postgresql/contrib/hstore/hstore--1.3--1.4.sql

Ignoring revisions in .git-blame-ignore-revs. Click here to bypass and see the normal blame view.

100 lines
5.2 KiB
MySQL
Raw Normal View History

/* contrib/hstore/hstore--1.3--1.4.sql */
-- complain if script is sourced in psql, rather than via ALTER EXTENSION
\echo Use "ALTER EXTENSION hstore UPDATE TO '1.4'" to load this file. \quit
-- Update procedure signatures the hard way.
-- We use to_regprocedure() so that query doesn't fail if run against 9.6beta1 definitions,
-- wherein the signatures have been updated already. In that case to_regprocedure() will
-- return NULL and no updates will happen.
Make contrib modules' installation scripts more secure. Hostile objects located within the installation-time search_path could capture references in an extension's installation or upgrade script. If the extension is being installed with superuser privileges, this opens the door to privilege escalation. While such hazards have existed all along, their urgency increases with the v13 "trusted extensions" feature, because that lets a non-superuser control the installation path for a superuser-privileged script. Therefore, make a number of changes to make such situations more secure: * Tweak the construction of the installation-time search_path to ensure that references to objects in pg_catalog can't be subverted; and explicitly add pg_temp to the end of the path to prevent attacks using temporary objects. * Disable check_function_bodies within installation/upgrade scripts, so that any security gaps in SQL-language or PL-language function bodies cannot create a risk of unwanted installation-time code execution. * Adjust lookup of type input/receive functions and join estimator functions to complain if there are multiple candidate functions. This prevents capture of references to functions whose signature is not the first one checked; and it's arguably more user-friendly anyway. * Modify various contrib upgrade scripts to ensure that catalog modification queries are executed with secure search paths. (These are in-place modifications with no extension version changes, since it is the update process itself that is at issue, not the end result.) Extensions that depend on other extensions cannot be made fully secure by these methods alone; therefore, revert the "trusted" marking that commit eb67623c9 applied to earthdistance and hstore_plperl, pending some better solution to that set of issues. Also add documentation around these issues, to help extension authors write secure installation scripts. Patch by me, following an observation by Andres Freund; thanks to Noah Misch for review. Security: CVE-2020-14350
2020-08-10 16:44:42 +02:00
DO LANGUAGE plpgsql
$$
DECLARE
my_schema pg_catalog.text := pg_catalog.quote_ident(pg_catalog.current_schema());
old_path pg_catalog.text := pg_catalog.current_setting('search_path');
BEGIN
-- for safety, transiently set search_path to just pg_catalog+pg_temp
PERFORM pg_catalog.set_config('search_path', 'pg_catalog, pg_temp', true);
UPDATE pg_catalog.pg_proc SET
proargtypes = pg_catalog.array_to_string(newtypes::pg_catalog.oid[], ' ')::pg_catalog.oidvector,
pronargs = pg_catalog.array_length(newtypes, 1)
FROM (VALUES
Make contrib modules' installation scripts more secure. Hostile objects located within the installation-time search_path could capture references in an extension's installation or upgrade script. If the extension is being installed with superuser privileges, this opens the door to privilege escalation. While such hazards have existed all along, their urgency increases with the v13 "trusted extensions" feature, because that lets a non-superuser control the installation path for a superuser-privileged script. Therefore, make a number of changes to make such situations more secure: * Tweak the construction of the installation-time search_path to ensure that references to objects in pg_catalog can't be subverted; and explicitly add pg_temp to the end of the path to prevent attacks using temporary objects. * Disable check_function_bodies within installation/upgrade scripts, so that any security gaps in SQL-language or PL-language function bodies cannot create a risk of unwanted installation-time code execution. * Adjust lookup of type input/receive functions and join estimator functions to complain if there are multiple candidate functions. This prevents capture of references to functions whose signature is not the first one checked; and it's arguably more user-friendly anyway. * Modify various contrib upgrade scripts to ensure that catalog modification queries are executed with secure search paths. (These are in-place modifications with no extension version changes, since it is the update process itself that is at issue, not the end result.) Extensions that depend on other extensions cannot be made fully secure by these methods alone; therefore, revert the "trusted" marking that commit eb67623c9 applied to earthdistance and hstore_plperl, pending some better solution to that set of issues. Also add documentation around these issues, to help extension authors write secure installation scripts. Patch by me, following an observation by Andres Freund; thanks to Noah Misch for review. Security: CVE-2020-14350
2020-08-10 16:44:42 +02:00
(NULL::pg_catalog.text, NULL::pg_catalog.text[]), -- establish column types
('ghstore_same(internal,internal,internal)', '{SCH.ghstore,SCH.ghstore,internal}'),
('ghstore_consistent(internal,internal,int4,oid,internal)', '{internal,SCH.hstore,int2,oid,internal}'),
('gin_extract_hstore(internal,internal)', '{SCH.hstore,internal}'),
('gin_extract_hstore_query(internal,internal,int2,internal,internal)', '{SCH.hstore,internal,int2,internal,internal}'),
('gin_consistent_hstore(internal,int2,internal,int4,internal,internal)', '{internal,int2,SCH.hstore,int4,internal,internal}')
) AS update_data (oldproc, newtypestext),
LATERAL (
SELECT array_agg(replace(typ, 'SCH', my_schema)::regtype) as newtypes FROM unnest(newtypestext) typ
) ls
WHERE oid = to_regprocedure(my_schema || '.' || replace(oldproc, 'SCH', my_schema));
UPDATE pg_catalog.pg_proc SET
Make contrib modules' installation scripts more secure. Hostile objects located within the installation-time search_path could capture references in an extension's installation or upgrade script. If the extension is being installed with superuser privileges, this opens the door to privilege escalation. While such hazards have existed all along, their urgency increases with the v13 "trusted extensions" feature, because that lets a non-superuser control the installation path for a superuser-privileged script. Therefore, make a number of changes to make such situations more secure: * Tweak the construction of the installation-time search_path to ensure that references to objects in pg_catalog can't be subverted; and explicitly add pg_temp to the end of the path to prevent attacks using temporary objects. * Disable check_function_bodies within installation/upgrade scripts, so that any security gaps in SQL-language or PL-language function bodies cannot create a risk of unwanted installation-time code execution. * Adjust lookup of type input/receive functions and join estimator functions to complain if there are multiple candidate functions. This prevents capture of references to functions whose signature is not the first one checked; and it's arguably more user-friendly anyway. * Modify various contrib upgrade scripts to ensure that catalog modification queries are executed with secure search paths. (These are in-place modifications with no extension version changes, since it is the update process itself that is at issue, not the end result.) Extensions that depend on other extensions cannot be made fully secure by these methods alone; therefore, revert the "trusted" marking that commit eb67623c9 applied to earthdistance and hstore_plperl, pending some better solution to that set of issues. Also add documentation around these issues, to help extension authors write secure installation scripts. Patch by me, following an observation by Andres Freund; thanks to Noah Misch for review. Security: CVE-2020-14350
2020-08-10 16:44:42 +02:00
prorettype = (my_schema || '.ghstore')::pg_catalog.regtype
WHERE oid = pg_catalog.to_regprocedure((my_schema || '.ghstore_union(internal,internal)'));
PERFORM pg_catalog.set_config('search_path', old_path, true);
END
$$;
ALTER FUNCTION hstore_in(cstring) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION hstore_out(hstore) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION hstore_recv(internal) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION hstore_send(hstore) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION hstore_version_diag(hstore) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION fetchval(hstore, text) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION slice_array(hstore, text[]) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION slice(hstore, text[]) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION isexists(hstore, text) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION exist(hstore, text) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION exists_any(hstore, text[]) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION exists_all(hstore, text[]) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION isdefined(hstore, text) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION defined(hstore, text) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION delete(hstore, text) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION delete(hstore, text[]) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION delete(hstore, hstore) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION hs_concat(hstore, hstore) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION hs_contains(hstore, hstore) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION hs_contained(hstore, hstore) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION tconvert(text, text) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION hstore(text, text) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION hstore(text[], text[]) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION hstore(text[]) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION hstore_to_json(hstore) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION hstore_to_json_loose(hstore) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION hstore_to_jsonb(hstore) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION hstore_to_jsonb_loose(hstore) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION hstore(record) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION hstore_to_array(hstore) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION hstore_to_matrix(hstore) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION akeys(hstore) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION avals(hstore) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION skeys(hstore) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION svals(hstore) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION each(hstore) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION populate_record(anyelement, hstore) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION hstore_eq(hstore, hstore) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION hstore_ne(hstore, hstore) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION hstore_gt(hstore, hstore) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION hstore_ge(hstore, hstore) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION hstore_lt(hstore, hstore) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION hstore_le(hstore, hstore) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION hstore_cmp(hstore, hstore) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION hstore_hash(hstore) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION ghstore_in(cstring) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION ghstore_out(ghstore) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION ghstore_compress(internal) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION ghstore_decompress(internal) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION ghstore_penalty(internal, internal, internal) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION ghstore_picksplit(internal, internal) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION ghstore_union(internal, internal) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION ghstore_same(ghstore, ghstore, internal) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION ghstore_consistent(internal, hstore, smallint, oid, internal) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION gin_extract_hstore(hstore, internal) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION gin_extract_hstore_query(hstore, internal, int2, internal, internal) PARALLEL SAFE;
ALTER FUNCTION gin_consistent_hstore(internal, int2, hstore, int4, internal, internal) PARALLEL SAFE;