Refactor HMAC implementations
Similarly to the cryptohash implementations, this refactors the existing
HMAC code into a single set of APIs that can be plugged with any crypto
libraries PostgreSQL is built with (only OpenSSL currently). If there
is no such libraries, a fallback implementation is available. Those new
APIs are designed similarly to the existing cryptohash layer, so there
is no real new design here, with the same logic around buffer bound
checks and memory handling.
HMAC has a dependency on cryptohashes, so all the cryptohash types
supported by cryptohash{_openssl}.c can be used with HMAC. This
refactoring is an advantage mainly for SCRAM, that included its own
implementation of HMAC with SHA256 without relying on the existing
crypto libraries even if PostgreSQL was built with their support.
This code has been tested on Windows and Linux, with and without
OpenSSL, across all the versions supported on HEAD from 1.1.1 down to
1.0.1. I have also checked that the implementations are working fine
using some sample results, a custom extension of my own, and doing
cross-checks across different major versions with SCRAM with the client
and the backend.
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Bruce Momjian
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/X9m0nkEJEzIPXjeZ@paquier.xyz
2021-04-03 10:30:49 +02:00
|
|
|
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* hmac_openssl.c
|
|
|
|
* Implementation of HMAC with OpenSSL.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This should only be used if code is compiled with OpenSSL support.
|
|
|
|
*
|
2024-01-04 02:49:05 +01:00
|
|
|
* Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2024, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
|
Refactor HMAC implementations
Similarly to the cryptohash implementations, this refactors the existing
HMAC code into a single set of APIs that can be plugged with any crypto
libraries PostgreSQL is built with (only OpenSSL currently). If there
is no such libraries, a fallback implementation is available. Those new
APIs are designed similarly to the existing cryptohash layer, so there
is no real new design here, with the same logic around buffer bound
checks and memory handling.
HMAC has a dependency on cryptohashes, so all the cryptohash types
supported by cryptohash{_openssl}.c can be used with HMAC. This
refactoring is an advantage mainly for SCRAM, that included its own
implementation of HMAC with SHA256 without relying on the existing
crypto libraries even if PostgreSQL was built with their support.
This code has been tested on Windows and Linux, with and without
OpenSSL, across all the versions supported on HEAD from 1.1.1 down to
1.0.1. I have also checked that the implementations are working fine
using some sample results, a custom extension of my own, and doing
cross-checks across different major versions with SCRAM with the client
and the backend.
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Bruce Momjian
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/X9m0nkEJEzIPXjeZ@paquier.xyz
2021-04-03 10:30:49 +02:00
|
|
|
* Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* IDENTIFICATION
|
|
|
|
* src/common/hmac_openssl.c
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef FRONTEND
|
|
|
|
#include "postgres.h"
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
#include "postgres_fe.h"
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
Improve error handling of HMAC computations
This is similar to b69aba7, except that this completes the work for
HMAC with a new routine called pg_hmac_error() that would provide more
context about the type of error that happened during a HMAC computation:
- The fallback HMAC implementation in hmac.c relies on cryptohashes, so
in some code paths it is necessary to return back the error generated by
cryptohashes.
- For the OpenSSL implementation (hmac_openssl.c), the logic is very
similar to cryptohash_openssl.c, where the error context comes from
OpenSSL if one of its internal routines failed, with different error
codes if something internal to hmac_openssl.c failed or was incorrect.
Any in-core code paths that use the centralized HMAC interface are
related to SCRAM, for errors that are unlikely going to happen, with
only SHA-256. It would be possible to see errors when computing some
HMACs with MD5 for example and OpenSSL FIPS enabled, and this commit
would help in reporting the correct errors but nothing in core uses
that. So, at the end, no backpatch to v14 is done, at least for now.
Errors in SCRAM related to the computation of the server key, stored
key, etc. need to pass down the potential error context string across
more layers of their respective call stacks for the frontend and the
backend, so each surrounding routine is adapted for this purpose.
Reviewed-by: Sergey Shinderuk
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/Yd0N9tSAIIkFd+qi@paquier.xyz
2022-01-13 08:17:21 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include <openssl/err.h>
|
Refactor HMAC implementations
Similarly to the cryptohash implementations, this refactors the existing
HMAC code into a single set of APIs that can be plugged with any crypto
libraries PostgreSQL is built with (only OpenSSL currently). If there
is no such libraries, a fallback implementation is available. Those new
APIs are designed similarly to the existing cryptohash layer, so there
is no real new design here, with the same logic around buffer bound
checks and memory handling.
HMAC has a dependency on cryptohashes, so all the cryptohash types
supported by cryptohash{_openssl}.c can be used with HMAC. This
refactoring is an advantage mainly for SCRAM, that included its own
implementation of HMAC with SHA256 without relying on the existing
crypto libraries even if PostgreSQL was built with their support.
This code has been tested on Windows and Linux, with and without
OpenSSL, across all the versions supported on HEAD from 1.1.1 down to
1.0.1. I have also checked that the implementations are working fine
using some sample results, a custom extension of my own, and doing
cross-checks across different major versions with SCRAM with the client
and the backend.
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Bruce Momjian
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/X9m0nkEJEzIPXjeZ@paquier.xyz
2021-04-03 10:30:49 +02:00
|
|
|
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include "common/hmac.h"
|
|
|
|
#include "common/md5.h"
|
|
|
|
#include "common/sha1.h"
|
|
|
|
#include "common/sha2.h"
|
|
|
|
#ifndef FRONTEND
|
|
|
|
#include "utils/memutils.h"
|
|
|
|
#include "utils/resowner.h"
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* In backend, use an allocation in TopMemoryContext to count for resowner
|
2021-04-19 04:32:30 +02:00
|
|
|
* cleanup handling if necessary. For versions of OpenSSL where HMAC_CTX is
|
Refactor HMAC implementations
Similarly to the cryptohash implementations, this refactors the existing
HMAC code into a single set of APIs that can be plugged with any crypto
libraries PostgreSQL is built with (only OpenSSL currently). If there
is no such libraries, a fallback implementation is available. Those new
APIs are designed similarly to the existing cryptohash layer, so there
is no real new design here, with the same logic around buffer bound
checks and memory handling.
HMAC has a dependency on cryptohashes, so all the cryptohash types
supported by cryptohash{_openssl}.c can be used with HMAC. This
refactoring is an advantage mainly for SCRAM, that included its own
implementation of HMAC with SHA256 without relying on the existing
crypto libraries even if PostgreSQL was built with their support.
This code has been tested on Windows and Linux, with and without
OpenSSL, across all the versions supported on HEAD from 1.1.1 down to
1.0.1. I have also checked that the implementations are working fine
using some sample results, a custom extension of my own, and doing
cross-checks across different major versions with SCRAM with the client
and the backend.
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Bruce Momjian
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/X9m0nkEJEzIPXjeZ@paquier.xyz
2021-04-03 10:30:49 +02:00
|
|
|
* known, just use palloc(). In frontend, use malloc to be able to return
|
|
|
|
* a failure status back to the caller.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#ifndef FRONTEND
|
|
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_HMAC_CTX_NEW
|
|
|
|
#define ALLOC(size) MemoryContextAlloc(TopMemoryContext, size)
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
#define ALLOC(size) palloc(size)
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#define FREE(ptr) pfree(ptr)
|
|
|
|
#else /* FRONTEND */
|
|
|
|
#define ALLOC(size) malloc(size)
|
|
|
|
#define FREE(ptr) free(ptr)
|
|
|
|
#endif /* FRONTEND */
|
|
|
|
|
Improve error handling of HMAC computations
This is similar to b69aba7, except that this completes the work for
HMAC with a new routine called pg_hmac_error() that would provide more
context about the type of error that happened during a HMAC computation:
- The fallback HMAC implementation in hmac.c relies on cryptohashes, so
in some code paths it is necessary to return back the error generated by
cryptohashes.
- For the OpenSSL implementation (hmac_openssl.c), the logic is very
similar to cryptohash_openssl.c, where the error context comes from
OpenSSL if one of its internal routines failed, with different error
codes if something internal to hmac_openssl.c failed or was incorrect.
Any in-core code paths that use the centralized HMAC interface are
related to SCRAM, for errors that are unlikely going to happen, with
only SHA-256. It would be possible to see errors when computing some
HMACs with MD5 for example and OpenSSL FIPS enabled, and this commit
would help in reporting the correct errors but nothing in core uses
that. So, at the end, no backpatch to v14 is done, at least for now.
Errors in SCRAM related to the computation of the server key, stored
key, etc. need to pass down the potential error context string across
more layers of their respective call stacks for the frontend and the
backend, so each surrounding routine is adapted for this purpose.
Reviewed-by: Sergey Shinderuk
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/Yd0N9tSAIIkFd+qi@paquier.xyz
2022-01-13 08:17:21 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Set of error states */
|
|
|
|
typedef enum pg_hmac_errno
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
PG_HMAC_ERROR_NONE = 0,
|
|
|
|
PG_HMAC_ERROR_DEST_LEN,
|
|
|
|
PG_HMAC_ERROR_OPENSSL,
|
|
|
|
} pg_hmac_errno;
|
|
|
|
|
2022-01-13 01:43:36 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Internal pg_hmac_ctx structure */
|
Refactor HMAC implementations
Similarly to the cryptohash implementations, this refactors the existing
HMAC code into a single set of APIs that can be plugged with any crypto
libraries PostgreSQL is built with (only OpenSSL currently). If there
is no such libraries, a fallback implementation is available. Those new
APIs are designed similarly to the existing cryptohash layer, so there
is no real new design here, with the same logic around buffer bound
checks and memory handling.
HMAC has a dependency on cryptohashes, so all the cryptohash types
supported by cryptohash{_openssl}.c can be used with HMAC. This
refactoring is an advantage mainly for SCRAM, that included its own
implementation of HMAC with SHA256 without relying on the existing
crypto libraries even if PostgreSQL was built with their support.
This code has been tested on Windows and Linux, with and without
OpenSSL, across all the versions supported on HEAD from 1.1.1 down to
1.0.1. I have also checked that the implementations are working fine
using some sample results, a custom extension of my own, and doing
cross-checks across different major versions with SCRAM with the client
and the backend.
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Bruce Momjian
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/X9m0nkEJEzIPXjeZ@paquier.xyz
2021-04-03 10:30:49 +02:00
|
|
|
struct pg_hmac_ctx
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
HMAC_CTX *hmacctx;
|
|
|
|
pg_cryptohash_type type;
|
Improve error handling of HMAC computations
This is similar to b69aba7, except that this completes the work for
HMAC with a new routine called pg_hmac_error() that would provide more
context about the type of error that happened during a HMAC computation:
- The fallback HMAC implementation in hmac.c relies on cryptohashes, so
in some code paths it is necessary to return back the error generated by
cryptohashes.
- For the OpenSSL implementation (hmac_openssl.c), the logic is very
similar to cryptohash_openssl.c, where the error context comes from
OpenSSL if one of its internal routines failed, with different error
codes if something internal to hmac_openssl.c failed or was incorrect.
Any in-core code paths that use the centralized HMAC interface are
related to SCRAM, for errors that are unlikely going to happen, with
only SHA-256. It would be possible to see errors when computing some
HMACs with MD5 for example and OpenSSL FIPS enabled, and this commit
would help in reporting the correct errors but nothing in core uses
that. So, at the end, no backpatch to v14 is done, at least for now.
Errors in SCRAM related to the computation of the server key, stored
key, etc. need to pass down the potential error context string across
more layers of their respective call stacks for the frontend and the
backend, so each surrounding routine is adapted for this purpose.
Reviewed-by: Sergey Shinderuk
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/Yd0N9tSAIIkFd+qi@paquier.xyz
2022-01-13 08:17:21 +01:00
|
|
|
pg_hmac_errno error;
|
|
|
|
const char *errreason;
|
Refactor HMAC implementations
Similarly to the cryptohash implementations, this refactors the existing
HMAC code into a single set of APIs that can be plugged with any crypto
libraries PostgreSQL is built with (only OpenSSL currently). If there
is no such libraries, a fallback implementation is available. Those new
APIs are designed similarly to the existing cryptohash layer, so there
is no real new design here, with the same logic around buffer bound
checks and memory handling.
HMAC has a dependency on cryptohashes, so all the cryptohash types
supported by cryptohash{_openssl}.c can be used with HMAC. This
refactoring is an advantage mainly for SCRAM, that included its own
implementation of HMAC with SHA256 without relying on the existing
crypto libraries even if PostgreSQL was built with their support.
This code has been tested on Windows and Linux, with and without
OpenSSL, across all the versions supported on HEAD from 1.1.1 down to
1.0.1. I have also checked that the implementations are working fine
using some sample results, a custom extension of my own, and doing
cross-checks across different major versions with SCRAM with the client
and the backend.
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Bruce Momjian
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/X9m0nkEJEzIPXjeZ@paquier.xyz
2021-04-03 10:30:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef FRONTEND
|
|
|
|
ResourceOwner resowner;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
Make ResourceOwners more easily extensible.
Instead of having a separate array/hash for each resource kind, use a
single array and hash to hold all kinds of resources. This makes it
possible to introduce new resource "kinds" without having to modify
the ResourceOwnerData struct. In particular, this makes it possible
for extensions to register custom resource kinds.
The old approach was to have a small array of resources of each kind,
and if it fills up, switch to a hash table. The new approach also uses
an array and a hash, but now the array and the hash are used at the
same time. The array is used to hold the recently added resources, and
when it fills up, they are moved to the hash. This keeps the access to
recent entries fast, even when there are a lot of long-held resources.
All the resource-specific ResourceOwnerEnlarge*(),
ResourceOwnerRemember*(), and ResourceOwnerForget*() functions have
been replaced with three generic functions that take resource kind as
argument. For convenience, we still define resource-specific wrapper
macros around the generic functions with the old names, but they are
now defined in the source files that use those resource kinds.
The release callback no longer needs to call ResourceOwnerForget on
the resource being released. ResourceOwnerRelease unregisters the
resource from the owner before calling the callback. That needed some
changes in bufmgr.c and some other files, where releasing the
resources previously always called ResourceOwnerForget.
Each resource kind specifies a release priority, and
ResourceOwnerReleaseAll releases the resources in priority order. To
make that possible, we have to restrict what you can do between
phases. After calling ResourceOwnerRelease(), you are no longer
allowed to remember any more resources in it or to forget any
previously remembered resources by calling ResourceOwnerForget. There
was one case where that was done previously. At subtransaction commit,
AtEOSubXact_Inval() would handle the invalidation messages and call
RelationFlushRelation(), which temporarily increased the reference
count on the relation being flushed. We now switch to the parent
subtransaction's resource owner before calling AtEOSubXact_Inval(), so
that there is a valid ResourceOwner to temporarily hold that relcache
reference.
Other end-of-xact routines make similar calls to AtEOXact_Inval()
between release phases, but I didn't see any regression test failures
from those, so I'm not sure if they could reach a codepath that needs
remembering extra resources.
There were two exceptions to how the resource leak WARNINGs on commit
were printed previously: llvmjit silently released the context without
printing the warning, and a leaked buffer io triggered a PANIC. Now
everything prints a WARNING, including those cases.
Add tests in src/test/modules/test_resowner.
Reviewed-by: Aleksander Alekseev, Michael Paquier, Julien Rouhaud
Reviewed-by: Kyotaro Horiguchi, Hayato Kuroda, Álvaro Herrera, Zhihong Yu
Reviewed-by: Peter Eisentraut, Andres Freund
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/cbfabeb0-cd3c-e951-a572-19b365ed314d%40iki.fi
2023-11-08 12:30:50 +01:00
|
|
|
/* ResourceOwner callbacks to hold HMAC contexts */
|
|
|
|
#ifndef FRONTEND
|
|
|
|
static void ResOwnerReleaseHMAC(Datum res);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static const ResourceOwnerDesc hmac_resowner_desc =
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
.name = "OpenSSL HMAC context",
|
|
|
|
.release_phase = RESOURCE_RELEASE_BEFORE_LOCKS,
|
|
|
|
.release_priority = RELEASE_PRIO_HMAC_CONTEXTS,
|
|
|
|
.ReleaseResource = ResOwnerReleaseHMAC,
|
|
|
|
.DebugPrint = NULL /* the default message is fine */
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Convenience wrappers over ResourceOwnerRemember/Forget */
|
|
|
|
static inline void
|
|
|
|
ResourceOwnerRememberHMAC(ResourceOwner owner, pg_hmac_ctx *ctx)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ResourceOwnerRemember(owner, PointerGetDatum(ctx), &hmac_resowner_desc);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline void
|
|
|
|
ResourceOwnerForgetHMAC(ResourceOwner owner, pg_hmac_ctx *ctx)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ResourceOwnerForget(owner, PointerGetDatum(ctx), &hmac_resowner_desc);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
Improve error handling of HMAC computations
This is similar to b69aba7, except that this completes the work for
HMAC with a new routine called pg_hmac_error() that would provide more
context about the type of error that happened during a HMAC computation:
- The fallback HMAC implementation in hmac.c relies on cryptohashes, so
in some code paths it is necessary to return back the error generated by
cryptohashes.
- For the OpenSSL implementation (hmac_openssl.c), the logic is very
similar to cryptohash_openssl.c, where the error context comes from
OpenSSL if one of its internal routines failed, with different error
codes if something internal to hmac_openssl.c failed or was incorrect.
Any in-core code paths that use the centralized HMAC interface are
related to SCRAM, for errors that are unlikely going to happen, with
only SHA-256. It would be possible to see errors when computing some
HMACs with MD5 for example and OpenSSL FIPS enabled, and this commit
would help in reporting the correct errors but nothing in core uses
that. So, at the end, no backpatch to v14 is done, at least for now.
Errors in SCRAM related to the computation of the server key, stored
key, etc. need to pass down the potential error context string across
more layers of their respective call stacks for the frontend and the
backend, so each surrounding routine is adapted for this purpose.
Reviewed-by: Sergey Shinderuk
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/Yd0N9tSAIIkFd+qi@paquier.xyz
2022-01-13 08:17:21 +01:00
|
|
|
static const char *
|
|
|
|
SSLerrmessage(unsigned long ecode)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (ecode == 0)
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* This may return NULL, but we would fall back to a default error path if
|
|
|
|
* that were the case.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
return ERR_reason_error_string(ecode);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Refactor HMAC implementations
Similarly to the cryptohash implementations, this refactors the existing
HMAC code into a single set of APIs that can be plugged with any crypto
libraries PostgreSQL is built with (only OpenSSL currently). If there
is no such libraries, a fallback implementation is available. Those new
APIs are designed similarly to the existing cryptohash layer, so there
is no real new design here, with the same logic around buffer bound
checks and memory handling.
HMAC has a dependency on cryptohashes, so all the cryptohash types
supported by cryptohash{_openssl}.c can be used with HMAC. This
refactoring is an advantage mainly for SCRAM, that included its own
implementation of HMAC with SHA256 without relying on the existing
crypto libraries even if PostgreSQL was built with their support.
This code has been tested on Windows and Linux, with and without
OpenSSL, across all the versions supported on HEAD from 1.1.1 down to
1.0.1. I have also checked that the implementations are working fine
using some sample results, a custom extension of my own, and doing
cross-checks across different major versions with SCRAM with the client
and the backend.
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Bruce Momjian
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/X9m0nkEJEzIPXjeZ@paquier.xyz
2021-04-03 10:30:49 +02:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* pg_hmac_create
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Allocate a hash context. Returns NULL on failure for an OOM. The
|
|
|
|
* backend issues an error, without returning.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
pg_hmac_ctx *
|
|
|
|
pg_hmac_create(pg_cryptohash_type type)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
pg_hmac_ctx *ctx;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ctx = ALLOC(sizeof(pg_hmac_ctx));
|
|
|
|
if (ctx == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(pg_hmac_ctx));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ctx->type = type;
|
Improve error handling of HMAC computations
This is similar to b69aba7, except that this completes the work for
HMAC with a new routine called pg_hmac_error() that would provide more
context about the type of error that happened during a HMAC computation:
- The fallback HMAC implementation in hmac.c relies on cryptohashes, so
in some code paths it is necessary to return back the error generated by
cryptohashes.
- For the OpenSSL implementation (hmac_openssl.c), the logic is very
similar to cryptohash_openssl.c, where the error context comes from
OpenSSL if one of its internal routines failed, with different error
codes if something internal to hmac_openssl.c failed or was incorrect.
Any in-core code paths that use the centralized HMAC interface are
related to SCRAM, for errors that are unlikely going to happen, with
only SHA-256. It would be possible to see errors when computing some
HMACs with MD5 for example and OpenSSL FIPS enabled, and this commit
would help in reporting the correct errors but nothing in core uses
that. So, at the end, no backpatch to v14 is done, at least for now.
Errors in SCRAM related to the computation of the server key, stored
key, etc. need to pass down the potential error context string across
more layers of their respective call stacks for the frontend and the
backend, so each surrounding routine is adapted for this purpose.
Reviewed-by: Sergey Shinderuk
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/Yd0N9tSAIIkFd+qi@paquier.xyz
2022-01-13 08:17:21 +01:00
|
|
|
ctx->error = PG_HMAC_ERROR_NONE;
|
|
|
|
ctx->errreason = NULL;
|
Refactor HMAC implementations
Similarly to the cryptohash implementations, this refactors the existing
HMAC code into a single set of APIs that can be plugged with any crypto
libraries PostgreSQL is built with (only OpenSSL currently). If there
is no such libraries, a fallback implementation is available. Those new
APIs are designed similarly to the existing cryptohash layer, so there
is no real new design here, with the same logic around buffer bound
checks and memory handling.
HMAC has a dependency on cryptohashes, so all the cryptohash types
supported by cryptohash{_openssl}.c can be used with HMAC. This
refactoring is an advantage mainly for SCRAM, that included its own
implementation of HMAC with SHA256 without relying on the existing
crypto libraries even if PostgreSQL was built with their support.
This code has been tested on Windows and Linux, with and without
OpenSSL, across all the versions supported on HEAD from 1.1.1 down to
1.0.1. I have also checked that the implementations are working fine
using some sample results, a custom extension of my own, and doing
cross-checks across different major versions with SCRAM with the client
and the backend.
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Bruce Momjian
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/X9m0nkEJEzIPXjeZ@paquier.xyz
2021-04-03 10:30:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2022-05-06 14:41:31 +02:00
|
|
|
|
Refactor HMAC implementations
Similarly to the cryptohash implementations, this refactors the existing
HMAC code into a single set of APIs that can be plugged with any crypto
libraries PostgreSQL is built with (only OpenSSL currently). If there
is no such libraries, a fallback implementation is available. Those new
APIs are designed similarly to the existing cryptohash layer, so there
is no real new design here, with the same logic around buffer bound
checks and memory handling.
HMAC has a dependency on cryptohashes, so all the cryptohash types
supported by cryptohash{_openssl}.c can be used with HMAC. This
refactoring is an advantage mainly for SCRAM, that included its own
implementation of HMAC with SHA256 without relying on the existing
crypto libraries even if PostgreSQL was built with their support.
This code has been tested on Windows and Linux, with and without
OpenSSL, across all the versions supported on HEAD from 1.1.1 down to
1.0.1. I have also checked that the implementations are working fine
using some sample results, a custom extension of my own, and doing
cross-checks across different major versions with SCRAM with the client
and the backend.
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Bruce Momjian
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/X9m0nkEJEzIPXjeZ@paquier.xyz
2021-04-03 10:30:49 +02:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Initialization takes care of assigning the correct type for OpenSSL.
|
2022-05-06 14:41:31 +02:00
|
|
|
* Also ensure that there aren't any unconsumed errors in the queue from
|
|
|
|
* previous runs.
|
Refactor HMAC implementations
Similarly to the cryptohash implementations, this refactors the existing
HMAC code into a single set of APIs that can be plugged with any crypto
libraries PostgreSQL is built with (only OpenSSL currently). If there
is no such libraries, a fallback implementation is available. Those new
APIs are designed similarly to the existing cryptohash layer, so there
is no real new design here, with the same logic around buffer bound
checks and memory handling.
HMAC has a dependency on cryptohashes, so all the cryptohash types
supported by cryptohash{_openssl}.c can be used with HMAC. This
refactoring is an advantage mainly for SCRAM, that included its own
implementation of HMAC with SHA256 without relying on the existing
crypto libraries even if PostgreSQL was built with their support.
This code has been tested on Windows and Linux, with and without
OpenSSL, across all the versions supported on HEAD from 1.1.1 down to
1.0.1. I have also checked that the implementations are working fine
using some sample results, a custom extension of my own, and doing
cross-checks across different major versions with SCRAM with the client
and the backend.
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Bruce Momjian
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/X9m0nkEJEzIPXjeZ@paquier.xyz
2021-04-03 10:30:49 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2022-05-06 14:41:31 +02:00
|
|
|
ERR_clear_error();
|
Refactor HMAC implementations
Similarly to the cryptohash implementations, this refactors the existing
HMAC code into a single set of APIs that can be plugged with any crypto
libraries PostgreSQL is built with (only OpenSSL currently). If there
is no such libraries, a fallback implementation is available. Those new
APIs are designed similarly to the existing cryptohash layer, so there
is no real new design here, with the same logic around buffer bound
checks and memory handling.
HMAC has a dependency on cryptohashes, so all the cryptohash types
supported by cryptohash{_openssl}.c can be used with HMAC. This
refactoring is an advantage mainly for SCRAM, that included its own
implementation of HMAC with SHA256 without relying on the existing
crypto libraries even if PostgreSQL was built with their support.
This code has been tested on Windows and Linux, with and without
OpenSSL, across all the versions supported on HEAD from 1.1.1 down to
1.0.1. I have also checked that the implementations are working fine
using some sample results, a custom extension of my own, and doing
cross-checks across different major versions with SCRAM with the client
and the backend.
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Bruce Momjian
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/X9m0nkEJEzIPXjeZ@paquier.xyz
2021-04-03 10:30:49 +02:00
|
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_HMAC_CTX_NEW
|
|
|
|
#ifndef FRONTEND
|
Make ResourceOwners more easily extensible.
Instead of having a separate array/hash for each resource kind, use a
single array and hash to hold all kinds of resources. This makes it
possible to introduce new resource "kinds" without having to modify
the ResourceOwnerData struct. In particular, this makes it possible
for extensions to register custom resource kinds.
The old approach was to have a small array of resources of each kind,
and if it fills up, switch to a hash table. The new approach also uses
an array and a hash, but now the array and the hash are used at the
same time. The array is used to hold the recently added resources, and
when it fills up, they are moved to the hash. This keeps the access to
recent entries fast, even when there are a lot of long-held resources.
All the resource-specific ResourceOwnerEnlarge*(),
ResourceOwnerRemember*(), and ResourceOwnerForget*() functions have
been replaced with three generic functions that take resource kind as
argument. For convenience, we still define resource-specific wrapper
macros around the generic functions with the old names, but they are
now defined in the source files that use those resource kinds.
The release callback no longer needs to call ResourceOwnerForget on
the resource being released. ResourceOwnerRelease unregisters the
resource from the owner before calling the callback. That needed some
changes in bufmgr.c and some other files, where releasing the
resources previously always called ResourceOwnerForget.
Each resource kind specifies a release priority, and
ResourceOwnerReleaseAll releases the resources in priority order. To
make that possible, we have to restrict what you can do between
phases. After calling ResourceOwnerRelease(), you are no longer
allowed to remember any more resources in it or to forget any
previously remembered resources by calling ResourceOwnerForget. There
was one case where that was done previously. At subtransaction commit,
AtEOSubXact_Inval() would handle the invalidation messages and call
RelationFlushRelation(), which temporarily increased the reference
count on the relation being flushed. We now switch to the parent
subtransaction's resource owner before calling AtEOSubXact_Inval(), so
that there is a valid ResourceOwner to temporarily hold that relcache
reference.
Other end-of-xact routines make similar calls to AtEOXact_Inval()
between release phases, but I didn't see any regression test failures
from those, so I'm not sure if they could reach a codepath that needs
remembering extra resources.
There were two exceptions to how the resource leak WARNINGs on commit
were printed previously: llvmjit silently released the context without
printing the warning, and a leaked buffer io triggered a PANIC. Now
everything prints a WARNING, including those cases.
Add tests in src/test/modules/test_resowner.
Reviewed-by: Aleksander Alekseev, Michael Paquier, Julien Rouhaud
Reviewed-by: Kyotaro Horiguchi, Hayato Kuroda, Álvaro Herrera, Zhihong Yu
Reviewed-by: Peter Eisentraut, Andres Freund
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/cbfabeb0-cd3c-e951-a572-19b365ed314d%40iki.fi
2023-11-08 12:30:50 +01:00
|
|
|
ResourceOwnerEnlarge(CurrentResourceOwner);
|
Refactor HMAC implementations
Similarly to the cryptohash implementations, this refactors the existing
HMAC code into a single set of APIs that can be plugged with any crypto
libraries PostgreSQL is built with (only OpenSSL currently). If there
is no such libraries, a fallback implementation is available. Those new
APIs are designed similarly to the existing cryptohash layer, so there
is no real new design here, with the same logic around buffer bound
checks and memory handling.
HMAC has a dependency on cryptohashes, so all the cryptohash types
supported by cryptohash{_openssl}.c can be used with HMAC. This
refactoring is an advantage mainly for SCRAM, that included its own
implementation of HMAC with SHA256 without relying on the existing
crypto libraries even if PostgreSQL was built with their support.
This code has been tested on Windows and Linux, with and without
OpenSSL, across all the versions supported on HEAD from 1.1.1 down to
1.0.1. I have also checked that the implementations are working fine
using some sample results, a custom extension of my own, and doing
cross-checks across different major versions with SCRAM with the client
and the backend.
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Bruce Momjian
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/X9m0nkEJEzIPXjeZ@paquier.xyz
2021-04-03 10:30:49 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
ctx->hmacctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
ctx->hmacctx = ALLOC(sizeof(HMAC_CTX));
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->hmacctx == NULL)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(pg_hmac_ctx));
|
|
|
|
FREE(ctx);
|
|
|
|
#ifndef FRONTEND
|
|
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
|
|
|
|
errmsg("out of memory")));
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_HMAC_CTX_NEW
|
|
|
|
#ifndef FRONTEND
|
|
|
|
ctx->resowner = CurrentResourceOwner;
|
Make ResourceOwners more easily extensible.
Instead of having a separate array/hash for each resource kind, use a
single array and hash to hold all kinds of resources. This makes it
possible to introduce new resource "kinds" without having to modify
the ResourceOwnerData struct. In particular, this makes it possible
for extensions to register custom resource kinds.
The old approach was to have a small array of resources of each kind,
and if it fills up, switch to a hash table. The new approach also uses
an array and a hash, but now the array and the hash are used at the
same time. The array is used to hold the recently added resources, and
when it fills up, they are moved to the hash. This keeps the access to
recent entries fast, even when there are a lot of long-held resources.
All the resource-specific ResourceOwnerEnlarge*(),
ResourceOwnerRemember*(), and ResourceOwnerForget*() functions have
been replaced with three generic functions that take resource kind as
argument. For convenience, we still define resource-specific wrapper
macros around the generic functions with the old names, but they are
now defined in the source files that use those resource kinds.
The release callback no longer needs to call ResourceOwnerForget on
the resource being released. ResourceOwnerRelease unregisters the
resource from the owner before calling the callback. That needed some
changes in bufmgr.c and some other files, where releasing the
resources previously always called ResourceOwnerForget.
Each resource kind specifies a release priority, and
ResourceOwnerReleaseAll releases the resources in priority order. To
make that possible, we have to restrict what you can do between
phases. After calling ResourceOwnerRelease(), you are no longer
allowed to remember any more resources in it or to forget any
previously remembered resources by calling ResourceOwnerForget. There
was one case where that was done previously. At subtransaction commit,
AtEOSubXact_Inval() would handle the invalidation messages and call
RelationFlushRelation(), which temporarily increased the reference
count on the relation being flushed. We now switch to the parent
subtransaction's resource owner before calling AtEOSubXact_Inval(), so
that there is a valid ResourceOwner to temporarily hold that relcache
reference.
Other end-of-xact routines make similar calls to AtEOXact_Inval()
between release phases, but I didn't see any regression test failures
from those, so I'm not sure if they could reach a codepath that needs
remembering extra resources.
There were two exceptions to how the resource leak WARNINGs on commit
were printed previously: llvmjit silently released the context without
printing the warning, and a leaked buffer io triggered a PANIC. Now
everything prints a WARNING, including those cases.
Add tests in src/test/modules/test_resowner.
Reviewed-by: Aleksander Alekseev, Michael Paquier, Julien Rouhaud
Reviewed-by: Kyotaro Horiguchi, Hayato Kuroda, Álvaro Herrera, Zhihong Yu
Reviewed-by: Peter Eisentraut, Andres Freund
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/cbfabeb0-cd3c-e951-a572-19b365ed314d%40iki.fi
2023-11-08 12:30:50 +01:00
|
|
|
ResourceOwnerRememberHMAC(CurrentResourceOwner, ctx);
|
Refactor HMAC implementations
Similarly to the cryptohash implementations, this refactors the existing
HMAC code into a single set of APIs that can be plugged with any crypto
libraries PostgreSQL is built with (only OpenSSL currently). If there
is no such libraries, a fallback implementation is available. Those new
APIs are designed similarly to the existing cryptohash layer, so there
is no real new design here, with the same logic around buffer bound
checks and memory handling.
HMAC has a dependency on cryptohashes, so all the cryptohash types
supported by cryptohash{_openssl}.c can be used with HMAC. This
refactoring is an advantage mainly for SCRAM, that included its own
implementation of HMAC with SHA256 without relying on the existing
crypto libraries even if PostgreSQL was built with their support.
This code has been tested on Windows and Linux, with and without
OpenSSL, across all the versions supported on HEAD from 1.1.1 down to
1.0.1. I have also checked that the implementations are working fine
using some sample results, a custom extension of my own, and doing
cross-checks across different major versions with SCRAM with the client
and the backend.
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Bruce Momjian
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/X9m0nkEJEzIPXjeZ@paquier.xyz
2021-04-03 10:30:49 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
memset(ctx->hmacctx, 0, sizeof(HMAC_CTX));
|
|
|
|
#endif /* HAVE_HMAC_CTX_NEW */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ctx;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* pg_hmac_init
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Initialize a HMAC context. Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
pg_hmac_init(pg_hmac_ctx *ctx, const uint8 *key, size_t len)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int status = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ctx == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (ctx->type)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
case PG_MD5:
|
|
|
|
status = HMAC_Init_ex(ctx->hmacctx, key, len, EVP_md5(), NULL);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case PG_SHA1:
|
|
|
|
status = HMAC_Init_ex(ctx->hmacctx, key, len, EVP_sha1(), NULL);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case PG_SHA224:
|
|
|
|
status = HMAC_Init_ex(ctx->hmacctx, key, len, EVP_sha224(), NULL);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case PG_SHA256:
|
|
|
|
status = HMAC_Init_ex(ctx->hmacctx, key, len, EVP_sha256(), NULL);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case PG_SHA384:
|
|
|
|
status = HMAC_Init_ex(ctx->hmacctx, key, len, EVP_sha384(), NULL);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case PG_SHA512:
|
|
|
|
status = HMAC_Init_ex(ctx->hmacctx, key, len, EVP_sha512(), NULL);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* OpenSSL internals return 1 on success, 0 on failure */
|
|
|
|
if (status <= 0)
|
Improve error handling of HMAC computations
This is similar to b69aba7, except that this completes the work for
HMAC with a new routine called pg_hmac_error() that would provide more
context about the type of error that happened during a HMAC computation:
- The fallback HMAC implementation in hmac.c relies on cryptohashes, so
in some code paths it is necessary to return back the error generated by
cryptohashes.
- For the OpenSSL implementation (hmac_openssl.c), the logic is very
similar to cryptohash_openssl.c, where the error context comes from
OpenSSL if one of its internal routines failed, with different error
codes if something internal to hmac_openssl.c failed or was incorrect.
Any in-core code paths that use the centralized HMAC interface are
related to SCRAM, for errors that are unlikely going to happen, with
only SHA-256. It would be possible to see errors when computing some
HMACs with MD5 for example and OpenSSL FIPS enabled, and this commit
would help in reporting the correct errors but nothing in core uses
that. So, at the end, no backpatch to v14 is done, at least for now.
Errors in SCRAM related to the computation of the server key, stored
key, etc. need to pass down the potential error context string across
more layers of their respective call stacks for the frontend and the
backend, so each surrounding routine is adapted for this purpose.
Reviewed-by: Sergey Shinderuk
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/Yd0N9tSAIIkFd+qi@paquier.xyz
2022-01-13 08:17:21 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ctx->errreason = SSLerrmessage(ERR_get_error());
|
|
|
|
ctx->error = PG_HMAC_ERROR_OPENSSL;
|
Refactor HMAC implementations
Similarly to the cryptohash implementations, this refactors the existing
HMAC code into a single set of APIs that can be plugged with any crypto
libraries PostgreSQL is built with (only OpenSSL currently). If there
is no such libraries, a fallback implementation is available. Those new
APIs are designed similarly to the existing cryptohash layer, so there
is no real new design here, with the same logic around buffer bound
checks and memory handling.
HMAC has a dependency on cryptohashes, so all the cryptohash types
supported by cryptohash{_openssl}.c can be used with HMAC. This
refactoring is an advantage mainly for SCRAM, that included its own
implementation of HMAC with SHA256 without relying on the existing
crypto libraries even if PostgreSQL was built with their support.
This code has been tested on Windows and Linux, with and without
OpenSSL, across all the versions supported on HEAD from 1.1.1 down to
1.0.1. I have also checked that the implementations are working fine
using some sample results, a custom extension of my own, and doing
cross-checks across different major versions with SCRAM with the client
and the backend.
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Bruce Momjian
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/X9m0nkEJEzIPXjeZ@paquier.xyz
2021-04-03 10:30:49 +02:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
Improve error handling of HMAC computations
This is similar to b69aba7, except that this completes the work for
HMAC with a new routine called pg_hmac_error() that would provide more
context about the type of error that happened during a HMAC computation:
- The fallback HMAC implementation in hmac.c relies on cryptohashes, so
in some code paths it is necessary to return back the error generated by
cryptohashes.
- For the OpenSSL implementation (hmac_openssl.c), the logic is very
similar to cryptohash_openssl.c, where the error context comes from
OpenSSL if one of its internal routines failed, with different error
codes if something internal to hmac_openssl.c failed or was incorrect.
Any in-core code paths that use the centralized HMAC interface are
related to SCRAM, for errors that are unlikely going to happen, with
only SHA-256. It would be possible to see errors when computing some
HMACs with MD5 for example and OpenSSL FIPS enabled, and this commit
would help in reporting the correct errors but nothing in core uses
that. So, at the end, no backpatch to v14 is done, at least for now.
Errors in SCRAM related to the computation of the server key, stored
key, etc. need to pass down the potential error context string across
more layers of their respective call stacks for the frontend and the
backend, so each surrounding routine is adapted for this purpose.
Reviewed-by: Sergey Shinderuk
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/Yd0N9tSAIIkFd+qi@paquier.xyz
2022-01-13 08:17:21 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
Refactor HMAC implementations
Similarly to the cryptohash implementations, this refactors the existing
HMAC code into a single set of APIs that can be plugged with any crypto
libraries PostgreSQL is built with (only OpenSSL currently). If there
is no such libraries, a fallback implementation is available. Those new
APIs are designed similarly to the existing cryptohash layer, so there
is no real new design here, with the same logic around buffer bound
checks and memory handling.
HMAC has a dependency on cryptohashes, so all the cryptohash types
supported by cryptohash{_openssl}.c can be used with HMAC. This
refactoring is an advantage mainly for SCRAM, that included its own
implementation of HMAC with SHA256 without relying on the existing
crypto libraries even if PostgreSQL was built with their support.
This code has been tested on Windows and Linux, with and without
OpenSSL, across all the versions supported on HEAD from 1.1.1 down to
1.0.1. I have also checked that the implementations are working fine
using some sample results, a custom extension of my own, and doing
cross-checks across different major versions with SCRAM with the client
and the backend.
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Bruce Momjian
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/X9m0nkEJEzIPXjeZ@paquier.xyz
2021-04-03 10:30:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* pg_hmac_update
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Update a HMAC context. Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
pg_hmac_update(pg_hmac_ctx *ctx, const uint8 *data, size_t len)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int status = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ctx == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
status = HMAC_Update(ctx->hmacctx, data, len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* OpenSSL internals return 1 on success, 0 on failure */
|
|
|
|
if (status <= 0)
|
Improve error handling of HMAC computations
This is similar to b69aba7, except that this completes the work for
HMAC with a new routine called pg_hmac_error() that would provide more
context about the type of error that happened during a HMAC computation:
- The fallback HMAC implementation in hmac.c relies on cryptohashes, so
in some code paths it is necessary to return back the error generated by
cryptohashes.
- For the OpenSSL implementation (hmac_openssl.c), the logic is very
similar to cryptohash_openssl.c, where the error context comes from
OpenSSL if one of its internal routines failed, with different error
codes if something internal to hmac_openssl.c failed or was incorrect.
Any in-core code paths that use the centralized HMAC interface are
related to SCRAM, for errors that are unlikely going to happen, with
only SHA-256. It would be possible to see errors when computing some
HMACs with MD5 for example and OpenSSL FIPS enabled, and this commit
would help in reporting the correct errors but nothing in core uses
that. So, at the end, no backpatch to v14 is done, at least for now.
Errors in SCRAM related to the computation of the server key, stored
key, etc. need to pass down the potential error context string across
more layers of their respective call stacks for the frontend and the
backend, so each surrounding routine is adapted for this purpose.
Reviewed-by: Sergey Shinderuk
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/Yd0N9tSAIIkFd+qi@paquier.xyz
2022-01-13 08:17:21 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ctx->errreason = SSLerrmessage(ERR_get_error());
|
|
|
|
ctx->error = PG_HMAC_ERROR_OPENSSL;
|
Refactor HMAC implementations
Similarly to the cryptohash implementations, this refactors the existing
HMAC code into a single set of APIs that can be plugged with any crypto
libraries PostgreSQL is built with (only OpenSSL currently). If there
is no such libraries, a fallback implementation is available. Those new
APIs are designed similarly to the existing cryptohash layer, so there
is no real new design here, with the same logic around buffer bound
checks and memory handling.
HMAC has a dependency on cryptohashes, so all the cryptohash types
supported by cryptohash{_openssl}.c can be used with HMAC. This
refactoring is an advantage mainly for SCRAM, that included its own
implementation of HMAC with SHA256 without relying on the existing
crypto libraries even if PostgreSQL was built with their support.
This code has been tested on Windows and Linux, with and without
OpenSSL, across all the versions supported on HEAD from 1.1.1 down to
1.0.1. I have also checked that the implementations are working fine
using some sample results, a custom extension of my own, and doing
cross-checks across different major versions with SCRAM with the client
and the backend.
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Bruce Momjian
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/X9m0nkEJEzIPXjeZ@paquier.xyz
2021-04-03 10:30:49 +02:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
Improve error handling of HMAC computations
This is similar to b69aba7, except that this completes the work for
HMAC with a new routine called pg_hmac_error() that would provide more
context about the type of error that happened during a HMAC computation:
- The fallback HMAC implementation in hmac.c relies on cryptohashes, so
in some code paths it is necessary to return back the error generated by
cryptohashes.
- For the OpenSSL implementation (hmac_openssl.c), the logic is very
similar to cryptohash_openssl.c, where the error context comes from
OpenSSL if one of its internal routines failed, with different error
codes if something internal to hmac_openssl.c failed or was incorrect.
Any in-core code paths that use the centralized HMAC interface are
related to SCRAM, for errors that are unlikely going to happen, with
only SHA-256. It would be possible to see errors when computing some
HMACs with MD5 for example and OpenSSL FIPS enabled, and this commit
would help in reporting the correct errors but nothing in core uses
that. So, at the end, no backpatch to v14 is done, at least for now.
Errors in SCRAM related to the computation of the server key, stored
key, etc. need to pass down the potential error context string across
more layers of their respective call stacks for the frontend and the
backend, so each surrounding routine is adapted for this purpose.
Reviewed-by: Sergey Shinderuk
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/Yd0N9tSAIIkFd+qi@paquier.xyz
2022-01-13 08:17:21 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
Refactor HMAC implementations
Similarly to the cryptohash implementations, this refactors the existing
HMAC code into a single set of APIs that can be plugged with any crypto
libraries PostgreSQL is built with (only OpenSSL currently). If there
is no such libraries, a fallback implementation is available. Those new
APIs are designed similarly to the existing cryptohash layer, so there
is no real new design here, with the same logic around buffer bound
checks and memory handling.
HMAC has a dependency on cryptohashes, so all the cryptohash types
supported by cryptohash{_openssl}.c can be used with HMAC. This
refactoring is an advantage mainly for SCRAM, that included its own
implementation of HMAC with SHA256 without relying on the existing
crypto libraries even if PostgreSQL was built with their support.
This code has been tested on Windows and Linux, with and without
OpenSSL, across all the versions supported on HEAD from 1.1.1 down to
1.0.1. I have also checked that the implementations are working fine
using some sample results, a custom extension of my own, and doing
cross-checks across different major versions with SCRAM with the client
and the backend.
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Bruce Momjian
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/X9m0nkEJEzIPXjeZ@paquier.xyz
2021-04-03 10:30:49 +02:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* pg_hmac_final
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Finalize a HMAC context. Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
pg_hmac_final(pg_hmac_ctx *ctx, uint8 *dest, size_t len)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int status = 0;
|
|
|
|
uint32 outlen;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ctx == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (ctx->type)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
case PG_MD5:
|
|
|
|
if (len < MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH)
|
Improve error handling of HMAC computations
This is similar to b69aba7, except that this completes the work for
HMAC with a new routine called pg_hmac_error() that would provide more
context about the type of error that happened during a HMAC computation:
- The fallback HMAC implementation in hmac.c relies on cryptohashes, so
in some code paths it is necessary to return back the error generated by
cryptohashes.
- For the OpenSSL implementation (hmac_openssl.c), the logic is very
similar to cryptohash_openssl.c, where the error context comes from
OpenSSL if one of its internal routines failed, with different error
codes if something internal to hmac_openssl.c failed or was incorrect.
Any in-core code paths that use the centralized HMAC interface are
related to SCRAM, for errors that are unlikely going to happen, with
only SHA-256. It would be possible to see errors when computing some
HMACs with MD5 for example and OpenSSL FIPS enabled, and this commit
would help in reporting the correct errors but nothing in core uses
that. So, at the end, no backpatch to v14 is done, at least for now.
Errors in SCRAM related to the computation of the server key, stored
key, etc. need to pass down the potential error context string across
more layers of their respective call stacks for the frontend and the
backend, so each surrounding routine is adapted for this purpose.
Reviewed-by: Sergey Shinderuk
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/Yd0N9tSAIIkFd+qi@paquier.xyz
2022-01-13 08:17:21 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ctx->error = PG_HMAC_ERROR_DEST_LEN;
|
Refactor HMAC implementations
Similarly to the cryptohash implementations, this refactors the existing
HMAC code into a single set of APIs that can be plugged with any crypto
libraries PostgreSQL is built with (only OpenSSL currently). If there
is no such libraries, a fallback implementation is available. Those new
APIs are designed similarly to the existing cryptohash layer, so there
is no real new design here, with the same logic around buffer bound
checks and memory handling.
HMAC has a dependency on cryptohashes, so all the cryptohash types
supported by cryptohash{_openssl}.c can be used with HMAC. This
refactoring is an advantage mainly for SCRAM, that included its own
implementation of HMAC with SHA256 without relying on the existing
crypto libraries even if PostgreSQL was built with their support.
This code has been tested on Windows and Linux, with and without
OpenSSL, across all the versions supported on HEAD from 1.1.1 down to
1.0.1. I have also checked that the implementations are working fine
using some sample results, a custom extension of my own, and doing
cross-checks across different major versions with SCRAM with the client
and the backend.
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Bruce Momjian
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/X9m0nkEJEzIPXjeZ@paquier.xyz
2021-04-03 10:30:49 +02:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
Improve error handling of HMAC computations
This is similar to b69aba7, except that this completes the work for
HMAC with a new routine called pg_hmac_error() that would provide more
context about the type of error that happened during a HMAC computation:
- The fallback HMAC implementation in hmac.c relies on cryptohashes, so
in some code paths it is necessary to return back the error generated by
cryptohashes.
- For the OpenSSL implementation (hmac_openssl.c), the logic is very
similar to cryptohash_openssl.c, where the error context comes from
OpenSSL if one of its internal routines failed, with different error
codes if something internal to hmac_openssl.c failed or was incorrect.
Any in-core code paths that use the centralized HMAC interface are
related to SCRAM, for errors that are unlikely going to happen, with
only SHA-256. It would be possible to see errors when computing some
HMACs with MD5 for example and OpenSSL FIPS enabled, and this commit
would help in reporting the correct errors but nothing in core uses
that. So, at the end, no backpatch to v14 is done, at least for now.
Errors in SCRAM related to the computation of the server key, stored
key, etc. need to pass down the potential error context string across
more layers of their respective call stacks for the frontend and the
backend, so each surrounding routine is adapted for this purpose.
Reviewed-by: Sergey Shinderuk
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/Yd0N9tSAIIkFd+qi@paquier.xyz
2022-01-13 08:17:21 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
Refactor HMAC implementations
Similarly to the cryptohash implementations, this refactors the existing
HMAC code into a single set of APIs that can be plugged with any crypto
libraries PostgreSQL is built with (only OpenSSL currently). If there
is no such libraries, a fallback implementation is available. Those new
APIs are designed similarly to the existing cryptohash layer, so there
is no real new design here, with the same logic around buffer bound
checks and memory handling.
HMAC has a dependency on cryptohashes, so all the cryptohash types
supported by cryptohash{_openssl}.c can be used with HMAC. This
refactoring is an advantage mainly for SCRAM, that included its own
implementation of HMAC with SHA256 without relying on the existing
crypto libraries even if PostgreSQL was built with their support.
This code has been tested on Windows and Linux, with and without
OpenSSL, across all the versions supported on HEAD from 1.1.1 down to
1.0.1. I have also checked that the implementations are working fine
using some sample results, a custom extension of my own, and doing
cross-checks across different major versions with SCRAM with the client
and the backend.
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Bruce Momjian
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/X9m0nkEJEzIPXjeZ@paquier.xyz
2021-04-03 10:30:49 +02:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case PG_SHA1:
|
|
|
|
if (len < SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH)
|
Improve error handling of HMAC computations
This is similar to b69aba7, except that this completes the work for
HMAC with a new routine called pg_hmac_error() that would provide more
context about the type of error that happened during a HMAC computation:
- The fallback HMAC implementation in hmac.c relies on cryptohashes, so
in some code paths it is necessary to return back the error generated by
cryptohashes.
- For the OpenSSL implementation (hmac_openssl.c), the logic is very
similar to cryptohash_openssl.c, where the error context comes from
OpenSSL if one of its internal routines failed, with different error
codes if something internal to hmac_openssl.c failed or was incorrect.
Any in-core code paths that use the centralized HMAC interface are
related to SCRAM, for errors that are unlikely going to happen, with
only SHA-256. It would be possible to see errors when computing some
HMACs with MD5 for example and OpenSSL FIPS enabled, and this commit
would help in reporting the correct errors but nothing in core uses
that. So, at the end, no backpatch to v14 is done, at least for now.
Errors in SCRAM related to the computation of the server key, stored
key, etc. need to pass down the potential error context string across
more layers of their respective call stacks for the frontend and the
backend, so each surrounding routine is adapted for this purpose.
Reviewed-by: Sergey Shinderuk
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/Yd0N9tSAIIkFd+qi@paquier.xyz
2022-01-13 08:17:21 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ctx->error = PG_HMAC_ERROR_DEST_LEN;
|
Refactor HMAC implementations
Similarly to the cryptohash implementations, this refactors the existing
HMAC code into a single set of APIs that can be plugged with any crypto
libraries PostgreSQL is built with (only OpenSSL currently). If there
is no such libraries, a fallback implementation is available. Those new
APIs are designed similarly to the existing cryptohash layer, so there
is no real new design here, with the same logic around buffer bound
checks and memory handling.
HMAC has a dependency on cryptohashes, so all the cryptohash types
supported by cryptohash{_openssl}.c can be used with HMAC. This
refactoring is an advantage mainly for SCRAM, that included its own
implementation of HMAC with SHA256 without relying on the existing
crypto libraries even if PostgreSQL was built with their support.
This code has been tested on Windows and Linux, with and without
OpenSSL, across all the versions supported on HEAD from 1.1.1 down to
1.0.1. I have also checked that the implementations are working fine
using some sample results, a custom extension of my own, and doing
cross-checks across different major versions with SCRAM with the client
and the backend.
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Bruce Momjian
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/X9m0nkEJEzIPXjeZ@paquier.xyz
2021-04-03 10:30:49 +02:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
Improve error handling of HMAC computations
This is similar to b69aba7, except that this completes the work for
HMAC with a new routine called pg_hmac_error() that would provide more
context about the type of error that happened during a HMAC computation:
- The fallback HMAC implementation in hmac.c relies on cryptohashes, so
in some code paths it is necessary to return back the error generated by
cryptohashes.
- For the OpenSSL implementation (hmac_openssl.c), the logic is very
similar to cryptohash_openssl.c, where the error context comes from
OpenSSL if one of its internal routines failed, with different error
codes if something internal to hmac_openssl.c failed or was incorrect.
Any in-core code paths that use the centralized HMAC interface are
related to SCRAM, for errors that are unlikely going to happen, with
only SHA-256. It would be possible to see errors when computing some
HMACs with MD5 for example and OpenSSL FIPS enabled, and this commit
would help in reporting the correct errors but nothing in core uses
that. So, at the end, no backpatch to v14 is done, at least for now.
Errors in SCRAM related to the computation of the server key, stored
key, etc. need to pass down the potential error context string across
more layers of their respective call stacks for the frontend and the
backend, so each surrounding routine is adapted for this purpose.
Reviewed-by: Sergey Shinderuk
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/Yd0N9tSAIIkFd+qi@paquier.xyz
2022-01-13 08:17:21 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
Refactor HMAC implementations
Similarly to the cryptohash implementations, this refactors the existing
HMAC code into a single set of APIs that can be plugged with any crypto
libraries PostgreSQL is built with (only OpenSSL currently). If there
is no such libraries, a fallback implementation is available. Those new
APIs are designed similarly to the existing cryptohash layer, so there
is no real new design here, with the same logic around buffer bound
checks and memory handling.
HMAC has a dependency on cryptohashes, so all the cryptohash types
supported by cryptohash{_openssl}.c can be used with HMAC. This
refactoring is an advantage mainly for SCRAM, that included its own
implementation of HMAC with SHA256 without relying on the existing
crypto libraries even if PostgreSQL was built with their support.
This code has been tested on Windows and Linux, with and without
OpenSSL, across all the versions supported on HEAD from 1.1.1 down to
1.0.1. I have also checked that the implementations are working fine
using some sample results, a custom extension of my own, and doing
cross-checks across different major versions with SCRAM with the client
and the backend.
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Bruce Momjian
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/X9m0nkEJEzIPXjeZ@paquier.xyz
2021-04-03 10:30:49 +02:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case PG_SHA224:
|
|
|
|
if (len < PG_SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH)
|
Improve error handling of HMAC computations
This is similar to b69aba7, except that this completes the work for
HMAC with a new routine called pg_hmac_error() that would provide more
context about the type of error that happened during a HMAC computation:
- The fallback HMAC implementation in hmac.c relies on cryptohashes, so
in some code paths it is necessary to return back the error generated by
cryptohashes.
- For the OpenSSL implementation (hmac_openssl.c), the logic is very
similar to cryptohash_openssl.c, where the error context comes from
OpenSSL if one of its internal routines failed, with different error
codes if something internal to hmac_openssl.c failed or was incorrect.
Any in-core code paths that use the centralized HMAC interface are
related to SCRAM, for errors that are unlikely going to happen, with
only SHA-256. It would be possible to see errors when computing some
HMACs with MD5 for example and OpenSSL FIPS enabled, and this commit
would help in reporting the correct errors but nothing in core uses
that. So, at the end, no backpatch to v14 is done, at least for now.
Errors in SCRAM related to the computation of the server key, stored
key, etc. need to pass down the potential error context string across
more layers of their respective call stacks for the frontend and the
backend, so each surrounding routine is adapted for this purpose.
Reviewed-by: Sergey Shinderuk
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/Yd0N9tSAIIkFd+qi@paquier.xyz
2022-01-13 08:17:21 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ctx->error = PG_HMAC_ERROR_DEST_LEN;
|
Refactor HMAC implementations
Similarly to the cryptohash implementations, this refactors the existing
HMAC code into a single set of APIs that can be plugged with any crypto
libraries PostgreSQL is built with (only OpenSSL currently). If there
is no such libraries, a fallback implementation is available. Those new
APIs are designed similarly to the existing cryptohash layer, so there
is no real new design here, with the same logic around buffer bound
checks and memory handling.
HMAC has a dependency on cryptohashes, so all the cryptohash types
supported by cryptohash{_openssl}.c can be used with HMAC. This
refactoring is an advantage mainly for SCRAM, that included its own
implementation of HMAC with SHA256 without relying on the existing
crypto libraries even if PostgreSQL was built with their support.
This code has been tested on Windows and Linux, with and without
OpenSSL, across all the versions supported on HEAD from 1.1.1 down to
1.0.1. I have also checked that the implementations are working fine
using some sample results, a custom extension of my own, and doing
cross-checks across different major versions with SCRAM with the client
and the backend.
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Bruce Momjian
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/X9m0nkEJEzIPXjeZ@paquier.xyz
2021-04-03 10:30:49 +02:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
Improve error handling of HMAC computations
This is similar to b69aba7, except that this completes the work for
HMAC with a new routine called pg_hmac_error() that would provide more
context about the type of error that happened during a HMAC computation:
- The fallback HMAC implementation in hmac.c relies on cryptohashes, so
in some code paths it is necessary to return back the error generated by
cryptohashes.
- For the OpenSSL implementation (hmac_openssl.c), the logic is very
similar to cryptohash_openssl.c, where the error context comes from
OpenSSL if one of its internal routines failed, with different error
codes if something internal to hmac_openssl.c failed or was incorrect.
Any in-core code paths that use the centralized HMAC interface are
related to SCRAM, for errors that are unlikely going to happen, with
only SHA-256. It would be possible to see errors when computing some
HMACs with MD5 for example and OpenSSL FIPS enabled, and this commit
would help in reporting the correct errors but nothing in core uses
that. So, at the end, no backpatch to v14 is done, at least for now.
Errors in SCRAM related to the computation of the server key, stored
key, etc. need to pass down the potential error context string across
more layers of their respective call stacks for the frontend and the
backend, so each surrounding routine is adapted for this purpose.
Reviewed-by: Sergey Shinderuk
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/Yd0N9tSAIIkFd+qi@paquier.xyz
2022-01-13 08:17:21 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
Refactor HMAC implementations
Similarly to the cryptohash implementations, this refactors the existing
HMAC code into a single set of APIs that can be plugged with any crypto
libraries PostgreSQL is built with (only OpenSSL currently). If there
is no such libraries, a fallback implementation is available. Those new
APIs are designed similarly to the existing cryptohash layer, so there
is no real new design here, with the same logic around buffer bound
checks and memory handling.
HMAC has a dependency on cryptohashes, so all the cryptohash types
supported by cryptohash{_openssl}.c can be used with HMAC. This
refactoring is an advantage mainly for SCRAM, that included its own
implementation of HMAC with SHA256 without relying on the existing
crypto libraries even if PostgreSQL was built with their support.
This code has been tested on Windows and Linux, with and without
OpenSSL, across all the versions supported on HEAD from 1.1.1 down to
1.0.1. I have also checked that the implementations are working fine
using some sample results, a custom extension of my own, and doing
cross-checks across different major versions with SCRAM with the client
and the backend.
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Bruce Momjian
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/X9m0nkEJEzIPXjeZ@paquier.xyz
2021-04-03 10:30:49 +02:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case PG_SHA256:
|
|
|
|
if (len < PG_SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)
|
Improve error handling of HMAC computations
This is similar to b69aba7, except that this completes the work for
HMAC with a new routine called pg_hmac_error() that would provide more
context about the type of error that happened during a HMAC computation:
- The fallback HMAC implementation in hmac.c relies on cryptohashes, so
in some code paths it is necessary to return back the error generated by
cryptohashes.
- For the OpenSSL implementation (hmac_openssl.c), the logic is very
similar to cryptohash_openssl.c, where the error context comes from
OpenSSL if one of its internal routines failed, with different error
codes if something internal to hmac_openssl.c failed or was incorrect.
Any in-core code paths that use the centralized HMAC interface are
related to SCRAM, for errors that are unlikely going to happen, with
only SHA-256. It would be possible to see errors when computing some
HMACs with MD5 for example and OpenSSL FIPS enabled, and this commit
would help in reporting the correct errors but nothing in core uses
that. So, at the end, no backpatch to v14 is done, at least for now.
Errors in SCRAM related to the computation of the server key, stored
key, etc. need to pass down the potential error context string across
more layers of their respective call stacks for the frontend and the
backend, so each surrounding routine is adapted for this purpose.
Reviewed-by: Sergey Shinderuk
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/Yd0N9tSAIIkFd+qi@paquier.xyz
2022-01-13 08:17:21 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ctx->error = PG_HMAC_ERROR_DEST_LEN;
|
Refactor HMAC implementations
Similarly to the cryptohash implementations, this refactors the existing
HMAC code into a single set of APIs that can be plugged with any crypto
libraries PostgreSQL is built with (only OpenSSL currently). If there
is no such libraries, a fallback implementation is available. Those new
APIs are designed similarly to the existing cryptohash layer, so there
is no real new design here, with the same logic around buffer bound
checks and memory handling.
HMAC has a dependency on cryptohashes, so all the cryptohash types
supported by cryptohash{_openssl}.c can be used with HMAC. This
refactoring is an advantage mainly for SCRAM, that included its own
implementation of HMAC with SHA256 without relying on the existing
crypto libraries even if PostgreSQL was built with their support.
This code has been tested on Windows and Linux, with and without
OpenSSL, across all the versions supported on HEAD from 1.1.1 down to
1.0.1. I have also checked that the implementations are working fine
using some sample results, a custom extension of my own, and doing
cross-checks across different major versions with SCRAM with the client
and the backend.
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Bruce Momjian
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/X9m0nkEJEzIPXjeZ@paquier.xyz
2021-04-03 10:30:49 +02:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
Improve error handling of HMAC computations
This is similar to b69aba7, except that this completes the work for
HMAC with a new routine called pg_hmac_error() that would provide more
context about the type of error that happened during a HMAC computation:
- The fallback HMAC implementation in hmac.c relies on cryptohashes, so
in some code paths it is necessary to return back the error generated by
cryptohashes.
- For the OpenSSL implementation (hmac_openssl.c), the logic is very
similar to cryptohash_openssl.c, where the error context comes from
OpenSSL if one of its internal routines failed, with different error
codes if something internal to hmac_openssl.c failed or was incorrect.
Any in-core code paths that use the centralized HMAC interface are
related to SCRAM, for errors that are unlikely going to happen, with
only SHA-256. It would be possible to see errors when computing some
HMACs with MD5 for example and OpenSSL FIPS enabled, and this commit
would help in reporting the correct errors but nothing in core uses
that. So, at the end, no backpatch to v14 is done, at least for now.
Errors in SCRAM related to the computation of the server key, stored
key, etc. need to pass down the potential error context string across
more layers of their respective call stacks for the frontend and the
backend, so each surrounding routine is adapted for this purpose.
Reviewed-by: Sergey Shinderuk
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/Yd0N9tSAIIkFd+qi@paquier.xyz
2022-01-13 08:17:21 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
Refactor HMAC implementations
Similarly to the cryptohash implementations, this refactors the existing
HMAC code into a single set of APIs that can be plugged with any crypto
libraries PostgreSQL is built with (only OpenSSL currently). If there
is no such libraries, a fallback implementation is available. Those new
APIs are designed similarly to the existing cryptohash layer, so there
is no real new design here, with the same logic around buffer bound
checks and memory handling.
HMAC has a dependency on cryptohashes, so all the cryptohash types
supported by cryptohash{_openssl}.c can be used with HMAC. This
refactoring is an advantage mainly for SCRAM, that included its own
implementation of HMAC with SHA256 without relying on the existing
crypto libraries even if PostgreSQL was built with their support.
This code has been tested on Windows and Linux, with and without
OpenSSL, across all the versions supported on HEAD from 1.1.1 down to
1.0.1. I have also checked that the implementations are working fine
using some sample results, a custom extension of my own, and doing
cross-checks across different major versions with SCRAM with the client
and the backend.
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Bruce Momjian
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/X9m0nkEJEzIPXjeZ@paquier.xyz
2021-04-03 10:30:49 +02:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case PG_SHA384:
|
|
|
|
if (len < PG_SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH)
|
Improve error handling of HMAC computations
This is similar to b69aba7, except that this completes the work for
HMAC with a new routine called pg_hmac_error() that would provide more
context about the type of error that happened during a HMAC computation:
- The fallback HMAC implementation in hmac.c relies on cryptohashes, so
in some code paths it is necessary to return back the error generated by
cryptohashes.
- For the OpenSSL implementation (hmac_openssl.c), the logic is very
similar to cryptohash_openssl.c, where the error context comes from
OpenSSL if one of its internal routines failed, with different error
codes if something internal to hmac_openssl.c failed or was incorrect.
Any in-core code paths that use the centralized HMAC interface are
related to SCRAM, for errors that are unlikely going to happen, with
only SHA-256. It would be possible to see errors when computing some
HMACs with MD5 for example and OpenSSL FIPS enabled, and this commit
would help in reporting the correct errors but nothing in core uses
that. So, at the end, no backpatch to v14 is done, at least for now.
Errors in SCRAM related to the computation of the server key, stored
key, etc. need to pass down the potential error context string across
more layers of their respective call stacks for the frontend and the
backend, so each surrounding routine is adapted for this purpose.
Reviewed-by: Sergey Shinderuk
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/Yd0N9tSAIIkFd+qi@paquier.xyz
2022-01-13 08:17:21 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ctx->error = PG_HMAC_ERROR_DEST_LEN;
|
Refactor HMAC implementations
Similarly to the cryptohash implementations, this refactors the existing
HMAC code into a single set of APIs that can be plugged with any crypto
libraries PostgreSQL is built with (only OpenSSL currently). If there
is no such libraries, a fallback implementation is available. Those new
APIs are designed similarly to the existing cryptohash layer, so there
is no real new design here, with the same logic around buffer bound
checks and memory handling.
HMAC has a dependency on cryptohashes, so all the cryptohash types
supported by cryptohash{_openssl}.c can be used with HMAC. This
refactoring is an advantage mainly for SCRAM, that included its own
implementation of HMAC with SHA256 without relying on the existing
crypto libraries even if PostgreSQL was built with their support.
This code has been tested on Windows and Linux, with and without
OpenSSL, across all the versions supported on HEAD from 1.1.1 down to
1.0.1. I have also checked that the implementations are working fine
using some sample results, a custom extension of my own, and doing
cross-checks across different major versions with SCRAM with the client
and the backend.
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Bruce Momjian
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/X9m0nkEJEzIPXjeZ@paquier.xyz
2021-04-03 10:30:49 +02:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
Improve error handling of HMAC computations
This is similar to b69aba7, except that this completes the work for
HMAC with a new routine called pg_hmac_error() that would provide more
context about the type of error that happened during a HMAC computation:
- The fallback HMAC implementation in hmac.c relies on cryptohashes, so
in some code paths it is necessary to return back the error generated by
cryptohashes.
- For the OpenSSL implementation (hmac_openssl.c), the logic is very
similar to cryptohash_openssl.c, where the error context comes from
OpenSSL if one of its internal routines failed, with different error
codes if something internal to hmac_openssl.c failed or was incorrect.
Any in-core code paths that use the centralized HMAC interface are
related to SCRAM, for errors that are unlikely going to happen, with
only SHA-256. It would be possible to see errors when computing some
HMACs with MD5 for example and OpenSSL FIPS enabled, and this commit
would help in reporting the correct errors but nothing in core uses
that. So, at the end, no backpatch to v14 is done, at least for now.
Errors in SCRAM related to the computation of the server key, stored
key, etc. need to pass down the potential error context string across
more layers of their respective call stacks for the frontend and the
backend, so each surrounding routine is adapted for this purpose.
Reviewed-by: Sergey Shinderuk
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/Yd0N9tSAIIkFd+qi@paquier.xyz
2022-01-13 08:17:21 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
Refactor HMAC implementations
Similarly to the cryptohash implementations, this refactors the existing
HMAC code into a single set of APIs that can be plugged with any crypto
libraries PostgreSQL is built with (only OpenSSL currently). If there
is no such libraries, a fallback implementation is available. Those new
APIs are designed similarly to the existing cryptohash layer, so there
is no real new design here, with the same logic around buffer bound
checks and memory handling.
HMAC has a dependency on cryptohashes, so all the cryptohash types
supported by cryptohash{_openssl}.c can be used with HMAC. This
refactoring is an advantage mainly for SCRAM, that included its own
implementation of HMAC with SHA256 without relying on the existing
crypto libraries even if PostgreSQL was built with their support.
This code has been tested on Windows and Linux, with and without
OpenSSL, across all the versions supported on HEAD from 1.1.1 down to
1.0.1. I have also checked that the implementations are working fine
using some sample results, a custom extension of my own, and doing
cross-checks across different major versions with SCRAM with the client
and the backend.
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Bruce Momjian
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/X9m0nkEJEzIPXjeZ@paquier.xyz
2021-04-03 10:30:49 +02:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case PG_SHA512:
|
|
|
|
if (len < PG_SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH)
|
Improve error handling of HMAC computations
This is similar to b69aba7, except that this completes the work for
HMAC with a new routine called pg_hmac_error() that would provide more
context about the type of error that happened during a HMAC computation:
- The fallback HMAC implementation in hmac.c relies on cryptohashes, so
in some code paths it is necessary to return back the error generated by
cryptohashes.
- For the OpenSSL implementation (hmac_openssl.c), the logic is very
similar to cryptohash_openssl.c, where the error context comes from
OpenSSL if one of its internal routines failed, with different error
codes if something internal to hmac_openssl.c failed or was incorrect.
Any in-core code paths that use the centralized HMAC interface are
related to SCRAM, for errors that are unlikely going to happen, with
only SHA-256. It would be possible to see errors when computing some
HMACs with MD5 for example and OpenSSL FIPS enabled, and this commit
would help in reporting the correct errors but nothing in core uses
that. So, at the end, no backpatch to v14 is done, at least for now.
Errors in SCRAM related to the computation of the server key, stored
key, etc. need to pass down the potential error context string across
more layers of their respective call stacks for the frontend and the
backend, so each surrounding routine is adapted for this purpose.
Reviewed-by: Sergey Shinderuk
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/Yd0N9tSAIIkFd+qi@paquier.xyz
2022-01-13 08:17:21 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ctx->error = PG_HMAC_ERROR_DEST_LEN;
|
Refactor HMAC implementations
Similarly to the cryptohash implementations, this refactors the existing
HMAC code into a single set of APIs that can be plugged with any crypto
libraries PostgreSQL is built with (only OpenSSL currently). If there
is no such libraries, a fallback implementation is available. Those new
APIs are designed similarly to the existing cryptohash layer, so there
is no real new design here, with the same logic around buffer bound
checks and memory handling.
HMAC has a dependency on cryptohashes, so all the cryptohash types
supported by cryptohash{_openssl}.c can be used with HMAC. This
refactoring is an advantage mainly for SCRAM, that included its own
implementation of HMAC with SHA256 without relying on the existing
crypto libraries even if PostgreSQL was built with their support.
This code has been tested on Windows and Linux, with and without
OpenSSL, across all the versions supported on HEAD from 1.1.1 down to
1.0.1. I have also checked that the implementations are working fine
using some sample results, a custom extension of my own, and doing
cross-checks across different major versions with SCRAM with the client
and the backend.
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Bruce Momjian
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/X9m0nkEJEzIPXjeZ@paquier.xyz
2021-04-03 10:30:49 +02:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
Improve error handling of HMAC computations
This is similar to b69aba7, except that this completes the work for
HMAC with a new routine called pg_hmac_error() that would provide more
context about the type of error that happened during a HMAC computation:
- The fallback HMAC implementation in hmac.c relies on cryptohashes, so
in some code paths it is necessary to return back the error generated by
cryptohashes.
- For the OpenSSL implementation (hmac_openssl.c), the logic is very
similar to cryptohash_openssl.c, where the error context comes from
OpenSSL if one of its internal routines failed, with different error
codes if something internal to hmac_openssl.c failed or was incorrect.
Any in-core code paths that use the centralized HMAC interface are
related to SCRAM, for errors that are unlikely going to happen, with
only SHA-256. It would be possible to see errors when computing some
HMACs with MD5 for example and OpenSSL FIPS enabled, and this commit
would help in reporting the correct errors but nothing in core uses
that. So, at the end, no backpatch to v14 is done, at least for now.
Errors in SCRAM related to the computation of the server key, stored
key, etc. need to pass down the potential error context string across
more layers of their respective call stacks for the frontend and the
backend, so each surrounding routine is adapted for this purpose.
Reviewed-by: Sergey Shinderuk
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/Yd0N9tSAIIkFd+qi@paquier.xyz
2022-01-13 08:17:21 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
Refactor HMAC implementations
Similarly to the cryptohash implementations, this refactors the existing
HMAC code into a single set of APIs that can be plugged with any crypto
libraries PostgreSQL is built with (only OpenSSL currently). If there
is no such libraries, a fallback implementation is available. Those new
APIs are designed similarly to the existing cryptohash layer, so there
is no real new design here, with the same logic around buffer bound
checks and memory handling.
HMAC has a dependency on cryptohashes, so all the cryptohash types
supported by cryptohash{_openssl}.c can be used with HMAC. This
refactoring is an advantage mainly for SCRAM, that included its own
implementation of HMAC with SHA256 without relying on the existing
crypto libraries even if PostgreSQL was built with their support.
This code has been tested on Windows and Linux, with and without
OpenSSL, across all the versions supported on HEAD from 1.1.1 down to
1.0.1. I have also checked that the implementations are working fine
using some sample results, a custom extension of my own, and doing
cross-checks across different major versions with SCRAM with the client
and the backend.
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Bruce Momjian
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/X9m0nkEJEzIPXjeZ@paquier.xyz
2021-04-03 10:30:49 +02:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
status = HMAC_Final(ctx->hmacctx, dest, &outlen);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* OpenSSL internals return 1 on success, 0 on failure */
|
|
|
|
if (status <= 0)
|
Improve error handling of HMAC computations
This is similar to b69aba7, except that this completes the work for
HMAC with a new routine called pg_hmac_error() that would provide more
context about the type of error that happened during a HMAC computation:
- The fallback HMAC implementation in hmac.c relies on cryptohashes, so
in some code paths it is necessary to return back the error generated by
cryptohashes.
- For the OpenSSL implementation (hmac_openssl.c), the logic is very
similar to cryptohash_openssl.c, where the error context comes from
OpenSSL if one of its internal routines failed, with different error
codes if something internal to hmac_openssl.c failed or was incorrect.
Any in-core code paths that use the centralized HMAC interface are
related to SCRAM, for errors that are unlikely going to happen, with
only SHA-256. It would be possible to see errors when computing some
HMACs with MD5 for example and OpenSSL FIPS enabled, and this commit
would help in reporting the correct errors but nothing in core uses
that. So, at the end, no backpatch to v14 is done, at least for now.
Errors in SCRAM related to the computation of the server key, stored
key, etc. need to pass down the potential error context string across
more layers of their respective call stacks for the frontend and the
backend, so each surrounding routine is adapted for this purpose.
Reviewed-by: Sergey Shinderuk
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/Yd0N9tSAIIkFd+qi@paquier.xyz
2022-01-13 08:17:21 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ctx->errreason = SSLerrmessage(ERR_get_error());
|
|
|
|
ctx->error = PG_HMAC_ERROR_OPENSSL;
|
Refactor HMAC implementations
Similarly to the cryptohash implementations, this refactors the existing
HMAC code into a single set of APIs that can be plugged with any crypto
libraries PostgreSQL is built with (only OpenSSL currently). If there
is no such libraries, a fallback implementation is available. Those new
APIs are designed similarly to the existing cryptohash layer, so there
is no real new design here, with the same logic around buffer bound
checks and memory handling.
HMAC has a dependency on cryptohashes, so all the cryptohash types
supported by cryptohash{_openssl}.c can be used with HMAC. This
refactoring is an advantage mainly for SCRAM, that included its own
implementation of HMAC with SHA256 without relying on the existing
crypto libraries even if PostgreSQL was built with their support.
This code has been tested on Windows and Linux, with and without
OpenSSL, across all the versions supported on HEAD from 1.1.1 down to
1.0.1. I have also checked that the implementations are working fine
using some sample results, a custom extension of my own, and doing
cross-checks across different major versions with SCRAM with the client
and the backend.
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Bruce Momjian
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/X9m0nkEJEzIPXjeZ@paquier.xyz
2021-04-03 10:30:49 +02:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
Improve error handling of HMAC computations
This is similar to b69aba7, except that this completes the work for
HMAC with a new routine called pg_hmac_error() that would provide more
context about the type of error that happened during a HMAC computation:
- The fallback HMAC implementation in hmac.c relies on cryptohashes, so
in some code paths it is necessary to return back the error generated by
cryptohashes.
- For the OpenSSL implementation (hmac_openssl.c), the logic is very
similar to cryptohash_openssl.c, where the error context comes from
OpenSSL if one of its internal routines failed, with different error
codes if something internal to hmac_openssl.c failed or was incorrect.
Any in-core code paths that use the centralized HMAC interface are
related to SCRAM, for errors that are unlikely going to happen, with
only SHA-256. It would be possible to see errors when computing some
HMACs with MD5 for example and OpenSSL FIPS enabled, and this commit
would help in reporting the correct errors but nothing in core uses
that. So, at the end, no backpatch to v14 is done, at least for now.
Errors in SCRAM related to the computation of the server key, stored
key, etc. need to pass down the potential error context string across
more layers of their respective call stacks for the frontend and the
backend, so each surrounding routine is adapted for this purpose.
Reviewed-by: Sergey Shinderuk
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/Yd0N9tSAIIkFd+qi@paquier.xyz
2022-01-13 08:17:21 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
Refactor HMAC implementations
Similarly to the cryptohash implementations, this refactors the existing
HMAC code into a single set of APIs that can be plugged with any crypto
libraries PostgreSQL is built with (only OpenSSL currently). If there
is no such libraries, a fallback implementation is available. Those new
APIs are designed similarly to the existing cryptohash layer, so there
is no real new design here, with the same logic around buffer bound
checks and memory handling.
HMAC has a dependency on cryptohashes, so all the cryptohash types
supported by cryptohash{_openssl}.c can be used with HMAC. This
refactoring is an advantage mainly for SCRAM, that included its own
implementation of HMAC with SHA256 without relying on the existing
crypto libraries even if PostgreSQL was built with their support.
This code has been tested on Windows and Linux, with and without
OpenSSL, across all the versions supported on HEAD from 1.1.1 down to
1.0.1. I have also checked that the implementations are working fine
using some sample results, a custom extension of my own, and doing
cross-checks across different major versions with SCRAM with the client
and the backend.
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Bruce Momjian
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/X9m0nkEJEzIPXjeZ@paquier.xyz
2021-04-03 10:30:49 +02:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* pg_hmac_free
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Free a HMAC context.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
pg_hmac_free(pg_hmac_ctx *ctx)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (ctx == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_HMAC_CTX_FREE
|
|
|
|
HMAC_CTX_free(ctx->hmacctx);
|
|
|
|
#ifndef FRONTEND
|
Make ResourceOwners more easily extensible.
Instead of having a separate array/hash for each resource kind, use a
single array and hash to hold all kinds of resources. This makes it
possible to introduce new resource "kinds" without having to modify
the ResourceOwnerData struct. In particular, this makes it possible
for extensions to register custom resource kinds.
The old approach was to have a small array of resources of each kind,
and if it fills up, switch to a hash table. The new approach also uses
an array and a hash, but now the array and the hash are used at the
same time. The array is used to hold the recently added resources, and
when it fills up, they are moved to the hash. This keeps the access to
recent entries fast, even when there are a lot of long-held resources.
All the resource-specific ResourceOwnerEnlarge*(),
ResourceOwnerRemember*(), and ResourceOwnerForget*() functions have
been replaced with three generic functions that take resource kind as
argument. For convenience, we still define resource-specific wrapper
macros around the generic functions with the old names, but they are
now defined in the source files that use those resource kinds.
The release callback no longer needs to call ResourceOwnerForget on
the resource being released. ResourceOwnerRelease unregisters the
resource from the owner before calling the callback. That needed some
changes in bufmgr.c and some other files, where releasing the
resources previously always called ResourceOwnerForget.
Each resource kind specifies a release priority, and
ResourceOwnerReleaseAll releases the resources in priority order. To
make that possible, we have to restrict what you can do between
phases. After calling ResourceOwnerRelease(), you are no longer
allowed to remember any more resources in it or to forget any
previously remembered resources by calling ResourceOwnerForget. There
was one case where that was done previously. At subtransaction commit,
AtEOSubXact_Inval() would handle the invalidation messages and call
RelationFlushRelation(), which temporarily increased the reference
count on the relation being flushed. We now switch to the parent
subtransaction's resource owner before calling AtEOSubXact_Inval(), so
that there is a valid ResourceOwner to temporarily hold that relcache
reference.
Other end-of-xact routines make similar calls to AtEOXact_Inval()
between release phases, but I didn't see any regression test failures
from those, so I'm not sure if they could reach a codepath that needs
remembering extra resources.
There were two exceptions to how the resource leak WARNINGs on commit
were printed previously: llvmjit silently released the context without
printing the warning, and a leaked buffer io triggered a PANIC. Now
everything prints a WARNING, including those cases.
Add tests in src/test/modules/test_resowner.
Reviewed-by: Aleksander Alekseev, Michael Paquier, Julien Rouhaud
Reviewed-by: Kyotaro Horiguchi, Hayato Kuroda, Álvaro Herrera, Zhihong Yu
Reviewed-by: Peter Eisentraut, Andres Freund
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/cbfabeb0-cd3c-e951-a572-19b365ed314d%40iki.fi
2023-11-08 12:30:50 +01:00
|
|
|
if (ctx->resowner)
|
|
|
|
ResourceOwnerForgetHMAC(ctx->resowner, ctx);
|
Refactor HMAC implementations
Similarly to the cryptohash implementations, this refactors the existing
HMAC code into a single set of APIs that can be plugged with any crypto
libraries PostgreSQL is built with (only OpenSSL currently). If there
is no such libraries, a fallback implementation is available. Those new
APIs are designed similarly to the existing cryptohash layer, so there
is no real new design here, with the same logic around buffer bound
checks and memory handling.
HMAC has a dependency on cryptohashes, so all the cryptohash types
supported by cryptohash{_openssl}.c can be used with HMAC. This
refactoring is an advantage mainly for SCRAM, that included its own
implementation of HMAC with SHA256 without relying on the existing
crypto libraries even if PostgreSQL was built with their support.
This code has been tested on Windows and Linux, with and without
OpenSSL, across all the versions supported on HEAD from 1.1.1 down to
1.0.1. I have also checked that the implementations are working fine
using some sample results, a custom extension of my own, and doing
cross-checks across different major versions with SCRAM with the client
and the backend.
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Bruce Momjian
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/X9m0nkEJEzIPXjeZ@paquier.xyz
2021-04-03 10:30:49 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
explicit_bzero(ctx->hmacctx, sizeof(HMAC_CTX));
|
|
|
|
FREE(ctx->hmacctx);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(pg_hmac_ctx));
|
|
|
|
FREE(ctx);
|
|
|
|
}
|
Improve error handling of HMAC computations
This is similar to b69aba7, except that this completes the work for
HMAC with a new routine called pg_hmac_error() that would provide more
context about the type of error that happened during a HMAC computation:
- The fallback HMAC implementation in hmac.c relies on cryptohashes, so
in some code paths it is necessary to return back the error generated by
cryptohashes.
- For the OpenSSL implementation (hmac_openssl.c), the logic is very
similar to cryptohash_openssl.c, where the error context comes from
OpenSSL if one of its internal routines failed, with different error
codes if something internal to hmac_openssl.c failed or was incorrect.
Any in-core code paths that use the centralized HMAC interface are
related to SCRAM, for errors that are unlikely going to happen, with
only SHA-256. It would be possible to see errors when computing some
HMACs with MD5 for example and OpenSSL FIPS enabled, and this commit
would help in reporting the correct errors but nothing in core uses
that. So, at the end, no backpatch to v14 is done, at least for now.
Errors in SCRAM related to the computation of the server key, stored
key, etc. need to pass down the potential error context string across
more layers of their respective call stacks for the frontend and the
backend, so each surrounding routine is adapted for this purpose.
Reviewed-by: Sergey Shinderuk
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/Yd0N9tSAIIkFd+qi@paquier.xyz
2022-01-13 08:17:21 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* pg_hmac_error
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Returns a static string providing details about an error that happened
|
|
|
|
* during a HMAC computation.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
const char *
|
|
|
|
pg_hmac_error(pg_hmac_ctx *ctx)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (ctx == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return _("out of memory");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* If a reason is provided, rely on it, else fallback to any error code
|
|
|
|
* set.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (ctx->errreason)
|
|
|
|
return ctx->errreason;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (ctx->error)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
case PG_HMAC_ERROR_NONE:
|
|
|
|
return _("success");
|
|
|
|
case PG_HMAC_ERROR_DEST_LEN:
|
|
|
|
return _("destination buffer too small");
|
|
|
|
case PG_HMAC_ERROR_OPENSSL:
|
|
|
|
return _("OpenSSL failure");
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Assert(false); /* cannot be reached */
|
|
|
|
return _("success");
|
|
|
|
}
|
Make ResourceOwners more easily extensible.
Instead of having a separate array/hash for each resource kind, use a
single array and hash to hold all kinds of resources. This makes it
possible to introduce new resource "kinds" without having to modify
the ResourceOwnerData struct. In particular, this makes it possible
for extensions to register custom resource kinds.
The old approach was to have a small array of resources of each kind,
and if it fills up, switch to a hash table. The new approach also uses
an array and a hash, but now the array and the hash are used at the
same time. The array is used to hold the recently added resources, and
when it fills up, they are moved to the hash. This keeps the access to
recent entries fast, even when there are a lot of long-held resources.
All the resource-specific ResourceOwnerEnlarge*(),
ResourceOwnerRemember*(), and ResourceOwnerForget*() functions have
been replaced with three generic functions that take resource kind as
argument. For convenience, we still define resource-specific wrapper
macros around the generic functions with the old names, but they are
now defined in the source files that use those resource kinds.
The release callback no longer needs to call ResourceOwnerForget on
the resource being released. ResourceOwnerRelease unregisters the
resource from the owner before calling the callback. That needed some
changes in bufmgr.c and some other files, where releasing the
resources previously always called ResourceOwnerForget.
Each resource kind specifies a release priority, and
ResourceOwnerReleaseAll releases the resources in priority order. To
make that possible, we have to restrict what you can do between
phases. After calling ResourceOwnerRelease(), you are no longer
allowed to remember any more resources in it or to forget any
previously remembered resources by calling ResourceOwnerForget. There
was one case where that was done previously. At subtransaction commit,
AtEOSubXact_Inval() would handle the invalidation messages and call
RelationFlushRelation(), which temporarily increased the reference
count on the relation being flushed. We now switch to the parent
subtransaction's resource owner before calling AtEOSubXact_Inval(), so
that there is a valid ResourceOwner to temporarily hold that relcache
reference.
Other end-of-xact routines make similar calls to AtEOXact_Inval()
between release phases, but I didn't see any regression test failures
from those, so I'm not sure if they could reach a codepath that needs
remembering extra resources.
There were two exceptions to how the resource leak WARNINGs on commit
were printed previously: llvmjit silently released the context without
printing the warning, and a leaked buffer io triggered a PANIC. Now
everything prints a WARNING, including those cases.
Add tests in src/test/modules/test_resowner.
Reviewed-by: Aleksander Alekseev, Michael Paquier, Julien Rouhaud
Reviewed-by: Kyotaro Horiguchi, Hayato Kuroda, Álvaro Herrera, Zhihong Yu
Reviewed-by: Peter Eisentraut, Andres Freund
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/cbfabeb0-cd3c-e951-a572-19b365ed314d%40iki.fi
2023-11-08 12:30:50 +01:00
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/* ResourceOwner callbacks */
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#ifndef FRONTEND
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static void
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ResOwnerReleaseHMAC(Datum res)
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{
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pg_hmac_ctx *ctx = (pg_hmac_ctx *) DatumGetPointer(res);
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ctx->resowner = NULL;
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pg_hmac_free(ctx);
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}
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#endif
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