postgresql/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth.c

603 lines
15 KiB
C
Raw Normal View History

/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*
* fe-auth.c
* The front-end (client) authorization routines
*
* Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2001, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
* Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
*
* NOTE: the error message strings returned by this module must not
* exceed INITIAL_EXPBUFFER_SIZE (currently 256 bytes).
*
* IDENTIFICATION
* $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth.c,v 1.45 2001/01/24 19:43:29 momjian Exp $
*
*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
/*
* INTERFACE ROUTINES
* frontend (client) routines:
* fe_sendauth send authentication information
* fe_getauthname get user's name according to the client side
* of the authentication system
* fe_setauthsvc set frontend authentication service
* fe_getauthsvc get current frontend authentication service
*
*
*
*/
#ifndef WIN32
#include "postgres.h"
#endif
#include "libpq-fe.h"
#include "libpq-int.h"
#include "fe-auth.h"
#ifdef WIN32
#include "win32.h"
#else
1999-07-19 08:25:40 +02:00
#include <unistd.h>
2000-05-27 06:13:05 +02:00
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/param.h> /* for MAXHOSTNAMELEN on most */
#ifndef MAXHOSTNAMELEN
#include <netdb.h> /* for MAXHOSTNAMELEN on some */
#endif
#include <pwd.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_H
#include <crypt.h>
#endif
/*----------------------------------------------------------------
* common definitions for generic fe/be routines
*----------------------------------------------------------------
*/
struct authsvc
{
char name[NAMEDATALEN]; /* service nickname (for command
* line) */
MsgType msgtype; /* startup packet header type */
int allowed; /* initially allowed (before command line
* option parsing)? */
};
/*
* Command-line parsing routines use this structure to map nicknames
* onto service types (and the startup packets to use with them).
*
* Programs receiving an authentication request use this structure to
* decide which authentication service types are currently permitted.
* By default, all authentication systems compiled into the system are
* allowed. Unauthenticated connections are disallowed unless there
* isn't any authentication system.
*/
static const struct authsvc authsvcs[] = {
#ifdef KRB4
{"krb4", STARTUP_KRB4_MSG, 1},
{"kerberos", STARTUP_KRB4_MSG, 1},
#endif /* KRB4 */
#ifdef KRB5
{"krb5", STARTUP_KRB5_MSG, 1},
{"kerberos", STARTUP_KRB5_MSG, 1},
#endif /* KRB5 */
{UNAUTHNAME, STARTUP_MSG,
#if defined(KRB4) || defined(KRB5)
0
#else /* !(KRB4 || KRB5) */
1
#endif /* !(KRB4 || KRB5) */
},
{"password", STARTUP_PASSWORD_MSG, 0}
};
static const int n_authsvcs = sizeof(authsvcs) / sizeof(struct authsvc);
#ifdef KRB4
/*----------------------------------------------------------------
* MIT Kerberos authentication system - protocol version 4
*----------------------------------------------------------------
*/
#include "krb.h"
/* for some reason, this is not defined in krb.h ... */
extern char *tkt_string(void);
/*
* pg_krb4_init -- initialization performed before any Kerberos calls are made
*
* For v4, all we need to do is make sure the library routines get the right
* ticket file if we want them to see a special one. (They will open the file
* themselves.)
*/
static void
pg_krb4_init()
{
char *realm;
static int init_done = 0;
if (init_done)
return;
init_done = 1;
/*
* If the user set PGREALM, then we use a ticket file with a special
* name: <usual-ticket-file-name>@<PGREALM-value>
*/
if ((realm = getenv("PGREALM")))
{
char tktbuf[MAXPGPATH];
(void) sprintf(tktbuf, "%s@%s", tkt_string(), realm);
krb_set_tkt_string(tktbuf);
}
}
/*
* pg_krb4_authname -- returns a pointer to static space containing whatever
* name the user has authenticated to the system
*
* We obtain this information by digging around in the ticket file.
*/
static char *
pg_krb4_authname(char *PQerrormsg)
{
1999-05-25 18:15:34 +02:00
char instance[INST_SZ + 1];
char realm[REALM_SZ + 1];
int status;
static char name[SNAME_SZ + 1] = "";
if (name[0])
1998-09-01 05:29:17 +02:00
return name;
pg_krb4_init();
name[SNAME_SZ] = '\0';
status = krb_get_tf_fullname(tkt_string(), name, instance, realm);
if (status != KSUCCESS)
{
(void) sprintf(PQerrormsg,
"pg_krb4_authname: krb_get_tf_fullname: %s\n",
krb_err_txt[status]);
1998-09-01 05:29:17 +02:00
return (char *) NULL;
}
1998-09-01 05:29:17 +02:00
return name;
}
/*
* pg_krb4_sendauth -- client routine to send authentication information to
* the server
*
* This routine does not do mutual authentication, nor does it return enough
* information to do encrypted connections. But then, if we want to do
* encrypted connections, we'll have to redesign the whole RPC mechanism
* anyway.
*
* If the user is too lazy to feed us a hostname, we try to come up with
* something other than "localhost" since the hostname is used as an
* instance and instance names in v4 databases are usually actual hostnames
* (canonicalized to omit all domain suffixes).
*/
static int
pg_krb4_sendauth(char *PQerrormsg, int sock,
struct sockaddr_in * laddr,
struct sockaddr_in * raddr,
const char *hostname)
{
long krbopts = 0; /* one-way authentication */
KTEXT_ST clttkt;
int status;
char hostbuf[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
const char *realm = getenv("PGREALM"); /* NULL == current realm */
if (!hostname || !(*hostname))
{
if (gethostname(hostbuf, MAXHOSTNAMELEN) < 0)
strcpy(hostbuf, "localhost");
hostname = hostbuf;
}
pg_krb4_init();
status = krb_sendauth(krbopts,
sock,
&clttkt,
PG_KRB_SRVNAM,
hostname,
realm,
(u_long) 0,
(MSG_DAT *) NULL,
(CREDENTIALS *) NULL,
NULL,
laddr,
raddr,
PG_KRB4_VERSION);
if (status != KSUCCESS)
{
(void) sprintf(PQerrormsg,
"pg_krb4_sendauth: kerberos error: %s\n",
krb_err_txt[status]);
1998-09-01 05:29:17 +02:00
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
1998-09-01 05:29:17 +02:00
return STATUS_OK;
}
#endif /* KRB4 */
#ifdef KRB5
/*----------------------------------------------------------------
* MIT Kerberos authentication system - protocol version 5
*----------------------------------------------------------------
*/
2000-05-27 06:13:05 +02:00
#include <krb5.h>
#include <com_err.h>
/*
* pg_an_to_ln -- return the local name corresponding to an authentication
* name
*
* XXX Assumes that the first aname component is the user name. This is NOT
* necessarily so, since an aname can actually be something out of your
* worst X.400 nightmare, like
* ORGANIZATION=U. C. Berkeley/NAME=Paul M. Aoki@CS.BERKELEY.EDU
* Note that the MIT an_to_ln code does the same thing if you don't
* provide an aname mapping database...it may be a better idea to use
* krb5_an_to_ln, except that it punts if multiple components are found,
* and we can't afford to punt.
*/
static char *
2000-05-27 06:13:05 +02:00
pg_an_to_ln(char *aname)
{
char *p;
if ((p = strchr(aname, '/')) || (p = strchr(aname, '@')))
*p = '\0';
1998-09-01 05:29:17 +02:00
return aname;
}
/*
2000-05-27 06:13:05 +02:00
* Various krb5 state which is not connection specfic, and a flag to
* indicate whether we have initialised it yet.
*/
2000-05-27 06:13:05 +02:00
static int pg_krb5_initialised;
static krb5_context pg_krb5_context;
static krb5_ccache pg_krb5_ccache;
static krb5_principal pg_krb5_client;
static char *pg_krb5_name;
static int
2000-05-27 06:13:05 +02:00
pg_krb5_init(char *PQerrormsg)
{
2000-05-27 06:13:05 +02:00
krb5_error_code retval;
2000-05-27 06:13:05 +02:00
if (pg_krb5_initialised)
return STATUS_OK;
2000-05-27 06:13:05 +02:00
retval = krb5_init_context(&pg_krb5_context);
if (retval) {
snprintf(PQerrormsg, PQERRORMSG_LENGTH,
"pg_krb5_init: krb5_init_context: %s",
error_message(retval));
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
2000-05-27 06:13:05 +02:00
retval = krb5_cc_default(pg_krb5_context, &pg_krb5_ccache);
if (retval) {
snprintf(PQerrormsg, PQERRORMSG_LENGTH,
"pg_krb5_init: krb5_cc_default: %s",
error_message(retval));
krb5_free_context(pg_krb5_context);
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
retval = krb5_cc_get_principal(pg_krb5_context, pg_krb5_ccache,
&pg_krb5_client);
if (retval) {
snprintf(PQerrormsg, PQERRORMSG_LENGTH,
"pg_krb5_init: krb5_cc_get_principal: %s",
error_message(retval));
krb5_cc_close(pg_krb5_context, pg_krb5_ccache);
krb5_free_context(pg_krb5_context);
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
retval = krb5_unparse_name(pg_krb5_context, pg_krb5_client, &pg_krb5_name);
if (retval) {
snprintf(PQerrormsg, PQERRORMSG_LENGTH,
"pg_krb5_init: krb5_unparse_name: %s",
error_message(retval));
krb5_free_principal(pg_krb5_context, pg_krb5_client);
krb5_cc_close(pg_krb5_context, pg_krb5_ccache);
krb5_free_context(pg_krb5_context);
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
pg_krb5_name = pg_an_to_ln(pg_krb5_name);
pg_krb5_initialised = 1;
return STATUS_OK;
}
2000-05-27 06:13:05 +02:00
/*
* pg_krb5_authname -- returns a pointer to static space containing whatever
* name the user has authenticated to the system
2000-05-27 06:13:05 +02:00
*/
static const char *
2000-05-27 06:13:05 +02:00
pg_krb5_authname(char *PQerrormsg)
{
2000-05-27 06:13:05 +02:00
if (pg_krb5_init(PQerrormsg) != STATUS_OK)
return NULL;
2000-05-27 06:13:05 +02:00
return pg_krb5_name;
}
2000-05-27 06:13:05 +02:00
/*
* pg_krb5_sendauth -- client routine to send authentication information to
* the server
*/
static int
2000-05-27 06:13:05 +02:00
pg_krb5_sendauth(char *PQerrormsg, int sock,
struct sockaddr_in * laddr,
struct sockaddr_in * raddr,
const char *hostname)
{
2000-05-27 06:13:05 +02:00
krb5_error_code retval;
int ret;
krb5_principal server;
krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL;
krb5_error *err_ret = NULL;
int flags;
ret = pg_krb5_init(PQerrormsg);
if (ret != STATUS_OK)
return ret;
retval = krb5_sname_to_principal(pg_krb5_context, hostname, PG_KRB_SRVNAM,
KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &server);
if (retval) {
snprintf(PQerrormsg, PQERRORMSG_LENGTH,
"pg_krb5_sendauth: krb5_sname_to_principal: %s",
error_message(retval));
1998-09-01 05:29:17 +02:00
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
2000-05-27 06:13:05 +02:00
/*
* libpq uses a non-blocking socket. But kerberos needs a blocking
* socket, and we have to block somehow to do mutual authentication
* anyway. So we temporarily make it blocking.
*/
2000-05-27 06:13:05 +02:00
flags = fcntl(sock, F_GETFL);
if (flags < 0 || fcntl(sock, F_SETFL, (long)(flags & ~O_NONBLOCK))) {
snprintf(PQerrormsg, PQERRORMSG_LENGTH,
"pg_krb5_sendauth: fcntl: %s", strerror(errno));
krb5_free_principal(pg_krb5_context, server);
1998-09-01 05:29:17 +02:00
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
2000-05-27 06:13:05 +02:00
retval = krb5_sendauth(pg_krb5_context, &auth_context,
(krb5_pointer) &sock, PG_KRB_SRVNAM,
pg_krb5_client, server,
AP_OPTS_MUTUAL_REQUIRED,
NULL, 0, /* no creds, use ccache instead */
pg_krb5_ccache, &err_ret, NULL, NULL);
if (retval) {
if (retval == KRB5_SENDAUTH_REJECTED && err_ret) {
snprintf(PQerrormsg, PQERRORMSG_LENGTH,
"pg_krb5_sendauth: authentication rejected: \"%*s\"",
err_ret->text.length, err_ret->text.data);
}
2000-05-27 06:13:05 +02:00
else {
snprintf(PQerrormsg, PQERRORMSG_LENGTH,
"pg_krb5_sendauth: krb5_sendauth: %s",
error_message(retval));
}
2000-05-27 06:13:05 +02:00
if (err_ret)
krb5_free_error(pg_krb5_context, err_ret);
ret = STATUS_ERROR;
}
2000-05-27 06:13:05 +02:00
krb5_free_principal(pg_krb5_context, server);
if (fcntl(sock, F_SETFL, (long)flags)) {
snprintf(PQerrormsg, PQERRORMSG_LENGTH,
"pg_krb5_sendauth: fcntl: %s", strerror(errno));
ret = STATUS_ERROR;
}
return ret;
}
#endif /* KRB5 */
static int
pg_password_sendauth(PGconn *conn, const char *password, AuthRequest areq)
{
/* Encrypt the password if needed. */
if (areq == AUTH_REQ_CRYPT)
password = crypt(password, conn->salt);
return pqPacketSend(conn, password, strlen(password) + 1);
}
/*
* fe_sendauth -- client demux routine for outgoing authentication information
*/
int
fe_sendauth(AuthRequest areq, PGconn *conn, const char *hostname,
const char *password, char *PQerrormsg)
{
#if !defined(KRB4) && !defined(KRB5)
(void) hostname; /* not used */
#endif
switch (areq)
{
case AUTH_REQ_OK:
break;
case AUTH_REQ_KRB4:
#ifdef KRB4
if (pg_krb4_sendauth(PQerrormsg, conn->sock, &conn->laddr.in,
&conn->raddr.in,
hostname) != STATUS_OK)
{
(void) sprintf(PQerrormsg,
"fe_sendauth: krb4 authentication failed\n");
1998-09-01 05:29:17 +02:00
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
break;
#else
(void) sprintf(PQerrormsg,
"fe_sendauth: krb4 authentication not supported\n");
1998-09-01 05:29:17 +02:00
return STATUS_ERROR;
#endif
case AUTH_REQ_KRB5:
#ifdef KRB5
if (pg_krb5_sendauth(PQerrormsg, conn->sock, &conn->laddr.in,
&conn->raddr.in,
hostname) != STATUS_OK)
{
(void) sprintf(PQerrormsg,
"fe_sendauth: krb5 authentication failed\n");
1998-09-01 05:29:17 +02:00
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
break;
#else
(void) sprintf(PQerrormsg,
"fe_sendauth: krb5 authentication not supported\n");
1998-09-01 05:29:17 +02:00
return STATUS_ERROR;
#endif
case AUTH_REQ_PASSWORD:
case AUTH_REQ_CRYPT:
if (password == NULL || *password == '\0')
{
(void) sprintf(PQerrormsg,
"fe_sendauth: no password supplied\n");
1998-09-01 05:29:17 +02:00
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
if (pg_password_sendauth(conn, password, areq) != STATUS_OK)
{
(void) sprintf(PQerrormsg,
"fe_sendauth: error sending password authentication\n");
1998-09-01 05:29:17 +02:00
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
break;
default:
(void) sprintf(PQerrormsg,
"fe_sendauth: authentication type %u not supported\n", areq);
1998-09-01 05:29:17 +02:00
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
1998-09-01 05:29:17 +02:00
return STATUS_OK;
}
/*
* fe_setauthsvc
* fe_getauthsvc
*
* Set/return the authentication service currently selected for use by the
* frontend. (You can only use one in the frontend, obviously.)
*
* NB: This is not thread-safe if different threads try to select different
* authentication services! It's OK for fe_getauthsvc to select the default,
* since that will be the same for all threads, but direct application use
* of fe_setauthsvc is not thread-safe. However, use of fe_setauthsvc is
* deprecated anyway...
*/
1999-05-25 18:15:34 +02:00
static int pg_authsvc = -1;
void
fe_setauthsvc(const char *name, char *PQerrormsg)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < n_authsvcs; ++i)
if (strcmp(name, authsvcs[i].name) == 0)
{
pg_authsvc = i;
break;
}
if (i == n_authsvcs)
{
(void) sprintf(PQerrormsg,
"fe_setauthsvc: invalid name: %s, ignoring...\n",
name);
}
return;
}
MsgType
fe_getauthsvc(char *PQerrormsg)
{
if (pg_authsvc < 0 || pg_authsvc >= n_authsvcs)
fe_setauthsvc(DEFAULT_CLIENT_AUTHSVC, PQerrormsg);
1998-09-01 05:29:17 +02:00
return authsvcs[pg_authsvc].msgtype;
}
/*
* fe_getauthname -- returns a pointer to dynamic space containing whatever
* name the user has authenticated to the system
* if there is an error, return the error message in PQerrormsg
*/
char *
fe_getauthname(char *PQerrormsg)
{
char *name = (char *) NULL;
char *authn = (char *) NULL;
MsgType authsvc;
authsvc = fe_getauthsvc(PQerrormsg);
#ifdef KRB4
if (authsvc == STARTUP_KRB4_MSG)
name = pg_krb4_authname(PQerrormsg);
#endif
#ifdef KRB5
if (authsvc == STARTUP_KRB5_MSG)
name = pg_krb5_authname(PQerrormsg);
#endif
if (authsvc == STARTUP_MSG
|| (authsvc == STARTUP_KRB4_MSG && !name)
|| (authsvc == STARTUP_KRB5_MSG && !name))
{
#ifdef WIN32
char username[128];
DWORD namesize = sizeof(username) - 1;
if (GetUserName(username, &namesize))
name = username;
#else
struct passwd *pw = getpwuid(geteuid());
if (pw)
name = pw->pw_name;
#endif
}
if (authsvc != STARTUP_MSG && authsvc != STARTUP_KRB4_MSG && authsvc != STARTUP_KRB5_MSG)
sprintf(PQerrormsg,"fe_getauthname: invalid authentication system: %d\n", authsvc);
if (name && (authn = (char *) malloc(strlen(name) + 1)))
strcpy(authn, name);
1998-09-01 05:29:17 +02:00
return authn;
}