postgresql/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c

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UPDATED PATCH: Attached are a revised set of SSL patches. Many of these patches are motivated by security concerns, it's not just bug fixes. The key differences (from stock 7.2.1) are: *) almost all code that directly uses the OpenSSL library is in two new files, src/interfaces/libpq/fe-ssl.c src/backend/postmaster/be-ssl.c in the long run, it would be nice to merge these two files. *) the legacy code to read and write network data have been encapsulated into read_SSL() and write_SSL(). These functions should probably be renamed - they handle both SSL and non-SSL cases. the remaining code should eliminate the problems identified earlier, albeit not very cleanly. *) both front- and back-ends will send a SSL shutdown via the new close_SSL() function. This is necessary for sessions to work properly. (Sessions are not yet fully supported, but by cleanly closing the SSL connection instead of just sending a TCP FIN packet other SSL tools will be much happier.) *) The client certificate and key are now expected in a subdirectory of the user's home directory. Specifically, - the directory .postgresql must be owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other.' - the file .postgresql/postgresql.crt must be a regular file owned by the user. - the file .postgresql/postgresql.key must be a regular file owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other'. At the current time encrypted private keys are not supported. There should also be a way to support multiple client certs/keys. *) the front-end performs minimal validation of the back-end cert. Self-signed certs are permitted, but the common name *must* match the hostname used by the front-end. (The cert itself should always use a fully qualified domain name (FDQN) in its common name field.) This means that psql -h eris db will fail, but psql -h eris.example.com db will succeed. At the current time this must be an exact match; future patches may support any FQDN that resolves to the address returned by getpeername(2). Another common "problem" is expiring certs. For now, it may be a good idea to use a very-long-lived self-signed cert. As a compile-time option, the front-end can specify a file containing valid root certificates, but it is not yet required. *) the back-end performs minimal validation of the client cert. It allows self-signed certs. It checks for expiration. It supports a compile-time option specifying a file containing valid root certificates. *) both front- and back-ends default to TLSv1, not SSLv3/SSLv2. *) both front- and back-ends support DSA keys. DSA keys are moderately more expensive on startup, but many people consider them preferable than RSA keys. (E.g., SSH2 prefers DSA keys.) *) if /dev/urandom exists, both client and server will read 16k of randomization data from it. *) the server can read empheral DH parameters from the files $DataDir/dh512.pem $DataDir/dh1024.pem $DataDir/dh2048.pem $DataDir/dh4096.pem if none are provided, the server will default to hardcoded parameter files provided by the OpenSSL project. Remaining tasks: *) the select() clauses need to be revisited - the SSL abstraction layer may need to absorb more of the current code to avoid rare deadlock conditions. This also touches on a true solution to the pg_eof() problem. *) the SIGPIPE signal handler may need to be revisited. *) support encrypted private keys. *) sessions are not yet fully supported. (SSL sessions can span multiple "connections," and allow the client and server to avoid costly renegotiations.) *) makecert - a script that creates back-end certs. *) pgkeygen - a tool that creates front-end certs. *) the whole protocol issue, SASL, etc. *) certs are fully validated - valid root certs must be available. This is a hassle, but it means that you *can* trust the identity of the server. *) the client library can handle hardcoded root certificates, to avoid the need to copy these files. *) host name of server cert must resolve to IP address, or be a recognized alias. This is more liberal than the previous iteration. *) the number of bytes transferred is tracked, and the session key is periodically renegotiated. *) basic cert generation scripts (mkcert.sh, pgkeygen.sh). The configuration files have reasonable defaults for each type of use. Bear Giles
2002-06-14 06:23:17 +02:00
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*
* fe-secure.c
UPDATED PATCH: Attached are a revised set of SSL patches. Many of these patches are motivated by security concerns, it's not just bug fixes. The key differences (from stock 7.2.1) are: *) almost all code that directly uses the OpenSSL library is in two new files, src/interfaces/libpq/fe-ssl.c src/backend/postmaster/be-ssl.c in the long run, it would be nice to merge these two files. *) the legacy code to read and write network data have been encapsulated into read_SSL() and write_SSL(). These functions should probably be renamed - they handle both SSL and non-SSL cases. the remaining code should eliminate the problems identified earlier, albeit not very cleanly. *) both front- and back-ends will send a SSL shutdown via the new close_SSL() function. This is necessary for sessions to work properly. (Sessions are not yet fully supported, but by cleanly closing the SSL connection instead of just sending a TCP FIN packet other SSL tools will be much happier.) *) The client certificate and key are now expected in a subdirectory of the user's home directory. Specifically, - the directory .postgresql must be owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other.' - the file .postgresql/postgresql.crt must be a regular file owned by the user. - the file .postgresql/postgresql.key must be a regular file owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other'. At the current time encrypted private keys are not supported. There should also be a way to support multiple client certs/keys. *) the front-end performs minimal validation of the back-end cert. Self-signed certs are permitted, but the common name *must* match the hostname used by the front-end. (The cert itself should always use a fully qualified domain name (FDQN) in its common name field.) This means that psql -h eris db will fail, but psql -h eris.example.com db will succeed. At the current time this must be an exact match; future patches may support any FQDN that resolves to the address returned by getpeername(2). Another common "problem" is expiring certs. For now, it may be a good idea to use a very-long-lived self-signed cert. As a compile-time option, the front-end can specify a file containing valid root certificates, but it is not yet required. *) the back-end performs minimal validation of the client cert. It allows self-signed certs. It checks for expiration. It supports a compile-time option specifying a file containing valid root certificates. *) both front- and back-ends default to TLSv1, not SSLv3/SSLv2. *) both front- and back-ends support DSA keys. DSA keys are moderately more expensive on startup, but many people consider them preferable than RSA keys. (E.g., SSH2 prefers DSA keys.) *) if /dev/urandom exists, both client and server will read 16k of randomization data from it. *) the server can read empheral DH parameters from the files $DataDir/dh512.pem $DataDir/dh1024.pem $DataDir/dh2048.pem $DataDir/dh4096.pem if none are provided, the server will default to hardcoded parameter files provided by the OpenSSL project. Remaining tasks: *) the select() clauses need to be revisited - the SSL abstraction layer may need to absorb more of the current code to avoid rare deadlock conditions. This also touches on a true solution to the pg_eof() problem. *) the SIGPIPE signal handler may need to be revisited. *) support encrypted private keys. *) sessions are not yet fully supported. (SSL sessions can span multiple "connections," and allow the client and server to avoid costly renegotiations.) *) makecert - a script that creates back-end certs. *) pgkeygen - a tool that creates front-end certs. *) the whole protocol issue, SASL, etc. *) certs are fully validated - valid root certs must be available. This is a hassle, but it means that you *can* trust the identity of the server. *) the client library can handle hardcoded root certificates, to avoid the need to copy these files. *) host name of server cert must resolve to IP address, or be a recognized alias. This is more liberal than the previous iteration. *) the number of bytes transferred is tracked, and the session key is periodically renegotiated. *) basic cert generation scripts (mkcert.sh, pgkeygen.sh). The configuration files have reasonable defaults for each type of use. Bear Giles
2002-06-14 06:23:17 +02:00
* functions related to setting up a secure connection to the backend.
* Secure connections are expected to provide confidentiality,
* message integrity and endpoint authentication.
*
*
2017-01-03 19:48:53 +01:00
* Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2017, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
UPDATED PATCH: Attached are a revised set of SSL patches. Many of these patches are motivated by security concerns, it's not just bug fixes. The key differences (from stock 7.2.1) are: *) almost all code that directly uses the OpenSSL library is in two new files, src/interfaces/libpq/fe-ssl.c src/backend/postmaster/be-ssl.c in the long run, it would be nice to merge these two files. *) the legacy code to read and write network data have been encapsulated into read_SSL() and write_SSL(). These functions should probably be renamed - they handle both SSL and non-SSL cases. the remaining code should eliminate the problems identified earlier, albeit not very cleanly. *) both front- and back-ends will send a SSL shutdown via the new close_SSL() function. This is necessary for sessions to work properly. (Sessions are not yet fully supported, but by cleanly closing the SSL connection instead of just sending a TCP FIN packet other SSL tools will be much happier.) *) The client certificate and key are now expected in a subdirectory of the user's home directory. Specifically, - the directory .postgresql must be owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other.' - the file .postgresql/postgresql.crt must be a regular file owned by the user. - the file .postgresql/postgresql.key must be a regular file owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other'. At the current time encrypted private keys are not supported. There should also be a way to support multiple client certs/keys. *) the front-end performs minimal validation of the back-end cert. Self-signed certs are permitted, but the common name *must* match the hostname used by the front-end. (The cert itself should always use a fully qualified domain name (FDQN) in its common name field.) This means that psql -h eris db will fail, but psql -h eris.example.com db will succeed. At the current time this must be an exact match; future patches may support any FQDN that resolves to the address returned by getpeername(2). Another common "problem" is expiring certs. For now, it may be a good idea to use a very-long-lived self-signed cert. As a compile-time option, the front-end can specify a file containing valid root certificates, but it is not yet required. *) the back-end performs minimal validation of the client cert. It allows self-signed certs. It checks for expiration. It supports a compile-time option specifying a file containing valid root certificates. *) both front- and back-ends default to TLSv1, not SSLv3/SSLv2. *) both front- and back-ends support DSA keys. DSA keys are moderately more expensive on startup, but many people consider them preferable than RSA keys. (E.g., SSH2 prefers DSA keys.) *) if /dev/urandom exists, both client and server will read 16k of randomization data from it. *) the server can read empheral DH parameters from the files $DataDir/dh512.pem $DataDir/dh1024.pem $DataDir/dh2048.pem $DataDir/dh4096.pem if none are provided, the server will default to hardcoded parameter files provided by the OpenSSL project. Remaining tasks: *) the select() clauses need to be revisited - the SSL abstraction layer may need to absorb more of the current code to avoid rare deadlock conditions. This also touches on a true solution to the pg_eof() problem. *) the SIGPIPE signal handler may need to be revisited. *) support encrypted private keys. *) sessions are not yet fully supported. (SSL sessions can span multiple "connections," and allow the client and server to avoid costly renegotiations.) *) makecert - a script that creates back-end certs. *) pgkeygen - a tool that creates front-end certs. *) the whole protocol issue, SASL, etc. *) certs are fully validated - valid root certs must be available. This is a hassle, but it means that you *can* trust the identity of the server. *) the client library can handle hardcoded root certificates, to avoid the need to copy these files. *) host name of server cert must resolve to IP address, or be a recognized alias. This is more liberal than the previous iteration. *) the number of bytes transferred is tracked, and the session key is periodically renegotiated. *) basic cert generation scripts (mkcert.sh, pgkeygen.sh). The configuration files have reasonable defaults for each type of use. Bear Giles
2002-06-14 06:23:17 +02:00
* Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
*
*
* IDENTIFICATION
2010-09-20 22:08:53 +02:00
* src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
2002-09-04 22:31:48 +02:00
*
UPDATED PATCH: Attached are a revised set of SSL patches. Many of these patches are motivated by security concerns, it's not just bug fixes. The key differences (from stock 7.2.1) are: *) almost all code that directly uses the OpenSSL library is in two new files, src/interfaces/libpq/fe-ssl.c src/backend/postmaster/be-ssl.c in the long run, it would be nice to merge these two files. *) the legacy code to read and write network data have been encapsulated into read_SSL() and write_SSL(). These functions should probably be renamed - they handle both SSL and non-SSL cases. the remaining code should eliminate the problems identified earlier, albeit not very cleanly. *) both front- and back-ends will send a SSL shutdown via the new close_SSL() function. This is necessary for sessions to work properly. (Sessions are not yet fully supported, but by cleanly closing the SSL connection instead of just sending a TCP FIN packet other SSL tools will be much happier.) *) The client certificate and key are now expected in a subdirectory of the user's home directory. Specifically, - the directory .postgresql must be owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other.' - the file .postgresql/postgresql.crt must be a regular file owned by the user. - the file .postgresql/postgresql.key must be a regular file owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other'. At the current time encrypted private keys are not supported. There should also be a way to support multiple client certs/keys. *) the front-end performs minimal validation of the back-end cert. Self-signed certs are permitted, but the common name *must* match the hostname used by the front-end. (The cert itself should always use a fully qualified domain name (FDQN) in its common name field.) This means that psql -h eris db will fail, but psql -h eris.example.com db will succeed. At the current time this must be an exact match; future patches may support any FQDN that resolves to the address returned by getpeername(2). Another common "problem" is expiring certs. For now, it may be a good idea to use a very-long-lived self-signed cert. As a compile-time option, the front-end can specify a file containing valid root certificates, but it is not yet required. *) the back-end performs minimal validation of the client cert. It allows self-signed certs. It checks for expiration. It supports a compile-time option specifying a file containing valid root certificates. *) both front- and back-ends default to TLSv1, not SSLv3/SSLv2. *) both front- and back-ends support DSA keys. DSA keys are moderately more expensive on startup, but many people consider them preferable than RSA keys. (E.g., SSH2 prefers DSA keys.) *) if /dev/urandom exists, both client and server will read 16k of randomization data from it. *) the server can read empheral DH parameters from the files $DataDir/dh512.pem $DataDir/dh1024.pem $DataDir/dh2048.pem $DataDir/dh4096.pem if none are provided, the server will default to hardcoded parameter files provided by the OpenSSL project. Remaining tasks: *) the select() clauses need to be revisited - the SSL abstraction layer may need to absorb more of the current code to avoid rare deadlock conditions. This also touches on a true solution to the pg_eof() problem. *) the SIGPIPE signal handler may need to be revisited. *) support encrypted private keys. *) sessions are not yet fully supported. (SSL sessions can span multiple "connections," and allow the client and server to avoid costly renegotiations.) *) makecert - a script that creates back-end certs. *) pgkeygen - a tool that creates front-end certs. *) the whole protocol issue, SASL, etc. *) certs are fully validated - valid root certs must be available. This is a hassle, but it means that you *can* trust the identity of the server. *) the client library can handle hardcoded root certificates, to avoid the need to copy these files. *) host name of server cert must resolve to IP address, or be a recognized alias. This is more liberal than the previous iteration. *) the number of bytes transferred is tracked, and the session key is periodically renegotiated. *) basic cert generation scripts (mkcert.sh, pgkeygen.sh). The configuration files have reasonable defaults for each type of use. Bear Giles
2002-06-14 06:23:17 +02:00
* NOTES
*
* We don't provide informational callbacks here (like
* info_cb() in be-secure.c), since there's no good mechanism to
* display such information to the user.
*
UPDATED PATCH: Attached are a revised set of SSL patches. Many of these patches are motivated by security concerns, it's not just bug fixes. The key differences (from stock 7.2.1) are: *) almost all code that directly uses the OpenSSL library is in two new files, src/interfaces/libpq/fe-ssl.c src/backend/postmaster/be-ssl.c in the long run, it would be nice to merge these two files. *) the legacy code to read and write network data have been encapsulated into read_SSL() and write_SSL(). These functions should probably be renamed - they handle both SSL and non-SSL cases. the remaining code should eliminate the problems identified earlier, albeit not very cleanly. *) both front- and back-ends will send a SSL shutdown via the new close_SSL() function. This is necessary for sessions to work properly. (Sessions are not yet fully supported, but by cleanly closing the SSL connection instead of just sending a TCP FIN packet other SSL tools will be much happier.) *) The client certificate and key are now expected in a subdirectory of the user's home directory. Specifically, - the directory .postgresql must be owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other.' - the file .postgresql/postgresql.crt must be a regular file owned by the user. - the file .postgresql/postgresql.key must be a regular file owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other'. At the current time encrypted private keys are not supported. There should also be a way to support multiple client certs/keys. *) the front-end performs minimal validation of the back-end cert. Self-signed certs are permitted, but the common name *must* match the hostname used by the front-end. (The cert itself should always use a fully qualified domain name (FDQN) in its common name field.) This means that psql -h eris db will fail, but psql -h eris.example.com db will succeed. At the current time this must be an exact match; future patches may support any FQDN that resolves to the address returned by getpeername(2). Another common "problem" is expiring certs. For now, it may be a good idea to use a very-long-lived self-signed cert. As a compile-time option, the front-end can specify a file containing valid root certificates, but it is not yet required. *) the back-end performs minimal validation of the client cert. It allows self-signed certs. It checks for expiration. It supports a compile-time option specifying a file containing valid root certificates. *) both front- and back-ends default to TLSv1, not SSLv3/SSLv2. *) both front- and back-ends support DSA keys. DSA keys are moderately more expensive on startup, but many people consider them preferable than RSA keys. (E.g., SSH2 prefers DSA keys.) *) if /dev/urandom exists, both client and server will read 16k of randomization data from it. *) the server can read empheral DH parameters from the files $DataDir/dh512.pem $DataDir/dh1024.pem $DataDir/dh2048.pem $DataDir/dh4096.pem if none are provided, the server will default to hardcoded parameter files provided by the OpenSSL project. Remaining tasks: *) the select() clauses need to be revisited - the SSL abstraction layer may need to absorb more of the current code to avoid rare deadlock conditions. This also touches on a true solution to the pg_eof() problem. *) the SIGPIPE signal handler may need to be revisited. *) support encrypted private keys. *) sessions are not yet fully supported. (SSL sessions can span multiple "connections," and allow the client and server to avoid costly renegotiations.) *) makecert - a script that creates back-end certs. *) pgkeygen - a tool that creates front-end certs. *) the whole protocol issue, SASL, etc. *) certs are fully validated - valid root certs must be available. This is a hassle, but it means that you *can* trust the identity of the server. *) the client library can handle hardcoded root certificates, to avoid the need to copy these files. *) host name of server cert must resolve to IP address, or be a recognized alias. This is more liberal than the previous iteration. *) the number of bytes transferred is tracked, and the session key is periodically renegotiated. *) basic cert generation scripts (mkcert.sh, pgkeygen.sh). The configuration files have reasonable defaults for each type of use. Bear Giles
2002-06-14 06:23:17 +02:00
*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
#include "postgres_fe.h"
#include <signal.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include "libpq-fe.h"
#include "fe-auth.h"
#include "libpq-int.h"
UPDATED PATCH: Attached are a revised set of SSL patches. Many of these patches are motivated by security concerns, it's not just bug fixes. The key differences (from stock 7.2.1) are: *) almost all code that directly uses the OpenSSL library is in two new files, src/interfaces/libpq/fe-ssl.c src/backend/postmaster/be-ssl.c in the long run, it would be nice to merge these two files. *) the legacy code to read and write network data have been encapsulated into read_SSL() and write_SSL(). These functions should probably be renamed - they handle both SSL and non-SSL cases. the remaining code should eliminate the problems identified earlier, albeit not very cleanly. *) both front- and back-ends will send a SSL shutdown via the new close_SSL() function. This is necessary for sessions to work properly. (Sessions are not yet fully supported, but by cleanly closing the SSL connection instead of just sending a TCP FIN packet other SSL tools will be much happier.) *) The client certificate and key are now expected in a subdirectory of the user's home directory. Specifically, - the directory .postgresql must be owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other.' - the file .postgresql/postgresql.crt must be a regular file owned by the user. - the file .postgresql/postgresql.key must be a regular file owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other'. At the current time encrypted private keys are not supported. There should also be a way to support multiple client certs/keys. *) the front-end performs minimal validation of the back-end cert. Self-signed certs are permitted, but the common name *must* match the hostname used by the front-end. (The cert itself should always use a fully qualified domain name (FDQN) in its common name field.) This means that psql -h eris db will fail, but psql -h eris.example.com db will succeed. At the current time this must be an exact match; future patches may support any FQDN that resolves to the address returned by getpeername(2). Another common "problem" is expiring certs. For now, it may be a good idea to use a very-long-lived self-signed cert. As a compile-time option, the front-end can specify a file containing valid root certificates, but it is not yet required. *) the back-end performs minimal validation of the client cert. It allows self-signed certs. It checks for expiration. It supports a compile-time option specifying a file containing valid root certificates. *) both front- and back-ends default to TLSv1, not SSLv3/SSLv2. *) both front- and back-ends support DSA keys. DSA keys are moderately more expensive on startup, but many people consider them preferable than RSA keys. (E.g., SSH2 prefers DSA keys.) *) if /dev/urandom exists, both client and server will read 16k of randomization data from it. *) the server can read empheral DH parameters from the files $DataDir/dh512.pem $DataDir/dh1024.pem $DataDir/dh2048.pem $DataDir/dh4096.pem if none are provided, the server will default to hardcoded parameter files provided by the OpenSSL project. Remaining tasks: *) the select() clauses need to be revisited - the SSL abstraction layer may need to absorb more of the current code to avoid rare deadlock conditions. This also touches on a true solution to the pg_eof() problem. *) the SIGPIPE signal handler may need to be revisited. *) support encrypted private keys. *) sessions are not yet fully supported. (SSL sessions can span multiple "connections," and allow the client and server to avoid costly renegotiations.) *) makecert - a script that creates back-end certs. *) pgkeygen - a tool that creates front-end certs. *) the whole protocol issue, SASL, etc. *) certs are fully validated - valid root certs must be available. This is a hassle, but it means that you *can* trust the identity of the server. *) the client library can handle hardcoded root certificates, to avoid the need to copy these files. *) host name of server cert must resolve to IP address, or be a recognized alias. This is more liberal than the previous iteration. *) the number of bytes transferred is tracked, and the session key is periodically renegotiated. *) basic cert generation scripts (mkcert.sh, pgkeygen.sh). The configuration files have reasonable defaults for each type of use. Bear Giles
2002-06-14 06:23:17 +02:00
#ifdef WIN32
#include "win32.h"
#else
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_TCP_H
#include <netinet/tcp.h>
#endif
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#endif
#include <sys/stat.h>
UPDATED PATCH: Attached are a revised set of SSL patches. Many of these patches are motivated by security concerns, it's not just bug fixes. The key differences (from stock 7.2.1) are: *) almost all code that directly uses the OpenSSL library is in two new files, src/interfaces/libpq/fe-ssl.c src/backend/postmaster/be-ssl.c in the long run, it would be nice to merge these two files. *) the legacy code to read and write network data have been encapsulated into read_SSL() and write_SSL(). These functions should probably be renamed - they handle both SSL and non-SSL cases. the remaining code should eliminate the problems identified earlier, albeit not very cleanly. *) both front- and back-ends will send a SSL shutdown via the new close_SSL() function. This is necessary for sessions to work properly. (Sessions are not yet fully supported, but by cleanly closing the SSL connection instead of just sending a TCP FIN packet other SSL tools will be much happier.) *) The client certificate and key are now expected in a subdirectory of the user's home directory. Specifically, - the directory .postgresql must be owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other.' - the file .postgresql/postgresql.crt must be a regular file owned by the user. - the file .postgresql/postgresql.key must be a regular file owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other'. At the current time encrypted private keys are not supported. There should also be a way to support multiple client certs/keys. *) the front-end performs minimal validation of the back-end cert. Self-signed certs are permitted, but the common name *must* match the hostname used by the front-end. (The cert itself should always use a fully qualified domain name (FDQN) in its common name field.) This means that psql -h eris db will fail, but psql -h eris.example.com db will succeed. At the current time this must be an exact match; future patches may support any FQDN that resolves to the address returned by getpeername(2). Another common "problem" is expiring certs. For now, it may be a good idea to use a very-long-lived self-signed cert. As a compile-time option, the front-end can specify a file containing valid root certificates, but it is not yet required. *) the back-end performs minimal validation of the client cert. It allows self-signed certs. It checks for expiration. It supports a compile-time option specifying a file containing valid root certificates. *) both front- and back-ends default to TLSv1, not SSLv3/SSLv2. *) both front- and back-ends support DSA keys. DSA keys are moderately more expensive on startup, but many people consider them preferable than RSA keys. (E.g., SSH2 prefers DSA keys.) *) if /dev/urandom exists, both client and server will read 16k of randomization data from it. *) the server can read empheral DH parameters from the files $DataDir/dh512.pem $DataDir/dh1024.pem $DataDir/dh2048.pem $DataDir/dh4096.pem if none are provided, the server will default to hardcoded parameter files provided by the OpenSSL project. Remaining tasks: *) the select() clauses need to be revisited - the SSL abstraction layer may need to absorb more of the current code to avoid rare deadlock conditions. This also touches on a true solution to the pg_eof() problem. *) the SIGPIPE signal handler may need to be revisited. *) support encrypted private keys. *) sessions are not yet fully supported. (SSL sessions can span multiple "connections," and allow the client and server to avoid costly renegotiations.) *) makecert - a script that creates back-end certs. *) pgkeygen - a tool that creates front-end certs. *) the whole protocol issue, SASL, etc. *) certs are fully validated - valid root certs must be available. This is a hassle, but it means that you *can* trust the identity of the server. *) the client library can handle hardcoded root certificates, to avoid the need to copy these files. *) host name of server cert must resolve to IP address, or be a recognized alias. This is more liberal than the previous iteration. *) the number of bytes transferred is tracked, and the session key is periodically renegotiated. *) basic cert generation scripts (mkcert.sh, pgkeygen.sh). The configuration files have reasonable defaults for each type of use. Bear Giles
2002-06-14 06:23:17 +02:00
#ifdef ENABLE_THREAD_SAFETY
#ifdef WIN32
#include "pthread-win32.h"
#else
#include <pthread.h>
#endif
#endif
/*
* Macros to handle disabling and then restoring the state of SIGPIPE handling.
* On Windows, these are all no-ops since there's no SIGPIPEs.
*/
#ifndef WIN32
#define SIGPIPE_MASKED(conn) ((conn)->sigpipe_so || (conn)->sigpipe_flag)
#ifdef ENABLE_THREAD_SAFETY
struct sigpipe_info
{
sigset_t oldsigmask;
bool sigpipe_pending;
bool got_epipe;
};
#define DECLARE_SIGPIPE_INFO(spinfo) struct sigpipe_info spinfo
#define DISABLE_SIGPIPE(conn, spinfo, failaction) \
do { \
(spinfo).got_epipe = false; \
if (!SIGPIPE_MASKED(conn)) \
{ \
if (pq_block_sigpipe(&(spinfo).oldsigmask, \
&(spinfo).sigpipe_pending) < 0) \
failaction; \
} \
} while (0)
#define REMEMBER_EPIPE(spinfo, cond) \
do { \
if (cond) \
(spinfo).got_epipe = true; \
} while (0)
#define RESTORE_SIGPIPE(conn, spinfo) \
do { \
if (!SIGPIPE_MASKED(conn)) \
pq_reset_sigpipe(&(spinfo).oldsigmask, (spinfo).sigpipe_pending, \
(spinfo).got_epipe); \
} while (0)
2010-02-26 03:01:40 +01:00
#else /* !ENABLE_THREAD_SAFETY */
#define DECLARE_SIGPIPE_INFO(spinfo) pqsigfunc spinfo = NULL
#define DISABLE_SIGPIPE(conn, spinfo, failaction) \
do { \
if (!SIGPIPE_MASKED(conn)) \
spinfo = pqsignal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); \
} while (0)
#define REMEMBER_EPIPE(spinfo, cond)
#define RESTORE_SIGPIPE(conn, spinfo) \
do { \
if (!SIGPIPE_MASKED(conn)) \
pqsignal(SIGPIPE, spinfo); \
} while (0)
2010-02-26 03:01:40 +01:00
#endif /* ENABLE_THREAD_SAFETY */
#else /* WIN32 */
#define DECLARE_SIGPIPE_INFO(spinfo)
#define DISABLE_SIGPIPE(conn, spinfo, failaction)
#define REMEMBER_EPIPE(spinfo, cond)
#define RESTORE_SIGPIPE(conn, spinfo)
2010-02-26 03:01:40 +01:00
#endif /* WIN32 */
UPDATED PATCH: Attached are a revised set of SSL patches. Many of these patches are motivated by security concerns, it's not just bug fixes. The key differences (from stock 7.2.1) are: *) almost all code that directly uses the OpenSSL library is in two new files, src/interfaces/libpq/fe-ssl.c src/backend/postmaster/be-ssl.c in the long run, it would be nice to merge these two files. *) the legacy code to read and write network data have been encapsulated into read_SSL() and write_SSL(). These functions should probably be renamed - they handle both SSL and non-SSL cases. the remaining code should eliminate the problems identified earlier, albeit not very cleanly. *) both front- and back-ends will send a SSL shutdown via the new close_SSL() function. This is necessary for sessions to work properly. (Sessions are not yet fully supported, but by cleanly closing the SSL connection instead of just sending a TCP FIN packet other SSL tools will be much happier.) *) The client certificate and key are now expected in a subdirectory of the user's home directory. Specifically, - the directory .postgresql must be owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other.' - the file .postgresql/postgresql.crt must be a regular file owned by the user. - the file .postgresql/postgresql.key must be a regular file owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other'. At the current time encrypted private keys are not supported. There should also be a way to support multiple client certs/keys. *) the front-end performs minimal validation of the back-end cert. Self-signed certs are permitted, but the common name *must* match the hostname used by the front-end. (The cert itself should always use a fully qualified domain name (FDQN) in its common name field.) This means that psql -h eris db will fail, but psql -h eris.example.com db will succeed. At the current time this must be an exact match; future patches may support any FQDN that resolves to the address returned by getpeername(2). Another common "problem" is expiring certs. For now, it may be a good idea to use a very-long-lived self-signed cert. As a compile-time option, the front-end can specify a file containing valid root certificates, but it is not yet required. *) the back-end performs minimal validation of the client cert. It allows self-signed certs. It checks for expiration. It supports a compile-time option specifying a file containing valid root certificates. *) both front- and back-ends default to TLSv1, not SSLv3/SSLv2. *) both front- and back-ends support DSA keys. DSA keys are moderately more expensive on startup, but many people consider them preferable than RSA keys. (E.g., SSH2 prefers DSA keys.) *) if /dev/urandom exists, both client and server will read 16k of randomization data from it. *) the server can read empheral DH parameters from the files $DataDir/dh512.pem $DataDir/dh1024.pem $DataDir/dh2048.pem $DataDir/dh4096.pem if none are provided, the server will default to hardcoded parameter files provided by the OpenSSL project. Remaining tasks: *) the select() clauses need to be revisited - the SSL abstraction layer may need to absorb more of the current code to avoid rare deadlock conditions. This also touches on a true solution to the pg_eof() problem. *) the SIGPIPE signal handler may need to be revisited. *) support encrypted private keys. *) sessions are not yet fully supported. (SSL sessions can span multiple "connections," and allow the client and server to avoid costly renegotiations.) *) makecert - a script that creates back-end certs. *) pgkeygen - a tool that creates front-end certs. *) the whole protocol issue, SASL, etc. *) certs are fully validated - valid root certs must be available. This is a hassle, but it means that you *can* trust the identity of the server. *) the client library can handle hardcoded root certificates, to avoid the need to copy these files. *) host name of server cert must resolve to IP address, or be a recognized alias. This is more liberal than the previous iteration. *) the number of bytes transferred is tracked, and the session key is periodically renegotiated. *) basic cert generation scripts (mkcert.sh, pgkeygen.sh). The configuration files have reasonable defaults for each type of use. Bear Giles
2002-06-14 06:23:17 +02:00
/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
2002-09-04 22:31:48 +02:00
/* Procedures common to all secure sessions */
UPDATED PATCH: Attached are a revised set of SSL patches. Many of these patches are motivated by security concerns, it's not just bug fixes. The key differences (from stock 7.2.1) are: *) almost all code that directly uses the OpenSSL library is in two new files, src/interfaces/libpq/fe-ssl.c src/backend/postmaster/be-ssl.c in the long run, it would be nice to merge these two files. *) the legacy code to read and write network data have been encapsulated into read_SSL() and write_SSL(). These functions should probably be renamed - they handle both SSL and non-SSL cases. the remaining code should eliminate the problems identified earlier, albeit not very cleanly. *) both front- and back-ends will send a SSL shutdown via the new close_SSL() function. This is necessary for sessions to work properly. (Sessions are not yet fully supported, but by cleanly closing the SSL connection instead of just sending a TCP FIN packet other SSL tools will be much happier.) *) The client certificate and key are now expected in a subdirectory of the user's home directory. Specifically, - the directory .postgresql must be owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other.' - the file .postgresql/postgresql.crt must be a regular file owned by the user. - the file .postgresql/postgresql.key must be a regular file owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other'. At the current time encrypted private keys are not supported. There should also be a way to support multiple client certs/keys. *) the front-end performs minimal validation of the back-end cert. Self-signed certs are permitted, but the common name *must* match the hostname used by the front-end. (The cert itself should always use a fully qualified domain name (FDQN) in its common name field.) This means that psql -h eris db will fail, but psql -h eris.example.com db will succeed. At the current time this must be an exact match; future patches may support any FQDN that resolves to the address returned by getpeername(2). Another common "problem" is expiring certs. For now, it may be a good idea to use a very-long-lived self-signed cert. As a compile-time option, the front-end can specify a file containing valid root certificates, but it is not yet required. *) the back-end performs minimal validation of the client cert. It allows self-signed certs. It checks for expiration. It supports a compile-time option specifying a file containing valid root certificates. *) both front- and back-ends default to TLSv1, not SSLv3/SSLv2. *) both front- and back-ends support DSA keys. DSA keys are moderately more expensive on startup, but many people consider them preferable than RSA keys. (E.g., SSH2 prefers DSA keys.) *) if /dev/urandom exists, both client and server will read 16k of randomization data from it. *) the server can read empheral DH parameters from the files $DataDir/dh512.pem $DataDir/dh1024.pem $DataDir/dh2048.pem $DataDir/dh4096.pem if none are provided, the server will default to hardcoded parameter files provided by the OpenSSL project. Remaining tasks: *) the select() clauses need to be revisited - the SSL abstraction layer may need to absorb more of the current code to avoid rare deadlock conditions. This also touches on a true solution to the pg_eof() problem. *) the SIGPIPE signal handler may need to be revisited. *) support encrypted private keys. *) sessions are not yet fully supported. (SSL sessions can span multiple "connections," and allow the client and server to avoid costly renegotiations.) *) makecert - a script that creates back-end certs. *) pgkeygen - a tool that creates front-end certs. *) the whole protocol issue, SASL, etc. *) certs are fully validated - valid root certs must be available. This is a hassle, but it means that you *can* trust the identity of the server. *) the client library can handle hardcoded root certificates, to avoid the need to copy these files. *) host name of server cert must resolve to IP address, or be a recognized alias. This is more liberal than the previous iteration. *) the number of bytes transferred is tracked, and the session key is periodically renegotiated. *) basic cert generation scripts (mkcert.sh, pgkeygen.sh). The configuration files have reasonable defaults for each type of use. Bear Giles
2002-06-14 06:23:17 +02:00
/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
/*
* Exported function to allow application to tell us it's already
* initialized OpenSSL.
*/
void
PQinitSSL(int do_init)
{
#ifdef USE_SSL
pgtls_init_library(do_init, do_init);
#endif
}
/*
* Exported function to allow application to tell us it's already
* initialized OpenSSL and/or libcrypto.
*/
void
PQinitOpenSSL(int do_ssl, int do_crypto)
{
#ifdef USE_SSL
pgtls_init_library(do_ssl, do_crypto);
#endif
}
UPDATED PATCH: Attached are a revised set of SSL patches. Many of these patches are motivated by security concerns, it's not just bug fixes. The key differences (from stock 7.2.1) are: *) almost all code that directly uses the OpenSSL library is in two new files, src/interfaces/libpq/fe-ssl.c src/backend/postmaster/be-ssl.c in the long run, it would be nice to merge these two files. *) the legacy code to read and write network data have been encapsulated into read_SSL() and write_SSL(). These functions should probably be renamed - they handle both SSL and non-SSL cases. the remaining code should eliminate the problems identified earlier, albeit not very cleanly. *) both front- and back-ends will send a SSL shutdown via the new close_SSL() function. This is necessary for sessions to work properly. (Sessions are not yet fully supported, but by cleanly closing the SSL connection instead of just sending a TCP FIN packet other SSL tools will be much happier.) *) The client certificate and key are now expected in a subdirectory of the user's home directory. Specifically, - the directory .postgresql must be owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other.' - the file .postgresql/postgresql.crt must be a regular file owned by the user. - the file .postgresql/postgresql.key must be a regular file owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other'. At the current time encrypted private keys are not supported. There should also be a way to support multiple client certs/keys. *) the front-end performs minimal validation of the back-end cert. Self-signed certs are permitted, but the common name *must* match the hostname used by the front-end. (The cert itself should always use a fully qualified domain name (FDQN) in its common name field.) This means that psql -h eris db will fail, but psql -h eris.example.com db will succeed. At the current time this must be an exact match; future patches may support any FQDN that resolves to the address returned by getpeername(2). Another common "problem" is expiring certs. For now, it may be a good idea to use a very-long-lived self-signed cert. As a compile-time option, the front-end can specify a file containing valid root certificates, but it is not yet required. *) the back-end performs minimal validation of the client cert. It allows self-signed certs. It checks for expiration. It supports a compile-time option specifying a file containing valid root certificates. *) both front- and back-ends default to TLSv1, not SSLv3/SSLv2. *) both front- and back-ends support DSA keys. DSA keys are moderately more expensive on startup, but many people consider them preferable than RSA keys. (E.g., SSH2 prefers DSA keys.) *) if /dev/urandom exists, both client and server will read 16k of randomization data from it. *) the server can read empheral DH parameters from the files $DataDir/dh512.pem $DataDir/dh1024.pem $DataDir/dh2048.pem $DataDir/dh4096.pem if none are provided, the server will default to hardcoded parameter files provided by the OpenSSL project. Remaining tasks: *) the select() clauses need to be revisited - the SSL abstraction layer may need to absorb more of the current code to avoid rare deadlock conditions. This also touches on a true solution to the pg_eof() problem. *) the SIGPIPE signal handler may need to be revisited. *) support encrypted private keys. *) sessions are not yet fully supported. (SSL sessions can span multiple "connections," and allow the client and server to avoid costly renegotiations.) *) makecert - a script that creates back-end certs. *) pgkeygen - a tool that creates front-end certs. *) the whole protocol issue, SASL, etc. *) certs are fully validated - valid root certs must be available. This is a hassle, but it means that you *can* trust the identity of the server. *) the client library can handle hardcoded root certificates, to avoid the need to copy these files. *) host name of server cert must resolve to IP address, or be a recognized alias. This is more liberal than the previous iteration. *) the number of bytes transferred is tracked, and the session key is periodically renegotiated. *) basic cert generation scripts (mkcert.sh, pgkeygen.sh). The configuration files have reasonable defaults for each type of use. Bear Giles
2002-06-14 06:23:17 +02:00
/*
* Initialize global SSL context
UPDATED PATCH: Attached are a revised set of SSL patches. Many of these patches are motivated by security concerns, it's not just bug fixes. The key differences (from stock 7.2.1) are: *) almost all code that directly uses the OpenSSL library is in two new files, src/interfaces/libpq/fe-ssl.c src/backend/postmaster/be-ssl.c in the long run, it would be nice to merge these two files. *) the legacy code to read and write network data have been encapsulated into read_SSL() and write_SSL(). These functions should probably be renamed - they handle both SSL and non-SSL cases. the remaining code should eliminate the problems identified earlier, albeit not very cleanly. *) both front- and back-ends will send a SSL shutdown via the new close_SSL() function. This is necessary for sessions to work properly. (Sessions are not yet fully supported, but by cleanly closing the SSL connection instead of just sending a TCP FIN packet other SSL tools will be much happier.) *) The client certificate and key are now expected in a subdirectory of the user's home directory. Specifically, - the directory .postgresql must be owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other.' - the file .postgresql/postgresql.crt must be a regular file owned by the user. - the file .postgresql/postgresql.key must be a regular file owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other'. At the current time encrypted private keys are not supported. There should also be a way to support multiple client certs/keys. *) the front-end performs minimal validation of the back-end cert. Self-signed certs are permitted, but the common name *must* match the hostname used by the front-end. (The cert itself should always use a fully qualified domain name (FDQN) in its common name field.) This means that psql -h eris db will fail, but psql -h eris.example.com db will succeed. At the current time this must be an exact match; future patches may support any FQDN that resolves to the address returned by getpeername(2). Another common "problem" is expiring certs. For now, it may be a good idea to use a very-long-lived self-signed cert. As a compile-time option, the front-end can specify a file containing valid root certificates, but it is not yet required. *) the back-end performs minimal validation of the client cert. It allows self-signed certs. It checks for expiration. It supports a compile-time option specifying a file containing valid root certificates. *) both front- and back-ends default to TLSv1, not SSLv3/SSLv2. *) both front- and back-ends support DSA keys. DSA keys are moderately more expensive on startup, but many people consider them preferable than RSA keys. (E.g., SSH2 prefers DSA keys.) *) if /dev/urandom exists, both client and server will read 16k of randomization data from it. *) the server can read empheral DH parameters from the files $DataDir/dh512.pem $DataDir/dh1024.pem $DataDir/dh2048.pem $DataDir/dh4096.pem if none are provided, the server will default to hardcoded parameter files provided by the OpenSSL project. Remaining tasks: *) the select() clauses need to be revisited - the SSL abstraction layer may need to absorb more of the current code to avoid rare deadlock conditions. This also touches on a true solution to the pg_eof() problem. *) the SIGPIPE signal handler may need to be revisited. *) support encrypted private keys. *) sessions are not yet fully supported. (SSL sessions can span multiple "connections," and allow the client and server to avoid costly renegotiations.) *) makecert - a script that creates back-end certs. *) pgkeygen - a tool that creates front-end certs. *) the whole protocol issue, SASL, etc. *) certs are fully validated - valid root certs must be available. This is a hassle, but it means that you *can* trust the identity of the server. *) the client library can handle hardcoded root certificates, to avoid the need to copy these files. *) host name of server cert must resolve to IP address, or be a recognized alias. This is more liberal than the previous iteration. *) the number of bytes transferred is tracked, and the session key is periodically renegotiated. *) basic cert generation scripts (mkcert.sh, pgkeygen.sh). The configuration files have reasonable defaults for each type of use. Bear Giles
2002-06-14 06:23:17 +02:00
*/
int
2002-09-04 22:31:48 +02:00
pqsecure_initialize(PGconn *conn)
UPDATED PATCH: Attached are a revised set of SSL patches. Many of these patches are motivated by security concerns, it's not just bug fixes. The key differences (from stock 7.2.1) are: *) almost all code that directly uses the OpenSSL library is in two new files, src/interfaces/libpq/fe-ssl.c src/backend/postmaster/be-ssl.c in the long run, it would be nice to merge these two files. *) the legacy code to read and write network data have been encapsulated into read_SSL() and write_SSL(). These functions should probably be renamed - they handle both SSL and non-SSL cases. the remaining code should eliminate the problems identified earlier, albeit not very cleanly. *) both front- and back-ends will send a SSL shutdown via the new close_SSL() function. This is necessary for sessions to work properly. (Sessions are not yet fully supported, but by cleanly closing the SSL connection instead of just sending a TCP FIN packet other SSL tools will be much happier.) *) The client certificate and key are now expected in a subdirectory of the user's home directory. Specifically, - the directory .postgresql must be owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other.' - the file .postgresql/postgresql.crt must be a regular file owned by the user. - the file .postgresql/postgresql.key must be a regular file owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other'. At the current time encrypted private keys are not supported. There should also be a way to support multiple client certs/keys. *) the front-end performs minimal validation of the back-end cert. Self-signed certs are permitted, but the common name *must* match the hostname used by the front-end. (The cert itself should always use a fully qualified domain name (FDQN) in its common name field.) This means that psql -h eris db will fail, but psql -h eris.example.com db will succeed. At the current time this must be an exact match; future patches may support any FQDN that resolves to the address returned by getpeername(2). Another common "problem" is expiring certs. For now, it may be a good idea to use a very-long-lived self-signed cert. As a compile-time option, the front-end can specify a file containing valid root certificates, but it is not yet required. *) the back-end performs minimal validation of the client cert. It allows self-signed certs. It checks for expiration. It supports a compile-time option specifying a file containing valid root certificates. *) both front- and back-ends default to TLSv1, not SSLv3/SSLv2. *) both front- and back-ends support DSA keys. DSA keys are moderately more expensive on startup, but many people consider them preferable than RSA keys. (E.g., SSH2 prefers DSA keys.) *) if /dev/urandom exists, both client and server will read 16k of randomization data from it. *) the server can read empheral DH parameters from the files $DataDir/dh512.pem $DataDir/dh1024.pem $DataDir/dh2048.pem $DataDir/dh4096.pem if none are provided, the server will default to hardcoded parameter files provided by the OpenSSL project. Remaining tasks: *) the select() clauses need to be revisited - the SSL abstraction layer may need to absorb more of the current code to avoid rare deadlock conditions. This also touches on a true solution to the pg_eof() problem. *) the SIGPIPE signal handler may need to be revisited. *) support encrypted private keys. *) sessions are not yet fully supported. (SSL sessions can span multiple "connections," and allow the client and server to avoid costly renegotiations.) *) makecert - a script that creates back-end certs. *) pgkeygen - a tool that creates front-end certs. *) the whole protocol issue, SASL, etc. *) certs are fully validated - valid root certs must be available. This is a hassle, but it means that you *can* trust the identity of the server. *) the client library can handle hardcoded root certificates, to avoid the need to copy these files. *) host name of server cert must resolve to IP address, or be a recognized alias. This is more liberal than the previous iteration. *) the number of bytes transferred is tracked, and the session key is periodically renegotiated. *) basic cert generation scripts (mkcert.sh, pgkeygen.sh). The configuration files have reasonable defaults for each type of use. Bear Giles
2002-06-14 06:23:17 +02:00
{
2002-09-04 22:31:48 +02:00
int r = 0;
UPDATED PATCH: Attached are a revised set of SSL patches. Many of these patches are motivated by security concerns, it's not just bug fixes. The key differences (from stock 7.2.1) are: *) almost all code that directly uses the OpenSSL library is in two new files, src/interfaces/libpq/fe-ssl.c src/backend/postmaster/be-ssl.c in the long run, it would be nice to merge these two files. *) the legacy code to read and write network data have been encapsulated into read_SSL() and write_SSL(). These functions should probably be renamed - they handle both SSL and non-SSL cases. the remaining code should eliminate the problems identified earlier, albeit not very cleanly. *) both front- and back-ends will send a SSL shutdown via the new close_SSL() function. This is necessary for sessions to work properly. (Sessions are not yet fully supported, but by cleanly closing the SSL connection instead of just sending a TCP FIN packet other SSL tools will be much happier.) *) The client certificate and key are now expected in a subdirectory of the user's home directory. Specifically, - the directory .postgresql must be owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other.' - the file .postgresql/postgresql.crt must be a regular file owned by the user. - the file .postgresql/postgresql.key must be a regular file owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other'. At the current time encrypted private keys are not supported. There should also be a way to support multiple client certs/keys. *) the front-end performs minimal validation of the back-end cert. Self-signed certs are permitted, but the common name *must* match the hostname used by the front-end. (The cert itself should always use a fully qualified domain name (FDQN) in its common name field.) This means that psql -h eris db will fail, but psql -h eris.example.com db will succeed. At the current time this must be an exact match; future patches may support any FQDN that resolves to the address returned by getpeername(2). Another common "problem" is expiring certs. For now, it may be a good idea to use a very-long-lived self-signed cert. As a compile-time option, the front-end can specify a file containing valid root certificates, but it is not yet required. *) the back-end performs minimal validation of the client cert. It allows self-signed certs. It checks for expiration. It supports a compile-time option specifying a file containing valid root certificates. *) both front- and back-ends default to TLSv1, not SSLv3/SSLv2. *) both front- and back-ends support DSA keys. DSA keys are moderately more expensive on startup, but many people consider them preferable than RSA keys. (E.g., SSH2 prefers DSA keys.) *) if /dev/urandom exists, both client and server will read 16k of randomization data from it. *) the server can read empheral DH parameters from the files $DataDir/dh512.pem $DataDir/dh1024.pem $DataDir/dh2048.pem $DataDir/dh4096.pem if none are provided, the server will default to hardcoded parameter files provided by the OpenSSL project. Remaining tasks: *) the select() clauses need to be revisited - the SSL abstraction layer may need to absorb more of the current code to avoid rare deadlock conditions. This also touches on a true solution to the pg_eof() problem. *) the SIGPIPE signal handler may need to be revisited. *) support encrypted private keys. *) sessions are not yet fully supported. (SSL sessions can span multiple "connections," and allow the client and server to avoid costly renegotiations.) *) makecert - a script that creates back-end certs. *) pgkeygen - a tool that creates front-end certs. *) the whole protocol issue, SASL, etc. *) certs are fully validated - valid root certs must be available. This is a hassle, but it means that you *can* trust the identity of the server. *) the client library can handle hardcoded root certificates, to avoid the need to copy these files. *) host name of server cert must resolve to IP address, or be a recognized alias. This is more liberal than the previous iteration. *) the number of bytes transferred is tracked, and the session key is periodically renegotiated. *) basic cert generation scripts (mkcert.sh, pgkeygen.sh). The configuration files have reasonable defaults for each type of use. Bear Giles
2002-06-14 06:23:17 +02:00
#ifdef USE_SSL
r = pgtls_init(conn);
UPDATED PATCH: Attached are a revised set of SSL patches. Many of these patches are motivated by security concerns, it's not just bug fixes. The key differences (from stock 7.2.1) are: *) almost all code that directly uses the OpenSSL library is in two new files, src/interfaces/libpq/fe-ssl.c src/backend/postmaster/be-ssl.c in the long run, it would be nice to merge these two files. *) the legacy code to read and write network data have been encapsulated into read_SSL() and write_SSL(). These functions should probably be renamed - they handle both SSL and non-SSL cases. the remaining code should eliminate the problems identified earlier, albeit not very cleanly. *) both front- and back-ends will send a SSL shutdown via the new close_SSL() function. This is necessary for sessions to work properly. (Sessions are not yet fully supported, but by cleanly closing the SSL connection instead of just sending a TCP FIN packet other SSL tools will be much happier.) *) The client certificate and key are now expected in a subdirectory of the user's home directory. Specifically, - the directory .postgresql must be owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other.' - the file .postgresql/postgresql.crt must be a regular file owned by the user. - the file .postgresql/postgresql.key must be a regular file owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other'. At the current time encrypted private keys are not supported. There should also be a way to support multiple client certs/keys. *) the front-end performs minimal validation of the back-end cert. Self-signed certs are permitted, but the common name *must* match the hostname used by the front-end. (The cert itself should always use a fully qualified domain name (FDQN) in its common name field.) This means that psql -h eris db will fail, but psql -h eris.example.com db will succeed. At the current time this must be an exact match; future patches may support any FQDN that resolves to the address returned by getpeername(2). Another common "problem" is expiring certs. For now, it may be a good idea to use a very-long-lived self-signed cert. As a compile-time option, the front-end can specify a file containing valid root certificates, but it is not yet required. *) the back-end performs minimal validation of the client cert. It allows self-signed certs. It checks for expiration. It supports a compile-time option specifying a file containing valid root certificates. *) both front- and back-ends default to TLSv1, not SSLv3/SSLv2. *) both front- and back-ends support DSA keys. DSA keys are moderately more expensive on startup, but many people consider them preferable than RSA keys. (E.g., SSH2 prefers DSA keys.) *) if /dev/urandom exists, both client and server will read 16k of randomization data from it. *) the server can read empheral DH parameters from the files $DataDir/dh512.pem $DataDir/dh1024.pem $DataDir/dh2048.pem $DataDir/dh4096.pem if none are provided, the server will default to hardcoded parameter files provided by the OpenSSL project. Remaining tasks: *) the select() clauses need to be revisited - the SSL abstraction layer may need to absorb more of the current code to avoid rare deadlock conditions. This also touches on a true solution to the pg_eof() problem. *) the SIGPIPE signal handler may need to be revisited. *) support encrypted private keys. *) sessions are not yet fully supported. (SSL sessions can span multiple "connections," and allow the client and server to avoid costly renegotiations.) *) makecert - a script that creates back-end certs. *) pgkeygen - a tool that creates front-end certs. *) the whole protocol issue, SASL, etc. *) certs are fully validated - valid root certs must be available. This is a hassle, but it means that you *can* trust the identity of the server. *) the client library can handle hardcoded root certificates, to avoid the need to copy these files. *) host name of server cert must resolve to IP address, or be a recognized alias. This is more liberal than the previous iteration. *) the number of bytes transferred is tracked, and the session key is periodically renegotiated. *) basic cert generation scripts (mkcert.sh, pgkeygen.sh). The configuration files have reasonable defaults for each type of use. Bear Giles
2002-06-14 06:23:17 +02:00
#endif
return r;
}
/*
* Begin or continue negotiating a secure session.
UPDATED PATCH: Attached are a revised set of SSL patches. Many of these patches are motivated by security concerns, it's not just bug fixes. The key differences (from stock 7.2.1) are: *) almost all code that directly uses the OpenSSL library is in two new files, src/interfaces/libpq/fe-ssl.c src/backend/postmaster/be-ssl.c in the long run, it would be nice to merge these two files. *) the legacy code to read and write network data have been encapsulated into read_SSL() and write_SSL(). These functions should probably be renamed - they handle both SSL and non-SSL cases. the remaining code should eliminate the problems identified earlier, albeit not very cleanly. *) both front- and back-ends will send a SSL shutdown via the new close_SSL() function. This is necessary for sessions to work properly. (Sessions are not yet fully supported, but by cleanly closing the SSL connection instead of just sending a TCP FIN packet other SSL tools will be much happier.) *) The client certificate and key are now expected in a subdirectory of the user's home directory. Specifically, - the directory .postgresql must be owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other.' - the file .postgresql/postgresql.crt must be a regular file owned by the user. - the file .postgresql/postgresql.key must be a regular file owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other'. At the current time encrypted private keys are not supported. There should also be a way to support multiple client certs/keys. *) the front-end performs minimal validation of the back-end cert. Self-signed certs are permitted, but the common name *must* match the hostname used by the front-end. (The cert itself should always use a fully qualified domain name (FDQN) in its common name field.) This means that psql -h eris db will fail, but psql -h eris.example.com db will succeed. At the current time this must be an exact match; future patches may support any FQDN that resolves to the address returned by getpeername(2). Another common "problem" is expiring certs. For now, it may be a good idea to use a very-long-lived self-signed cert. As a compile-time option, the front-end can specify a file containing valid root certificates, but it is not yet required. *) the back-end performs minimal validation of the client cert. It allows self-signed certs. It checks for expiration. It supports a compile-time option specifying a file containing valid root certificates. *) both front- and back-ends default to TLSv1, not SSLv3/SSLv2. *) both front- and back-ends support DSA keys. DSA keys are moderately more expensive on startup, but many people consider them preferable than RSA keys. (E.g., SSH2 prefers DSA keys.) *) if /dev/urandom exists, both client and server will read 16k of randomization data from it. *) the server can read empheral DH parameters from the files $DataDir/dh512.pem $DataDir/dh1024.pem $DataDir/dh2048.pem $DataDir/dh4096.pem if none are provided, the server will default to hardcoded parameter files provided by the OpenSSL project. Remaining tasks: *) the select() clauses need to be revisited - the SSL abstraction layer may need to absorb more of the current code to avoid rare deadlock conditions. This also touches on a true solution to the pg_eof() problem. *) the SIGPIPE signal handler may need to be revisited. *) support encrypted private keys. *) sessions are not yet fully supported. (SSL sessions can span multiple "connections," and allow the client and server to avoid costly renegotiations.) *) makecert - a script that creates back-end certs. *) pgkeygen - a tool that creates front-end certs. *) the whole protocol issue, SASL, etc. *) certs are fully validated - valid root certs must be available. This is a hassle, but it means that you *can* trust the identity of the server. *) the client library can handle hardcoded root certificates, to avoid the need to copy these files. *) host name of server cert must resolve to IP address, or be a recognized alias. This is more liberal than the previous iteration. *) the number of bytes transferred is tracked, and the session key is periodically renegotiated. *) basic cert generation scripts (mkcert.sh, pgkeygen.sh). The configuration files have reasonable defaults for each type of use. Bear Giles
2002-06-14 06:23:17 +02:00
*/
PostgresPollingStatusType
2002-09-04 22:31:48 +02:00
pqsecure_open_client(PGconn *conn)
UPDATED PATCH: Attached are a revised set of SSL patches. Many of these patches are motivated by security concerns, it's not just bug fixes. The key differences (from stock 7.2.1) are: *) almost all code that directly uses the OpenSSL library is in two new files, src/interfaces/libpq/fe-ssl.c src/backend/postmaster/be-ssl.c in the long run, it would be nice to merge these two files. *) the legacy code to read and write network data have been encapsulated into read_SSL() and write_SSL(). These functions should probably be renamed - they handle both SSL and non-SSL cases. the remaining code should eliminate the problems identified earlier, albeit not very cleanly. *) both front- and back-ends will send a SSL shutdown via the new close_SSL() function. This is necessary for sessions to work properly. (Sessions are not yet fully supported, but by cleanly closing the SSL connection instead of just sending a TCP FIN packet other SSL tools will be much happier.) *) The client certificate and key are now expected in a subdirectory of the user's home directory. Specifically, - the directory .postgresql must be owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other.' - the file .postgresql/postgresql.crt must be a regular file owned by the user. - the file .postgresql/postgresql.key must be a regular file owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other'. At the current time encrypted private keys are not supported. There should also be a way to support multiple client certs/keys. *) the front-end performs minimal validation of the back-end cert. Self-signed certs are permitted, but the common name *must* match the hostname used by the front-end. (The cert itself should always use a fully qualified domain name (FDQN) in its common name field.) This means that psql -h eris db will fail, but psql -h eris.example.com db will succeed. At the current time this must be an exact match; future patches may support any FQDN that resolves to the address returned by getpeername(2). Another common "problem" is expiring certs. For now, it may be a good idea to use a very-long-lived self-signed cert. As a compile-time option, the front-end can specify a file containing valid root certificates, but it is not yet required. *) the back-end performs minimal validation of the client cert. It allows self-signed certs. It checks for expiration. It supports a compile-time option specifying a file containing valid root certificates. *) both front- and back-ends default to TLSv1, not SSLv3/SSLv2. *) both front- and back-ends support DSA keys. DSA keys are moderately more expensive on startup, but many people consider them preferable than RSA keys. (E.g., SSH2 prefers DSA keys.) *) if /dev/urandom exists, both client and server will read 16k of randomization data from it. *) the server can read empheral DH parameters from the files $DataDir/dh512.pem $DataDir/dh1024.pem $DataDir/dh2048.pem $DataDir/dh4096.pem if none are provided, the server will default to hardcoded parameter files provided by the OpenSSL project. Remaining tasks: *) the select() clauses need to be revisited - the SSL abstraction layer may need to absorb more of the current code to avoid rare deadlock conditions. This also touches on a true solution to the pg_eof() problem. *) the SIGPIPE signal handler may need to be revisited. *) support encrypted private keys. *) sessions are not yet fully supported. (SSL sessions can span multiple "connections," and allow the client and server to avoid costly renegotiations.) *) makecert - a script that creates back-end certs. *) pgkeygen - a tool that creates front-end certs. *) the whole protocol issue, SASL, etc. *) certs are fully validated - valid root certs must be available. This is a hassle, but it means that you *can* trust the identity of the server. *) the client library can handle hardcoded root certificates, to avoid the need to copy these files. *) host name of server cert must resolve to IP address, or be a recognized alias. This is more liberal than the previous iteration. *) the number of bytes transferred is tracked, and the session key is periodically renegotiated. *) basic cert generation scripts (mkcert.sh, pgkeygen.sh). The configuration files have reasonable defaults for each type of use. Bear Giles
2002-06-14 06:23:17 +02:00
{
#ifdef USE_SSL
return pgtls_open_client(conn);
#else
/* shouldn't get here */
return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
UPDATED PATCH: Attached are a revised set of SSL patches. Many of these patches are motivated by security concerns, it's not just bug fixes. The key differences (from stock 7.2.1) are: *) almost all code that directly uses the OpenSSL library is in two new files, src/interfaces/libpq/fe-ssl.c src/backend/postmaster/be-ssl.c in the long run, it would be nice to merge these two files. *) the legacy code to read and write network data have been encapsulated into read_SSL() and write_SSL(). These functions should probably be renamed - they handle both SSL and non-SSL cases. the remaining code should eliminate the problems identified earlier, albeit not very cleanly. *) both front- and back-ends will send a SSL shutdown via the new close_SSL() function. This is necessary for sessions to work properly. (Sessions are not yet fully supported, but by cleanly closing the SSL connection instead of just sending a TCP FIN packet other SSL tools will be much happier.) *) The client certificate and key are now expected in a subdirectory of the user's home directory. Specifically, - the directory .postgresql must be owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other.' - the file .postgresql/postgresql.crt must be a regular file owned by the user. - the file .postgresql/postgresql.key must be a regular file owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other'. At the current time encrypted private keys are not supported. There should also be a way to support multiple client certs/keys. *) the front-end performs minimal validation of the back-end cert. Self-signed certs are permitted, but the common name *must* match the hostname used by the front-end. (The cert itself should always use a fully qualified domain name (FDQN) in its common name field.) This means that psql -h eris db will fail, but psql -h eris.example.com db will succeed. At the current time this must be an exact match; future patches may support any FQDN that resolves to the address returned by getpeername(2). Another common "problem" is expiring certs. For now, it may be a good idea to use a very-long-lived self-signed cert. As a compile-time option, the front-end can specify a file containing valid root certificates, but it is not yet required. *) the back-end performs minimal validation of the client cert. It allows self-signed certs. It checks for expiration. It supports a compile-time option specifying a file containing valid root certificates. *) both front- and back-ends default to TLSv1, not SSLv3/SSLv2. *) both front- and back-ends support DSA keys. DSA keys are moderately more expensive on startup, but many people consider them preferable than RSA keys. (E.g., SSH2 prefers DSA keys.) *) if /dev/urandom exists, both client and server will read 16k of randomization data from it. *) the server can read empheral DH parameters from the files $DataDir/dh512.pem $DataDir/dh1024.pem $DataDir/dh2048.pem $DataDir/dh4096.pem if none are provided, the server will default to hardcoded parameter files provided by the OpenSSL project. Remaining tasks: *) the select() clauses need to be revisited - the SSL abstraction layer may need to absorb more of the current code to avoid rare deadlock conditions. This also touches on a true solution to the pg_eof() problem. *) the SIGPIPE signal handler may need to be revisited. *) support encrypted private keys. *) sessions are not yet fully supported. (SSL sessions can span multiple "connections," and allow the client and server to avoid costly renegotiations.) *) makecert - a script that creates back-end certs. *) pgkeygen - a tool that creates front-end certs. *) the whole protocol issue, SASL, etc. *) certs are fully validated - valid root certs must be available. This is a hassle, but it means that you *can* trust the identity of the server. *) the client library can handle hardcoded root certificates, to avoid the need to copy these files. *) host name of server cert must resolve to IP address, or be a recognized alias. This is more liberal than the previous iteration. *) the number of bytes transferred is tracked, and the session key is periodically renegotiated. *) basic cert generation scripts (mkcert.sh, pgkeygen.sh). The configuration files have reasonable defaults for each type of use. Bear Giles
2002-06-14 06:23:17 +02:00
#endif
}
/*
* Close secure session.
*/
void
2002-09-04 22:31:48 +02:00
pqsecure_close(PGconn *conn)
UPDATED PATCH: Attached are a revised set of SSL patches. Many of these patches are motivated by security concerns, it's not just bug fixes. The key differences (from stock 7.2.1) are: *) almost all code that directly uses the OpenSSL library is in two new files, src/interfaces/libpq/fe-ssl.c src/backend/postmaster/be-ssl.c in the long run, it would be nice to merge these two files. *) the legacy code to read and write network data have been encapsulated into read_SSL() and write_SSL(). These functions should probably be renamed - they handle both SSL and non-SSL cases. the remaining code should eliminate the problems identified earlier, albeit not very cleanly. *) both front- and back-ends will send a SSL shutdown via the new close_SSL() function. This is necessary for sessions to work properly. (Sessions are not yet fully supported, but by cleanly closing the SSL connection instead of just sending a TCP FIN packet other SSL tools will be much happier.) *) The client certificate and key are now expected in a subdirectory of the user's home directory. Specifically, - the directory .postgresql must be owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other.' - the file .postgresql/postgresql.crt must be a regular file owned by the user. - the file .postgresql/postgresql.key must be a regular file owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other'. At the current time encrypted private keys are not supported. There should also be a way to support multiple client certs/keys. *) the front-end performs minimal validation of the back-end cert. Self-signed certs are permitted, but the common name *must* match the hostname used by the front-end. (The cert itself should always use a fully qualified domain name (FDQN) in its common name field.) This means that psql -h eris db will fail, but psql -h eris.example.com db will succeed. At the current time this must be an exact match; future patches may support any FQDN that resolves to the address returned by getpeername(2). Another common "problem" is expiring certs. For now, it may be a good idea to use a very-long-lived self-signed cert. As a compile-time option, the front-end can specify a file containing valid root certificates, but it is not yet required. *) the back-end performs minimal validation of the client cert. It allows self-signed certs. It checks for expiration. It supports a compile-time option specifying a file containing valid root certificates. *) both front- and back-ends default to TLSv1, not SSLv3/SSLv2. *) both front- and back-ends support DSA keys. DSA keys are moderately more expensive on startup, but many people consider them preferable than RSA keys. (E.g., SSH2 prefers DSA keys.) *) if /dev/urandom exists, both client and server will read 16k of randomization data from it. *) the server can read empheral DH parameters from the files $DataDir/dh512.pem $DataDir/dh1024.pem $DataDir/dh2048.pem $DataDir/dh4096.pem if none are provided, the server will default to hardcoded parameter files provided by the OpenSSL project. Remaining tasks: *) the select() clauses need to be revisited - the SSL abstraction layer may need to absorb more of the current code to avoid rare deadlock conditions. This also touches on a true solution to the pg_eof() problem. *) the SIGPIPE signal handler may need to be revisited. *) support encrypted private keys. *) sessions are not yet fully supported. (SSL sessions can span multiple "connections," and allow the client and server to avoid costly renegotiations.) *) makecert - a script that creates back-end certs. *) pgkeygen - a tool that creates front-end certs. *) the whole protocol issue, SASL, etc. *) certs are fully validated - valid root certs must be available. This is a hassle, but it means that you *can* trust the identity of the server. *) the client library can handle hardcoded root certificates, to avoid the need to copy these files. *) host name of server cert must resolve to IP address, or be a recognized alias. This is more liberal than the previous iteration. *) the number of bytes transferred is tracked, and the session key is periodically renegotiated. *) basic cert generation scripts (mkcert.sh, pgkeygen.sh). The configuration files have reasonable defaults for each type of use. Bear Giles
2002-06-14 06:23:17 +02:00
{
#ifdef USE_SSL
if (conn->ssl_in_use)
pgtls_close(conn);
UPDATED PATCH: Attached are a revised set of SSL patches. Many of these patches are motivated by security concerns, it's not just bug fixes. The key differences (from stock 7.2.1) are: *) almost all code that directly uses the OpenSSL library is in two new files, src/interfaces/libpq/fe-ssl.c src/backend/postmaster/be-ssl.c in the long run, it would be nice to merge these two files. *) the legacy code to read and write network data have been encapsulated into read_SSL() and write_SSL(). These functions should probably be renamed - they handle both SSL and non-SSL cases. the remaining code should eliminate the problems identified earlier, albeit not very cleanly. *) both front- and back-ends will send a SSL shutdown via the new close_SSL() function. This is necessary for sessions to work properly. (Sessions are not yet fully supported, but by cleanly closing the SSL connection instead of just sending a TCP FIN packet other SSL tools will be much happier.) *) The client certificate and key are now expected in a subdirectory of the user's home directory. Specifically, - the directory .postgresql must be owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other.' - the file .postgresql/postgresql.crt must be a regular file owned by the user. - the file .postgresql/postgresql.key must be a regular file owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other'. At the current time encrypted private keys are not supported. There should also be a way to support multiple client certs/keys. *) the front-end performs minimal validation of the back-end cert. Self-signed certs are permitted, but the common name *must* match the hostname used by the front-end. (The cert itself should always use a fully qualified domain name (FDQN) in its common name field.) This means that psql -h eris db will fail, but psql -h eris.example.com db will succeed. At the current time this must be an exact match; future patches may support any FQDN that resolves to the address returned by getpeername(2). Another common "problem" is expiring certs. For now, it may be a good idea to use a very-long-lived self-signed cert. As a compile-time option, the front-end can specify a file containing valid root certificates, but it is not yet required. *) the back-end performs minimal validation of the client cert. It allows self-signed certs. It checks for expiration. It supports a compile-time option specifying a file containing valid root certificates. *) both front- and back-ends default to TLSv1, not SSLv3/SSLv2. *) both front- and back-ends support DSA keys. DSA keys are moderately more expensive on startup, but many people consider them preferable than RSA keys. (E.g., SSH2 prefers DSA keys.) *) if /dev/urandom exists, both client and server will read 16k of randomization data from it. *) the server can read empheral DH parameters from the files $DataDir/dh512.pem $DataDir/dh1024.pem $DataDir/dh2048.pem $DataDir/dh4096.pem if none are provided, the server will default to hardcoded parameter files provided by the OpenSSL project. Remaining tasks: *) the select() clauses need to be revisited - the SSL abstraction layer may need to absorb more of the current code to avoid rare deadlock conditions. This also touches on a true solution to the pg_eof() problem. *) the SIGPIPE signal handler may need to be revisited. *) support encrypted private keys. *) sessions are not yet fully supported. (SSL sessions can span multiple "connections," and allow the client and server to avoid costly renegotiations.) *) makecert - a script that creates back-end certs. *) pgkeygen - a tool that creates front-end certs. *) the whole protocol issue, SASL, etc. *) certs are fully validated - valid root certs must be available. This is a hassle, but it means that you *can* trust the identity of the server. *) the client library can handle hardcoded root certificates, to avoid the need to copy these files. *) host name of server cert must resolve to IP address, or be a recognized alias. This is more liberal than the previous iteration. *) the number of bytes transferred is tracked, and the session key is periodically renegotiated. *) basic cert generation scripts (mkcert.sh, pgkeygen.sh). The configuration files have reasonable defaults for each type of use. Bear Giles
2002-06-14 06:23:17 +02:00
#endif
}
/*
* Read data from a secure connection.
*
* On failure, this function is responsible for putting a suitable message
* into conn->errorMessage. The caller must still inspect errno, but only
* to determine whether to continue/retry after error.
UPDATED PATCH: Attached are a revised set of SSL patches. Many of these patches are motivated by security concerns, it's not just bug fixes. The key differences (from stock 7.2.1) are: *) almost all code that directly uses the OpenSSL library is in two new files, src/interfaces/libpq/fe-ssl.c src/backend/postmaster/be-ssl.c in the long run, it would be nice to merge these two files. *) the legacy code to read and write network data have been encapsulated into read_SSL() and write_SSL(). These functions should probably be renamed - they handle both SSL and non-SSL cases. the remaining code should eliminate the problems identified earlier, albeit not very cleanly. *) both front- and back-ends will send a SSL shutdown via the new close_SSL() function. This is necessary for sessions to work properly. (Sessions are not yet fully supported, but by cleanly closing the SSL connection instead of just sending a TCP FIN packet other SSL tools will be much happier.) *) The client certificate and key are now expected in a subdirectory of the user's home directory. Specifically, - the directory .postgresql must be owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other.' - the file .postgresql/postgresql.crt must be a regular file owned by the user. - the file .postgresql/postgresql.key must be a regular file owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other'. At the current time encrypted private keys are not supported. There should also be a way to support multiple client certs/keys. *) the front-end performs minimal validation of the back-end cert. Self-signed certs are permitted, but the common name *must* match the hostname used by the front-end. (The cert itself should always use a fully qualified domain name (FDQN) in its common name field.) This means that psql -h eris db will fail, but psql -h eris.example.com db will succeed. At the current time this must be an exact match; future patches may support any FQDN that resolves to the address returned by getpeername(2). Another common "problem" is expiring certs. For now, it may be a good idea to use a very-long-lived self-signed cert. As a compile-time option, the front-end can specify a file containing valid root certificates, but it is not yet required. *) the back-end performs minimal validation of the client cert. It allows self-signed certs. It checks for expiration. It supports a compile-time option specifying a file containing valid root certificates. *) both front- and back-ends default to TLSv1, not SSLv3/SSLv2. *) both front- and back-ends support DSA keys. DSA keys are moderately more expensive on startup, but many people consider them preferable than RSA keys. (E.g., SSH2 prefers DSA keys.) *) if /dev/urandom exists, both client and server will read 16k of randomization data from it. *) the server can read empheral DH parameters from the files $DataDir/dh512.pem $DataDir/dh1024.pem $DataDir/dh2048.pem $DataDir/dh4096.pem if none are provided, the server will default to hardcoded parameter files provided by the OpenSSL project. Remaining tasks: *) the select() clauses need to be revisited - the SSL abstraction layer may need to absorb more of the current code to avoid rare deadlock conditions. This also touches on a true solution to the pg_eof() problem. *) the SIGPIPE signal handler may need to be revisited. *) support encrypted private keys. *) sessions are not yet fully supported. (SSL sessions can span multiple "connections," and allow the client and server to avoid costly renegotiations.) *) makecert - a script that creates back-end certs. *) pgkeygen - a tool that creates front-end certs. *) the whole protocol issue, SASL, etc. *) certs are fully validated - valid root certs must be available. This is a hassle, but it means that you *can* trust the identity of the server. *) the client library can handle hardcoded root certificates, to avoid the need to copy these files. *) host name of server cert must resolve to IP address, or be a recognized alias. This is more liberal than the previous iteration. *) the number of bytes transferred is tracked, and the session key is periodically renegotiated. *) basic cert generation scripts (mkcert.sh, pgkeygen.sh). The configuration files have reasonable defaults for each type of use. Bear Giles
2002-06-14 06:23:17 +02:00
*/
ssize_t
2002-09-04 22:31:48 +02:00
pqsecure_read(PGconn *conn, void *ptr, size_t len)
UPDATED PATCH: Attached are a revised set of SSL patches. Many of these patches are motivated by security concerns, it's not just bug fixes. The key differences (from stock 7.2.1) are: *) almost all code that directly uses the OpenSSL library is in two new files, src/interfaces/libpq/fe-ssl.c src/backend/postmaster/be-ssl.c in the long run, it would be nice to merge these two files. *) the legacy code to read and write network data have been encapsulated into read_SSL() and write_SSL(). These functions should probably be renamed - they handle both SSL and non-SSL cases. the remaining code should eliminate the problems identified earlier, albeit not very cleanly. *) both front- and back-ends will send a SSL shutdown via the new close_SSL() function. This is necessary for sessions to work properly. (Sessions are not yet fully supported, but by cleanly closing the SSL connection instead of just sending a TCP FIN packet other SSL tools will be much happier.) *) The client certificate and key are now expected in a subdirectory of the user's home directory. Specifically, - the directory .postgresql must be owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other.' - the file .postgresql/postgresql.crt must be a regular file owned by the user. - the file .postgresql/postgresql.key must be a regular file owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other'. At the current time encrypted private keys are not supported. There should also be a way to support multiple client certs/keys. *) the front-end performs minimal validation of the back-end cert. Self-signed certs are permitted, but the common name *must* match the hostname used by the front-end. (The cert itself should always use a fully qualified domain name (FDQN) in its common name field.) This means that psql -h eris db will fail, but psql -h eris.example.com db will succeed. At the current time this must be an exact match; future patches may support any FQDN that resolves to the address returned by getpeername(2). Another common "problem" is expiring certs. For now, it may be a good idea to use a very-long-lived self-signed cert. As a compile-time option, the front-end can specify a file containing valid root certificates, but it is not yet required. *) the back-end performs minimal validation of the client cert. It allows self-signed certs. It checks for expiration. It supports a compile-time option specifying a file containing valid root certificates. *) both front- and back-ends default to TLSv1, not SSLv3/SSLv2. *) both front- and back-ends support DSA keys. DSA keys are moderately more expensive on startup, but many people consider them preferable than RSA keys. (E.g., SSH2 prefers DSA keys.) *) if /dev/urandom exists, both client and server will read 16k of randomization data from it. *) the server can read empheral DH parameters from the files $DataDir/dh512.pem $DataDir/dh1024.pem $DataDir/dh2048.pem $DataDir/dh4096.pem if none are provided, the server will default to hardcoded parameter files provided by the OpenSSL project. Remaining tasks: *) the select() clauses need to be revisited - the SSL abstraction layer may need to absorb more of the current code to avoid rare deadlock conditions. This also touches on a true solution to the pg_eof() problem. *) the SIGPIPE signal handler may need to be revisited. *) support encrypted private keys. *) sessions are not yet fully supported. (SSL sessions can span multiple "connections," and allow the client and server to avoid costly renegotiations.) *) makecert - a script that creates back-end certs. *) pgkeygen - a tool that creates front-end certs. *) the whole protocol issue, SASL, etc. *) certs are fully validated - valid root certs must be available. This is a hassle, but it means that you *can* trust the identity of the server. *) the client library can handle hardcoded root certificates, to avoid the need to copy these files. *) host name of server cert must resolve to IP address, or be a recognized alias. This is more liberal than the previous iteration. *) the number of bytes transferred is tracked, and the session key is periodically renegotiated. *) basic cert generation scripts (mkcert.sh, pgkeygen.sh). The configuration files have reasonable defaults for each type of use. Bear Giles
2002-06-14 06:23:17 +02:00
{
2002-09-04 22:31:48 +02:00
ssize_t n;
UPDATED PATCH: Attached are a revised set of SSL patches. Many of these patches are motivated by security concerns, it's not just bug fixes. The key differences (from stock 7.2.1) are: *) almost all code that directly uses the OpenSSL library is in two new files, src/interfaces/libpq/fe-ssl.c src/backend/postmaster/be-ssl.c in the long run, it would be nice to merge these two files. *) the legacy code to read and write network data have been encapsulated into read_SSL() and write_SSL(). These functions should probably be renamed - they handle both SSL and non-SSL cases. the remaining code should eliminate the problems identified earlier, albeit not very cleanly. *) both front- and back-ends will send a SSL shutdown via the new close_SSL() function. This is necessary for sessions to work properly. (Sessions are not yet fully supported, but by cleanly closing the SSL connection instead of just sending a TCP FIN packet other SSL tools will be much happier.) *) The client certificate and key are now expected in a subdirectory of the user's home directory. Specifically, - the directory .postgresql must be owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other.' - the file .postgresql/postgresql.crt must be a regular file owned by the user. - the file .postgresql/postgresql.key must be a regular file owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other'. At the current time encrypted private keys are not supported. There should also be a way to support multiple client certs/keys. *) the front-end performs minimal validation of the back-end cert. Self-signed certs are permitted, but the common name *must* match the hostname used by the front-end. (The cert itself should always use a fully qualified domain name (FDQN) in its common name field.) This means that psql -h eris db will fail, but psql -h eris.example.com db will succeed. At the current time this must be an exact match; future patches may support any FQDN that resolves to the address returned by getpeername(2). Another common "problem" is expiring certs. For now, it may be a good idea to use a very-long-lived self-signed cert. As a compile-time option, the front-end can specify a file containing valid root certificates, but it is not yet required. *) the back-end performs minimal validation of the client cert. It allows self-signed certs. It checks for expiration. It supports a compile-time option specifying a file containing valid root certificates. *) both front- and back-ends default to TLSv1, not SSLv3/SSLv2. *) both front- and back-ends support DSA keys. DSA keys are moderately more expensive on startup, but many people consider them preferable than RSA keys. (E.g., SSH2 prefers DSA keys.) *) if /dev/urandom exists, both client and server will read 16k of randomization data from it. *) the server can read empheral DH parameters from the files $DataDir/dh512.pem $DataDir/dh1024.pem $DataDir/dh2048.pem $DataDir/dh4096.pem if none are provided, the server will default to hardcoded parameter files provided by the OpenSSL project. Remaining tasks: *) the select() clauses need to be revisited - the SSL abstraction layer may need to absorb more of the current code to avoid rare deadlock conditions. This also touches on a true solution to the pg_eof() problem. *) the SIGPIPE signal handler may need to be revisited. *) support encrypted private keys. *) sessions are not yet fully supported. (SSL sessions can span multiple "connections," and allow the client and server to avoid costly renegotiations.) *) makecert - a script that creates back-end certs. *) pgkeygen - a tool that creates front-end certs. *) the whole protocol issue, SASL, etc. *) certs are fully validated - valid root certs must be available. This is a hassle, but it means that you *can* trust the identity of the server. *) the client library can handle hardcoded root certificates, to avoid the need to copy these files. *) host name of server cert must resolve to IP address, or be a recognized alias. This is more liberal than the previous iteration. *) the number of bytes transferred is tracked, and the session key is periodically renegotiated. *) basic cert generation scripts (mkcert.sh, pgkeygen.sh). The configuration files have reasonable defaults for each type of use. Bear Giles
2002-06-14 06:23:17 +02:00
#ifdef USE_SSL
if (conn->ssl_in_use)
UPDATED PATCH: Attached are a revised set of SSL patches. Many of these patches are motivated by security concerns, it's not just bug fixes. The key differences (from stock 7.2.1) are: *) almost all code that directly uses the OpenSSL library is in two new files, src/interfaces/libpq/fe-ssl.c src/backend/postmaster/be-ssl.c in the long run, it would be nice to merge these two files. *) the legacy code to read and write network data have been encapsulated into read_SSL() and write_SSL(). These functions should probably be renamed - they handle both SSL and non-SSL cases. the remaining code should eliminate the problems identified earlier, albeit not very cleanly. *) both front- and back-ends will send a SSL shutdown via the new close_SSL() function. This is necessary for sessions to work properly. (Sessions are not yet fully supported, but by cleanly closing the SSL connection instead of just sending a TCP FIN packet other SSL tools will be much happier.) *) The client certificate and key are now expected in a subdirectory of the user's home directory. Specifically, - the directory .postgresql must be owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other.' - the file .postgresql/postgresql.crt must be a regular file owned by the user. - the file .postgresql/postgresql.key must be a regular file owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other'. At the current time encrypted private keys are not supported. There should also be a way to support multiple client certs/keys. *) the front-end performs minimal validation of the back-end cert. Self-signed certs are permitted, but the common name *must* match the hostname used by the front-end. (The cert itself should always use a fully qualified domain name (FDQN) in its common name field.) This means that psql -h eris db will fail, but psql -h eris.example.com db will succeed. At the current time this must be an exact match; future patches may support any FQDN that resolves to the address returned by getpeername(2). Another common "problem" is expiring certs. For now, it may be a good idea to use a very-long-lived self-signed cert. As a compile-time option, the front-end can specify a file containing valid root certificates, but it is not yet required. *) the back-end performs minimal validation of the client cert. It allows self-signed certs. It checks for expiration. It supports a compile-time option specifying a file containing valid root certificates. *) both front- and back-ends default to TLSv1, not SSLv3/SSLv2. *) both front- and back-ends support DSA keys. DSA keys are moderately more expensive on startup, but many people consider them preferable than RSA keys. (E.g., SSH2 prefers DSA keys.) *) if /dev/urandom exists, both client and server will read 16k of randomization data from it. *) the server can read empheral DH parameters from the files $DataDir/dh512.pem $DataDir/dh1024.pem $DataDir/dh2048.pem $DataDir/dh4096.pem if none are provided, the server will default to hardcoded parameter files provided by the OpenSSL project. Remaining tasks: *) the select() clauses need to be revisited - the SSL abstraction layer may need to absorb more of the current code to avoid rare deadlock conditions. This also touches on a true solution to the pg_eof() problem. *) the SIGPIPE signal handler may need to be revisited. *) support encrypted private keys. *) sessions are not yet fully supported. (SSL sessions can span multiple "connections," and allow the client and server to avoid costly renegotiations.) *) makecert - a script that creates back-end certs. *) pgkeygen - a tool that creates front-end certs. *) the whole protocol issue, SASL, etc. *) certs are fully validated - valid root certs must be available. This is a hassle, but it means that you *can* trust the identity of the server. *) the client library can handle hardcoded root certificates, to avoid the need to copy these files. *) host name of server cert must resolve to IP address, or be a recognized alias. This is more liberal than the previous iteration. *) the number of bytes transferred is tracked, and the session key is periodically renegotiated. *) basic cert generation scripts (mkcert.sh, pgkeygen.sh). The configuration files have reasonable defaults for each type of use. Bear Giles
2002-06-14 06:23:17 +02:00
{
n = pgtls_read(conn, ptr, len);
}
else
#endif
{
n = pqsecure_raw_read(conn, ptr, len);
}
2003-08-04 02:43:34 +02:00
return n;
}
2004-08-29 07:07:03 +02:00
ssize_t
pqsecure_raw_read(PGconn *conn, void *ptr, size_t len)
{
ssize_t n;
int result_errno = 0;
char sebuf[256];
n = recv(conn->sock, ptr, len, 0);
if (n < 0)
{
result_errno = SOCK_ERRNO;
UPDATED PATCH: Attached are a revised set of SSL patches. Many of these patches are motivated by security concerns, it's not just bug fixes. The key differences (from stock 7.2.1) are: *) almost all code that directly uses the OpenSSL library is in two new files, src/interfaces/libpq/fe-ssl.c src/backend/postmaster/be-ssl.c in the long run, it would be nice to merge these two files. *) the legacy code to read and write network data have been encapsulated into read_SSL() and write_SSL(). These functions should probably be renamed - they handle both SSL and non-SSL cases. the remaining code should eliminate the problems identified earlier, albeit not very cleanly. *) both front- and back-ends will send a SSL shutdown via the new close_SSL() function. This is necessary for sessions to work properly. (Sessions are not yet fully supported, but by cleanly closing the SSL connection instead of just sending a TCP FIN packet other SSL tools will be much happier.) *) The client certificate and key are now expected in a subdirectory of the user's home directory. Specifically, - the directory .postgresql must be owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other.' - the file .postgresql/postgresql.crt must be a regular file owned by the user. - the file .postgresql/postgresql.key must be a regular file owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other'. At the current time encrypted private keys are not supported. There should also be a way to support multiple client certs/keys. *) the front-end performs minimal validation of the back-end cert. Self-signed certs are permitted, but the common name *must* match the hostname used by the front-end. (The cert itself should always use a fully qualified domain name (FDQN) in its common name field.) This means that psql -h eris db will fail, but psql -h eris.example.com db will succeed. At the current time this must be an exact match; future patches may support any FQDN that resolves to the address returned by getpeername(2). Another common "problem" is expiring certs. For now, it may be a good idea to use a very-long-lived self-signed cert. As a compile-time option, the front-end can specify a file containing valid root certificates, but it is not yet required. *) the back-end performs minimal validation of the client cert. It allows self-signed certs. It checks for expiration. It supports a compile-time option specifying a file containing valid root certificates. *) both front- and back-ends default to TLSv1, not SSLv3/SSLv2. *) both front- and back-ends support DSA keys. DSA keys are moderately more expensive on startup, but many people consider them preferable than RSA keys. (E.g., SSH2 prefers DSA keys.) *) if /dev/urandom exists, both client and server will read 16k of randomization data from it. *) the server can read empheral DH parameters from the files $DataDir/dh512.pem $DataDir/dh1024.pem $DataDir/dh2048.pem $DataDir/dh4096.pem if none are provided, the server will default to hardcoded parameter files provided by the OpenSSL project. Remaining tasks: *) the select() clauses need to be revisited - the SSL abstraction layer may need to absorb more of the current code to avoid rare deadlock conditions. This also touches on a true solution to the pg_eof() problem. *) the SIGPIPE signal handler may need to be revisited. *) support encrypted private keys. *) sessions are not yet fully supported. (SSL sessions can span multiple "connections," and allow the client and server to avoid costly renegotiations.) *) makecert - a script that creates back-end certs. *) pgkeygen - a tool that creates front-end certs. *) the whole protocol issue, SASL, etc. *) certs are fully validated - valid root certs must be available. This is a hassle, but it means that you *can* trust the identity of the server. *) the client library can handle hardcoded root certificates, to avoid the need to copy these files. *) host name of server cert must resolve to IP address, or be a recognized alias. This is more liberal than the previous iteration. *) the number of bytes transferred is tracked, and the session key is periodically renegotiated. *) basic cert generation scripts (mkcert.sh, pgkeygen.sh). The configuration files have reasonable defaults for each type of use. Bear Giles
2002-06-14 06:23:17 +02:00
/* Set error message if appropriate */
switch (result_errno)
{
#ifdef EAGAIN
case EAGAIN:
#endif
#if defined(EWOULDBLOCK) && (!defined(EAGAIN) || (EWOULDBLOCK != EAGAIN))
case EWOULDBLOCK:
#endif
case EINTR:
/* no error message, caller is expected to retry */
break;
#ifdef ECONNRESET
case ECONNRESET:
printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
libpq_gettext(
"server closed the connection unexpectedly\n"
2015-05-24 03:35:49 +02:00
"\tThis probably means the server terminated abnormally\n"
"\tbefore or while processing the request.\n"));
break;
#endif
default:
printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
2015-05-24 03:35:49 +02:00
libpq_gettext("could not receive data from server: %s\n"),
SOCK_STRERROR(result_errno,
sebuf, sizeof(sebuf)));
break;
}
}
/* ensure we return the intended errno to caller */
SOCK_ERRNO_SET(result_errno);
UPDATED PATCH: Attached are a revised set of SSL patches. Many of these patches are motivated by security concerns, it's not just bug fixes. The key differences (from stock 7.2.1) are: *) almost all code that directly uses the OpenSSL library is in two new files, src/interfaces/libpq/fe-ssl.c src/backend/postmaster/be-ssl.c in the long run, it would be nice to merge these two files. *) the legacy code to read and write network data have been encapsulated into read_SSL() and write_SSL(). These functions should probably be renamed - they handle both SSL and non-SSL cases. the remaining code should eliminate the problems identified earlier, albeit not very cleanly. *) both front- and back-ends will send a SSL shutdown via the new close_SSL() function. This is necessary for sessions to work properly. (Sessions are not yet fully supported, but by cleanly closing the SSL connection instead of just sending a TCP FIN packet other SSL tools will be much happier.) *) The client certificate and key are now expected in a subdirectory of the user's home directory. Specifically, - the directory .postgresql must be owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other.' - the file .postgresql/postgresql.crt must be a regular file owned by the user. - the file .postgresql/postgresql.key must be a regular file owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other'. At the current time encrypted private keys are not supported. There should also be a way to support multiple client certs/keys. *) the front-end performs minimal validation of the back-end cert. Self-signed certs are permitted, but the common name *must* match the hostname used by the front-end. (The cert itself should always use a fully qualified domain name (FDQN) in its common name field.) This means that psql -h eris db will fail, but psql -h eris.example.com db will succeed. At the current time this must be an exact match; future patches may support any FQDN that resolves to the address returned by getpeername(2). Another common "problem" is expiring certs. For now, it may be a good idea to use a very-long-lived self-signed cert. As a compile-time option, the front-end can specify a file containing valid root certificates, but it is not yet required. *) the back-end performs minimal validation of the client cert. It allows self-signed certs. It checks for expiration. It supports a compile-time option specifying a file containing valid root certificates. *) both front- and back-ends default to TLSv1, not SSLv3/SSLv2. *) both front- and back-ends support DSA keys. DSA keys are moderately more expensive on startup, but many people consider them preferable than RSA keys. (E.g., SSH2 prefers DSA keys.) *) if /dev/urandom exists, both client and server will read 16k of randomization data from it. *) the server can read empheral DH parameters from the files $DataDir/dh512.pem $DataDir/dh1024.pem $DataDir/dh2048.pem $DataDir/dh4096.pem if none are provided, the server will default to hardcoded parameter files provided by the OpenSSL project. Remaining tasks: *) the select() clauses need to be revisited - the SSL abstraction layer may need to absorb more of the current code to avoid rare deadlock conditions. This also touches on a true solution to the pg_eof() problem. *) the SIGPIPE signal handler may need to be revisited. *) support encrypted private keys. *) sessions are not yet fully supported. (SSL sessions can span multiple "connections," and allow the client and server to avoid costly renegotiations.) *) makecert - a script that creates back-end certs. *) pgkeygen - a tool that creates front-end certs. *) the whole protocol issue, SASL, etc. *) certs are fully validated - valid root certs must be available. This is a hassle, but it means that you *can* trust the identity of the server. *) the client library can handle hardcoded root certificates, to avoid the need to copy these files. *) host name of server cert must resolve to IP address, or be a recognized alias. This is more liberal than the previous iteration. *) the number of bytes transferred is tracked, and the session key is periodically renegotiated. *) basic cert generation scripts (mkcert.sh, pgkeygen.sh). The configuration files have reasonable defaults for each type of use. Bear Giles
2002-06-14 06:23:17 +02:00
return n;
}
/*
* Write data to a secure connection.
*
* On failure, this function is responsible for putting a suitable message
* into conn->errorMessage. The caller must still inspect errno, but only
* to determine whether to continue/retry after error.
UPDATED PATCH: Attached are a revised set of SSL patches. Many of these patches are motivated by security concerns, it's not just bug fixes. The key differences (from stock 7.2.1) are: *) almost all code that directly uses the OpenSSL library is in two new files, src/interfaces/libpq/fe-ssl.c src/backend/postmaster/be-ssl.c in the long run, it would be nice to merge these two files. *) the legacy code to read and write network data have been encapsulated into read_SSL() and write_SSL(). These functions should probably be renamed - they handle both SSL and non-SSL cases. the remaining code should eliminate the problems identified earlier, albeit not very cleanly. *) both front- and back-ends will send a SSL shutdown via the new close_SSL() function. This is necessary for sessions to work properly. (Sessions are not yet fully supported, but by cleanly closing the SSL connection instead of just sending a TCP FIN packet other SSL tools will be much happier.) *) The client certificate and key are now expected in a subdirectory of the user's home directory. Specifically, - the directory .postgresql must be owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other.' - the file .postgresql/postgresql.crt must be a regular file owned by the user. - the file .postgresql/postgresql.key must be a regular file owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other'. At the current time encrypted private keys are not supported. There should also be a way to support multiple client certs/keys. *) the front-end performs minimal validation of the back-end cert. Self-signed certs are permitted, but the common name *must* match the hostname used by the front-end. (The cert itself should always use a fully qualified domain name (FDQN) in its common name field.) This means that psql -h eris db will fail, but psql -h eris.example.com db will succeed. At the current time this must be an exact match; future patches may support any FQDN that resolves to the address returned by getpeername(2). Another common "problem" is expiring certs. For now, it may be a good idea to use a very-long-lived self-signed cert. As a compile-time option, the front-end can specify a file containing valid root certificates, but it is not yet required. *) the back-end performs minimal validation of the client cert. It allows self-signed certs. It checks for expiration. It supports a compile-time option specifying a file containing valid root certificates. *) both front- and back-ends default to TLSv1, not SSLv3/SSLv2. *) both front- and back-ends support DSA keys. DSA keys are moderately more expensive on startup, but many people consider them preferable than RSA keys. (E.g., SSH2 prefers DSA keys.) *) if /dev/urandom exists, both client and server will read 16k of randomization data from it. *) the server can read empheral DH parameters from the files $DataDir/dh512.pem $DataDir/dh1024.pem $DataDir/dh2048.pem $DataDir/dh4096.pem if none are provided, the server will default to hardcoded parameter files provided by the OpenSSL project. Remaining tasks: *) the select() clauses need to be revisited - the SSL abstraction layer may need to absorb more of the current code to avoid rare deadlock conditions. This also touches on a true solution to the pg_eof() problem. *) the SIGPIPE signal handler may need to be revisited. *) support encrypted private keys. *) sessions are not yet fully supported. (SSL sessions can span multiple "connections," and allow the client and server to avoid costly renegotiations.) *) makecert - a script that creates back-end certs. *) pgkeygen - a tool that creates front-end certs. *) the whole protocol issue, SASL, etc. *) certs are fully validated - valid root certs must be available. This is a hassle, but it means that you *can* trust the identity of the server. *) the client library can handle hardcoded root certificates, to avoid the need to copy these files. *) host name of server cert must resolve to IP address, or be a recognized alias. This is more liberal than the previous iteration. *) the number of bytes transferred is tracked, and the session key is periodically renegotiated. *) basic cert generation scripts (mkcert.sh, pgkeygen.sh). The configuration files have reasonable defaults for each type of use. Bear Giles
2002-06-14 06:23:17 +02:00
*/
ssize_t
2002-09-04 22:31:48 +02:00
pqsecure_write(PGconn *conn, const void *ptr, size_t len)
UPDATED PATCH: Attached are a revised set of SSL patches. Many of these patches are motivated by security concerns, it's not just bug fixes. The key differences (from stock 7.2.1) are: *) almost all code that directly uses the OpenSSL library is in two new files, src/interfaces/libpq/fe-ssl.c src/backend/postmaster/be-ssl.c in the long run, it would be nice to merge these two files. *) the legacy code to read and write network data have been encapsulated into read_SSL() and write_SSL(). These functions should probably be renamed - they handle both SSL and non-SSL cases. the remaining code should eliminate the problems identified earlier, albeit not very cleanly. *) both front- and back-ends will send a SSL shutdown via the new close_SSL() function. This is necessary for sessions to work properly. (Sessions are not yet fully supported, but by cleanly closing the SSL connection instead of just sending a TCP FIN packet other SSL tools will be much happier.) *) The client certificate and key are now expected in a subdirectory of the user's home directory. Specifically, - the directory .postgresql must be owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other.' - the file .postgresql/postgresql.crt must be a regular file owned by the user. - the file .postgresql/postgresql.key must be a regular file owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other'. At the current time encrypted private keys are not supported. There should also be a way to support multiple client certs/keys. *) the front-end performs minimal validation of the back-end cert. Self-signed certs are permitted, but the common name *must* match the hostname used by the front-end. (The cert itself should always use a fully qualified domain name (FDQN) in its common name field.) This means that psql -h eris db will fail, but psql -h eris.example.com db will succeed. At the current time this must be an exact match; future patches may support any FQDN that resolves to the address returned by getpeername(2). Another common "problem" is expiring certs. For now, it may be a good idea to use a very-long-lived self-signed cert. As a compile-time option, the front-end can specify a file containing valid root certificates, but it is not yet required. *) the back-end performs minimal validation of the client cert. It allows self-signed certs. It checks for expiration. It supports a compile-time option specifying a file containing valid root certificates. *) both front- and back-ends default to TLSv1, not SSLv3/SSLv2. *) both front- and back-ends support DSA keys. DSA keys are moderately more expensive on startup, but many people consider them preferable than RSA keys. (E.g., SSH2 prefers DSA keys.) *) if /dev/urandom exists, both client and server will read 16k of randomization data from it. *) the server can read empheral DH parameters from the files $DataDir/dh512.pem $DataDir/dh1024.pem $DataDir/dh2048.pem $DataDir/dh4096.pem if none are provided, the server will default to hardcoded parameter files provided by the OpenSSL project. Remaining tasks: *) the select() clauses need to be revisited - the SSL abstraction layer may need to absorb more of the current code to avoid rare deadlock conditions. This also touches on a true solution to the pg_eof() problem. *) the SIGPIPE signal handler may need to be revisited. *) support encrypted private keys. *) sessions are not yet fully supported. (SSL sessions can span multiple "connections," and allow the client and server to avoid costly renegotiations.) *) makecert - a script that creates back-end certs. *) pgkeygen - a tool that creates front-end certs. *) the whole protocol issue, SASL, etc. *) certs are fully validated - valid root certs must be available. This is a hassle, but it means that you *can* trust the identity of the server. *) the client library can handle hardcoded root certificates, to avoid the need to copy these files. *) host name of server cert must resolve to IP address, or be a recognized alias. This is more liberal than the previous iteration. *) the number of bytes transferred is tracked, and the session key is periodically renegotiated. *) basic cert generation scripts (mkcert.sh, pgkeygen.sh). The configuration files have reasonable defaults for each type of use. Bear Giles
2002-06-14 06:23:17 +02:00
{
2002-09-04 22:31:48 +02:00
ssize_t n;
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
UPDATED PATCH: Attached are a revised set of SSL patches. Many of these patches are motivated by security concerns, it's not just bug fixes. The key differences (from stock 7.2.1) are: *) almost all code that directly uses the OpenSSL library is in two new files, src/interfaces/libpq/fe-ssl.c src/backend/postmaster/be-ssl.c in the long run, it would be nice to merge these two files. *) the legacy code to read and write network data have been encapsulated into read_SSL() and write_SSL(). These functions should probably be renamed - they handle both SSL and non-SSL cases. the remaining code should eliminate the problems identified earlier, albeit not very cleanly. *) both front- and back-ends will send a SSL shutdown via the new close_SSL() function. This is necessary for sessions to work properly. (Sessions are not yet fully supported, but by cleanly closing the SSL connection instead of just sending a TCP FIN packet other SSL tools will be much happier.) *) The client certificate and key are now expected in a subdirectory of the user's home directory. Specifically, - the directory .postgresql must be owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other.' - the file .postgresql/postgresql.crt must be a regular file owned by the user. - the file .postgresql/postgresql.key must be a regular file owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other'. At the current time encrypted private keys are not supported. There should also be a way to support multiple client certs/keys. *) the front-end performs minimal validation of the back-end cert. Self-signed certs are permitted, but the common name *must* match the hostname used by the front-end. (The cert itself should always use a fully qualified domain name (FDQN) in its common name field.) This means that psql -h eris db will fail, but psql -h eris.example.com db will succeed. At the current time this must be an exact match; future patches may support any FQDN that resolves to the address returned by getpeername(2). Another common "problem" is expiring certs. For now, it may be a good idea to use a very-long-lived self-signed cert. As a compile-time option, the front-end can specify a file containing valid root certificates, but it is not yet required. *) the back-end performs minimal validation of the client cert. It allows self-signed certs. It checks for expiration. It supports a compile-time option specifying a file containing valid root certificates. *) both front- and back-ends default to TLSv1, not SSLv3/SSLv2. *) both front- and back-ends support DSA keys. DSA keys are moderately more expensive on startup, but many people consider them preferable than RSA keys. (E.g., SSH2 prefers DSA keys.) *) if /dev/urandom exists, both client and server will read 16k of randomization data from it. *) the server can read empheral DH parameters from the files $DataDir/dh512.pem $DataDir/dh1024.pem $DataDir/dh2048.pem $DataDir/dh4096.pem if none are provided, the server will default to hardcoded parameter files provided by the OpenSSL project. Remaining tasks: *) the select() clauses need to be revisited - the SSL abstraction layer may need to absorb more of the current code to avoid rare deadlock conditions. This also touches on a true solution to the pg_eof() problem. *) the SIGPIPE signal handler may need to be revisited. *) support encrypted private keys. *) sessions are not yet fully supported. (SSL sessions can span multiple "connections," and allow the client and server to avoid costly renegotiations.) *) makecert - a script that creates back-end certs. *) pgkeygen - a tool that creates front-end certs. *) the whole protocol issue, SASL, etc. *) certs are fully validated - valid root certs must be available. This is a hassle, but it means that you *can* trust the identity of the server. *) the client library can handle hardcoded root certificates, to avoid the need to copy these files. *) host name of server cert must resolve to IP address, or be a recognized alias. This is more liberal than the previous iteration. *) the number of bytes transferred is tracked, and the session key is periodically renegotiated. *) basic cert generation scripts (mkcert.sh, pgkeygen.sh). The configuration files have reasonable defaults for each type of use. Bear Giles
2002-06-14 06:23:17 +02:00
#ifdef USE_SSL
if (conn->ssl_in_use)
UPDATED PATCH: Attached are a revised set of SSL patches. Many of these patches are motivated by security concerns, it's not just bug fixes. The key differences (from stock 7.2.1) are: *) almost all code that directly uses the OpenSSL library is in two new files, src/interfaces/libpq/fe-ssl.c src/backend/postmaster/be-ssl.c in the long run, it would be nice to merge these two files. *) the legacy code to read and write network data have been encapsulated into read_SSL() and write_SSL(). These functions should probably be renamed - they handle both SSL and non-SSL cases. the remaining code should eliminate the problems identified earlier, albeit not very cleanly. *) both front- and back-ends will send a SSL shutdown via the new close_SSL() function. This is necessary for sessions to work properly. (Sessions are not yet fully supported, but by cleanly closing the SSL connection instead of just sending a TCP FIN packet other SSL tools will be much happier.) *) The client certificate and key are now expected in a subdirectory of the user's home directory. Specifically, - the directory .postgresql must be owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other.' - the file .postgresql/postgresql.crt must be a regular file owned by the user. - the file .postgresql/postgresql.key must be a regular file owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other'. At the current time encrypted private keys are not supported. There should also be a way to support multiple client certs/keys. *) the front-end performs minimal validation of the back-end cert. Self-signed certs are permitted, but the common name *must* match the hostname used by the front-end. (The cert itself should always use a fully qualified domain name (FDQN) in its common name field.) This means that psql -h eris db will fail, but psql -h eris.example.com db will succeed. At the current time this must be an exact match; future patches may support any FQDN that resolves to the address returned by getpeername(2). Another common "problem" is expiring certs. For now, it may be a good idea to use a very-long-lived self-signed cert. As a compile-time option, the front-end can specify a file containing valid root certificates, but it is not yet required. *) the back-end performs minimal validation of the client cert. It allows self-signed certs. It checks for expiration. It supports a compile-time option specifying a file containing valid root certificates. *) both front- and back-ends default to TLSv1, not SSLv3/SSLv2. *) both front- and back-ends support DSA keys. DSA keys are moderately more expensive on startup, but many people consider them preferable than RSA keys. (E.g., SSH2 prefers DSA keys.) *) if /dev/urandom exists, both client and server will read 16k of randomization data from it. *) the server can read empheral DH parameters from the files $DataDir/dh512.pem $DataDir/dh1024.pem $DataDir/dh2048.pem $DataDir/dh4096.pem if none are provided, the server will default to hardcoded parameter files provided by the OpenSSL project. Remaining tasks: *) the select() clauses need to be revisited - the SSL abstraction layer may need to absorb more of the current code to avoid rare deadlock conditions. This also touches on a true solution to the pg_eof() problem. *) the SIGPIPE signal handler may need to be revisited. *) support encrypted private keys. *) sessions are not yet fully supported. (SSL sessions can span multiple "connections," and allow the client and server to avoid costly renegotiations.) *) makecert - a script that creates back-end certs. *) pgkeygen - a tool that creates front-end certs. *) the whole protocol issue, SASL, etc. *) certs are fully validated - valid root certs must be available. This is a hassle, but it means that you *can* trust the identity of the server. *) the client library can handle hardcoded root certificates, to avoid the need to copy these files. *) host name of server cert must resolve to IP address, or be a recognized alias. This is more liberal than the previous iteration. *) the number of bytes transferred is tracked, and the session key is periodically renegotiated. *) basic cert generation scripts (mkcert.sh, pgkeygen.sh). The configuration files have reasonable defaults for each type of use. Bear Giles
2002-06-14 06:23:17 +02:00
{
n = pgtls_write(conn, ptr, len);
UPDATED PATCH: Attached are a revised set of SSL patches. Many of these patches are motivated by security concerns, it's not just bug fixes. The key differences (from stock 7.2.1) are: *) almost all code that directly uses the OpenSSL library is in two new files, src/interfaces/libpq/fe-ssl.c src/backend/postmaster/be-ssl.c in the long run, it would be nice to merge these two files. *) the legacy code to read and write network data have been encapsulated into read_SSL() and write_SSL(). These functions should probably be renamed - they handle both SSL and non-SSL cases. the remaining code should eliminate the problems identified earlier, albeit not very cleanly. *) both front- and back-ends will send a SSL shutdown via the new close_SSL() function. This is necessary for sessions to work properly. (Sessions are not yet fully supported, but by cleanly closing the SSL connection instead of just sending a TCP FIN packet other SSL tools will be much happier.) *) The client certificate and key are now expected in a subdirectory of the user's home directory. Specifically, - the directory .postgresql must be owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other.' - the file .postgresql/postgresql.crt must be a regular file owned by the user. - the file .postgresql/postgresql.key must be a regular file owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other'. At the current time encrypted private keys are not supported. There should also be a way to support multiple client certs/keys. *) the front-end performs minimal validation of the back-end cert. Self-signed certs are permitted, but the common name *must* match the hostname used by the front-end. (The cert itself should always use a fully qualified domain name (FDQN) in its common name field.) This means that psql -h eris db will fail, but psql -h eris.example.com db will succeed. At the current time this must be an exact match; future patches may support any FQDN that resolves to the address returned by getpeername(2). Another common "problem" is expiring certs. For now, it may be a good idea to use a very-long-lived self-signed cert. As a compile-time option, the front-end can specify a file containing valid root certificates, but it is not yet required. *) the back-end performs minimal validation of the client cert. It allows self-signed certs. It checks for expiration. It supports a compile-time option specifying a file containing valid root certificates. *) both front- and back-ends default to TLSv1, not SSLv3/SSLv2. *) both front- and back-ends support DSA keys. DSA keys are moderately more expensive on startup, but many people consider them preferable than RSA keys. (E.g., SSH2 prefers DSA keys.) *) if /dev/urandom exists, both client and server will read 16k of randomization data from it. *) the server can read empheral DH parameters from the files $DataDir/dh512.pem $DataDir/dh1024.pem $DataDir/dh2048.pem $DataDir/dh4096.pem if none are provided, the server will default to hardcoded parameter files provided by the OpenSSL project. Remaining tasks: *) the select() clauses need to be revisited - the SSL abstraction layer may need to absorb more of the current code to avoid rare deadlock conditions. This also touches on a true solution to the pg_eof() problem. *) the SIGPIPE signal handler may need to be revisited. *) support encrypted private keys. *) sessions are not yet fully supported. (SSL sessions can span multiple "connections," and allow the client and server to avoid costly renegotiations.) *) makecert - a script that creates back-end certs. *) pgkeygen - a tool that creates front-end certs. *) the whole protocol issue, SASL, etc. *) certs are fully validated - valid root certs must be available. This is a hassle, but it means that you *can* trust the identity of the server. *) the client library can handle hardcoded root certificates, to avoid the need to copy these files. *) host name of server cert must resolve to IP address, or be a recognized alias. This is more liberal than the previous iteration. *) the number of bytes transferred is tracked, and the session key is periodically renegotiated. *) basic cert generation scripts (mkcert.sh, pgkeygen.sh). The configuration files have reasonable defaults for each type of use. Bear Giles
2002-06-14 06:23:17 +02:00
}
else
#endif
{
n = pqsecure_raw_write(conn, ptr, len);
}
return n;
}
ssize_t
pqsecure_raw_write(PGconn *conn, const void *ptr, size_t len)
{
ssize_t n;
int flags = 0;
int result_errno = 0;
char sebuf[256];
DECLARE_SIGPIPE_INFO(spinfo);
#ifdef MSG_NOSIGNAL
if (conn->sigpipe_flag)
flags |= MSG_NOSIGNAL;
retry_masked:
2010-02-26 03:01:40 +01:00
#endif /* MSG_NOSIGNAL */
DISABLE_SIGPIPE(conn, spinfo, return -1);
n = send(conn->sock, ptr, len, flags);
if (n < 0)
{
result_errno = SOCK_ERRNO;
/*
2015-05-24 03:35:49 +02:00
* If we see an EINVAL, it may be because MSG_NOSIGNAL isn't available
* on this machine. So, clear sigpipe_flag so we don't try the flag
* again, and retry the send().
*/
#ifdef MSG_NOSIGNAL
if (flags != 0 && result_errno == EINVAL)
{
conn->sigpipe_flag = false;
flags = 0;
goto retry_masked;
}
2010-02-26 03:01:40 +01:00
#endif /* MSG_NOSIGNAL */
/* Set error message if appropriate */
switch (result_errno)
{
#ifdef EAGAIN
case EAGAIN:
#endif
#if defined(EWOULDBLOCK) && (!defined(EAGAIN) || (EWOULDBLOCK != EAGAIN))
case EWOULDBLOCK:
#endif
case EINTR:
/* no error message, caller is expected to retry */
break;
case EPIPE:
/* Set flag for EPIPE */
REMEMBER_EPIPE(spinfo, true);
/* FALL THRU */
#ifdef ECONNRESET
case ECONNRESET:
#endif
printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
libpq_gettext(
"server closed the connection unexpectedly\n"
2015-05-24 03:35:49 +02:00
"\tThis probably means the server terminated abnormally\n"
"\tbefore or while processing the request.\n"));
break;
default:
printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
libpq_gettext("could not send data to server: %s\n"),
2015-05-24 03:35:49 +02:00
SOCK_STRERROR(result_errno,
sebuf, sizeof(sebuf)));
break;
}
}
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
RESTORE_SIGPIPE(conn, spinfo);
UPDATED PATCH: Attached are a revised set of SSL patches. Many of these patches are motivated by security concerns, it's not just bug fixes. The key differences (from stock 7.2.1) are: *) almost all code that directly uses the OpenSSL library is in two new files, src/interfaces/libpq/fe-ssl.c src/backend/postmaster/be-ssl.c in the long run, it would be nice to merge these two files. *) the legacy code to read and write network data have been encapsulated into read_SSL() and write_SSL(). These functions should probably be renamed - they handle both SSL and non-SSL cases. the remaining code should eliminate the problems identified earlier, albeit not very cleanly. *) both front- and back-ends will send a SSL shutdown via the new close_SSL() function. This is necessary for sessions to work properly. (Sessions are not yet fully supported, but by cleanly closing the SSL connection instead of just sending a TCP FIN packet other SSL tools will be much happier.) *) The client certificate and key are now expected in a subdirectory of the user's home directory. Specifically, - the directory .postgresql must be owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other.' - the file .postgresql/postgresql.crt must be a regular file owned by the user. - the file .postgresql/postgresql.key must be a regular file owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other'. At the current time encrypted private keys are not supported. There should also be a way to support multiple client certs/keys. *) the front-end performs minimal validation of the back-end cert. Self-signed certs are permitted, but the common name *must* match the hostname used by the front-end. (The cert itself should always use a fully qualified domain name (FDQN) in its common name field.) This means that psql -h eris db will fail, but psql -h eris.example.com db will succeed. At the current time this must be an exact match; future patches may support any FQDN that resolves to the address returned by getpeername(2). Another common "problem" is expiring certs. For now, it may be a good idea to use a very-long-lived self-signed cert. As a compile-time option, the front-end can specify a file containing valid root certificates, but it is not yet required. *) the back-end performs minimal validation of the client cert. It allows self-signed certs. It checks for expiration. It supports a compile-time option specifying a file containing valid root certificates. *) both front- and back-ends default to TLSv1, not SSLv3/SSLv2. *) both front- and back-ends support DSA keys. DSA keys are moderately more expensive on startup, but many people consider them preferable than RSA keys. (E.g., SSH2 prefers DSA keys.) *) if /dev/urandom exists, both client and server will read 16k of randomization data from it. *) the server can read empheral DH parameters from the files $DataDir/dh512.pem $DataDir/dh1024.pem $DataDir/dh2048.pem $DataDir/dh4096.pem if none are provided, the server will default to hardcoded parameter files provided by the OpenSSL project. Remaining tasks: *) the select() clauses need to be revisited - the SSL abstraction layer may need to absorb more of the current code to avoid rare deadlock conditions. This also touches on a true solution to the pg_eof() problem. *) the SIGPIPE signal handler may need to be revisited. *) support encrypted private keys. *) sessions are not yet fully supported. (SSL sessions can span multiple "connections," and allow the client and server to avoid costly renegotiations.) *) makecert - a script that creates back-end certs. *) pgkeygen - a tool that creates front-end certs. *) the whole protocol issue, SASL, etc. *) certs are fully validated - valid root certs must be available. This is a hassle, but it means that you *can* trust the identity of the server. *) the client library can handle hardcoded root certificates, to avoid the need to copy these files. *) host name of server cert must resolve to IP address, or be a recognized alias. This is more liberal than the previous iteration. *) the number of bytes transferred is tracked, and the session key is periodically renegotiated. *) basic cert generation scripts (mkcert.sh, pgkeygen.sh). The configuration files have reasonable defaults for each type of use. Bear Giles
2002-06-14 06:23:17 +02:00
/* ensure we return the intended errno to caller */
SOCK_ERRNO_SET(result_errno);
UPDATED PATCH: Attached are a revised set of SSL patches. Many of these patches are motivated by security concerns, it's not just bug fixes. The key differences (from stock 7.2.1) are: *) almost all code that directly uses the OpenSSL library is in two new files, src/interfaces/libpq/fe-ssl.c src/backend/postmaster/be-ssl.c in the long run, it would be nice to merge these two files. *) the legacy code to read and write network data have been encapsulated into read_SSL() and write_SSL(). These functions should probably be renamed - they handle both SSL and non-SSL cases. the remaining code should eliminate the problems identified earlier, albeit not very cleanly. *) both front- and back-ends will send a SSL shutdown via the new close_SSL() function. This is necessary for sessions to work properly. (Sessions are not yet fully supported, but by cleanly closing the SSL connection instead of just sending a TCP FIN packet other SSL tools will be much happier.) *) The client certificate and key are now expected in a subdirectory of the user's home directory. Specifically, - the directory .postgresql must be owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other.' - the file .postgresql/postgresql.crt must be a regular file owned by the user. - the file .postgresql/postgresql.key must be a regular file owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other'. At the current time encrypted private keys are not supported. There should also be a way to support multiple client certs/keys. *) the front-end performs minimal validation of the back-end cert. Self-signed certs are permitted, but the common name *must* match the hostname used by the front-end. (The cert itself should always use a fully qualified domain name (FDQN) in its common name field.) This means that psql -h eris db will fail, but psql -h eris.example.com db will succeed. At the current time this must be an exact match; future patches may support any FQDN that resolves to the address returned by getpeername(2). Another common "problem" is expiring certs. For now, it may be a good idea to use a very-long-lived self-signed cert. As a compile-time option, the front-end can specify a file containing valid root certificates, but it is not yet required. *) the back-end performs minimal validation of the client cert. It allows self-signed certs. It checks for expiration. It supports a compile-time option specifying a file containing valid root certificates. *) both front- and back-ends default to TLSv1, not SSLv3/SSLv2. *) both front- and back-ends support DSA keys. DSA keys are moderately more expensive on startup, but many people consider them preferable than RSA keys. (E.g., SSH2 prefers DSA keys.) *) if /dev/urandom exists, both client and server will read 16k of randomization data from it. *) the server can read empheral DH parameters from the files $DataDir/dh512.pem $DataDir/dh1024.pem $DataDir/dh2048.pem $DataDir/dh4096.pem if none are provided, the server will default to hardcoded parameter files provided by the OpenSSL project. Remaining tasks: *) the select() clauses need to be revisited - the SSL abstraction layer may need to absorb more of the current code to avoid rare deadlock conditions. This also touches on a true solution to the pg_eof() problem. *) the SIGPIPE signal handler may need to be revisited. *) support encrypted private keys. *) sessions are not yet fully supported. (SSL sessions can span multiple "connections," and allow the client and server to avoid costly renegotiations.) *) makecert - a script that creates back-end certs. *) pgkeygen - a tool that creates front-end certs. *) the whole protocol issue, SASL, etc. *) certs are fully validated - valid root certs must be available. This is a hassle, but it means that you *can* trust the identity of the server. *) the client library can handle hardcoded root certificates, to avoid the need to copy these files. *) host name of server cert must resolve to IP address, or be a recognized alias. This is more liberal than the previous iteration. *) the number of bytes transferred is tracked, and the session key is periodically renegotiated. *) basic cert generation scripts (mkcert.sh, pgkeygen.sh). The configuration files have reasonable defaults for each type of use. Bear Giles
2002-06-14 06:23:17 +02:00
return n;
}
/* Dummy versions of SSL info functions, when built without SSL support */
#ifndef USE_SSL
int
PQsslInUse(PGconn *conn)
{
return 0;
}
void *
PQgetssl(PGconn *conn)
{
return NULL;
}
void *
PQsslStruct(PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name)
{
return NULL;
}
const char *
PQsslAttribute(PGconn *conn, const char *attribute_name)
{
return NULL;
}
const char *const *
PQsslAttributeNames(PGconn *conn)
{
static const char *const result[] = {NULL};
return result;
}
2002-09-04 22:31:48 +02:00
#endif /* USE_SSL */
#if defined(ENABLE_THREAD_SAFETY) && !defined(WIN32)
/*
* Block SIGPIPE for this thread. This prevents send()/write() from exiting
* the application.
*/
int
pq_block_sigpipe(sigset_t *osigset, bool *sigpipe_pending)
{
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
sigset_t sigpipe_sigset;
sigset_t sigset;
sigemptyset(&sigpipe_sigset);
sigaddset(&sigpipe_sigset, SIGPIPE);
/* Block SIGPIPE and save previous mask for later reset */
SOCK_ERRNO_SET(pthread_sigmask(SIG_BLOCK, &sigpipe_sigset, osigset));
if (SOCK_ERRNO)
return -1;
/* We can have a pending SIGPIPE only if it was blocked before */
if (sigismember(osigset, SIGPIPE))
{
/* Is there a pending SIGPIPE? */
if (sigpending(&sigset) != 0)
return -1;
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
if (sigismember(&sigset, SIGPIPE))
*sigpipe_pending = true;
else
*sigpipe_pending = false;
}
else
*sigpipe_pending = false;
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
return 0;
}
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
/*
* Discard any pending SIGPIPE and reset the signal mask.
*
* Note: we are effectively assuming here that the C library doesn't queue
* up multiple SIGPIPE events. If it did, then we'd accidentally leave
* ours in the queue when an event was already pending and we got another.
* As long as it doesn't queue multiple events, we're OK because the caller
* can't tell the difference.
*
* The caller should say got_epipe = FALSE if it is certain that it
* didn't get an EPIPE error; in that case we'll skip the clear operation
* and things are definitely OK, queuing or no. If it got one or might have
* gotten one, pass got_epipe = TRUE.
*
* We do not want this to change errno, since if it did that could lose
* the error code from a preceding send(). We essentially assume that if
* we were able to do pq_block_sigpipe(), this can't fail.
*/
void
pq_reset_sigpipe(sigset_t *osigset, bool sigpipe_pending, bool got_epipe)
{
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
int save_errno = SOCK_ERRNO;
int signo;
sigset_t sigset;
2004-08-29 07:07:03 +02:00
/* Clear SIGPIPE only if none was pending */
if (got_epipe && !sigpipe_pending)
{
if (sigpending(&sigset) == 0 &&
sigismember(&sigset, SIGPIPE))
{
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
sigset_t sigpipe_sigset;
sigemptyset(&sigpipe_sigset);
sigaddset(&sigpipe_sigset, SIGPIPE);
sigwait(&sigpipe_sigset, &signo);
}
}
2005-10-15 04:49:52 +02:00
/* Restore saved block mask */
pthread_sigmask(SIG_SETMASK, osigset, NULL);
SOCK_ERRNO_SET(save_errno);
}
#endif /* ENABLE_THREAD_SAFETY && !WIN32 */