementations, and ensures that we don't accidentally fall back to a less secure implementation, if the primary source fails. All of those methods are quite reliable, it would be pretty surprising for them to fail, so we'd rather find out by failing hard. If no strong random source is available, we fall back to using erand48(), seeded from current timestamp, like PostmasterRandom() was. That isn't cryptographically secure, but allows us to still work on platforms that don't have any of the above stronger sources. Because it's not very secure, the built-in implementation is only used if explicitly requested with --disable-strong-random. This replaces the more complicated Fortuna algorithm we used to have in pgcrypto, which is unfortunate, but all modern platforms have /dev/urandom, so it doesn't seem worth the maintenance effort to keep that. pgcrypto functions that require strong random numbers will be disabled with --disable-strong-random. Original patch by Magnus Hagander, tons of further work by Michael Paquier and me. Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqRy3krN8quR9XujMVVHYtXJ0_60nqgVc6oUk8ygyVkZsA@mail.gmail.com Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqRWkNYRRPJA7-cF+LfroYV10pvjdz6GNvxk-Eee9FypKA@mail.gmail.com
2016-12-05 12:42:59 +01:00
px_THROW_ERROR(err);
}
/* res_len includes VARHDRSZ */
res_len = mbuf_steal_data(dst, &restmp);
res = (bytea *) restmp;
SET_VARSIZE(res, res_len);
if (tmp_data)
clear_and_pfree(tmp_data);
pgp_free(ctx);
mbuf_free(src);
mbuf_free(dst);
px_set_debug_handler(NULL);
return res;
}
static bytea *
decrypt_internal(int is_pubenc, int need_text, text *data,
text *key, text *keypsw, text *args)
{
int err;
MBuf *src = NULL,
*dst = NULL;
uint8 tmp[VARHDRSZ];
uint8 *restmp;
bytea *res;
int res_len;
PGP_Context *ctx = NULL;
struct debug_expect ex;
int got_unicode = 0;
init_work(&ctx, need_text, args, &ex);
src = mbuf_create_from_data((uint8 *) VARDATA_ANY(data),
VARSIZE_ANY_EXHDR(data));
dst = mbuf_create(VARSIZE_ANY(data) + 2048);
/*
* reserve room for header
*/
mbuf_append(dst, tmp, VARHDRSZ);
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
/*
* set key
*/
if (is_pubenc)
{
uint8 *psw = NULL;
int psw_len = 0;
MBuf *kbuf;
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
if (keypsw)
{
psw = (uint8 *) VARDATA_ANY(keypsw);
psw_len = VARSIZE_ANY_EXHDR(keypsw);
}
kbuf = create_mbuf_from_vardata(key);
err = pgp_set_pubkey(ctx, kbuf, psw, psw_len, 1);
mbuf_free(kbuf);
}
else
err = pgp_set_symkey(ctx, (uint8 *) VARDATA_ANY(key),
VARSIZE_ANY_EXHDR(key));
/* decrypt */
if (err >= 0)
{
err = pgp_decrypt(ctx, src, dst);
if (ex.expect)
check_expect(ctx, &ex);
/* remember the setting */
got_unicode = pgp_get_unicode_mode(ctx);
}
mbuf_free(src);
pgp_free(ctx);
if (err)
{
px_set_debug_handler(NULL);
mbuf_free(dst);
Replace PostmasterRandom() with a stronger source, second attempt. This adds a new routine, pg_strong_random() for generating random bytes, for use in both frontend and backend. At the moment, it's only used in the backend, but the upcoming SCRAM authentication patches need strong random numbers in libpq as well. pg_strong_random() is based on, and replaces, the existing implementation in pgcrypto. It can acquire strong random numbers from a number of sources, depending on what's available: - OpenSSL RAND_bytes(), if built with OpenSSL - On Windows, the native cryptographic functions are used - /dev/urandom Unlike the current pgcrypto function, the source is chosen by configure. That makes it easier to test different implementations, and ensures that we don't accidentally fall back to a less secure implementation, if the primary source fails. All of those methods are quite reliable, it would be pretty surprising for them to fail, so we'd rather find out by failing hard. If no strong random source is available, we fall back to using erand48(), seeded from current timestamp, like PostmasterRandom() was. That isn't cryptographically secure, but allows us to still work on platforms that don't have any of the above stronger sources. Because it's not very secure, the built-in implementation is only used if explicitly requested with --disable-strong-random. This replaces the more complicated Fortuna algorithm we used to have in pgcrypto, which is unfortunate, but all modern platforms have /dev/urandom, so it doesn't seem worth the maintenance effort to keep that. pgcrypto functions that require strong random numbers will be disabled with --disable-strong-random. Original patch by Magnus Hagander, tons of further work by Michael Paquier and me. Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqRy3krN8quR9XujMVVHYtXJ0_60nqgVc6oUk8ygyVkZsA@mail.gmail.com Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqRWkNYRRPJA7-cF+LfroYV10pvjdz6GNvxk-Eee9FypKA@mail.gmail.com
2016-12-05 12:42:59 +01:00
px_THROW_ERROR(err);
}
res_len = mbuf_steal_data(dst, &restmp);
mbuf_free(dst);
/* res_len includes VARHDRSZ */
res = (bytea *) restmp;
SET_VARSIZE(res, res_len);
if (need_text && got_unicode)
{
text *utf = convert_from_utf8(res);
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
if (utf != res)
{
clear_and_pfree(res);
res = utf;
}
}
px_set_debug_handler(NULL);
return res;
}
/*
* Wrappers for symmetric-key functions
*/
Datum
pgp_sym_encrypt_bytea(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
bytea *data;
text *arg = NULL;
text *res,
*key;
data = PG_GETARG_BYTEA_PP(0);
key = PG_GETARG_TEXT_PP(1);
if (PG_NARGS() > 2)
arg = PG_GETARG_TEXT_PP(2);
res = encrypt_internal(0, 0, data, key, arg);
PG_FREE_IF_COPY(data, 0);
PG_FREE_IF_COPY(key, 1);
if (PG_NARGS() > 2)
PG_FREE_IF_COPY(arg, 2);
PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(res);
}
Datum
pgp_sym_encrypt_text(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
text *data,
*key;
text *arg = NULL;
text *res;
data = PG_GETARG_TEXT_PP(0);
key = PG_GETARG_TEXT_PP(1);
if (PG_NARGS() > 2)
arg = PG_GETARG_TEXT_PP(2);
res = encrypt_internal(0, 1, data, key, arg);
PG_FREE_IF_COPY(data, 0);
PG_FREE_IF_COPY(key, 1);
if (PG_NARGS() > 2)
PG_FREE_IF_COPY(arg, 2);
PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(res);
}
Datum
pgp_sym_decrypt_bytea(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
bytea *data;
text *arg = NULL;
text *res,
*key;
data = PG_GETARG_BYTEA_PP(0);
key = PG_GETARG_TEXT_PP(1);
if (PG_NARGS() > 2)
arg = PG_GETARG_TEXT_PP(2);
res = decrypt_internal(0, 0, data, key, NULL, arg);
PG_FREE_IF_COPY(data, 0);
PG_FREE_IF_COPY(key, 1);
if (PG_NARGS() > 2)
PG_FREE_IF_COPY(arg, 2);
PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(res);
}
Datum
pgp_sym_decrypt_text(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
bytea *data;
text *arg = NULL;
text *res,
*key;
data = PG_GETARG_BYTEA_PP(0);
key = PG_GETARG_TEXT_PP(1);
if (PG_NARGS() > 2)
arg = PG_GETARG_TEXT_PP(2);
res = decrypt_internal(0, 1, data, key, NULL, arg);
PG_FREE_IF_COPY(data, 0);
PG_FREE_IF_COPY(key, 1);
if (PG_NARGS() > 2)
PG_FREE_IF_COPY(arg, 2);
PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(res);
}
/*
* Wrappers for public-key functions
*/
Datum
pgp_pub_encrypt_bytea(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
bytea *data,
*key;
text *arg = NULL;
text *res;
data = PG_GETARG_BYTEA_PP(0);
key = PG_GETARG_BYTEA_PP(1);
if (PG_NARGS() > 2)
arg = PG_GETARG_TEXT_PP(2);
res = encrypt_internal(1, 0, data, key, arg);
PG_FREE_IF_COPY(data, 0);
PG_FREE_IF_COPY(key, 1);
if (PG_NARGS() > 2)
PG_FREE_IF_COPY(arg, 2);
PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(res);
}
Datum
pgp_pub_encrypt_text(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
bytea *key;
text *arg = NULL;
text *res,
*data;
data = PG_GETARG_TEXT_PP(0);
key = PG_GETARG_BYTEA_PP(1);
if (PG_NARGS() > 2)
arg = PG_GETARG_TEXT_PP(2);
res = encrypt_internal(1, 1, data, key, arg);
PG_FREE_IF_COPY(data, 0);
PG_FREE_IF_COPY(key, 1);
if (PG_NARGS() > 2)
PG_FREE_IF_COPY(arg, 2);
PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(res);
}
Datum
pgp_pub_decrypt_bytea(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
bytea *data,
*key;
text *psw = NULL,
*arg = NULL;
text *res;
data = PG_GETARG_BYTEA_PP(0);
key = PG_GETARG_BYTEA_PP(1);
if (PG_NARGS() > 2)
psw = PG_GETARG_TEXT_PP(2);
if (PG_NARGS() > 3)
arg = PG_GETARG_TEXT_PP(3);
res = decrypt_internal(1, 0, data, key, psw, arg);
PG_FREE_IF_COPY(data, 0);
PG_FREE_IF_COPY(key, 1);
if (PG_NARGS() > 2)
PG_FREE_IF_COPY(psw, 2);
if (PG_NARGS() > 3)
PG_FREE_IF_COPY(arg, 3);
PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(res);
}
Datum
pgp_pub_decrypt_text(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
bytea *data,
*key;
text *psw = NULL,
*arg = NULL;
text *res;
data = PG_GETARG_BYTEA_PP(0);
key = PG_GETARG_BYTEA_PP(1);
if (PG_NARGS() > 2)
psw = PG_GETARG_TEXT_PP(2);
if (PG_NARGS() > 3)
arg = PG_GETARG_TEXT_PP(3);
res = decrypt_internal(1, 1, data, key, psw, arg);
PG_FREE_IF_COPY(data, 0);
PG_FREE_IF_COPY(key, 1);
if (PG_NARGS() > 2)
PG_FREE_IF_COPY(psw, 2);
if (PG_NARGS() > 3)
PG_FREE_IF_COPY(arg, 3);
PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(res);
}
/*
* Wrappers for PGP ascii armor
*/
/*
* Helper function for pg_armor. Converts arrays of keys and values into
* plain C arrays, and checks that they don't contain invalid characters.
*/
static int
parse_key_value_arrays(ArrayType *key_array, ArrayType *val_array,
char ***p_keys, char ***p_values)
{
int nkdims = ARR_NDIM(key_array);
int nvdims = ARR_NDIM(val_array);
char **keys,
**values;
Datum *key_datums,
*val_datums;
bool *key_nulls,
*val_nulls;
int key_count,
val_count;
int i;
if (nkdims > 1 || nkdims != nvdims)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_ARRAY_SUBSCRIPT_ERROR),
errmsg("wrong number of array subscripts")));
if (nkdims == 0)
return 0;
deconstruct_array_builtin(key_array, TEXTOID, &key_datums, &key_nulls, &key_count);
deconstruct_array_builtin(val_array, TEXTOID, &val_datums, &val_nulls, &val_count);
if (key_count != val_count)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_ARRAY_SUBSCRIPT_ERROR),
errmsg("mismatched array dimensions")));
keys = (char **) palloc(sizeof(char *) * key_count);
values = (char **) palloc(sizeof(char *) * val_count);
for (i = 0; i < key_count; i++)
{
char *v;
/* Check that the key doesn't contain anything funny */
if (key_nulls[i])
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_NULL_VALUE_NOT_ALLOWED),
errmsg("null value not allowed for header key")));
v = TextDatumGetCString(key_datums[i]);
if (!pg_is_ascii(v))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
errmsg("header key must not contain non-ASCII characters")));
if (strstr(v, ": "))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
errmsg("header key must not contain \": \"")));
if (strchr(v, '\n'))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
errmsg("header key must not contain newlines")));
keys[i] = v;
/* And the same for the value */
if (val_nulls[i])
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_NULL_VALUE_NOT_ALLOWED),
errmsg("null value not allowed for header value")));
v = TextDatumGetCString(val_datums[i]);
if (!pg_is_ascii(v))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
errmsg("header value must not contain non-ASCII characters")));
if (strchr(v, '\n'))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
errmsg("header value must not contain newlines")));
values[i] = v;
}
*p_keys = keys;
*p_values = values;
return key_count;
}
Datum
pg_armor(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
bytea *data;
text *res;
int data_len;
StringInfoData buf;
int num_headers;
char **keys = NULL,
**values = NULL;
data = PG_GETARG_BYTEA_PP(0);
data_len = VARSIZE_ANY_EXHDR(data);
if (PG_NARGS() == 3)
{
num_headers = parse_key_value_arrays(PG_GETARG_ARRAYTYPE_P(1),
PG_GETARG_ARRAYTYPE_P(2),
&keys, &values);
}
else if (PG_NARGS() == 1)
num_headers = 0;
else
elog(ERROR, "unexpected number of arguments %d", PG_NARGS());
initStringInfo(&buf);
pgp_armor_encode((uint8 *) VARDATA_ANY(data), data_len, &buf,
num_headers, keys, values);
res = palloc(VARHDRSZ + buf.len);
SET_VARSIZE(res, VARHDRSZ + buf.len);
memcpy(VARDATA(res), buf.data, buf.len);
pfree(buf.data);
PG_FREE_IF_COPY(data, 0);
PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(res);
}
Datum
pg_dearmor(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
text *data;
bytea *res;
int data_len;
int ret;
StringInfoData buf;
data = PG_GETARG_TEXT_PP(0);
data_len = VARSIZE_ANY_EXHDR(data);
initStringInfo(&buf);
ret = pgp_armor_decode((uint8 *) VARDATA_ANY(data), data_len, &buf);
if (ret < 0)
Replace PostmasterRandom() with a stronger source, second attempt. This adds a new routine, pg_strong_random() for generating random bytes, for use in both frontend and backend. At the moment, it's only used in the backend, but the upcoming SCRAM authentication patches need strong random numbers in libpq as well. pg_strong_random() is based on, and replaces, the existing implementation in pgcrypto. It can acquire strong random numbers from a number of sources, depending on what's available: - OpenSSL RAND_bytes(), if built with OpenSSL - On Windows, the native cryptographic functions are used - /dev/urandom Unlike the current pgcrypto function, the source is chosen by configure. That makes it easier to test different implementations, and ensures that we don't accidentally fall back to a less secure implementation, if the primary source fails. All of those methods are quite reliable, it would be pretty surprising for them to fail, so we'd rather find out by failing hard. If no strong random source is available, we fall back to using erand48(), seeded from current timestamp, like PostmasterRandom() was. That isn't cryptographically secure, but allows us to still work on platforms that don't have any of the above stronger sources. Because it's not very secure, the built-in implementation is only used if explicitly requested with --disable-strong-random. This replaces the more complicated Fortuna algorithm we used to have in pgcrypto, which is unfortunate, but all modern platforms have /dev/urandom, so it doesn't seem worth the maintenance effort to keep that. pgcrypto functions that require strong random numbers will be disabled with --disable-strong-random. Original patch by Magnus Hagander, tons of further work by Michael Paquier and me. Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqRy3krN8quR9XujMVVHYtXJ0_60nqgVc6oUk8ygyVkZsA@mail.gmail.com Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqRWkNYRRPJA7-cF+LfroYV10pvjdz6GNvxk-Eee9FypKA@mail.gmail.com
2016-12-05 12:42:59 +01:00
px_THROW_ERROR(ret);
res = palloc(VARHDRSZ + buf.len);
SET_VARSIZE(res, VARHDRSZ + buf.len);
memcpy(VARDATA(res), buf.data, buf.len);
pfree(buf.data);
PG_FREE_IF_COPY(data, 0);
PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(res);
}
/* cross-call state for pgp_armor_headers */
typedef struct
{
int nheaders;
char **keys;
char **values;
} pgp_armor_headers_state;
Datum
pgp_armor_headers(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
FuncCallContext *funcctx;
pgp_armor_headers_state *state;
char *utf8key;
char *utf8val;
HeapTuple tuple;
TupleDesc tupdesc;
AttInMetadata *attinmeta;
if (SRF_IS_FIRSTCALL())
{
text *data = PG_GETARG_TEXT_PP(0);
int res;
MemoryContext oldcontext;
funcctx = SRF_FIRSTCALL_INIT();
/* we need the state allocated in the multi call context */
oldcontext = MemoryContextSwitchTo(funcctx->multi_call_memory_ctx);
/* Build a tuple descriptor for our result type */
if (get_call_result_type(fcinfo, NULL, &tupdesc) != TYPEFUNC_COMPOSITE)
elog(ERROR, "return type must be a row type");
attinmeta = TupleDescGetAttInMetadata(tupdesc);
funcctx->attinmeta = attinmeta;
state = (pgp_armor_headers_state *) palloc(sizeof(pgp_armor_headers_state));
res = pgp_extract_armor_headers((uint8 *) VARDATA_ANY(data),
VARSIZE_ANY_EXHDR(data),
&state->nheaders, &state->keys,
&state->values);
if (res < 0)
Replace PostmasterRandom() with a stronger source, second attempt. This adds a new routine, pg_strong_random() for generating random bytes, for use in both frontend and backend. At the moment, it's only used in the backend, but the upcoming SCRAM authentication patches need strong random numbers in libpq as well. pg_strong_random() is based on, and replaces, the existing implementation in pgcrypto. It can acquire strong random numbers from a number of sources, depending on what's available: - OpenSSL RAND_bytes(), if built with OpenSSL - On Windows, the native cryptographic functions are used - /dev/urandom Unlike the current pgcrypto function, the source is chosen by configure. That makes it easier to test different implementations, and ensures that we don't accidentally fall back to a less secure implementation, if the primary source fails. All of those methods are quite reliable, it would be pretty surprising for them to fail, so we'd rather find out by failing hard. If no strong random source is available, we fall back to using erand48(), seeded from current timestamp, like PostmasterRandom() was. That isn't cryptographically secure, but allows us to still work on platforms that don't have any of the above stronger sources. Because it's not very secure, the built-in implementation is only used if explicitly requested with --disable-strong-random. This replaces the more complicated Fortuna algorithm we used to have in pgcrypto, which is unfortunate, but all modern platforms have /dev/urandom, so it doesn't seem worth the maintenance effort to keep that. pgcrypto functions that require strong random numbers will be disabled with --disable-strong-random. Original patch by Magnus Hagander, tons of further work by Michael Paquier and me. Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqRy3krN8quR9XujMVVHYtXJ0_60nqgVc6oUk8ygyVkZsA@mail.gmail.com Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqRWkNYRRPJA7-cF+LfroYV10pvjdz6GNvxk-Eee9FypKA@mail.gmail.com
2016-12-05 12:42:59 +01:00
px_THROW_ERROR(res);
MemoryContextSwitchTo(oldcontext);
funcctx->user_fctx = state;
}
funcctx = SRF_PERCALL_SETUP();
state = (pgp_armor_headers_state *) funcctx->user_fctx;
if (funcctx->call_cntr >= state->nheaders)
SRF_RETURN_DONE(funcctx);
else
{
char *values[2];
/* we assume that the keys (and values) are in UTF-8. */
utf8key = state->keys[funcctx->call_cntr];
utf8val = state->values[funcctx->call_cntr];
values[0] = pg_any_to_server(utf8key, strlen(utf8key), PG_UTF8);
values[1] = pg_any_to_server(utf8val, strlen(utf8val), PG_UTF8);
/* build a tuple */
tuple = BuildTupleFromCStrings(funcctx->attinmeta, values);
SRF_RETURN_NEXT(funcctx, HeapTupleGetDatum(tuple));
}
}
/*
* Wrappers for PGP key id
*/
Datum
pgp_key_id_w(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
bytea *data;
text *res;
int res_len;
MBuf *buf;
data = PG_GETARG_BYTEA_PP(0);
buf = create_mbuf_from_vardata(data);
res = palloc(VARHDRSZ + 17);
res_len = pgp_get_keyid(buf, VARDATA(res));
mbuf_free(buf);
if (res_len < 0)
Replace PostmasterRandom() with a stronger source, second attempt. This adds a new routine, pg_strong_random() for generating random bytes, for use in both frontend and backend. At the moment, it's only used in the backend, but the upcoming SCRAM authentication patches need strong random numbers in libpq as well. pg_strong_random() is based on, and replaces, the existing implementation in pgcrypto. It can acquire strong random numbers from a number of sources, depending on what's available: - OpenSSL RAND_bytes(), if built with OpenSSL - On Windows, the native cryptographic functions are used - /dev/urandom Unlike the current pgcrypto function, the source is chosen by configure. That makes it easier to test different implementations, and ensures that we don't accidentally fall back to a less secure implementation, if the primary source fails. All of those methods are quite reliable, it would be pretty surprising for them to fail, so we'd rather find out by failing hard. If no strong random source is available, we fall back to using erand48(), seeded from current timestamp, like PostmasterRandom() was. That isn't cryptographically secure, but allows us to still work on platforms that don't have any of the above stronger sources. Because it's not very secure, the built-in implementation is only used if explicitly requested with --disable-strong-random. This replaces the more complicated Fortuna algorithm we used to have in pgcrypto, which is unfortunate, but all modern platforms have /dev/urandom, so it doesn't seem worth the maintenance effort to keep that. pgcrypto functions that require strong random numbers will be disabled with --disable-strong-random. Original patch by Magnus Hagander, tons of further work by Michael Paquier and me. Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqRy3krN8quR9XujMVVHYtXJ0_60nqgVc6oUk8ygyVkZsA@mail.gmail.com Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqRWkNYRRPJA7-cF+LfroYV10pvjdz6GNvxk-Eee9FypKA@mail.gmail.com
2016-12-05 12:42:59 +01:00
px_THROW_ERROR(res_len);
SET_VARSIZE(res, VARHDRSZ + res_len);
PG_FREE_IF_COPY(data, 0);
PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(res);
}