From 0150ab567bcf5e5913e2b62a1678f84cc272441f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>
Date: Mon, 2 Feb 2015 10:00:44 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] to_char():  prevent accesses beyond the allocated buffer

Previously very long field masks for floats could access memory
beyond the existing buffer allocated to hold the result.

Reported by Andres Freund and Peter Geoghegan.	Backpatch to all
supported versions.

Security: CVE-2015-0241
---
 src/backend/utils/adt/formatting.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/src/backend/utils/adt/formatting.c b/src/backend/utils/adt/formatting.c
index f39de1f232..4bc9e1c281 100644
--- a/src/backend/utils/adt/formatting.c
+++ b/src/backend/utils/adt/formatting.c
@@ -4428,7 +4428,9 @@ NUM_numpart_to_char(NUMProc *Np, int id)
 					Np->num_in = TRUE;
 				}
 			}
-			++Np->number_p;
+			/* do no exceed string length */
+			if (*Np->number_p)
+				++Np->number_p;
 		}
 
 		end = Np->num_count + (Np->out_pre_spaces ? 1 : 0) + (IS_DECIMAL(Np->Num) ? 1 : 0);