postgresql/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile

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#-------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
# Makefile for src/interfaces/libpq library
#
# Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2016, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
# Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
#
2010-09-20 22:08:53 +02:00
# src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
#
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------
subdir = src/interfaces/libpq
top_builddir = ../../..
include $(top_builddir)/src/Makefile.global
# shared library parameters
NAME= pq
SO_MAJOR_VERSION= 5
SO_MINOR_VERSION= 10
override CPPFLAGS := -DFRONTEND -DUNSAFE_STAT_OK -I$(srcdir) $(CPPFLAGS) -I$(top_builddir)/src/port -I$(top_srcdir)/src/port
ifneq ($(PORTNAME), win32)
override CFLAGS += $(PTHREAD_CFLAGS)
endif
# Need to recompile any external C files because we need
# all object files to use the same compile flags as libpq; some
# platforms require special flags.
LIBS := $(LIBS:-lpgport=)
# We can't use Makefile variables here because the MSVC build system scrapes
# OBJS from this file.
OBJS= fe-auth.o fe-connect.o fe-exec.o fe-misc.o fe-print.o fe-lobj.o \
fe-protocol2.o fe-protocol3.o pqexpbuffer.o fe-secure.o \
libpq-events.o
# libpgport C files we always use
OBJS += chklocale.o inet_net_ntop.o noblock.o pgstrcasecmp.o pqsignal.o \
Revert error-throwing wrappers for the printf family of functions. This reverts commit 16304a013432931e61e623c8d85e9fe24709d9ba, except for its changes in src/port/snprintf.c; as well as commit cac18a76bb6b08f1ecc2a85e46c9d2ab82dd9d23 which is no longer needed. Fujii Masao reported that the previous commit caused failures in psql on OS X, since if one exits the pager program early while viewing a query result, psql sees an EPIPE error from fprintf --- and the wrapper function thought that was reason to panic. (It's a bit surprising that the same does not happen on Linux.) Further discussion among the security list concluded that the risk of other such failures was far too great, and that the one-size-fits-all approach to error handling embodied in the previous patch is unlikely to be workable. This leaves us again exposed to the possibility of the type of failure envisioned in CVE-2015-3166. However, that failure mode is strictly hypothetical at this point: there is no concrete reason to believe that an attacker could trigger information disclosure through the supposed mechanism. In the first place, the attack surface is fairly limited, since so much of what the backend does with format strings goes through stringinfo.c or psprintf(), and those already had adequate defenses. In the second place, even granting that an unprivileged attacker could control the occurrence of ENOMEM with some precision, it's a stretch to believe that he could induce it just where the target buffer contains some valuable information. So we concluded that the risk of non-hypothetical problems induced by the patch greatly outweighs the security risks. We will therefore revert, and instead undertake closer analysis to identify specific calls that may need hardening, rather than attempt a universal solution. We have kept the portion of the previous patch that improved snprintf.c's handling of errors when it calls the platform's sprintf(). That seems to be an unalloyed improvement. Security: CVE-2015-3166
2015-05-20 00:14:52 +02:00
thread.o
# libpgport C files that are needed if identified by configure
OBJS += $(filter crypt.o getaddrinfo.o getpeereid.o inet_aton.o open.o system.o snprintf.o strerror.o strlcpy.o win32error.o win32setlocale.o, $(LIBOBJS))
# backend/libpq
OBJS += ip.o md5.o
# utils/mb
OBJS += encnames.o wchar.o
ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
OBJS += fe-secure-openssl.o
endif
ifeq ($(PORTNAME), cygwin)
override shlib = cyg$(NAME)$(DLSUFFIX)
endif
ifeq ($(PORTNAME), win32)
# pgsleep.o is from libpgport
OBJS += pgsleep.o win32.o libpqrc.o
libpqrc.o: libpq.rc
$(WINDRES) -i $< -o $@
ifeq ($(enable_thread_safety), yes)
OBJS += pthread-win32.o
endif
endif
# Add libraries that libpq depends (or might depend) on into the
# shared library link. (The order in which you list them here doesn't
# matter.)
ifneq ($(PORTNAME), win32)
SHLIB_LINK += $(filter -lcrypt -ldes -lcom_err -lcrypto -lk5crypto -lkrb5 -lgssapi_krb5 -lgss -lgssapi -lssl -lsocket -lnsl -lresolv -lintl, $(LIBS)) $(LDAP_LIBS_FE) $(PTHREAD_LIBS)
else
SHLIB_LINK += $(filter -lcrypt -ldes -lcom_err -lcrypto -lk5crypto -lkrb5 -lgssapi32 -lssl -lsocket -lnsl -lresolv -lintl $(PTHREAD_LIBS), $(LIBS)) $(LDAP_LIBS_FE)
endif
ifeq ($(PORTNAME), win32)
SHLIB_LINK += -lshell32 -lws2_32 -lsecur32 $(filter -leay32 -lssleay32 -lcomerr32 -lkrb5_32, $(LIBS))
endif
SHLIB_EXPORTS = exports.txt
all: all-lib
# Shared library stuff
include $(top_srcdir)/src/Makefile.shlib
backend_src = $(top_srcdir)/src/backend
# We use several libpgport and backend modules verbatim, but since we need
# to compile with appropriate options to build a shared lib, we can't
# necessarily use the same object files built for libpgport and the backend.
# Instead, symlink the source files in here and build our own object files.
# For some libpgport modules, this only happens if configure decides
# the module is needed (see filter hack in OBJS, above).
Revert error-throwing wrappers for the printf family of functions. This reverts commit 16304a013432931e61e623c8d85e9fe24709d9ba, except for its changes in src/port/snprintf.c; as well as commit cac18a76bb6b08f1ecc2a85e46c9d2ab82dd9d23 which is no longer needed. Fujii Masao reported that the previous commit caused failures in psql on OS X, since if one exits the pager program early while viewing a query result, psql sees an EPIPE error from fprintf --- and the wrapper function thought that was reason to panic. (It's a bit surprising that the same does not happen on Linux.) Further discussion among the security list concluded that the risk of other such failures was far too great, and that the one-size-fits-all approach to error handling embodied in the previous patch is unlikely to be workable. This leaves us again exposed to the possibility of the type of failure envisioned in CVE-2015-3166. However, that failure mode is strictly hypothetical at this point: there is no concrete reason to believe that an attacker could trigger information disclosure through the supposed mechanism. In the first place, the attack surface is fairly limited, since so much of what the backend does with format strings goes through stringinfo.c or psprintf(), and those already had adequate defenses. In the second place, even granting that an unprivileged attacker could control the occurrence of ENOMEM with some precision, it's a stretch to believe that he could induce it just where the target buffer contains some valuable information. So we concluded that the risk of non-hypothetical problems induced by the patch greatly outweighs the security risks. We will therefore revert, and instead undertake closer analysis to identify specific calls that may need hardening, rather than attempt a universal solution. We have kept the portion of the previous patch that improved snprintf.c's handling of errors when it calls the platform's sprintf(). That seems to be an unalloyed improvement. Security: CVE-2015-3166
2015-05-20 00:14:52 +02:00
chklocale.c crypt.c getaddrinfo.c getpeereid.c inet_aton.c inet_net_ntop.c noblock.c open.c system.c pgsleep.c pgstrcasecmp.c pqsignal.c snprintf.c strerror.c strlcpy.c thread.c win32error.c win32setlocale.c: % : $(top_srcdir)/src/port/%
rm -f $@ && $(LN_S) $< .
ip.c md5.c: % : $(backend_src)/libpq/%
rm -f $@ && $(LN_S) $< .
encnames.c wchar.c: % : $(backend_src)/utils/mb/%
Commit Karel's patch. ------------------------------------------------------------------- Subject: Re: [PATCHES] encoding names From: Karel Zak <zakkr@zf.jcu.cz> To: Peter Eisentraut <peter_e@gmx.net> Cc: pgsql-patches <pgsql-patches@postgresql.org> Date: Fri, 31 Aug 2001 17:24:38 +0200 On Thu, Aug 30, 2001 at 01:30:40AM +0200, Peter Eisentraut wrote: > > - convert encoding 'name' to 'id' > > I thought we decided not to add functions returning "new" names until we > know exactly what the new names should be, and pending schema Ok, the patch not to add functions. > better > > ...(): encoding name too long Fixed. I found new bug in command/variable.c in parse_client_encoding(), nobody probably never see this error: if (pg_set_client_encoding(encoding)) { elog(ERROR, "Conversion between %s and %s is not supported", value, GetDatabaseEncodingName()); } because pg_set_client_encoding() returns -1 for error and 0 as true. It's fixed too. IMHO it can be apply. Karel PS: * following files are renamed: src/utils/mb/Unicode/KOI8_to_utf8.map --> src/utils/mb/Unicode/koi8r_to_utf8.map src/utils/mb/Unicode/WIN_to_utf8.map --> src/utils/mb/Unicode/win1251_to_utf8.map src/utils/mb/Unicode/utf8_to_KOI8.map --> src/utils/mb/Unicode/utf8_to_koi8r.map src/utils/mb/Unicode/utf8_to_WIN.map --> src/utils/mb/Unicode/utf8_to_win1251.map * new file: src/utils/mb/encname.c * removed file: src/utils/mb/common.c -- Karel Zak <zakkr@zf.jcu.cz> http://home.zf.jcu.cz/~zakkr/ C, PostgreSQL, PHP, WWW, http://docs.linux.cz, http://mape.jcu.cz
2001-09-06 06:57:30 +02:00
rm -f $@ && $(LN_S) $< .
distprep: libpq-dist.rc
libpq.rc libpq-dist.rc: libpq.rc.in
sed -e 's/\(VERSION.*\),0 *$$/\1,'`date '+%y%j' | sed 's/^0*//'`'/' $< >$@
# Depend on Makefile.global to force rebuild on re-run of configure.
# (But libpq-dist.rc is shipped in the distribution for shell-less
# installations and is only updated by distprep.)
libpq.rc: $(top_builddir)/src/Makefile.global
fe-connect.o: fe-connect.c $(top_builddir)/src/port/pg_config_paths.h
fe-misc.o: fe-misc.c $(top_builddir)/src/port/pg_config_paths.h
$(top_builddir)/src/port/pg_config_paths.h:
$(MAKE) -C $(top_builddir)/src/port pg_config_paths.h
install: all installdirs install-lib
$(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/libpq-fe.h '$(DESTDIR)$(includedir)'
$(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/libpq-events.h '$(DESTDIR)$(includedir)'
$(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/libpq-int.h '$(DESTDIR)$(includedir_internal)'
$(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/pqexpbuffer.h '$(DESTDIR)$(includedir_internal)'
$(INSTALL_DATA) $(srcdir)/pg_service.conf.sample '$(DESTDIR)$(datadir)/pg_service.conf.sample'
installcheck:
$(MAKE) -C test $@
installdirs: installdirs-lib
$(MKDIR_P) '$(DESTDIR)$(includedir)' '$(DESTDIR)$(includedir_internal)' '$(DESTDIR)$(datadir)'
uninstall: uninstall-lib
rm -f '$(DESTDIR)$(includedir)/libpq-fe.h'
rm -f '$(DESTDIR)$(includedir)/libpq-events.h'
rm -f '$(DESTDIR)$(includedir_internal)/libpq-int.h'
rm -f '$(DESTDIR)$(includedir_internal)/pqexpbuffer.h'
rm -f '$(DESTDIR)$(datadir)/pg_service.conf.sample'
clean distclean: clean-lib
$(MAKE) -C test $@
rm -f $(OBJS) pthread.h libpq.rc
# Might be left over from a Win32 client-only build
rm -f pg_config_paths.h
rm -f inet_net_ntop.c noblock.c pgstrcasecmp.c pqsignal.c thread.c
Revert error-throwing wrappers for the printf family of functions. This reverts commit 16304a013432931e61e623c8d85e9fe24709d9ba, except for its changes in src/port/snprintf.c; as well as commit cac18a76bb6b08f1ecc2a85e46c9d2ab82dd9d23 which is no longer needed. Fujii Masao reported that the previous commit caused failures in psql on OS X, since if one exits the pager program early while viewing a query result, psql sees an EPIPE error from fprintf --- and the wrapper function thought that was reason to panic. (It's a bit surprising that the same does not happen on Linux.) Further discussion among the security list concluded that the risk of other such failures was far too great, and that the one-size-fits-all approach to error handling embodied in the previous patch is unlikely to be workable. This leaves us again exposed to the possibility of the type of failure envisioned in CVE-2015-3166. However, that failure mode is strictly hypothetical at this point: there is no concrete reason to believe that an attacker could trigger information disclosure through the supposed mechanism. In the first place, the attack surface is fairly limited, since so much of what the backend does with format strings goes through stringinfo.c or psprintf(), and those already had adequate defenses. In the second place, even granting that an unprivileged attacker could control the occurrence of ENOMEM with some precision, it's a stretch to believe that he could induce it just where the target buffer contains some valuable information. So we concluded that the risk of non-hypothetical problems induced by the patch greatly outweighs the security risks. We will therefore revert, and instead undertake closer analysis to identify specific calls that may need hardening, rather than attempt a universal solution. We have kept the portion of the previous patch that improved snprintf.c's handling of errors when it calls the platform's sprintf(). That seems to be an unalloyed improvement. Security: CVE-2015-3166
2015-05-20 00:14:52 +02:00
rm -f chklocale.c crypt.c getaddrinfo.c getpeereid.c inet_aton.c open.c system.c snprintf.c strerror.c strlcpy.c win32error.c win32setlocale.c
rm -f pgsleep.c
rm -f md5.c ip.c
rm -f encnames.c wchar.c
maintainer-clean: distclean maintainer-clean-lib
$(MAKE) -C test $@
rm -f libpq-dist.rc