postgresql/contrib/pgcrypto/pgp-encrypt.c

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/*
* pgp-encrypt.c
* OpenPGP encrypt.
*
* Copyright (c) 2005 Marko Kreen
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
2010-09-20 22:08:53 +02:00
* contrib/pgcrypto/pgp-encrypt.c
*/
#include "postgres.h"
#include <time.h>
#include "mbuf.h"
#include "pgp.h"
#include "px.h"
#define MDC_DIGEST_LEN 20
#define STREAM_ID 0xE0
#define STREAM_BLOCK_SHIFT 14
static uint8 *
render_newlen(uint8 *h, int len)
{
if (len <= 191)
{
*h++ = len & 255;
}
else if (len > 191 && len <= 8383)
{
*h++ = ((len - 192) >> 8) + 192;
*h++ = (len - 192) & 255;
}
else
{
*h++ = 255;
*h++ = (len >> 24) & 255;
*h++ = (len >> 16) & 255;
*h++ = (len >> 8) & 255;
*h++ = len & 255;
}
return h;
}
static int
write_tag_only(PushFilter *dst, int tag)
{
uint8 hdr = 0xC0 | tag;
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return pushf_write(dst, &hdr, 1);
}
static int
write_normal_header(PushFilter *dst, int tag, int len)
{
uint8 hdr[8];
uint8 *h = hdr;
*h++ = 0xC0 | tag;
h = render_newlen(h, len);
return pushf_write(dst, hdr, h - hdr);
}
/*
* MAC writer
*/
static int
mdc_init(PushFilter *dst, void *init_arg, void **priv_p)
{
int res;
PX_MD *md;
res = pgp_load_digest(PGP_DIGEST_SHA1, &md);
if (res < 0)
return res;
*priv_p = md;
return 0;
}
static int
mdc_write(PushFilter *dst, void *priv, const uint8 *data, int len)
{
PX_MD *md = priv;
px_md_update(md, data, len);
return pushf_write(dst, data, len);
}
static int
mdc_flush(PushFilter *dst, void *priv)
{
int res;
uint8 pkt[2 + MDC_DIGEST_LEN];
PX_MD *md = priv;
/*
* create mdc pkt
*/
pkt[0] = 0xD3;
pkt[1] = 0x14; /* MDC_DIGEST_LEN */
px_md_update(md, pkt, 2);
px_md_finish(md, pkt + 2);
res = pushf_write(dst, pkt, 2 + MDC_DIGEST_LEN);
px_memset(pkt, 0, 2 + MDC_DIGEST_LEN);
return res;
}
static void
mdc_free(void *priv)
{
PX_MD *md = priv;
px_md_free(md);
}
static const PushFilterOps mdc_filter = {
mdc_init, mdc_write, mdc_flush, mdc_free
};
/*
* Encrypted pkt writer
*/
#define ENCBUF 8192
struct EncStat
{
PGP_CFB *ciph;
uint8 buf[ENCBUF];
};
static int
encrypt_init(PushFilter *next, void *init_arg, void **priv_p)
{
struct EncStat *st;
PGP_Context *ctx = init_arg;
PGP_CFB *ciph;
int resync = 1;
int res;
/* should we use newer packet format? */
if (ctx->disable_mdc == 0)
{
uint8 ver = 1;
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resync = 0;
res = pushf_write(next, &ver, 1);
if (res < 0)
return res;
}
res = pgp_cfb_create(&ciph, ctx->cipher_algo,
ctx->sess_key, ctx->sess_key_len, resync, NULL);
if (res < 0)
return res;
st = palloc0(sizeof(*st));
st->ciph = ciph;
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*priv_p = st;
return ENCBUF;
}
static int
encrypt_process(PushFilter *next, void *priv, const uint8 *data, int len)
{
int res;
struct EncStat *st = priv;
int avail = len;
while (avail > 0)
{
int tmplen = avail > ENCBUF ? ENCBUF : avail;
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res = pgp_cfb_encrypt(st->ciph, data, tmplen, st->buf);
if (res < 0)
return res;
res = pushf_write(next, st->buf, tmplen);
if (res < 0)
return res;
data += tmplen;
avail -= tmplen;
}
return 0;
}
static void
encrypt_free(void *priv)
{
struct EncStat *st = priv;
if (st->ciph)
pgp_cfb_free(st->ciph);
px_memset(st, 0, sizeof(*st));
pfree(st);
}
static const PushFilterOps encrypt_filter = {
encrypt_init, encrypt_process, NULL, encrypt_free
};
/*
* Write Streamable pkts
*/
struct PktStreamStat
{
int final_done;
int pkt_block;
};
static int
pkt_stream_init(PushFilter *next, void *init_arg, void **priv_p)
{
struct PktStreamStat *st;
st = palloc(sizeof(*st));
st->final_done = 0;
st->pkt_block = 1 << STREAM_BLOCK_SHIFT;
*priv_p = st;
return st->pkt_block;
}
static int
pkt_stream_process(PushFilter *next, void *priv, const uint8 *data, int len)
{
int res;
uint8 hdr[8];
uint8 *h = hdr;
struct PktStreamStat *st = priv;
if (st->final_done)
return PXE_BUG;
if (len == st->pkt_block)
*h++ = STREAM_ID | STREAM_BLOCK_SHIFT;
else
{
h = render_newlen(h, len);
st->final_done = 1;
}
res = pushf_write(next, hdr, h - hdr);
if (res < 0)
return res;
return pushf_write(next, data, len);
}
static int
pkt_stream_flush(PushFilter *next, void *priv)
{
int res;
uint8 hdr[8];
uint8 *h = hdr;
struct PktStreamStat *st = priv;
/* stream MUST end with normal packet. */
if (!st->final_done)
{
h = render_newlen(h, 0);
res = pushf_write(next, hdr, h - hdr);
if (res < 0)
return res;
st->final_done = 1;
}
return 0;
}
static void
pkt_stream_free(void *priv)
{
struct PktStreamStat *st = priv;
px_memset(st, 0, sizeof(*st));
pfree(st);
}
static const PushFilterOps pkt_stream_filter = {
pkt_stream_init, pkt_stream_process, pkt_stream_flush, pkt_stream_free
};
int
pgp_create_pkt_writer(PushFilter *dst, int tag, PushFilter **res_p)
{
int res;
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res = write_tag_only(dst, tag);
if (res < 0)
return res;
return pushf_create(res_p, &pkt_stream_filter, NULL, dst);
}
/*
* Text conversion filter
*/
static int
crlf_process(PushFilter *dst, void *priv, const uint8 *data, int len)
{
const uint8 *data_end = data + len;
const uint8 *p2,
*p1 = data;
int line_len;
static const uint8 crlf[] = {'\r', '\n'};
int res = 0;
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while (p1 < data_end)
{
p2 = memchr(p1, '\n', data_end - p1);
if (p2 == NULL)
p2 = data_end;
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line_len = p2 - p1;
/* write data */
res = 0;
if (line_len > 0)
{
res = pushf_write(dst, p1, line_len);
if (res < 0)
break;
p1 += line_len;
}
/* write crlf */
while (p1 < data_end && *p1 == '\n')
{
res = pushf_write(dst, crlf, 2);
if (res < 0)
break;
p1++;
}
}
return res;
}
static const PushFilterOps crlf_filter = {
NULL, crlf_process, NULL, NULL
};
/*
* Initialize literal data packet
*/
static int
init_litdata_packet(PushFilter **pf_res, PGP_Context *ctx, PushFilter *dst)
{
int res;
int hdrlen;
uint8 hdr[6];
uint32 t;
PushFilter *pkt;
int type;
/*
* Create header
*/
if (ctx->text_mode)
type = ctx->unicode_mode ? 'u' : 't';
else
type = 'b';
/*
* Store the creation time into packet. The goal is to have as few known
* bytes as possible.
*/
t = (uint32) time(NULL);
hdr[0] = type;
hdr[1] = 0;
hdr[2] = (t >> 24) & 255;
hdr[3] = (t >> 16) & 255;
hdr[4] = (t >> 8) & 255;
hdr[5] = t & 255;
hdrlen = 6;
res = write_tag_only(dst, PGP_PKT_LITERAL_DATA);
if (res < 0)
return res;
res = pushf_create(&pkt, &pkt_stream_filter, ctx, dst);
if (res < 0)
return res;
res = pushf_write(pkt, hdr, hdrlen);
if (res < 0)
{
pushf_free(pkt);
return res;
}
*pf_res = pkt;
return 0;
}
/*
* Initialize compression filter
*/
static int
init_compress(PushFilter **pf_res, PGP_Context *ctx, PushFilter *dst)
{
int res;
uint8 type = ctx->compress_algo;
PushFilter *pkt;
res = write_tag_only(dst, PGP_PKT_COMPRESSED_DATA);
if (res < 0)
return res;
res = pushf_create(&pkt, &pkt_stream_filter, ctx, dst);
if (res < 0)
return res;
res = pushf_write(pkt, &type, 1);
if (res >= 0)
res = pgp_compress_filter(pf_res, ctx, pkt);
if (res < 0)
pushf_free(pkt);
return res;
}
/*
* Initialize encdata packet
*/
static int
init_encdata_packet(PushFilter **pf_res, PGP_Context *ctx, PushFilter *dst)
{
int res;
int tag;
if (ctx->disable_mdc)
tag = PGP_PKT_SYMENCRYPTED_DATA;
else
tag = PGP_PKT_SYMENCRYPTED_DATA_MDC;
res = write_tag_only(dst, tag);
if (res < 0)
return res;
return pushf_create(pf_res, &pkt_stream_filter, ctx, dst);
}
/*
* write prefix
*/
static int
write_prefix(PGP_Context *ctx, PushFilter *dst)
{
uint8 prefix[PGP_MAX_BLOCK + 2];
int res,
bs;
bs = pgp_get_cipher_block_size(ctx->cipher_algo);
if (!pg_strong_random(prefix, bs))
Replace PostmasterRandom() with a stronger source, second attempt. This adds a new routine, pg_strong_random() for generating random bytes, for use in both frontend and backend. At the moment, it's only used in the backend, but the upcoming SCRAM authentication patches need strong random numbers in libpq as well. pg_strong_random() is based on, and replaces, the existing implementation in pgcrypto. It can acquire strong random numbers from a number of sources, depending on what's available: - OpenSSL RAND_bytes(), if built with OpenSSL - On Windows, the native cryptographic functions are used - /dev/urandom Unlike the current pgcrypto function, the source is chosen by configure. That makes it easier to test different implementations, and ensures that we don't accidentally fall back to a less secure implementation, if the primary source fails. All of those methods are quite reliable, it would be pretty surprising for them to fail, so we'd rather find out by failing hard. If no strong random source is available, we fall back to using erand48(), seeded from current timestamp, like PostmasterRandom() was. That isn't cryptographically secure, but allows us to still work on platforms that don't have any of the above stronger sources. Because it's not very secure, the built-in implementation is only used if explicitly requested with --disable-strong-random. This replaces the more complicated Fortuna algorithm we used to have in pgcrypto, which is unfortunate, but all modern platforms have /dev/urandom, so it doesn't seem worth the maintenance effort to keep that. pgcrypto functions that require strong random numbers will be disabled with --disable-strong-random. Original patch by Magnus Hagander, tons of further work by Michael Paquier and me. Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqRy3krN8quR9XujMVVHYtXJ0_60nqgVc6oUk8ygyVkZsA@mail.gmail.com Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqRWkNYRRPJA7-cF+LfroYV10pvjdz6GNvxk-Eee9FypKA@mail.gmail.com
2016-12-05 12:42:59 +01:00
return PXE_NO_RANDOM;
prefix[bs + 0] = prefix[bs - 2];
prefix[bs + 1] = prefix[bs - 1];
res = pushf_write(dst, prefix, bs + 2);
px_memset(prefix, 0, bs + 2);
return res < 0 ? res : 0;
}
/*
* write symmetrically encrypted session key packet
*/
static int
symencrypt_sesskey(PGP_Context *ctx, uint8 *dst)
{
int res;
PGP_CFB *cfb;
uint8 algo = ctx->cipher_algo;
res = pgp_cfb_create(&cfb, ctx->s2k_cipher_algo,
ctx->s2k.key, ctx->s2k.key_len, 0, NULL);
if (res < 0)
return res;
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pgp_cfb_encrypt(cfb, &algo, 1, dst);
pgp_cfb_encrypt(cfb, ctx->sess_key, ctx->sess_key_len, dst + 1);
pgp_cfb_free(cfb);
return ctx->sess_key_len + 1;
}
/* 5.3: Symmetric-Key Encrypted Session-Key */
static int
write_symenc_sesskey(PGP_Context *ctx, PushFilter *dst)
{
uint8 pkt[256];
int pktlen;
int res;
uint8 *p = pkt;
*p++ = 4; /* 5.3 - version number */
*p++ = ctx->s2k_cipher_algo;
*p++ = ctx->s2k.mode;
*p++ = ctx->s2k.digest_algo;
if (ctx->s2k.mode > 0)
{
memcpy(p, ctx->s2k.salt, 8);
p += 8;
}
if (ctx->s2k.mode == 3)
*p++ = ctx->s2k.iter;
if (ctx->use_sess_key)
{
res = symencrypt_sesskey(ctx, p);
if (res < 0)
return res;
p += res;
}
pktlen = p - pkt;
res = write_normal_header(dst, PGP_PKT_SYMENCRYPTED_SESSKEY, pktlen);
if (res >= 0)
res = pushf_write(dst, pkt, pktlen);
px_memset(pkt, 0, pktlen);
return res;
}
/*
* key setup
*/
static int
init_s2k_key(PGP_Context *ctx)
{
int res;
if (ctx->s2k_cipher_algo < 0)
ctx->s2k_cipher_algo = ctx->cipher_algo;
res = pgp_s2k_fill(&ctx->s2k, ctx->s2k_mode, ctx->s2k_digest_algo, ctx->s2k_count);
if (res < 0)
return res;
return pgp_s2k_process(&ctx->s2k, ctx->s2k_cipher_algo,
ctx->sym_key, ctx->sym_key_len);
}
static int
init_sess_key(PGP_Context *ctx)
{
if (ctx->use_sess_key || ctx->pub_key)
{
ctx->sess_key_len = pgp_get_cipher_key_size(ctx->cipher_algo);
if (!pg_strong_random(ctx->sess_key, ctx->sess_key_len))
Replace PostmasterRandom() with a stronger source, second attempt. This adds a new routine, pg_strong_random() for generating random bytes, for use in both frontend and backend. At the moment, it's only used in the backend, but the upcoming SCRAM authentication patches need strong random numbers in libpq as well. pg_strong_random() is based on, and replaces, the existing implementation in pgcrypto. It can acquire strong random numbers from a number of sources, depending on what's available: - OpenSSL RAND_bytes(), if built with OpenSSL - On Windows, the native cryptographic functions are used - /dev/urandom Unlike the current pgcrypto function, the source is chosen by configure. That makes it easier to test different implementations, and ensures that we don't accidentally fall back to a less secure implementation, if the primary source fails. All of those methods are quite reliable, it would be pretty surprising for them to fail, so we'd rather find out by failing hard. If no strong random source is available, we fall back to using erand48(), seeded from current timestamp, like PostmasterRandom() was. That isn't cryptographically secure, but allows us to still work on platforms that don't have any of the above stronger sources. Because it's not very secure, the built-in implementation is only used if explicitly requested with --disable-strong-random. This replaces the more complicated Fortuna algorithm we used to have in pgcrypto, which is unfortunate, but all modern platforms have /dev/urandom, so it doesn't seem worth the maintenance effort to keep that. pgcrypto functions that require strong random numbers will be disabled with --disable-strong-random. Original patch by Magnus Hagander, tons of further work by Michael Paquier and me. Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqRy3krN8quR9XujMVVHYtXJ0_60nqgVc6oUk8ygyVkZsA@mail.gmail.com Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqRWkNYRRPJA7-cF+LfroYV10pvjdz6GNvxk-Eee9FypKA@mail.gmail.com
2016-12-05 12:42:59 +01:00
return PXE_NO_RANDOM;
}
else
{
ctx->sess_key_len = ctx->s2k.key_len;
memcpy(ctx->sess_key, ctx->s2k.key, ctx->s2k.key_len);
}
return 0;
}
/*
* combine
*/
int
pgp_encrypt(PGP_Context *ctx, MBuf *src, MBuf *dst)
{
int res;
int len;
uint8 *buf;
PushFilter *pf,
*pf_tmp;
/*
* do we have any key
*/
if (!ctx->sym_key && !ctx->pub_key)
return PXE_ARGUMENT_ERROR;
/* MBuf writer */
res = pushf_create_mbuf_writer(&pf, dst);
if (res < 0)
goto out;
/*
* initialize sym_key
*/
if (ctx->sym_key)
{
res = init_s2k_key(ctx);
if (res < 0)
goto out;
}
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res = init_sess_key(ctx);
if (res < 0)
goto out;
/*
* write keypkt
*/
if (ctx->pub_key)
res = pgp_write_pubenc_sesskey(ctx, pf);
else
res = write_symenc_sesskey(ctx, pf);
if (res < 0)
goto out;
/* encrypted data pkt */
res = init_encdata_packet(&pf_tmp, ctx, pf);
if (res < 0)
goto out;
pf = pf_tmp;
/* encrypter */
res = pushf_create(&pf_tmp, &encrypt_filter, ctx, pf);
if (res < 0)
goto out;
pf = pf_tmp;
/* hasher */
if (ctx->disable_mdc == 0)
{
res = pushf_create(&pf_tmp, &mdc_filter, ctx, pf);
if (res < 0)
goto out;
pf = pf_tmp;
}
/* prefix */
res = write_prefix(ctx, pf);
if (res < 0)
goto out;
/* compressor */
if (ctx->compress_algo > 0 && ctx->compress_level > 0)
{
res = init_compress(&pf_tmp, ctx, pf);
if (res < 0)
goto out;
pf = pf_tmp;
}
/* data streamer */
res = init_litdata_packet(&pf_tmp, ctx, pf);
if (res < 0)
goto out;
pf = pf_tmp;
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/* text conversion? */
if (ctx->text_mode && ctx->convert_crlf)
{
res = pushf_create(&pf_tmp, &crlf_filter, ctx, pf);
if (res < 0)
goto out;
pf = pf_tmp;
}
/*
* chain complete
*/
len = mbuf_grab(src, mbuf_avail(src), &buf);
res = pushf_write(pf, buf, len);
if (res >= 0)
res = pushf_flush(pf);
out:
pushf_free_all(pf);
return res;
}