Authentication improvements:

A new pg_hba.conf column, USER
Allow specifiction of lists of users separated by commas
Allow group names specified by +
Allow include files containing lists of users specified by @
Allow lists of databases, and database files
Allow samegroup in database column to match group name matching dbname
Removal of secondary password files
Remove pg_passwd utility
Lots of code cleanup in user.c and hba.c
New data/global/pg_pwd format
New data/global/pg_group file
This commit is contained in:
Bruce Momjian 2002-04-04 04:25:54 +00:00
parent af10378ab0
commit 43a3543a4e
25 changed files with 1453 additions and 1931 deletions

View File

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
<!--
$Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/doc/src/sgml/client-auth.sgml,v 1.33 2002/03/22 19:20:06 petere Exp $
$Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/doc/src/sgml/client-auth.sgml,v 1.34 2002/04/04 04:25:44 momjian Exp $
-->
<chapter id="client-authentication">
@ -10,14 +10,13 @@ $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/doc/src/sgml/client-auth.sgml,v 1.33 2002/03/22 19:20:06
</indexterm>
<para>
When a client application connects to the database server, it specifies which
<productname>PostgreSQL</productname> user name it wants to connect as,
much the same way one logs into a Unix computer as a particular user.
Within the SQL environment the active
database user name determines access privileges to database
objects -- see <xref linkend="user-manag"> for more information
about that. It is therefore obviously essential to restrict which
database user name(s) a given client can connect as.
When a client application connects to the database server, it
specifies which <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> user name it
wants to connect as, much the same way one logs into a Unix computer
as a particular user. Within the SQL environment the active database
user name determines access privileges to database objects -- see
<xref linkend="user-manag"> for more information. Therefore, it is
essential to restrict which database users can connect.
</para>
<para>
@ -30,20 +29,19 @@ $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/doc/src/sgml/client-auth.sgml,v 1.33 2002/03/22 19:20:06
<para>
<productname>PostgreSQL</productname> offers a number of different
client authentication methods. The method to be used can be selected
on the basis of (client) host and database; some authentication methods
allow you to restrict by user name as well.
client authentication methods. The method to be used can be selected
on the basis of (client) host, database, and user.
</para>
<para>
<productname>PostgreSQL</productname> database user names are logically
<productname>PostgreSQL</productname> user names are logically
separate from user names of the operating system in which the server
runs. If all the users of a particular server also have accounts on
runs. If all the users of a particular server also have accounts on
the server's machine, it makes sense to assign database user names
that match their operating system user names. However, a server that accepts remote
connections may have many users who have no local account, and in such
cases there need be no connection between database user names and OS
user names.
that match their operating system user names. However, a server that
accepts remote connections may have many users who have no local
account, and in such cases there need be no connection between
database user names and OS user names.
</para>
<sect1 id="pg-hba-conf">
@ -56,39 +54,39 @@ $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/doc/src/sgml/client-auth.sgml,v 1.33 2002/03/22 19:20:06
<para>
Client authentication is controlled by the file
<filename>pg_hba.conf</filename> in the data directory, e.g.,
<filename>/usr/local/pgsql/data/pg_hba.conf</filename>. (<acronym>HBA</> stands
for host-based authentication.) A default <filename>pg_hba.conf</filename>
file is installed when the
data area is initialized by <command>initdb</command>.
<filename>/usr/local/pgsql/data/pg_hba.conf</filename>.
(<acronym>HBA</> stands for host-based authentication.) A default
<filename>pg_hba.conf</filename> file is installed when the data area
is initialized by <command>initdb</command>.
</para>
<para>
The general format of the <filename>pg_hba.conf</filename> file is
of a set of records, one per line. Blank lines and lines beginning
with a hash character (<quote>#</quote>) are ignored. A record is
made up of a number of fields which are separated by spaces and/or
tabs. Records cannot be continued across lines.
The general format of the <filename>pg_hba.conf</filename> file is of
a set of records, one per line. Blank lines are ignored, as is any
text after the <quote>#</quote> comment character. A record is made
up of a number of fields which are separated by spaces and/or tabs.
Fields can contain white space if the field value is quoted. Records
cannot be continued across lines.
</para>
<para>
Each record specifies a connection type, a client IP address range
(if relevant for the connection type), a database name or names,
(if relevant for the connection type), a database name, a user name,
and the authentication method to be used for connections matching
these parameters.
The first record that matches the type, client address, and requested
database name of a connection attempt is used to do the
authentication step. There is no <quote>fall-through</> or
these parameters. The first record with a matching connection type,
client address, requested database, and user name is used to perform
authentication. There is no <quote>fall-through</> or
<quote>backup</>: if one record is chosen and the authentication
fails, the following records are not considered. If no record
matches, the access will be denied.
fails, subsequent records are not considered. If no record matches,
access is denied.
</para>
<para>
A record may have one of the three formats
<synopsis>
local <replaceable>database</replaceable> <replaceable>authentication-method</replaceable> [ <replaceable>authentication-option</replaceable> ]
host <replaceable>database</replaceable> <replaceable>IP-address</replaceable> <replaceable>IP-mask</replaceable> <replaceable>authentication-method</replaceable> [ <replaceable>authentication-option</replaceable> ]
hostssl <replaceable>database</replaceable> <replaceable>IP-address</replaceable> <replaceable>IP-mask</replaceable> <replaceable>authentication-method</replaceable> [ <replaceable>authentication-option</replaceable> ]
local <replaceable>database</replaceable> <replaceable>user</replaceable> <replaceable>authentication-method</replaceable> [ <replaceable>authentication-option</replaceable> ]
host <replaceable>database</replaceable> <replaceable>user</replaceable> <replaceable>IP-address</replaceable> <replaceable>IP-mask</replaceable> <replaceable>authentication-method</replaceable>
hostssl <replaceable>database</replaceable> <replaceable>user</replaceable> <replaceable>IP-address</replaceable> <replaceable>IP-mask</replaceable> <replaceable>authentication-method</replaceable>
</synopsis>
The meaning of the fields is as follows:
@ -97,7 +95,7 @@ hostssl <replaceable>database</replaceable> <replaceable>IP-address</replaceable
<term><literal>local</literal></term>
<listitem>
<para>
This record pertains to connection attempts over Unix domain
This record applies to connection attempts using Unix domain
sockets.
</para>
</listitem>
@ -107,10 +105,11 @@ hostssl <replaceable>database</replaceable> <replaceable>IP-address</replaceable
<term><literal>host</literal></term>
<listitem>
<para>
This record pertains to connection attempts over TCP/IP
networks. Note that TCP/IP connections are completely disabled
unless the server is started with the <option>-i</option> switch or
the equivalent configuration parameter is set.
This record applied to connection attempts using TCP/IP networks.
Note that TCP/IP connections are disabled unless the server is
started with the <option>-i</option> option or the
<literal>tcpip_socket</> <filename>postgresql.conf</>
configuration parameter is enabled.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@ -119,13 +118,13 @@ hostssl <replaceable>database</replaceable> <replaceable>IP-address</replaceable
<term><literal>hostssl</literal></term>
<listitem>
<para>
This record pertains to connection attempts with SSL over
This record applies to connection attempts using SSL over
TCP/IP. To make use of this option the server must be
built with SSL support enabled. Furthermore, SSL must be
enabled with the <option>-l</> option or equivalent configuration
setting when the server is started. (Note: <literal>host</literal>
records will match either SSL or non-SSL connection attempts, but
<literal>hostssl</literal> records match only SSL connections.)
<literal>hostssl</literal> records requires SSL connections.)
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@ -134,12 +133,35 @@ hostssl <replaceable>database</replaceable> <replaceable>IP-address</replaceable
<term><replaceable>database</replaceable></term>
<listitem>
<para>
Specifies the database that this record applies to. The value
Specifies the database for this record. The value
<literal>all</literal> specifies that it applies to all
databases, while the value <literal>sameuser</> identifies the
database with the same name as the connecting user. Otherwise,
this is the name of a specific <productname>PostgreSQL</productname>
database.
database with the same name as the connecting user. The value
<literal>samegroup</> identifies a group with the same name as
the database name. Only members of this group can connect to the
database. Otherwise, this is the name of a specific
<productname>PostgreSQL</productname> database. Multiple database
names can be supplied by separating them with commas. A file
containing database names can be specified by preceding the file
name with <literal>@</>. The file must be in the same directory
as <filename>pg_hba.conf</>.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
<term><replaceable>user</replaceable></term>
<listitem>
<para>
Specifies the user for this record. The value
<literal>all</literal> specifies that it applies to all users.
Otherwise, this is the name of a specific
<productname>PostgreSQL</productname> user. Multiple user names
can be supplied by separating them with commas. Group names can
be specified by preceding the group name with <literal>+</>. A
file containing user names can be specified by preceding the file
name with <literal>@</>. The file must be in the same directory
as <filename>pg_hba.conf</>.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@ -149,10 +171,9 @@ hostssl <replaceable>database</replaceable> <replaceable>IP-address</replaceable
<term><replaceable>IP mask</replaceable></term>
<listitem>
<para>
These two fields specify to which client machines a
<literal>host</literal> or <literal>hostssl</literal>
record applies, based on their IP
address. (Of course IP addresses can be spoofed but this
These two fields specify the client machine IP addresses
(<literal>host</literal> or <literal>hostssl</literal>) for this
record. (Of course IP addresses can be spoofed but this
consideration is beyond the scope of
<productname>PostgreSQL</productname>.) The precise logic is that
<blockquote>
@ -169,10 +190,9 @@ hostssl <replaceable>database</replaceable> <replaceable>IP-address</replaceable
<term><replaceable>authentication method</replaceable></term>
<listitem>
<para>
Specifies the method that users must use to authenticate themselves
when connecting under the control of this authentication record.
The possible choices are summarized here,
details are in <xref linkend="auth-methods">.
Specifies the authentication method to use when connecting via
this record. The possible choices are summarized here; details
are in <xref linkend="auth-methods">.
<variablelist>
<varlistentry>
@ -190,31 +210,8 @@ hostssl <replaceable>database</replaceable> <replaceable>IP-address</replaceable
<term><literal>reject</></term>
<listitem>
<para>
The connection is rejected unconditionally. This is mostly
useful to <quote>filter out</> certain hosts from a group.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
<term><literal>password</></term>
<listitem>
<para>
The client is required to supply a password which is required to
match the database password that was set up for the user.
</para>
<para>
An optional file name may be specified after the
<literal>password</literal> keyword. This file is expected to
contain a list of users who may connect using this record,
and optionally alternative passwords for them.
</para>
<para>
The password is sent over the wire in clear text. For better
protection, use the <literal>md5</literal> or
<literal>crypt</literal> methods.
The connection is rejected unconditionally. This is useful for
<quote>filtering out</> certain hosts from a group.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@ -223,17 +220,9 @@ hostssl <replaceable>database</replaceable> <replaceable>IP-address</replaceable
<term><literal>md5</></term>
<listitem>
<para>
Like the <literal>password</literal> method, but the password
is sent over the wire encrypted using a simple
challenge-response protocol. This protects against incidental
wire-sniffing. This is now the recommended choice for
password-based authentication.
</para>
<para>
The name of a file may follow the
<literal>md5</literal> keyword. It contains a list of users
who may connect using this record.
Requires the client to supply an MD5 encrypted password for
authentication. This is the only method that allows encrypted
passwords to be stored in pg_shadow.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@ -242,14 +231,20 @@ hostssl <replaceable>database</replaceable> <replaceable>IP-address</replaceable
<term><literal>crypt</></term>
<listitem>
<para>
Like the <literal>md5</literal> method but uses older crypt
encryption, which is needed for pre-7.2
clients. <literal>md5</literal> is
preferred for 7.2 and later clients. The <literal>crypt</>
method is not compatible with encrypting passwords in
<filename>pg_shadow</>, and may fail if client and server
machines have different implementations of the crypt() library
routine.
Like <literal>md5</literal> method but uses older crypt
encryption, which is needed for pre-7.2 clients.
<literal>md5</literal> is preferred for 7.2 and later clients.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
<term><literal>password</></term>
<listitem>
<para>
Same as "md5", but the password is sent in cleartext over the
network. This should not be used on untrusted networks.
</para>
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@ -278,34 +273,36 @@ hostssl <replaceable>database</replaceable> <replaceable>IP-address</replaceable
<term><literal>ident</></term>
<listitem>
<para>
The identity of the user as determined on login to the
operating system is used by <productname>PostgreSQL</productname>
to determine whether the user
is allowed to connect as the requested database user.
For TCP/IP connections the user's identity is determined by
contacting the <firstterm>ident</firstterm> server on the client
host. (Note that this is only as reliable as the remote ident
server; ident authentication should never be used for remote hosts
whose administrators are not trustworthy.)
On operating systems
supporting <symbol>SO_PEERCRED</> requests for Unix domain sockets,
ident authentication is possible for local connections;
the system is then asked for the connecting user's identity.
For TCP/IP connections, authentication is done by contacting
the <firstterm>ident</firstterm> server on the client host.
This is only as secure as the client machine. You must specify
the map name after the 'ident' keyword. It determines how to
map remote user names to PostgreSQL user names. If you use
"sameuser", the user names are assumed to be identical. If
not, the map name is looked up in the $PGDATA/pg_ident.conf
file. The connection is accepted if that file contains an
entry for this map name with the ident-supplied user name and
the requested PostgreSQL user name.
</para>
<para>
On machines that support unix-domain socket credentials
(currently Linux, FreeBSD, NetBSD, and BSD/OS), ident allows
reliable authentication of 'local' connections without ident
running on the local machine.
</para>
<para>
On systems without <symbol>SO_PEERCRED</> requests, ident
authentication is only available for TCP/IP connections. As a
work around, it is possible to specify the <systemitem
class="systemname">localhost</> address <systemitem
class="systemname">127.0.0.1</> and make connections to this
address.
</para>
<para>
On systems without <symbol>SO_PEERCRED</> requests, ident authentication
is only available for TCP/IP connections. As a workaround,
it is possible to
specify the <systemitem class="systemname">localhost</> address
<systemitem class="systemname">127.0.0.1</> and make connections
to this address.
</para>
<para>
The <replaceable>authentication option</replaceable> following
the <literal>ident</> keyword specifies the name of an
<firstterm>ident map</firstterm> that specifies which operating
system users equate with which database users. See below for
details.
Following the <literal>ident</> keyword, an <firstterm>ident
map</firstterm> name should be supplied which specifies which
operating system users equate with which database users. See
below for details.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@ -315,17 +312,16 @@ hostssl <replaceable>database</replaceable> <replaceable>IP-address</replaceable
<listitem>
<para>
This authentication type operates similarly to
<firstterm>password</firstterm>, with the main difference that
it will use PAM (Pluggable Authentication Modules) as the
authentication mechanism. The <replaceable>authentication
option</replaceable> following the <literal>pam</> keyword
specifies the service name that will be passed to PAM. The
default service name is <literal>postgresql</literal>.
For more information about PAM, please read the <ulink
url="http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/pam/"><productname>Linux-PAM</productname>
Page</ulink> and/or the <ulink
url="http://www.sun.com/software/solaris/pam/"><systemitem class="osname">Solaris</> PAM
Page</ulink>.
<firstterm>password</firstterm> except that it uses PAM
(Pluggable Authentication Modules) as the authentication
mechanism. The default PAM service name is
<literal>postgresql</literal>. You can optionally supply you
own service name after the <literal>pam</> keyword in the
file. For more information about PAM, please read the <ulink
url="http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/pam/"><productname>L
inux-PAM</productname> Page</ulink> and the <ulink
url="http://www.sun.com/software/solaris/pam/"><systemitem
class="osname">Solaris</> PAM Page</ulink>.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
@ -336,42 +332,33 @@ hostssl <replaceable>database</replaceable> <replaceable>IP-address</replaceable
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
<term><replaceable>authentication option</replaceable></term>
<listitem>
<para>
This field is interpreted differently depending on the
authentication method, as described above.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
</variablelist>
</para>
<para>
Since the <filename>pg_hba.conf</filename> records are examined
sequentially for each connection attempt, the order of the records is
very significant. Typically, earlier records will have tight
connection match parameters and weaker authentication methods,
while later records will have looser match parameters and stronger
authentication methods. For example, one might wish to use
<literal>trust</> authentication for local TCP connections but
require a password for remote TCP connections. In this case a
record specifying <literal>trust</> authentication for connections
from 127.0.0.1 would appear before a record specifying password
authentication for a wider range of allowed client IP addresses.
significant. Typically, earlier records will have tight connection
match parameters and weaker authentication methods, while later
records will have looser match parameters and stronger authentication
methods. For example, one might wish to use <literal>trust</>
authentication for local TCP connections but require a password for
remote TCP connections. In this case a record specifying
<literal>trust</> authentication for connections from 127.0.0.1 would
appear before a record specifying password authentication for a wider
range of allowed client IP addresses.
</para>
<para>
<indexterm>
<primary>SIGHUP</primary>
</indexterm>
The <filename>pg_hba.conf</filename> file is read on start-up
and when the <application>postmaster</> receives a
The <filename>pg_hba.conf</filename> file is read on start-up and when
the <application>postmaster</> receives a
<systemitem>SIGHUP</systemitem> signal. If you edit the file on an
active system, you will need to signal the <application>postmaster</>
(using <literal>pg_ctl reload</> or <literal>kill -HUP</>)
to make it re-read the file.
(using <literal>pg_ctl reload</> or <literal>kill -HUP</>) to make it
re-read the file.
</para>
<para>
@ -382,27 +369,27 @@ hostssl <replaceable>database</replaceable> <replaceable>IP-address</replaceable
<example id="example-pg-hba.conf">
<title>An example <filename>pg_hba.conf</filename> file</title>
<programlisting>
# TYPE DATABASE IP_ADDRESS MASK AUTHTYPE MAP
# TYPE DATABASE USER IP_ADDRESS MASK AUTHTYPE
# Allow any user on the local system to connect to any
# database under any username, but only via an IP connection:
# database under any user name, but only via an IP connection:
host all 127.0.0.1 255.255.255.255 trust
host all all 127.0.0.1 255.255.255.255 trust
# The same, over Unix-socket connections:
local all trust
local all all trust
# Allow any user from any host with IP address 192.168.93.x to
# connect to database "template1" as the same username that ident on that
# host identifies him as (typically his Unix username):
# connect to database "template1" as the same user name that ident on that
# host identifies him as (typically his Unix user name):
host template1 192.168.93.0 255.255.255.0 ident sameuser
host template1 all 192.168.93.0 255.255.255.0 ident sameuser
# Allow a user from host 192.168.12.10 to connect to database "template1"
# if the user's password in pg_shadow is correctly supplied:
# if the user's password is correctly supplied:
host template1 192.168.12.10 255.255.255.255 md5
host template1 all 192.168.12.10 255.255.255.255 md5
# In the absence of preceding "host" lines, these two lines will reject
# all connection attempts from 192.168.54.1 (since that entry will be
@ -410,8 +397,8 @@ host template1 192.168.12.10 255.255.255.255 md5
# else on the Internet. The zero mask means that no bits of the host IP
# address are considered, so it matches any host:
host all 192.168.54.1 255.255.255.255 reject
host all 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 krb5
host all all 192.168.54.1 255.255.255.255 reject
host all all 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 krb5
# Allow users from 192.168.x.x hosts to connect to any database, if they
# pass the ident check. If, for example, ident says the user is "bryanh"
@ -419,7 +406,7 @@ host all 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 krb5
# is allowed if there is an entry in pg_ident.conf for map "omicron" that
# says "bryanh" is allowed to connect as "guest1":
host all 192.168.0.0 255.255.0.0 ident omicron
host all all 192.168.0.0 255.255.0.0 ident omicron
# If these are the only two lines for local connections, they will allow
# local users to connect only to their own databases (database named the
@ -429,8 +416,8 @@ host all 192.168.0.0 255.255.0.0 ident omicron
# cases. (If you prefer to use ident authorization, an ident map can
# serve a parallel purpose to the password list file used here.)
local sameuser md5
local all md5 admins
local sameuser all md5
local all @admins md5
</programlisting>
</example>
</para>
@ -490,86 +477,49 @@ local all md5 admins
<title>Password authentication</title>
<indexterm>
<primary>password</primary>
<primary>MD5</>
</indexterm>
<indexterm>
<primary>MD5</>
<primary>crypt</>
</indexterm>
<indexterm>
<primary>password</primary>
</indexterm>
<para>
Password-based authentication methods include <literal>md5</>,
<literal>crypt</>, and <literal>password</>. These methods operate
<literal>crypt</>, and <literal>password</>. These methods operate
similarly except for the way that the password is sent across the
connection. If you are at all concerned about password <quote>sniffing</>
attacks then <literal>md5</> is preferred, with <literal>crypt</> a
second choice if you must support obsolete clients. Plain
<literal>password</> should especially be avoided for connections over
the open Internet (unless you use SSL, SSH, or other communications
security wrappers around the connection).
connection. If you are at all concerned about password
<quote>sniffing</> attacks then <literal>md5</> is preferred, with
<literal>crypt</> a second choice if you must support pre-7.2
clients. Plain <literal>password</> should especially be avoided for
connections over the open Internet (unless you use SSL, SSH, or
other communications security wrappers around the connection).
</para>
<para>
<productname>PostgreSQL</productname> database passwords are separate from
operating system user passwords. Ordinarily, the password for each
database user is stored in the pg_shadow system catalog table.
Passwords can be managed with the query language commands
<command>CREATE USER</command> and <command>ALTER USER</command>,
e.g., <userinput>CREATE USER foo WITH PASSWORD
'secret';</userinput>. By default, that is, if no password has
been set up, the stored password is <literal>NULL</literal>
and password authentication will always fail for that user.
<productname>PostgreSQL</productname> database passwords are
separate from operating system user passwords. Ordinarily, the
password for each database user is stored in the pg_shadow system
catalog table. Passwords can be managed with the query language
commands <command>CREATE USER</command> and <command>ALTER
USER</command>, e.g., <userinput>CREATE USER foo WITH PASSWORD
'secret';</userinput>. By default, that is, if no password has been
set up, the stored password is <literal>NULL</literal> and password
authentication will always fail for that user.
</para>
<para>
To restrict the set of users that are allowed to connect to certain
databases, list the set of users in a separate file (one user name
per line) in the same directory that <filename>pg_hba.conf</> is in,
and mention the (base) name of the file after the
<literal>password</>, <literal>md5</>, or <literal>crypt</> keyword,
respectively, in <filename>pg_hba.conf</>. If you do not use this
feature, then any user that is known to the database system can
connect to any database (so long as he supplies the correct password,
of course).
</para>
<para>
These files can also be used to apply a different set of passwords
to a particular database or set thereof. In that case, the files
have a format similar to the standard Unix password file
<filename>/etc/passwd</filename>, that is,
<synopsis>
<replaceable>username</replaceable>:<replaceable>password</replaceable>
</synopsis>
Any extra colon-separated fields following the password are
ignored. The password is expected to be encrypted using the
system's <function>crypt()</function> function. The utility
program <application>pg_passwd</application> that is installed
with <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> can be used to manage
these password files.
</para>
<para>
Lines with and without passwords can be mixed in secondary
password files. Lines without password indicate use of the main
password in <literal>pg_shadow</> that is managed by
<command>CREATE USER</> and <command>ALTER USER</>. Lines with
passwords will cause that password to be used. A password entry of
<quote>+</quote> also means using the pg_shadow password.
</para>
<para>
Alternative passwords cannot be used when using the <literal>md5</>
or <literal>crypt</> methods. The file will be read as
usual, but the password field will simply be ignored and the
<literal>pg_shadow</> password will always be used.
</para>
<para>
Note that using alternative passwords like this means that one can
no longer use <command>ALTER USER</command> to change one's
password. It will appear to work but the password one is
changing is not the password that the system will end up
using.
databases, list the users separated by commas, or in a separate
file. The file should contain user names separated by commas or one
user name per line, and be in the same directory as
<filename>pg_hba.conf</>. Mention the (base) name of the file
preceded with <literal>@</>in the <literal>USER</> column. The
<literal>DATABASE</> column can similarly accept a list of values or
a file name. You can also specify group names by preceding the group
name with <literal>+</>.
</para>
</sect2>
@ -588,10 +538,10 @@ local all md5 admins
<productname>Kerberos</productname> system is far beyond the scope
of this document; in all generality it can be quite complex (yet
powerful). The <ulink
url="http://www.nrl.navy.mil/CCS/people/kenh/kerberos-faq.html">Kerberos
<acronym>FAQ</></ulink> or <ulink
url="ftp://athena-dist.mit.edu">MIT Project Athena</ulink> can be
a good starting point for exploration. Several sources for
url="http://www.nrl.navy.mil/CCS/people/kenh/kerberos-faq.html">Kerb
eros <acronym>FAQ</></ulink> or <ulink
url="ftp://athena-dist.mit.edu">MIT Project Athena</ulink> can be a
good starting point for exploration. Several sources for
<productname>Kerberos</> distributions exist.
</para>
@ -606,34 +556,33 @@ local all md5 admins
<para>
<productname>PostgreSQL</> operates like a normal Kerberos service.
The name of the service principal is
<replaceable>servicename/hostname@realm</>, where
<replaceable>servicename</> is <literal>postgres</literal>
(unless a different service name was selected at configure time
with <literal>./configure --with-krb-srvnam=whatever</>).
<replaceable>hostname</> is the fully qualified domain name of the server
machine. The service principal's realm is the preferred realm of the
server machine.
<replaceable>servicename/hostname@realm</>, where
<replaceable>servicename</> is <literal>postgres</literal> (unless a
different service name was selected at configure time with
<literal>./configure --with-krb-srvnam=whatever</>).
<replaceable>hostname</> is the fully qualified domain name of the
server machine. The service principal's realm is the preferred realm
of the server machine.
</para>
<para>
Client principals must have their <productname>PostgreSQL</> user name as
their first component, for example
<replaceable>pgusername/otherstuff@realm</>.
At present the realm of the client is not checked by
<productname>PostgreSQL</>; so
if you have cross-realm authentication enabled, then any principal
in any realm that can communicate with yours will be accepted.
Client principals must have their <productname>PostgreSQL</> user
name as their first component, for example
<replaceable>pgusername/otherstuff@realm</>. At present the realm of
the client is not checked by <productname>PostgreSQL</>; so if you
have cross-realm authentication enabled, then any principal in any
realm that can communicate with yours will be accepted.
</para>
<para>
Make sure that your server key file is readable (and
preferably only readable) by the
<productname>PostgreSQL</productname> server account (see
<xref linkend="postgres-user">). The location of the key file
is specified with the <varname>krb_server_keyfile</> run time
configuration parameter. (See also <xref linkend="runtime-config">.)
The default is <filename>/etc/srvtab</> if you are using Kerberos 4
and <filename>FILE:/usr/local/pgsql/etc/krb5.keytab</> (or whichever
Make sure that your server key file is readable (and preferably only
readable) by the <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> server
account (see <xref linkend="postgres-user">). The location of the
key file is specified with the <varname>krb_server_keyfile</> run
time configuration parameter. (See also <xref
linkend="runtime-config">.) The default is <filename>/etc/srvtab</>
if you are using Kerberos 4 and
<filename>FILE:/usr/local/pgsql/etc/krb5.keytab</> (or whichever
directory was specified as <varname>sysconfdir</> at build time)
with Kerberos 5.
</para>
@ -649,18 +598,20 @@ local all md5 admins
<para>
When connecting to the database make sure you have a ticket for a
principal matching the requested database user name.
An example: For database user name <literal>fred</>, both principal
principal matching the requested database user name. An example: For
database user name <literal>fred</>, both principal
<literal>fred@EXAMPLE.COM</> and
<literal>fred/users.example.com@EXAMPLE.COM</> can be
used to authenticate to the database server.
<literal>fred/users.example.com@EXAMPLE.COM</> can be used to
authenticate to the database server.
</para>
<para>
If you use <application>mod_auth_krb</application> and <application>mod_perl</application> on your <productname>Apache</productname> web server,
you can use <literal>AuthType KerberosV5SaveCredentials</literal> with a <application>mod_perl</application>
script. This gives secure database access over the web, no extra
passwords required.
If you use <application>mod_auth_krb</application> and
<application>mod_perl</application> on your
<productname>Apache</productname> web server, you can use
<literal>AuthType KerberosV5SaveCredentials</literal> with a
<application>mod_perl</application> script. This gives secure
database access over the web, no extra passwords required.
</para>
</sect2>
@ -707,55 +658,54 @@ local all md5 admins
</para>
<para>
On systems supporting <symbol>SO_PEERCRED</symbol> requests for Unix-domain sockets,
ident authentication can also be applied to local connections. In this
case, no security risk is added by using ident authentication; indeed
it is a preferable choice for local connections on such a system.
On systems supporting <symbol>SO_PEERCRED</symbol> requests for
Unix-domain sockets, ident authentication can also be applied to
local connections. In this case, no security risk is added by using
ident authentication; indeed it is a preferable choice for local
connections on such systems.
</para>
<para>
When using ident-based authentication, after having determined the
name of the operating system user that initiated the connection,
<productname>PostgreSQL</productname> checks whether that user is allowed
to connect as the database user he is requesting to connect as.
This is controlled by the ident map
argument that follows the <literal>ident</> keyword in the
<filename>pg_hba.conf</filename> file. There is a predefined ident map
<literal>sameuser</literal>, which allows any operating system
user to connect as the database user of the same name (if the
latter exists). Other maps must be created manually.
<productname>PostgreSQL</productname> checks whether that user is
allowed to connect as the database user he is requesting to connect
as. This is controlled by the ident map argument that follows the
<literal>ident</> keyword in the <filename>pg_hba.conf</filename>
file. There is a predefined ident map <literal>sameuser</literal>,
which allows any operating system user to connect as the database
user of the same name (if the latter exists). Other maps must be
created manually.
</para>
<para>
<indexterm><primary>pg_ident.conf</primary></indexterm>
Ident maps other than <literal>sameuser</literal> are defined
in the file <filename>pg_ident.conf</filename>
in the data directory, which contains lines of the general form:
<indexterm><primary>pg_ident.conf</primary></indexterm> Ident maps
other than <literal>sameuser</literal> are defined in the file
<filename>pg_ident.conf</filename> in the data directory, which
contains lines of the general form:
<synopsis>
<replaceable>map-name</> <replaceable>ident-username</> <replaceable>database-username</>
</synopsis>
Comments and whitespace are handled in the usual way.
The <replaceable>map-name</> is an arbitrary name that will be
used to refer to this mapping in <filename>pg_hba.conf</filename>.
The other two fields specify which operating system user is
allowed to connect as which database user. The same
<replaceable>map-name</> can be used repeatedly to specify more
user-mappings within a single map. There is no restriction regarding
how many
database users a given operating system user may correspond to and vice
versa.
Comments and whitespace are handled in the usual way. The
<replaceable>map-name</> is an arbitrary name that will be used to
refer to this mapping in <filename>pg_hba.conf</filename>. The other
two fields specify which operating system user is allowed to connect
as which database user. The same <replaceable>map-name</> can be
used repeatedly to specify more user-mappings within a single map.
There is no restriction regarding how many database users a given
operating system user may correspond to and vice versa.
</para>
<para>
<indexterm>
<primary>SIGHUP</primary>
</indexterm>
The <filename>pg_ident.conf</filename> file is read on start-up
and when the <application>postmaster</> receives a
The <filename>pg_ident.conf</filename> file is read on start-up and
when the <application>postmaster</> receives a
<systemitem>SIGHUP</systemitem> signal. If you edit the file on an
active system, you will need to signal the <application>postmaster</>
(using <literal>pg_ctl reload</> or <literal>kill -HUP</>)
to make it re-read the file.
(using <literal>pg_ctl reload</> or <literal>kill -HUP</>) to make it
re-read the file.
</para>
<para>
@ -763,13 +713,14 @@ local all md5 admins
conjunction with the <filename>pg_hba.conf</> file in <xref
linkend="example-pg-hba.conf"> is shown in <xref
linkend="example-pg-ident.conf">. In this example setup, anyone
logged in to a machine on the 192.168 network that does not have
the Unix user name <systemitem>bryanh</>, <systemitem>ann</>, or <systemitem>robert</> would not be granted access.
Unix user <systemitem>robert</> would only be allowed access when he tries to
connect as <productname>PostgreSQL</> user <systemitem>bob</>,
not as <systemitem>robert</>
or anyone else. <systemitem>ann</> would only be allowed to connect as
<systemitem>ann</>. User <systemitem>bryanh</> would be allowed to connect as either
logged in to a machine on the 192.168 network that does not have the
Unix user name <systemitem>bryanh</>, <systemitem>ann</>, or
<systemitem>robert</> would not be granted access. Unix user
<systemitem>robert</> would only be allowed access when he tries to
connect as <productname>PostgreSQL</> user <systemitem>bob</>, not
as <systemitem>robert</> or anyone else. <systemitem>ann</> would
only be allowed to connect as <systemitem>ann</>. User
<systemitem>bryanh</> would be allowed to connect as either
<systemitem>bryanh</> himself or as <systemitem>guest1</>.
</para>
@ -780,7 +731,7 @@ local all md5 admins
omicron bryanh bryanh
omicron ann ann
# bob has username robert on these machines
# bob has user name robert on these machines
omicron robert bob
# bryanh can also connect as guest1
omicron bryanh guest1
@ -799,30 +750,30 @@ omicron bryanh guest1
<para>
<ProgramListing>
No pg_hba.conf entry for host 123.123.123.123, user joeblow, database testdb
No pg_hba.conf entry for host 123.123.123.123, user andym, database testdb
</ProgramListing>
This is what you are most likely to get if you succeed in
contacting the server, but it does not want to talk to you. As the
message suggests, the server refused the connection request
because it found no authorizing entry in its <filename>pg_hba.conf</filename>
This is what you are most likely to get if you succeed in contacting
the server, but it does not want to talk to you. As the message
suggests, the server refused the connection request because it found
no authorizing entry in its <filename>pg_hba.conf</filename>
configuration file.
</para>
<para>
<ProgramListing>
Password authentication failed for user 'joeblow'
Password authentication failed for user 'andym'
</ProgramListing>
Messages like this indicate that you contacted the server, and
it is willing to talk to you, but not until you pass the
authorization method specified in the
<filename>pg_hba.conf</filename> file. Check the password you are
providing, or check your Kerberos or ident software if the
complaint mentions one of those authentication types.
Messages like this indicate that you contacted the server, and it is
willing to talk to you, but not until you pass the authorization
method specified in the <filename>pg_hba.conf</filename> file. Check
the password you are providing, or check your Kerberos or ident
software if the complaint mentions one of those authentication
types.
</para>
<para>
<ProgramListing>
FATAL 1: user "joeblow" does not exist
FATAL 1: user "andym" does not exist
</ProgramListing>
The indicated user name was not found.
</para>
@ -837,9 +788,9 @@ FATAL 1: Database "testdb" does not exist in the system catalog.
</para>
<para>
Note that the server log may contain more information
about an authentication failure than is reported to the client.
If you are confused about the reason for a failure, check the log.
Note that the server log may contain more information about an
authentication failure than is reported to the client. If you are
confused about the reason for a failure, check the log.
</para>
</sect1>

View File

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
<!--
$Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/doc/src/sgml/ref/allfiles.sgml,v 1.36 2002/03/19 02:18:12 momjian Exp $
$Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/doc/src/sgml/ref/allfiles.sgml,v 1.37 2002/04/04 04:25:45 momjian Exp $
PostgreSQL documentation
Complete list of usable sgml source files in this directory.
-->
@ -125,7 +125,6 @@ Complete list of usable sgml source files in this directory.
<!entity pgCtl system "pg_ctl-ref.sgml">
<!entity pgDump system "pg_dump.sgml">
<!entity pgDumpall system "pg_dumpall.sgml">
<!entity pgPasswd system "pg_passwd.sgml">
<!entity pgRestore system "pg_restore.sgml">
<!entity pgTclSh system "pgtclsh.sgml">
<!entity pgTkSh system "pgtksh.sgml">

View File

@ -1,123 +0,0 @@
<!--
$Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/doc/src/sgml/ref/Attic/pg_passwd.sgml,v 1.10 2001/12/08 03:24:38 thomas Exp $
PostgreSQL documentation
-->
<refentry id="APP-PG-PASSWD">
<docinfo>
<date>2000-11-18</date>
</docinfo>
<refmeta>
<refentrytitle id="APP-PG-PASSWD-TITLE"><application>pg_passwd</application></refentrytitle>
<manvolnum>1</manvolnum>
<refmiscinfo>Application</refmiscinfo>
</refmeta>
<refnamediv>
<refname>pg_passwd</refname>
<refpurpose>change a secondary <productname>PostgreSQL</> password file</refpurpose>
</refnamediv>
<refsynopsisdiv>
<cmdsynopsis>
<command>pg_passwd</command>
<arg choice="plain"><replaceable>filename</replaceable></arg>
</cmdsynopsis>
</refsynopsisdiv>
<refsect1 id="app-pg-passwd-description">
<title>Description</title>
<para>
<application>pg_passwd</application> is a tool for manipulating flat
text password files. These files can control client authentication of
the <productname>PostgreSQL</productname> server. More information
about setting up this authentication mechanism can be found in the
<citetitle>Administrator's Guide</citetitle>.
</para>
<para>
The format of a text password file is one entry per line; the fields
of each entry are separated by colons. The first field is the user
name, the second field is the encrypted password. Other fields are
ignored (to allow password files to be shared between applications
that use similar formats). <application>pg_passwd</application>
enables users to interactively add entries to such a file, to alter
passwords of existing entries, and to encrypt such passwords.
</para>
<para>
Supply the name of the password file as argument to the
<application>pg_passwd</application> command. To be used by
PostgreSQL, the file needs to be located in the server's data
directory, and the base name of the file needs to be specified in the
<filename>pg_hba.conf</filename> access control file.
<screen>
<prompt>$</prompt> <userinput>pg_passwd /usr/local/pgsql/data/passwords</userinput>
<computeroutput>File "/usr/local/pgsql/data/passwords" does not exist. Create? (y/n):</computeroutput> <userinput>y</userinput>
<prompt>Username:</prompt> <userinput>guest</userinput>
<prompt>Password:</prompt>
<prompt>Re-enter password:</prompt>
</screen>
where the <literal>Password:</literal> and <literal>Re-enter
password:</literal> prompts require the same password input which
is not displayed on the terminal. Note that the password is limited
to eight useful characters by restrictions of the standard crypt(3)
library routine.
</para>
<para>
The original password file is renamed to
<filename>passwords.bk</filename>.
</para>
<para>
To make use of this password file, put a line like the following in
<filename>pg_hba.conf</filename>:
<programlisting>
host mydb 133.65.96.250 255.255.255.255 password passwords
</programlisting>
which would allow access to database mydb from host 133.65.96.250 using
the passwords listed in the <filename>passwords</filename> file (and
only to the users listed in that file).
</para>
<note>
<para>
It is also useful to have entries in a password file with empty
password fields. (This is different from an empty password.) Such
entries allow you to restrict users who can access the system. These
entries cannot be managed by <application>pg_passwd</application>,
but you can edit password files manually.
</para>
</note>
</refsect1>
<refsect1 id="app-pg-passwd-seealso">
<title>See also</title>
<para>
<citetitle>PostgreSQL Administrator's Guide</citetitle>
</para>
</refsect1>
</refentry>
<!-- Keep this comment at the end of the file
Local variables:
mode: sgml
sgml-omittag:nil
sgml-shorttag:t
sgml-minimize-attributes:nil
sgml-always-quote-attributes:t
sgml-indent-step:1
sgml-indent-data:t
sgml-parent-document:nil
sgml-default-dtd-file:"../reference.ced"
sgml-exposed-tags:nil
sgml-local-catalogs:"/usr/lib/sgml/catalog"
sgml-local-ecat-files:nil
End:
-->

View File

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
<!-- reference.sgml
$Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/doc/src/sgml/reference.sgml,v 1.24 2002/03/19 02:18:11 momjian Exp $
$Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/doc/src/sgml/reference.sgml,v 1.25 2002/04/04 04:25:44 momjian Exp $
PostgreSQL Reference Manual
-->
@ -191,7 +191,6 @@ Disable this chapter until we have more functions documented.
&initlocation;
&ipcclean;
&pgCtl;
&pgPasswd;
&postgres;
&postmaster;

View File

@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
* Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2001, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
* Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
*
* $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/backend/commands/user.c,v 1.94 2002/03/26 19:15:48 tgl Exp $
* $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/backend/commands/user.c,v 1.95 2002/04/04 04:25:45 momjian Exp $
*
*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "access/heapam.h"
@ -27,6 +28,7 @@
#include "libpq/crypt.h"
#include "miscadmin.h"
#include "storage/pmsignal.h"
#include "utils/acl.h"
#include "utils/array.h"
#include "utils/builtins.h"
#include "utils/fmgroids.h"
@ -39,22 +41,75 @@ extern bool Password_encryption;
static void CheckPgUserAclNotNull(void);
/*---------------------------------------------------------------------
* write_password_file / update_pg_pwd
/*
* fputs_quote
*
* copy the modified contents of pg_shadow to a file used by the postmaster
* for user authentication. The file is stored as $PGDATA/global/pg_pwd.
* Outputs string in quotes, with double-quotes duplicated.
* We could use quote_ident(), but that expects varlena.
*/
static void fputs_quote(char *str, FILE *fp)
{
fputc('"', fp);
while (*str)
{
fputc(*str, fp);
if (*str == '"')
fputc('"', fp);
str++;
}
fputc('"', fp);
}
/*
* group_getfilename --- get full pathname of group file
*
* This function set is both a trigger function for direct updates to pg_shadow
* as well as being called directly from create/alter/drop user.
*
* We raise an error to force transaction rollback if we detect an illegal
* username or password --- illegal being defined as values that would
* mess up the pg_pwd parser.
*---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Note that result string is palloc'd, and should be freed by the caller.
*/
char *
group_getfilename(void)
{
int bufsize;
char *pfnam;
bufsize = strlen(DataDir) + strlen("/global/") +
strlen(USER_GROUP_FILE) + 1;
pfnam = (char *) palloc(bufsize);
snprintf(pfnam, bufsize, "%s/global/%s", DataDir, USER_GROUP_FILE);
return pfnam;
}
/*
* Get full pathname of password file.
* Note that result string is palloc'd, and should be freed by the caller.
*/
char *
user_getfilename(void)
{
int bufsize;
char *pfnam;
bufsize = strlen(DataDir) + strlen("/global/") +
strlen(PWD_FILE) + 1;
pfnam = (char *) palloc(bufsize);
snprintf(pfnam, bufsize, "%s/global/%s", DataDir, PWD_FILE);
return pfnam;
}
/*
* write_group_file for trigger update_pg_pwd_and_pg_group
*/
static void
write_password_file(Relation rel)
write_group_file(Relation urel, Relation grel)
{
char *filename,
*tempname;
@ -63,14 +118,14 @@ write_password_file(Relation rel)
mode_t oumask;
HeapScanDesc scan;
HeapTuple tuple;
TupleDesc dsc = RelationGetDescr(rel);
TupleDesc dsc = RelationGetDescr(grel);
/*
* Create a temporary filename to be renamed later. This prevents the
* backend from clobbering the pg_pwd file while the postmaster might
* backend from clobbering the pg_group file while the postmaster might
* be reading from it.
*/
filename = crypt_getpwdfilename();
filename = group_getfilename();
bufsize = strlen(filename) + 12;
tempname = (char *) palloc(bufsize);
@ -79,88 +134,89 @@ write_password_file(Relation rel)
fp = AllocateFile(tempname, "w");
umask(oumask);
if (fp == NULL)
elog(ERROR, "write_password_file: unable to write %s: %m", tempname);
elog(ERROR, "write_group_file: unable to write %s: %m", tempname);
/* read table */
scan = heap_beginscan(rel, false, SnapshotSelf, 0, NULL);
scan = heap_beginscan(grel, false, SnapshotSelf, 0, NULL);
while (HeapTupleIsValid(tuple = heap_getnext(scan, 0)))
{
Datum datum_n,
datum_p,
datum_v;
bool null_n,
null_p,
null_v;
char *str_n,
*str_p,
*str_v;
int i;
Datum datum, grolist_datum;
bool isnull;
char *groname;
IdList *grolist_p;
AclId *aidp;
int i, j,
num;
char *usename;
bool first_user = true;
datum_n = heap_getattr(tuple, Anum_pg_shadow_usename, dsc, &null_n);
if (null_n)
continue; /* ignore NULL usernames */
str_n = DatumGetCString(DirectFunctionCall1(nameout, datum_n));
datum = heap_getattr(tuple, Anum_pg_group_groname, dsc, &isnull);
if (isnull)
continue; /* ignore NULL groupnames */
groname = (char *) DatumGetName(datum);
datum_p = heap_getattr(tuple, Anum_pg_shadow_passwd, dsc, &null_p);
grolist_datum = heap_getattr(tuple, Anum_pg_group_grolist, dsc, &isnull);
/* Ignore NULL group lists */
if (isnull)
continue;
grolist_p = DatumGetIdListP(grolist_datum);
/*
* It can be argued that people having a null password shouldn't
* be allowed to connect under password authentication, because
* they need to have a password set up first. If you think
* assuming an empty password in that case is better, change this
* logic to look something like the code for valuntil.
* Check for illegal characters in the group name.
*/
if (null_p)
i = strcspn(groname, "\n");
if (groname[i] != '\0')
{
pfree(str_n);
elog(LOG, "Invalid group name '%s'", groname);
continue;
}
str_p = DatumGetCString(DirectFunctionCall1(textout, datum_p));
datum_v = heap_getattr(tuple, Anum_pg_shadow_valuntil, dsc, &null_v);
if (null_v)
str_v = pstrdup("\\N");
else
str_v = DatumGetCString(DirectFunctionCall1(nabstimeout, datum_v));
/* be sure the IdList is not toasted */
/* scan it */
num = IDLIST_NUM(grolist_p);
aidp = IDLIST_DAT(grolist_p);
for (i = 0; i < num; ++i)
{
tuple = SearchSysCache(SHADOWSYSID,
PointerGetDatum(aidp[i]),
0, 0, 0);
if (HeapTupleIsValid(tuple))
{
usename = NameStr(((Form_pg_shadow) GETSTRUCT(tuple))->usename);
/*
* Check for illegal characters in the username and password.
*/
i = strcspn(str_n, CRYPT_PWD_FILE_SEPSTR "\n");
if (str_n[i] != '\0')
elog(ERROR, "Invalid user name '%s'", str_n);
i = strcspn(str_p, CRYPT_PWD_FILE_SEPSTR "\n");
if (str_p[i] != '\0')
elog(ERROR, "Invalid user password '%s'", str_p);
/*
* Check for illegal characters in the user name.
*/
j = strcspn(usename, "\n");
if (usename[j] != '\0')
{
elog(LOG, "Invalid user name '%s'", usename);
continue;
}
/*
* The extra columns we emit here are not really necessary. To
* remove them, the parser in backend/libpq/crypt.c would need to
* be adjusted.
*/
fprintf(fp,
"%s"
CRYPT_PWD_FILE_SEPSTR
"0"
CRYPT_PWD_FILE_SEPSTR
"x"
CRYPT_PWD_FILE_SEPSTR
"x"
CRYPT_PWD_FILE_SEPSTR
"x"
CRYPT_PWD_FILE_SEPSTR
"x"
CRYPT_PWD_FILE_SEPSTR
"%s"
CRYPT_PWD_FILE_SEPSTR
"%s\n",
str_n,
str_p,
str_v);
/* File format is:
* "dbname" "user1","user2","user3"
* This matches pg_hba.conf.
*/
if (first_user)
{
fputs_quote(groname, fp);
fputs("\t", fp);
}
else
fputs(" ", fp);
pfree(str_n);
pfree(str_p);
pfree(str_v);
first_user = false;
fputs_quote(usename, fp);
ReleaseSysCache(tuple);
}
}
if (!first_user)
fputs("\n", fp);
/* if IdList was toasted, free detoasted copy */
if ((Pointer) grolist_p != DatumGetPointer(grolist_datum))
pfree(grolist_p);
}
heap_endscan(scan);
@ -178,29 +234,154 @@ write_password_file(Relation rel)
pfree((void *) tempname);
pfree((void *) filename);
}
/*
* write_password_file for trigger update_pg_pwd_and_pg_group
*
* copy the modified contents of pg_shadow to a file used by the postmaster
* for user authentication. The file is stored as $PGDATA/global/pg_pwd.
*
* This function set is both a trigger function for direct updates to pg_shadow
* as well as being called directly from create/alter/drop user.
*
* We raise an error to force transaction rollback if we detect an illegal
* username or password --- illegal being defined as values that would
* mess up the pg_pwd parser.
*/
static void
write_user_file(Relation urel)
{
char *filename,
*tempname;
int bufsize;
FILE *fp;
mode_t oumask;
HeapScanDesc scan;
HeapTuple tuple;
TupleDesc dsc = RelationGetDescr(urel);
/*
* Signal the postmaster to reload its password-file cache.
* Create a temporary filename to be renamed later. This prevents the
* backend from clobbering the pg_pwd file while the postmaster might
* be reading from it.
*/
SendPostmasterSignal(PMSIGNAL_PASSWORD_CHANGE);
filename = user_getfilename();
bufsize = strlen(filename) + 12;
tempname = (char *) palloc(bufsize);
snprintf(tempname, bufsize, "%s.%d", filename, MyProcPid);
oumask = umask((mode_t) 077);
fp = AllocateFile(tempname, "w");
umask(oumask);
if (fp == NULL)
elog(ERROR, "write_password_file: unable to write %s: %m", tempname);
/* read table */
scan = heap_beginscan(urel, false, SnapshotSelf, 0, NULL);
while (HeapTupleIsValid(tuple = heap_getnext(scan, 0)))
{
Datum datum;
bool isnull;
char *usename,
*passwd,
*valuntil;
int i;
datum = heap_getattr(tuple, Anum_pg_shadow_usename, dsc, &isnull);
if (isnull)
continue; /* ignore NULL usernames */
usename = (char *) DatumGetName(datum);
datum = heap_getattr(tuple, Anum_pg_shadow_passwd, dsc, &isnull);
/*
* It can be argued that people having a null password shouldn't
* be allowed to connect under password authentication, because
* they need to have a password set up first. If you think
* assuming an empty password in that case is better, change this
* logic to look something like the code for valuntil.
*/
if (isnull)
continue;
passwd = DatumGetCString(DirectFunctionCall1(textout, datum));
datum = heap_getattr(tuple, Anum_pg_shadow_valuntil, dsc, &isnull);
if (isnull)
valuntil = pstrdup("");
else
valuntil = DatumGetCString(DirectFunctionCall1(nabstimeout, datum));
/*
* Check for illegal characters in the username and password.
*/
i = strcspn(usename, "\n");
if (usename[i] != '\0')
elog(ERROR, "Invalid user name '%s'", usename);
i = strcspn(passwd, "\n");
if (passwd[i] != '\0')
elog(ERROR, "Invalid user password '%s'", passwd);
/*
* The extra columns we emit here are not really necessary. To
* remove them, the parser in backend/libpq/crypt.c would need to
* be adjusted.
*/
fputs_quote(usename, fp);
fputs(" ", fp);
fputs_quote(passwd, fp);
fputs(" ", fp);
fputs_quote(valuntil, fp);
pfree(passwd);
pfree(valuntil);
}
heap_endscan(scan);
fflush(fp);
if (ferror(fp))
elog(ERROR, "%s: %m", tempname);
FreeFile(fp);
/*
* Rename the temp file to its final name, deleting the old pg_pwd. We
* expect that rename(2) is an atomic action.
*/
if (rename(tempname, filename))
elog(ERROR, "rename %s to %s: %m", tempname, filename);
pfree((void *) tempname);
pfree((void *) filename);
}
/* This is the wrapper for triggers. */
Datum
update_pg_pwd(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
update_pg_pwd_and_pg_group(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
/*
* ExclusiveLock ensures no one modifies pg_shadow while we read it,
* and that only one backend rewrites the flat file at a time. It's
* OK to allow normal reads of pg_shadow in parallel, however.
*/
Relation rel = heap_openr(ShadowRelationName, ExclusiveLock);
Relation urel = heap_openr(ShadowRelationName, ExclusiveLock);
Relation grel = heap_openr(GroupRelationName, ExclusiveLock);
write_password_file(rel);
write_user_file(urel);
write_group_file(urel, grel);
/* OK to release lock, since we did not modify the relation */
heap_close(rel, ExclusiveLock);
heap_close(grel, ExclusiveLock);
heap_close(urel, ExclusiveLock);
/*
* Signal the postmaster to reload its password & group-file cache.
*/
SendPostmasterSignal(PMSIGNAL_PASSWORD_CHANGE);
return PointerGetDatum(NULL);
}
@ -445,15 +626,15 @@ CreateUser(CreateUserStmt *stmt)
AlterGroup(&ags, "CREATE USER");
}
/*
* Write the updated pg_shadow data to the flat password file.
*/
write_password_file(pg_shadow_rel);
/*
* Now we can clean up; but keep lock until commit.
*/
heap_close(pg_shadow_rel, NoLock);
/*
* Write the updated pg_shadow and pg_group data to the flat file.
*/
update_pg_pwd_and_pg_group(NULL);
}
@ -679,15 +860,15 @@ AlterUser(AlterUserStmt *stmt)
ReleaseSysCache(tuple);
heap_freetuple(new_tuple);
/*
* Write the updated pg_shadow data to the flat password file.
*/
write_password_file(pg_shadow_rel);
/*
* Now we can clean up.
*/
heap_close(pg_shadow_rel, NoLock);
/*
* Write the updated pg_shadow and pg_group data to the flat file.
*/
update_pg_pwd_and_pg_group(NULL);
}
@ -733,7 +914,7 @@ AlterUserSet(AlterUserSetStmt *stmt)
{
Datum datum;
bool isnull;
ArrayType *a;
ArrayType *array;
repl_null[Anum_pg_shadow_useconfig-1] = ' ';
@ -741,17 +922,17 @@ AlterUserSet(AlterUserSetStmt *stmt)
Anum_pg_shadow_useconfig, &isnull);
if (valuestr)
a = GUCArrayAdd(isnull
array = GUCArrayAdd(isnull
? NULL
: (ArrayType *) pg_detoast_datum((struct varlena *)datum),
stmt->variable, valuestr);
else
a = GUCArrayDelete(isnull
array = GUCArrayDelete(isnull
? NULL
: (ArrayType *) pg_detoast_datum((struct varlena *)datum),
stmt->variable);
repl_val[Anum_pg_shadow_useconfig-1] = PointerGetDatum(a);
repl_val[Anum_pg_shadow_useconfig-1] = PointerGetDatum(array);
}
newtuple = heap_modifytuple(oldtuple, rel, repl_val, repl_null, repl_repl);
@ -846,7 +1027,7 @@ DropUser(DropUserStmt *stmt)
datum = heap_getattr(tmp_tuple, Anum_pg_database_datname,
pg_dsc, &null);
Assert(!null);
dbname = DatumGetCString(DirectFunctionCall1(nameout, datum));
dbname = (char *) DatumGetName(datum);
elog(ERROR, "DROP USER: user \"%s\" owns database \"%s\", cannot be removed%s",
user, dbname,
(length(stmt->users) > 1) ? " (no users removed)" : "");
@ -900,15 +1081,15 @@ DropUser(DropUserStmt *stmt)
CommandCounterIncrement();
}
/*
* Write the updated pg_shadow data to the flat password file.
*/
write_password_file(pg_shadow_rel);
/*
* Now we can clean up.
*/
heap_close(pg_shadow_rel, NoLock);
/*
* Write the updated pg_shadow and pg_group data to the flat file.
*/
update_pg_pwd_and_pg_group(NULL);
}
@ -1111,6 +1292,11 @@ CreateGroup(CreateGroupStmt *stmt)
}
heap_close(pg_group_rel, NoLock);
/*
* Write the updated pg_shadow and pg_group data to the flat file.
*/
update_pg_pwd_and_pg_group(NULL);
}
@ -1366,7 +1552,15 @@ AlterGroup(AlterGroupStmt *stmt, const char *tag)
ReleaseSysCache(group_tuple);
/*
* Write the updated pg_shadow and pg_group data to the flat files.
*/
heap_close(pg_group_rel, NoLock);
/*
* Write the updated pg_shadow and pg_group data to the flat file.
*/
update_pg_pwd_and_pg_group(NULL);
}
@ -1419,4 +1613,9 @@ DropGroup(DropGroupStmt *stmt)
elog(ERROR, "DROP GROUP: group \"%s\" does not exist", stmt->name);
heap_close(pg_group_rel, NoLock);
/*
* Write the updated pg_shadow and pg_group data to the flat file.
*/
update_pg_pwd_and_pg_group(NULL);
}

View File

@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
# Makefile for libpq subsystem (backend half of libpq interface)
#
# IDENTIFICATION
# $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/backend/libpq/Makefile,v 1.29 2002/03/04 01:46:02 tgl Exp $
# $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/backend/libpq/Makefile,v 1.30 2002/04/04 04:25:46 momjian Exp $
#
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------
@ -14,9 +14,7 @@ include $(top_builddir)/src/Makefile.global
# be-fsstubs is here for historical reasons, probably belongs elsewhere
OBJS = be-fsstubs.o \
auth.o crypt.o hba.o md5.o password.o \
pqcomm.o pqformat.o pqsignal.o
OBJS = be-fsstubs.o auth.o crypt.o hba.o md5.o pqcomm.o pqformat.o pqsignal.o
all: SUBSYS.o

View File

@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
*
*
* IDENTIFICATION
* $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/backend/libpq/auth.c,v 1.79 2002/03/05 07:57:45 momjian Exp $
* $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/backend/libpq/auth.c,v 1.80 2002/04/04 04:25:47 momjian Exp $
*
*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
@ -34,7 +34,6 @@
#include "miscadmin.h"
static void sendAuthRequest(Port *port, AuthRequest areq);
static int checkPassword(Port *port, char *user, char *password);
static int old_be_recvauth(Port *port);
static int map_old_to_new(Port *port, UserAuth old, int status);
static void auth_failed(Port *port, int status);
@ -381,7 +380,7 @@ recv_and_check_passwordv0(Port *port)
saved = port->auth_method;
port->auth_method = uaPassword;
status = checkPassword(port, user, password);
status = md5_crypt_verify(port, user, password);
port->auth_method = saved;
@ -663,7 +662,7 @@ pam_passwd_conv_proc(int num_msg, const struct pam_message ** msg, struct pam_re
initStringInfo(&buf);
pq_getstr(&buf);
/* Do not echo failed password to logs, for security. */
elog(DEBUG5, "received PAM packet");
@ -810,26 +809,13 @@ recv_and_check_password_packet(Port *port)
/* Do not echo failed password to logs, for security. */
elog(DEBUG5, "received password packet");
result = checkPassword(port, port->user, buf.data);
result = md5_crypt_verify(port, port->user, buf.data);
pfree(buf.data);
return result;
}
/*
* Handle `password' and `crypt' records. If an auth argument was
* specified, use the respective file. Else use pg_shadow passwords.
*/
static int
checkPassword(Port *port, char *user, char *password)
{
if (port->auth_arg[0] != '\0')
return verify_password(port, user, password);
return md5_crypt_verify(port, user, password);
}
/*
* Server demux routine for incoming authentication information for protocol
* version 0.

View File

@ -9,13 +9,12 @@
* Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2001, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
* Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
*
* $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/backend/libpq/crypt.c,v 1.44 2002/03/04 01:46:03 tgl Exp $
* $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/backend/libpq/crypt.c,v 1.45 2002/04/04 04:25:47 momjian Exp $
*
*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
#include "postgres.h"
#include <errno.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_H
#include <crypt.h>
@ -25,231 +24,10 @@
#include "libpq/libpq.h"
#include "miscadmin.h"
#include "storage/fd.h"
#include "nodes/pg_list.h"
#include "utils/nabstime.h"
#define CRYPT_PWD_FILE "pg_pwd"
static char **pwd_cache = NULL;
static int pwd_cache_count = 0;
/*
* crypt_getpwdfilename --- get full pathname of password file
*
* Note that result string is palloc'd, and should be freed by the caller.
*/
char *
crypt_getpwdfilename(void)
{
int bufsize;
char *pfnam;
bufsize = strlen(DataDir) + 8 + strlen(CRYPT_PWD_FILE) + 1;
pfnam = (char *) palloc(bufsize);
snprintf(pfnam, bufsize, "%s/global/%s", DataDir, CRYPT_PWD_FILE);
return pfnam;
}
/*
* Open the password file if possible (return NULL if not)
*/
static FILE *
crypt_openpwdfile(void)
{
char *filename;
FILE *pwdfile;
filename = crypt_getpwdfilename();
pwdfile = AllocateFile(filename, "r");
if (pwdfile == NULL && errno != ENOENT)
elog(LOG, "could not open %s: %m", filename);
pfree(filename);
return pwdfile;
}
/*
* Compare two password-file lines on the basis of their usernames.
*
* Can also be used to compare just a username against a password-file
* line (for bsearch).
*/
static int
compar_user(const void *user_a, const void *user_b)
{
char *login_a;
char *login_b;
int len_a,
len_b,
result;
login_a = *((char **) user_a);
login_b = *((char **) user_b);
/*
* We only really want to compare the user logins which are first and
* are terminated by CRYPT_PWD_FILE_SEPSTR. (NB: this code
* effectively assumes that CRYPT_PWD_FILE_SEPSTR is just one char.)
*/
len_a = strcspn(login_a, CRYPT_PWD_FILE_SEPSTR);
len_b = strcspn(login_b, CRYPT_PWD_FILE_SEPSTR);
result = strncmp(login_a, login_b, Min(len_a, len_b));
if (result == 0) /* one could be a prefix of the other */
result = (len_a - len_b);
return result;
}
/*
* Load or reload the password-file cache
*/
void
load_password_cache(void)
{
FILE *pwd_file;
char buffer[1024];
/*
* If for some reason we fail to open the password file, preserve the
* old cache contents; this seems better than dropping the cache if,
* say, we are temporarily out of filetable slots.
*/
if (!(pwd_file = crypt_openpwdfile()))
return;
/* free any old data */
if (pwd_cache)
{
while (--pwd_cache_count >= 0)
pfree(pwd_cache[pwd_cache_count]);
pfree(pwd_cache);
pwd_cache = NULL;
pwd_cache_count = 0;
}
/*
* Read the file and store its lines in current memory context, which
* we expect will be PostmasterContext. That context will live as
* long as we need the cache to live, ie, until just after each
* postmaster child has completed client authentication.
*/
while (fgets(buffer, sizeof(buffer), pwd_file) != NULL)
{
int blen;
/*
* We must remove the return char at the end of the string, as
* this will affect the correct parsing of the password entry.
*/
if (buffer[(blen = strlen(buffer) - 1)] == '\n')
buffer[blen] = '\0';
if (pwd_cache == NULL)
pwd_cache = (char **)
palloc(sizeof(char *) * (pwd_cache_count + 1));
else
pwd_cache = (char **)
repalloc((void *) pwd_cache,
sizeof(char *) * (pwd_cache_count + 1));
pwd_cache[pwd_cache_count++] = pstrdup(buffer);
}
FreeFile(pwd_file);
/*
* Now sort the entries in the cache for faster searching later.
*/
qsort((void *) pwd_cache, pwd_cache_count, sizeof(char *), compar_user);
}
/*
* Parse a line of the password file to extract password and valid-until date.
*/
static bool
crypt_parsepwdentry(char *buffer, char **pwd, char **valdate)
{
char *parse = buffer;
int count,
i;
*pwd = NULL;
*valdate = NULL;
/*
* skip to the password field
*/
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++)
{
parse += strcspn(parse, CRYPT_PWD_FILE_SEPSTR);
if (*parse == '\0')
return false;
parse++;
}
/*
* store a copy of user password to return
*/
count = strcspn(parse, CRYPT_PWD_FILE_SEPSTR);
*pwd = (char *) palloc(count + 1);
memcpy(*pwd, parse, count);
(*pwd)[count] = '\0';
parse += count;
if (*parse == '\0')
{
pfree(*pwd);
*pwd = NULL;
return false;
}
parse++;
/*
* store a copy of the date login becomes invalid
*/
count = strcspn(parse, CRYPT_PWD_FILE_SEPSTR);
*valdate = (char *) palloc(count + 1);
memcpy(*valdate, parse, count);
(*valdate)[count] = '\0';
return true;
}
/*
* Lookup a username in the password-file cache,
* return his password and valid-until date.
*/
static bool
crypt_getloginfo(const char *user, char **passwd, char **valuntil)
{
*passwd = NULL;
*valuntil = NULL;
if (pwd_cache)
{
char **pwd_entry;
pwd_entry = (char **) bsearch((void *) &user,
(void *) pwd_cache,
pwd_cache_count,
sizeof(char *),
compar_user);
if (pwd_entry)
{
if (crypt_parsepwdentry(*pwd_entry, passwd, valuntil))
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
int
md5_crypt_verify(const Port *port, const char *user, const char *pgpass)
{
@ -257,10 +35,14 @@ md5_crypt_verify(const Port *port, const char *user, const char *pgpass)
*valuntil,
*crypt_pwd;
int retval = STATUS_ERROR;
List **line;
if (!crypt_getloginfo(user, &passwd, &valuntil))
if ((line = get_user_line(user)) == NULL)
return STATUS_ERROR;
passwd = lfirst(lnext(lnext(*line)));
valuntil = lfirst(lnext(lnext(lnext(*line))));
if (passwd == NULL || *passwd == '\0')
{
if (passwd)

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@ -1,109 +0,0 @@
/*
* Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2001, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
* Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
*
* $Id: password.c,v 1.41 2002/03/04 01:46:03 tgl Exp $
*
*/
#include <errno.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "postgres.h"
#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_H
#include <crypt.h>
#endif
#include "libpq/libpq.h"
#include "libpq/password.h"
#include "libpq/crypt.h"
#include "miscadmin.h"
#include "storage/fd.h"
int
verify_password(const Port *port, const char *user, const char *password)
{
char *pw_file_fullname;
FILE *pw_file;
pw_file_fullname = (char *) palloc(strlen(DataDir) + strlen(port->auth_arg) + 2);
strcpy(pw_file_fullname, DataDir);
strcat(pw_file_fullname, "/");
strcat(pw_file_fullname, port->auth_arg);
pw_file = AllocateFile(pw_file_fullname, PG_BINARY_R);
if (!pw_file)
{
elog(LOG, "verify_password: Unable to open password file \"%s\": %m",
pw_file_fullname);
pfree(pw_file_fullname);
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
pfree(pw_file_fullname);
while (!feof(pw_file))
{
char pw_file_line[255],
*p,
*test_user,
*test_pw;
if (fgets(pw_file_line, sizeof(pw_file_line), pw_file) == NULL)
pw_file_line[0] = '\0';
/* kill the newline */
if (strlen(pw_file_line) > 0 &&
pw_file_line[strlen(pw_file_line) - 1] == '\n')
pw_file_line[strlen(pw_file_line) - 1] = '\0';
p = pw_file_line;
test_user = strtok(p, ":");
if (!test_user || test_user[0] == '\0')
continue;
test_pw = strtok(NULL, ":");
if (strcmp(user, test_user) == 0)
{
/* we're outta here one way or the other, so close file */
FreeFile(pw_file);
/*
* If the password is empty or "+" then we use the regular
* pg_shadow passwords. If we use crypt then we have to use
* pg_shadow passwords no matter what. This is because the
* current code needs non-encrypted passwords to encrypt with
* a random salt.
*/
if (port->auth_method == uaMD5 ||
port->auth_method == uaCrypt ||
test_pw == NULL ||
test_pw[0] == '\0' ||
strcmp(test_pw, "+") == 0)
return md5_crypt_verify(port, user, password);
/* external password file is crypt-only */
if (strcmp(crypt(password, test_pw), test_pw) == 0)
{
/* it matched. */
return STATUS_OK;
}
elog(LOG, "verify_password: password mismatch for '%s'",
user);
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
}
FreeFile(pw_file);
elog(LOG, "verify_password: user '%s' not found in password file",
user);
return STATUS_ERROR;
}

View File

@ -42,22 +42,36 @@
#
# Format:
#
# host DBNAME IP_ADDRESS ADDRESS_MASK AUTH_TYPE [AUTH_ARGUMENT]
# host DATABASE USER IP_ADDRESS MASK AUTH_TYPE
#
# DBNAME can be:
# o a database name
# o "all", which means the record matches all databases
# o "sameuser", which means users can only access databases whose name
# is the same as their username
# DATABASE can be:
# o a database name
# o "sameuser", which means a user can only access a database with the
# same name as their user name
# o "samegroup", which means a user can only access databases when they
# are members of a group with the same name as the database name
# o "all", which matches all databases
# o a list of database names, separated by commas
# o a file name containing database names, starting with '@'
#
# IP_ADDRESS and ADDRESS_MASK are standard dotted decimal IP address and
# USER can be:
# o a user name
# o "all", which matches all users
# o a list of user names, separated by commas
# o a group name, starting with '+'
# o a file name containing user names, starting with '@'
#
# Files read using '@' can contain comma-separated database/user names,
# or one name per line. The files can also contain comments using '#'.
#
# IP_ADDRESS and MASK are standard dotted decimal IP address and
# mask values. IP addresses can only be specified numerically, not as
# domain or host names.
#
# Do not prevent the superuser from accessing the template1 database.
# Various utility commands need access to template1.
#
# AUTH_TYPE and AUTH_ARGUMENT are described below.
# AUTH_TYPE is described below.
#
#
# hostssl
@ -65,10 +79,8 @@
#
# The format of this record is identical to "host".
#
#
#
# It specifies hosts that required connection via secure SSL. "host"
# records allow SSL connections too, but "hostssl" only allows SSL-secured
# It specifies hosts that require connection via secure SSL. "host"
# allows SSL connections too, but "hostssl" requires SSL-secured
# connections.
#
# This keyword is only available if the server was compiled with SSL
@ -82,10 +94,10 @@
# connections. Without this record, UNIX-socket connections are disallowed
#
# Format:
# local DBNAME AUTH_TYPE [AUTH_ARGUMENT]
# local DATABASE USER AUTH_TYPE
#
# This format is identical to the "host" record type except there are no
# IP_ADDRESS and ADDRESS_MASK fields.
# IP_ADDRESS and MASK fields.
#
#
#
@ -96,57 +108,38 @@
# has an AUTH_TYPE.
#
# trust:
# No authentication is done. Any valid username is accepted,
# No authentication is done. Any valid user name is accepted,
# including the PostgreSQL superuser. This option should
# be used only for hosts where all users are trusted.
#
# password:
# Authentication is done by matching a password supplied
# in clear by the host. If no AUTH_ARGUMENT is used, the
# password is compared with the user's entry in the
# pg_shadow table.
#
# If AUTH_ARGUMENT is specified, the username is looked up
# in that file in the $PGDATA directory. If the username
# is found but there is no password, the password is looked
# up in pg_shadow. If a password exists in the file, it is
# used instead. These secondary files allow fine-grained
# control over who can access which databases and whether
# a non-default password is required. The same file can be
# used in multiple records for easier administration.
# Password files can be maintained with the pg_passwd(1)
# utility. Remember, these passwords override pg_shadow
# passwords. Also, such passwords are passed over the network
# in cleartext, meaning this should not be used on untrusted
# networks.
#
# md5:
# Same as "password", except the password is encrypted over the
# network. This method is preferable to "password" and "crypt"
# except for pre-7.2 clients that don't support it. NOTE: md5 can
# use usernames stored in secondary password files but ignores
# passwords stored there. The pg_shadow password will always be
# used.
# Requires the client to supply an MD5 encrypted password for
# authentication. This is the only method that allows encrypted
# passwords to be stored in pg_shadow.
#
# crypt:
# Same as "md5", but uses crypt for pre-7.2 clients. You can
# not store encrypted passwords in pg_shadow if you use this
# method.
# Same as "md5", but uses crypt for pre-7.2 clients.
#
# password:
# Same as "md5", but the password is sent in cleartext over
# the network. This should not be used on untrusted
# networks.
#
# ident:
# For TCP/IP connections, authentication is done by contacting the
# ident server on the client host. This is only as secure as the
# client machine. On machines that support unix-domain socket
# credentials (currently Linux, FreeBSD, NetBSD, and BSD/OS), this
# method also works for "local" connections.
# client machine. You must specify the map name after the 'ident'
# keyword. It determines how to map remote user names to
# PostgreSQL user names. If you use "sameuser", the user names are
# assumed to be identical. If not, the map name is looked up
# in the $PGDATA/pg_ident.conf file. The connection is accepted if
# that file contains an entry for this map name with the
# ident-supplied username and the requested PostgreSQL username.
#
# AUTH_ARGUMENT is required. It determines how to map remote user
# names to PostgreSQL user names. If you use "sameuser", the user
# names are assumed to be the identical. If not, AUTH_ARGUMENT is
# assumed to be a map name found in the $PGDATA/pg_ident.conf
# file. The connection is accepted if that file contains an entry
# for this map name with the ident-supplied username and the
# requested PostgreSQL username.
# On machines that support unix-domain socket credentials
# (currently Linux, FreeBSD, NetBSD, and BSD/OS), ident allows
# reliable authentication of 'local' connections without ident
# running on the local machine.
#
# krb4:
# Kerberos V4 authentication is used. Allowed only for
@ -157,10 +150,10 @@
# TCP/IP connections, not for local UNIX-domain sockets.
#
# pam:
# Authentication is passed off to PAM (PostgreSQL must be
# configured --with-pam), using the default service name
# "postgresql" - you can specify your own service name by
# setting AUTH_ARGUMENT to the desired service name.
# Authentication is done by PAM using the default service name
# "postgresql". You can specify your own service name by adding
# the service name after the 'pam' keyword. To use this option,
# PostgreSQL must be configured --with-pam.
#
# reject:
# Reject the connection. This is used to reject certain hosts
@ -177,60 +170,70 @@
# Allow any user on the local system to connect to any database under any
# username using Unix-domain sockets (the default for local connections):
#
# TYPE DATABASE IP_ADDRESS MASK AUTH_TYPE AUTH_ARGUMENT
# local all trust
# TYPE DATABASE USER IP_ADDRESS MASK AUTH_TYPE
# local all all trust
#
# The same using local loopback TCP/IP connections:
#
# TYPE DATABASE IP_ADDRESS MASK AUTH_TYPE AUTH_ARGUMENT
# host all 127.0.0.1 255.255.255.255 trust
# TYPE DATABASE USER IP_ADDRESS MASK AUTH_TYPE
# host all all 127.0.0.1 255.255.255.255 trust
#
# Allow any user from any host with IP address 192.168.93.x to
# connect to database "template1" as the same username that ident reports
# for the connection (typically his Unix username):
#
# TYPE DATABASE IP_ADDRESS MASK AUTH_TYPE AUTH_ARGUMENT
# host template1 192.168.93.0 255.255.255.0 ident sameuser
# TYPE DATABASE USER IP_ADDRESS MASK AUTH_TYPE
# host template1 all 192.168.93.0 255.255.255.0 ident sameuser
#
# Allow a user from host 192.168.12.10 to connect to database "template1"
# if the user's password in pg_shadow is correctly supplied:
# if the user's password is correctly supplied:
#
# TYPE DATABASE IP_ADDRESS MASK AUTH_TYPE AUTH_ARGUMENT
# host template1 192.168.12.10 255.255.255.255 md5
# TYPE DATABASE USER IP_ADDRESS MASK AUTH_TYPE
# host template1 all 192.168.12.10 255.255.255.255 md5
#
# In the absence of preceding "host" lines, these two lines will reject
# all connection from 192.168.54.1 (since that entry will be matched
# first), but allow Kerberos V5 connections from anywhere else on the
# Internet. The zero mask means that no bits of the host IP address are
# considered, so it matches any host:
# considered so it matches any host:
#
#
# TYPE DATABASE IP_ADDRESS MASK AUTH_TYPE AUTH_ARGUMENT
# host all 192.168.54.1 255.255.255.255 reject
# host all 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 krb5
# TYPE DATABASE USER IP_ADDRESS MASK AUTH_TYPE
# host all all 192.168.54.1 255.255.255.255 reject
# host all all 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 krb5
#
# Allow users from 192.168.x.x hosts to connect to any database if they
# pass the ident check. For example, if ident says the user is "james" and
# he requests to connect as PostgreSQL user "guest", the connection is
# allowed if there is an entry in $PGDATA/pg_ident.conf with map name
# "phoenix" that says "james" is allowed to connect as "guest":
#
# TYPE DATABASE IP_ADDRESS MASK AUTH_TYPE AUTH_ARGUMENT
# host all 192.168.0.0 255.255.0.0 ident phoenix
#
# If these are the only two lines for local connections, they will allow
# local users to connect only to their own databases (databases with the
# same name as their user name) except for administrators who may connect
# to all databases. The file $PGDATA/admins lists the user names who are
# permitted to connect to all databases. Passwords are required in all
# cases. (If you prefer to use ident authorization, an ident map can
# serve a parallel purpose to the password list file used here.)
#
# TYPE DATABASE IP_ADDRESS MASK AUTH_TYPE AUTH_ARGUMENT
# local sameuser md5
# local all md5 admins
#
# See $PGDATA/pg_ident.conf for more information on Ident maps.
#
# TYPE DATABASE USER IP_ADDRESS MASK AUTH_TYPE
# host all all 192.168.0.0 255.255.0.0 ident phoenix
#
# If these are the only three lines for local connections, they will
# allow local users to connect only to their own databases (databases
# with the same name as their user name) except for administrators and
# members of group 'support' who may connect to all databases . The file
# $PGDATA/admins contains a list of user names. Passwords are required in
# all cases.
#
# TYPE DATABASE USER IP_ADDRESS MASK AUTH_TYPE
# local sameuser all md5
# local all @admins md5
# local all +support md5
#
# The last two lines above can be combined into a single line:
#
# local all @admins,+support md5
#
# The database column can also use lists and file names, but not groups:
#
# local db1,db2,@demodbs all md5
#
#
#
#
#
#
@ -250,7 +253,7 @@
# configuration is probably too liberal for you. Change it to use
# something other than "trust" authentication.
#
# TYPE DATABASE IP_ADDRESS MASK AUTH_TYPE AUTH_ARGUMENT
# TYPE DATABASE USER IP_ADDRESS MASK AUTH_TYPE
local all trust
host all 127.0.0.1 255.255.255.255 trust
local all all trust
host all all 127.0.0.1 255.255.255.255 trust

View File

@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
*
*
* IDENTIFICATION
* $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/backend/postmaster/postmaster.c,v 1.271 2002/03/15 19:20:35 tgl Exp $
* $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/backend/postmaster/postmaster.c,v 1.272 2002/04/04 04:25:48 momjian Exp $
*
* NOTES
*
@ -748,8 +748,10 @@ PostmasterMain(int argc, char *argv[])
/*
* Load cached files for client authentication.
*/
load_hba_and_ident();
load_password_cache();
load_hba();
load_ident();
load_user();
load_group();
/*
* We're ready to rock and roll...
@ -1389,7 +1391,8 @@ SIGHUP_handler(SIGNAL_ARGS)
elog(LOG, "Received SIGHUP, reloading configuration files");
SignalChildren(SIGHUP);
ProcessConfigFile(PGC_SIGHUP);
load_hba_and_ident();
load_hba();
load_ident();
}
PG_SETMASK(&UnBlockSig);
@ -2288,9 +2291,10 @@ sigusr1_handler(SIGNAL_ARGS)
if (CheckPostmasterSignal(PMSIGNAL_PASSWORD_CHANGE))
{
/*
* Password file has changed.
* Password or group file has changed.
*/
load_password_cache();
load_user();
load_group();
}
if (CheckPostmasterSignal(PMSIGNAL_WAKEN_CHILDREN))

View File

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
*
*
* IDENTIFICATION
* $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/backend/utils/adt/quote.c,v 1.6 2001/10/28 06:25:53 momjian Exp $
* $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/backend/utils/adt/quote.c,v 1.7 2002/04/04 04:25:49 momjian Exp $
*
*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
@ -124,8 +124,6 @@ do_quote_ident(text *iptr)
{
if (*cp1 == '"')
*cp2++ = '"';
if (*cp1 == '\\')
*cp2++ = '\\';
*cp2++ = *cp1++;
}
*cp2++ = '"';
@ -234,8 +232,6 @@ do_quote_ident(text *iptr)
if (*cp1 == '"')
*cp2++ = '"';
if (*cp1 == '\\')
*cp2++ = '\\';
*cp2++ = *cp1++;
len--;

View File

@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
*
*
* IDENTIFICATION
* $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/backend/utils/init/miscinit.c,v 1.85 2002/03/04 04:45:27 tgl Exp $
* $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/backend/utils/init/miscinit.c,v 1.86 2002/04/04 04:25:49 momjian Exp $
*
*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
@ -236,85 +236,17 @@ pg_convert2(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
#ifdef CYR_RECODE
#define MAX_TOKEN 80
/*
* Some standard C libraries, including GNU, have an isblank() function.
* Others, including Solaris, do not. So we have our own.
*/
static bool
isblank(const char c)
{
return c == ' ' || c == '\t';
}
/*
* Grab one token out of fp. Tokens are strings of non-blank
* characters bounded by blank characters, beginning of line, and end
* of line. Blank means space or tab. Return the token as *buf.
* Leave file positioned to character immediately after the token or
* EOF, whichever comes first. If no more tokens on line, return null
* string as *buf and position file to beginning of next line or EOF,
* whichever comes first.
*/
static void
next_token(FILE *fp, char *buf, const int bufsz)
{
int c;
char *eb = buf + (bufsz - 1);
/* Move over initial token-delimiting blanks */
while ((c = getc(fp)) != EOF && isblank(c))
;
if (c != EOF && c != '\n')
{
/*
* build a token in buf of next characters up to EOF, eol, or
* blank. If the token gets too long, we still parse it
* correctly, but the excess characters are not stored into *buf.
*/
while (c != EOF && c != '\n' && !isblank(c))
{
if (buf < eb)
*buf++ = c;
c = getc(fp);
}
/*
* Put back the char right after the token (critical in case it is
* eol, since we need to detect end-of-line at next call).
*/
if (c != EOF)
ungetc(c, fp);
}
*buf = '\0';
}
static void
read_through_eol(FILE *file)
{
int c;
while ((c = getc(file)) != EOF && c != '\n')
;
}
void
SetCharSet(void)
{
FILE *file;
char *p;
char *filename;
char *map_file;
char buf[MAX_TOKEN];
int i,
c;
unsigned char FromChar,
ToChar;
char ChTable[80];
char ChTable[MAX_TOKEN];
for (i = 0; i < 128; i++)
{
@ -325,39 +257,40 @@ SetCharSet(void)
if (IsUnderPostmaster)
{
GetCharSetByHost(ChTable, MyProcPort->raddr.in.sin_addr.s_addr, DataDir);
p = ChTable;
filename = ChTable;
}
else
p = getenv("PG_RECODETABLE");
filename = getenv("PG_RECODETABLE");
if (p && *p != '\0')
if (filename && *filename != '\0')
{
map_file = palloc(strlen(DataDir) + strlen(p) + 2);
sprintf(map_file, "%s/%s", DataDir, p);
file = AllocateFile(map_file, PG_BINARY_R);
map_file = palloc(strlen(DataDir) + strlen(filename) + 2);
sprintf(map_file, "%s/%s", DataDir, filename);
file = AllocateFile(map_file, "r");
pfree(map_file);
if (file == NULL)
return;
while ((c = getc(file)) != EOF)
while (!feof(file))
{
if (c == '#')
read_through_eol(file);
else
next_token(file, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (buf[0] != '\0')
{
/* Read the FromChar */
ungetc(c, file);
FromChar = strtoul(buf, 0, 0);
/* Read the ToChar */
next_token(file, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (buf[0] != '\0')
{
FromChar = strtoul(buf, 0, 0);
/* Read the ToChar */
next_token(file, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (buf[0] != '\0')
ToChar = strtoul(buf, 0, 0);
RecodeForwTable[FromChar - 128] = ToChar;
RecodeBackTable[ToChar - 128] = FromChar;
/* read to EOL */
while (!feof(file) && buf[0])
{
ToChar = strtoul(buf, 0, 0);
RecodeForwTable[FromChar - 128] = ToChar;
RecodeBackTable[ToChar - 128] = FromChar;
read_through_eol(file);
next_token(file, buf, sizeof(buf));
elog(LOG, "SetCharSet: unknown tag %s in file %s"
buf, filename);
}
}
}
@ -366,6 +299,7 @@ SetCharSet(void)
}
}
char *
convertstr(unsigned char *buff, int len, int dest)
{
@ -384,7 +318,206 @@ convertstr(unsigned char *buff, int len, int dest)
}
return ch;
}
#endif
#define CHARSET_FILE "charset.conf"
#define MAX_CHARSETS 10
#define KEY_HOST 1
#define KEY_BASE 2
#define KEY_TABLE 3
struct CharsetItem
{
char Orig[MAX_TOKEN];
char Dest[MAX_TOKEN];
char Table[MAX_TOKEN];
};
static bool
CharSetInRange(char *buf, int host)
{
int valid,
i,
FromAddr,
ToAddr,
tmp;
struct in_addr file_ip_addr;
char *p;
unsigned int one = 0x80000000,
NetMask = 0;
unsigned char mask;
p = strchr(buf, '/');
if (p)
{
*p++ = '\0';
valid = inet_aton(buf, &file_ip_addr);
if (valid)
{
mask = strtoul(p, 0, 0);
FromAddr = ntohl(file_ip_addr.s_addr);
ToAddr = ntohl(file_ip_addr.s_addr);
for (i = 0; i < mask; i++)
{
NetMask |= one;
one >>= 1;
}
FromAddr &= NetMask;
ToAddr = ToAddr | ~NetMask;
tmp = ntohl(host);
return ((unsigned) tmp >= (unsigned) FromAddr &&
(unsigned) tmp <= (unsigned) ToAddr);
}
}
else
{
p = strchr(buf, '-');
if (p)
{
*p++ = '\0';
valid = inet_aton(buf, &file_ip_addr);
if (valid)
{
FromAddr = ntohl(file_ip_addr.s_addr);
valid = inet_aton(p, &file_ip_addr);
if (valid)
{
ToAddr = ntohl(file_ip_addr.s_addr);
tmp = ntohl(host);
return ((unsigned) tmp >= (unsigned) FromAddr &&
(unsigned) tmp <= (unsigned) ToAddr);
}
}
}
else
{
valid = inet_aton(buf, &file_ip_addr);
if (valid)
{
FromAddr = file_ip_addr.s_addr;
return (unsigned) FromAddr == (unsigned) host;
}
}
}
return false;
}
static void
GetCharSetByHost(char *TableName, int host, const char *DataDir)
{
FILE *file;
char buf[MAX_TOKEN],
BaseCharset[MAX_TOKEN],
OrigCharset[MAX_TOKEN],
DestCharset[MAX_TOKEN],
HostCharset[MAX_TOKEN],
*map_file;
int key,
ChIndex = 0,
c,
i,
bufsize;
struct CharsetItem *ChArray[MAX_CHARSETS];
*TableName = '\0';
bufsize = (strlen(DataDir) + strlen(CHARSET_FILE) + 2) * sizeof(char);
map_file = (char *) palloc(bufsize);
snprintf(map_file, bufsize, "%s/%s", DataDir, CHARSET_FILE);
file = AllocateFile(map_file, "r");
pfree(map_file);
if (file == NULL)
{
/* XXX should we log a complaint? */
return;
}
while (!feof(file))
{
next_token(file, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (buf[0] != '\0')
{
key = 0;
if (strcasecmp(buf, "HostCharset") == 0)
key = KEY_HOST;
else if (strcasecmp(buf, "BaseCharset") == 0)
key = KEY_BASE;
else if (strcasecmp(buf, "RecodeTable") == 0)
key = KEY_TABLE;
else
elog(LOG, "GetCharSetByHost: unknown tag %s in file %s"
buf, CHARSET_FILE);
switch (key)
{
case KEY_HOST:
/* Read the host */
next_token(file, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (buf[0] != '\0')
{
if (CharSetInRange(buf, host))
{
/* Read the charset */
next_token(file, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (buf[0] != '\0')
strcpy(HostCharset, buf);
}
}
break;
case KEY_BASE:
/* Read the base charset */
next_token(file, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (buf[0] != '\0')
strcpy(BaseCharset, buf);
break;
case KEY_TABLE:
/* Read the original charset */
next_token(file, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (buf[0] != '\0')
{
strcpy(OrigCharset, buf);
/* Read the destination charset */
next_token(file, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (buf[0] != '\0')
{
strcpy(DestCharset, buf);
/* Read the table filename */
next_token(file, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (buf[0] != '\0')
{
ChArray[ChIndex] =
(struct CharsetItem *) palloc(sizeof(struct CharsetItem));
strcpy(ChArray[ChIndex]->Orig, OrigCharset);
strcpy(ChArray[ChIndex]->Dest, DestCharset);
strcpy(ChArray[ChIndex]->Table, buf);
ChIndex++;
}
}
}
break;
}
/* read to EOL */
while (!feof(file) && buf[0])
{
next_token(file, buf, sizeof(buf));
elog(LOG, "GetCharSetByHost: unknown tag %s in file %s"
buf, CHARSET_FILE);
}
}
}
FreeFile(file);
for (i = 0; i < ChIndex; i++)
{
if (strcasecmp(BaseCharset, ChArray[i]->Orig) == 0 &&
strcasecmp(HostCharset, ChArray[i]->Dest) == 0)
strncpy(TableName, ChArray[i]->Table, 79);
pfree(ChArray[i]);
}
}
#endif /* CYR_RECODE */

View File

@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
# Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2001, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
# Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
#
# $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/bin/Makefile,v 1.34 2001/02/18 18:33:59 momjian Exp $
# $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/bin/Makefile,v 1.35 2002/04/04 04:25:50 momjian Exp $
#
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------
@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ top_builddir = ../..
include $(top_builddir)/src/Makefile.global
DIRS := initdb initlocation ipcclean pg_ctl pg_dump pg_id \
pg_passwd psql scripts pg_config
psql scripts pg_config
ifdef MULTIBYTE
DIRS += pg_encoding

View File

@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
# Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2001, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
# Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
#
# $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/bin/initdb/Attic/initdb.sh,v 1.146 2002/04/03 05:39:32 petere Exp $
# $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/bin/initdb/Attic/initdb.sh,v 1.147 2002/04/04 04:25:50 momjian Exp $
#
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------
@ -603,9 +603,11 @@ $ECHO_N "initializing pg_shadow... "$ECHO_C
"$PGPATH"/postgres $PGSQL_OPT template1 >/dev/null <<EOF
-- Create a trigger so that direct updates to pg_shadow will be written
-- to the flat password file pg_pwd
-- to the flat password/group files pg_pwd and pg_group
CREATE TRIGGER pg_sync_pg_pwd AFTER INSERT OR UPDATE OR DELETE ON pg_shadow \
FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE PROCEDURE update_pg_pwd();
FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE PROCEDURE update_pg_pwd_and_pg_group();
CREATE TRIGGER pg_sync_pg_group AFTER INSERT OR UPDATE OR DELETE ON pg_group \
FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE PROCEDURE update_pg_pwd_and_pg_group();
-- needs to be done before alter user, because alter user checks that
-- pg_shadow is secure ...
REVOKE ALL on pg_shadow FROM public;
@ -643,6 +645,11 @@ EOF
echo "The password file wasn't generated. Please report this problem." 1>&2
exit_nicely
fi
if [ ! -f "$PGDATA"/global/pg_group ]; then
echo
echo "The group file wasn't generated. Please report this problem." 1>&2
exit_nicely
fi
echo "ok"
fi

View File

@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
# $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/bin/pg_passwd/Attic/Makefile,v 1.14 2001/05/12 19:49:47 petere Exp $
subdir = src/bin/pg_passwd
top_builddir = ../../..
include $(top_builddir)/src/Makefile.global
OBJS = pg_passwd.o
ifdef STRDUP
OBJS += $(top_builddir)/src/utils/strdup.o
endif
all: pg_passwd
pg_passwd: $(OBJS)
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) $^ $(LIBS) -o $@
$(top_builddir)/src/utils/strdup.o:
$(MAKE) -C $(top_builddir)/src/utils strdup.o
install: all installdirs
$(INSTALL_PROGRAM) pg_passwd$(X) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/pg_passwd$(X)
installdirs:
$(mkinstalldirs) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)
uninstall:
rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/pg_passwd$(X)
depend dep:
$(CC) -MM $(CFLAGS) *.c >depend
clean distclean maintainer-clean:
rm -f pg_passwd$(X) pg_passwd.o
ifeq (depend,$(wildcard depend))
include depend
endif

View File

@ -1,412 +0,0 @@
/*
* @(#) pg_passwd.c 1.8 09:13:16 97/07/02 Y. Ichikawa
*/
#include "postgres_fe.h"
#include <unistd.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#define issaltchar(c) (isalnum((unsigned char) (c)) || (c) == '.' || (c) == '/')
#ifdef HAVE_TERMIOS_H
#include <termios.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_H
#include <crypt.h>
#else
extern char *crypt(const char *, const char *);
#endif
/*
* We assume that the output of crypt(3) is always 13 characters,
* and that at most 8 characters can usefully be sent to it.
*
* Postgres usernames are assumed to be less than NAMEDATALEN chars long.
*/
#define CLEAR_PASSWD_LEN 8 /* not including null */
#define CRYPTED_PASSWD_LEN 13 /* not including null */
const char *progname;
static void usage(void);
static void read_pwd_file(char *filename);
static void write_pwd_file(char *filename, char *bkname);
static void encrypt_pwd(char key[CLEAR_PASSWD_LEN + 1],
char salt[3],
char passwd[CRYPTED_PASSWD_LEN + 1]);
static void prompt_for_username(char *username);
static void prompt_for_password(char *prompt, char *password);
static void
usage(void)
{
printf("%s manipulates flat text password files for PostgreSQL.\n\n", progname);
printf("Usage:\n %s PASSWORD-FILE\n\n", progname);
printf("Report bugs to <pgsql-bugs@postgresql.org>.\n");
}
typedef struct
{
char *uname;
char *pwd;
char *rest;
} pg_pwd;
#define MAXPWDS 1024
pg_pwd pwds[MAXPWDS];
int npwds = 0;
static void
read_pwd_file(char *filename)
{
FILE *fp;
static char line[512];
static char ans[128];
int i;
try_again:
fp = fopen(filename, PG_BINARY_R);
if (fp == NULL)
{
if (errno == ENOENT)
{
printf("File \"%s\" does not exist. Create? (y/n): ", filename);
fflush(stdout);
if (fgets(ans, sizeof(ans), stdin) == NULL)
exit(1);
switch (ans[0])
{
case 'y':
case 'Y':
fp = fopen(filename, PG_BINARY_W);
if (fp == NULL)
{
perror(filename);
exit(1);
}
fclose(fp);
goto try_again;
default:
/* cannot continue */
exit(1);
}
}
else
{
perror(filename);
exit(1);
}
}
/* read all the entries */
for (npwds = 0;
npwds < MAXPWDS && fgets(line, sizeof(line), fp) != NULL;
++npwds)
{
int l;
char *p,
*q;
l = strlen(line);
if (line[l - 1] == '\n')
line[l - 1] = '\0';
else
{
fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: line too long\n",
filename, npwds + 1);
exit(1);
}
/* get user name */
p = line;
if ((q = strchr(p, ':')) != NULL)
*q = '\0';
if (strlen(p) == 0)
{
fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: null user name\n",
filename, npwds + 1);
exit(1);
}
pwds[npwds].uname = strdup(p);
/* check for duplicate user name */
for (i = 0; i < npwds; ++i)
{
if (strcmp(pwds[i].uname, pwds[npwds].uname) == 0)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Duplicate username %s in entry %d\n",
pwds[npwds].uname, npwds + 1);
exit(1);
}
}
/* get password field */
if (q)
{
p = q + 1;
q = strchr(p, ':');
if (q != NULL)
*(q++) = '\0';
if (strlen(p) != CRYPTED_PASSWD_LEN && strcmp(p, "+") != 0)
{
fprintf(stderr, "%s:%d: warning: invalid password length\n",
filename, npwds + 1);
}
pwds[npwds].pwd = strdup(p);
}
else
pwds[npwds].pwd = NULL;
/* rest of the line is treated as is */
if (q == NULL)
pwds[npwds].rest = NULL;
else
pwds[npwds].rest = strdup(q);
}
fclose(fp);
}
static void
write_pwd_file(char *filename, char *bkname)
{
FILE *fp;
int i;
/* make the backup file */
link_again:
if (link(filename, bkname))
{
if (errno == EEXIST)
{
unlink(bkname);
goto link_again;
}
perror(bkname);
exit(1);
}
if (unlink(filename))
{
perror(filename);
exit(1);
}
/* open file */
if ((fp = fopen(filename, PG_BINARY_W)) == NULL)
{
perror(filename);
exit(1);
}
/* write file */
for (i = 0; i < npwds; ++i)
{
fprintf(fp, "%s", pwds[i].uname);
if (pwds[i].pwd)
fprintf(fp, ":%s", pwds[i].pwd);
if (pwds[i].rest)
fprintf(fp, ":%s", pwds[i].rest);
fprintf(fp, "\n");
}
fclose(fp);
}
static void
encrypt_pwd(char key[CLEAR_PASSWD_LEN + 1],
char salt[3],
char passwd[CRYPTED_PASSWD_LEN + 1])
{
int n;
/* select a salt, if not already given */
if (salt[0] == '\0')
{
srand(time(NULL));
do
{
n = rand() % 256;
} while (!issaltchar(n));
salt[0] = n;
do
{
n = rand() % 256;
} while (!issaltchar(n));
salt[1] = n;
salt[2] = '\0';
}
/* get encrypted password */
strcpy(passwd, crypt(key, salt));
#ifdef PG_PASSWD_DEBUG
/* show it */
fprintf(stderr, "key = %s, salt = %s, password = %s\n",
key, salt, passwd);
#endif
}
static void
prompt_for_username(char *username)
{
int length;
printf("Username: ");
fflush(stdout);
if (fgets(username, NAMEDATALEN, stdin) == NULL)
username[0] = '\0';
length = strlen(username);
if (length > 0 && username[length - 1] != '\n')
{
/* eat rest of the line */
char buf[128];
int buflen;
do
{
if (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin) == NULL)
break;
buflen = strlen(buf);
} while (buflen > 0 && buf[buflen - 1] != '\n');
}
if (length > 0 && username[length - 1] == '\n')
username[length - 1] = '\0';
}
static void
prompt_for_password(char *prompt, char *password)
{
int length;
#ifdef HAVE_TERMIOS_H
struct termios t_orig,
t;
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_TERMIOS_H
tcgetattr(0, &t);
t_orig = t;
t.c_lflag &= ~ECHO;
tcsetattr(0, TCSADRAIN, &t);
#endif
printf(prompt);
fflush(stdout);
if (fgets(password, CLEAR_PASSWD_LEN + 1, stdin) == NULL)
password[0] = '\0';
#ifdef HAVE_TERMIOS_H
tcsetattr(0, TCSADRAIN, &t_orig);
#endif
length = strlen(password);
if (length > 0 && password[length - 1] != '\n')
{
/* eat rest of the line */
char buf[128];
int buflen;
do
{
if (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin) == NULL)
break;
buflen = strlen(buf);
} while (buflen > 0 && buf[buflen - 1] != '\n');
}
if (length > 0 && password[length - 1] == '\n')
password[length - 1] = '\0';
printf("\n");
}
int
main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
char *filename;
char bkname[MAXPGPATH];
char username[NAMEDATALEN];
char salt[3];
char key[CLEAR_PASSWD_LEN + 1],
key2[CLEAR_PASSWD_LEN + 1];
char e_passwd[CRYPTED_PASSWD_LEN + 1];
int i;
progname = argv[0];
if (argc != 2)
{
fprintf(stderr, "%s: too %s arguments\nTry '%s --help' for more information.\n",
progname, argc > 2 ? "many" : "few", progname);
exit(1);
}
if (strcmp(argv[1], "--help") == 0 || strcmp(argv[1], "-?") == 0)
{
usage();
exit(0);
}
if (strcmp(argv[1], "--version") == 0 || strcmp(argv[1], "-V") == 0)
{
puts("pg_passwd (PostgreSQL) " PG_VERSION);
exit(0);
}
if (argv[1][0] == '-')
{
fprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid option: %s\nTry '%s --help' for more information.\n",
progname, argv[1], progname);
exit(1);
}
filename = argv[1];
/* open file */
read_pwd_file(filename);
/* ask for the user name and the password */
prompt_for_username(username);
prompt_for_password("New password: ", key);
prompt_for_password("Re-enter new password: ", key2);
if (strcmp(key, key2) != 0)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Password mismatch\n");
exit(1);
}
salt[0] = '\0';
encrypt_pwd(key, salt, e_passwd);
/* check password entry */
for (i = 0; i < npwds; ++i)
{
if (strcmp(pwds[i].uname, username) == 0)
{ /* found */
pwds[i].pwd = strdup(e_passwd);
break;
}
}
if (i == npwds)
{ /* did not exist */
if (npwds == MAXPWDS)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Cannot handle so many entries\n");
exit(1);
}
pwds[npwds].uname = strdup(username);
pwds[npwds].pwd = strdup(e_passwd);
pwds[npwds].rest = NULL;
++npwds;
}
/* write back the file */
sprintf(bkname, "%s.bk", filename);
write_pwd_file(filename, bkname);
return 0;
}

View File

@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
* Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2001, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
* Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
*
* $Id: pg_proc.h,v 1.224 2002/03/29 19:06:19 tgl Exp $
* $Id: pg_proc.h,v 1.225 2002/04/04 04:25:52 momjian Exp $
*
* NOTES
* The script catalog/genbki.sh reads this file and generates .bki
@ -2101,8 +2101,8 @@ DESCR("does not match LIKE expression, case-insensitive");
DATA(insert OID = 1637 ( like_escape PGUID 12 f t t t 2 f 25 "25 25" 100 0 0 100 like_escape - _null_ ));
DESCR("convert match pattern to use backslash escapes");
DATA(insert OID = 1689 ( update_pg_pwd PGUID 12 f t f t 0 f 0 "" 100 0 0 100 update_pg_pwd - _null_ ));
DESCR("update pg_pwd file");
DATA(insert OID = 1689 ( update_pg_pwd_and_pg_group PGUID 12 f t f t 0 f 0 "" 100 0 0 100 update_pg_pwd_and_pg_group - _null_ ));
DESCR("update pg_pwd and pg_group files");
/* Oracle Compatibility Related Functions - By Edmund Mergl <E.Mergl@bawue.de> */
DATA(insert OID = 868 ( strpos PGUID 12 f t t t 2 f 23 "25 25" 100 0 0 100 textpos - _null_ ));

View File

@ -3,15 +3,23 @@
* user.h
*
*
* $Id: user.h,v 1.17 2002/03/01 22:45:17 petere Exp $
* $Id: user.h,v 1.18 2002/04/04 04:25:53 momjian Exp $
*
*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
#ifndef USER_H
#define USER_H
#include "fmgr.h"
#include "nodes/parsenodes.h"
#define PWD_FILE "pg_pwd"
#define USER_GROUP_FILE "pg_group"
extern char *group_getfilename(void);
extern char *user_getfilename(void);
extern void CreateUser(CreateUserStmt *stmt);
extern void AlterUser(AlterUserStmt *stmt);
extern void AlterUserSet(AlterUserSetStmt *stmt);
@ -21,6 +29,6 @@ extern void CreateGroup(CreateGroupStmt *stmt);
extern void AlterGroup(AlterGroupStmt *stmt, const char *tag);
extern void DropGroup(DropGroupStmt *stmt);
extern Datum update_pg_pwd(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS);
extern Datum update_pg_pwd_and_pg_group(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS);
#endif /* USER_H */

View File

@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
* Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2001, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
* Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
*
* $Id: crypt.h,v 1.19 2001/11/12 01:52:46 momjian Exp $
* $Id: crypt.h,v 1.20 2002/04/04 04:25:53 momjian Exp $
*
*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
@ -15,8 +15,6 @@
#include "libpq/libpq-be.h"
#define CRYPT_PWD_FILE_SEPSTR "\t"
/* Also defined in interfaces/odbc/md5.h */
#define MD5_PASSWD_LEN 35
@ -24,9 +22,6 @@
strlen(passwd) == MD5_PASSWD_LEN)
extern char *crypt_getpwdfilename(void);
extern void load_password_cache(void);
extern int md5_crypt_verify(const Port *port, const char *user,
const char *pgpass);
extern bool md5_hash(const void *buff, size_t len, char *hexsum);

View File

@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
* Interface to hba.c
*
*
* $Id: hba.h,v 1.31 2001/11/05 17:46:33 momjian Exp $
* $Id: hba.h,v 1.32 2002/04/04 04:25:54 momjian Exp $
*
*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
@ -15,15 +15,14 @@
#include <netinet/in.h>
#endif
#include "nodes/pg_list.h"
#define CONF_FILE "pg_hba.conf"
/* Name of the config file */
#define USERMAP_FILE "pg_ident.conf"
/* Name of the usermap file */
#define OLD_CONF_FILE "pg_hba"
/* Name of the config file in prior releases of Postgres. */
#define IDENT_PORT 113
/* Standard TCP port number for Ident service. Assigned by IANA */
@ -46,8 +45,15 @@ typedef enum UserAuth
typedef struct Port hbaPort;
#define MAX_TOKEN 256
extern void next_token(FILE *fp, char *buf, const int bufsz);
extern List **get_user_line(const char *user);
extern void load_hba(void);
extern void load_ident(void);
extern void load_user(void);
extern void load_group(void);
extern int hba_getauthmethod(hbaPort *port);
extern int authident(hbaPort *port);
extern void load_hba_and_ident(void);
#endif

View File

@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
* Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2001, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
* Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
*
* $Id: miscadmin.h,v 1.101 2002/03/04 01:46:04 tgl Exp $
* $Id: miscadmin.h,v 1.102 2002/04/04 04:25:51 momjian Exp $
*
* NOTES
* some of the information in this file should be moved to
@ -219,7 +219,6 @@ extern int FindExec(char *full_path, const char *argv0,
extern int CheckPathAccess(char *path, char *name, int open_mode);
#ifdef CYR_RECODE
extern void GetCharSetByHost(char *TableName, int host, const char *DataDir);
extern void SetCharSet(void);
extern char *convertstr(unsigned char *buff, int len, int dest);
#endif

View File

@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ WHERE (p1.prolang = 0 OR p1.prorettype = 0 OR
AND p1.proname !~ '^pl[^_]+_call_handler$'
AND p1.proname !~ '^RI_FKey_'
AND p1.proname !~ 'costestimate$'
AND p1.proname != 'update_pg_pwd';
AND p1.proname != 'update_pg_pwd_and_pg_group';
oid | proname
-----+---------
(0 rows)

View File

@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ WHERE (p1.prolang = 0 OR p1.prorettype = 0 OR
AND p1.proname !~ '^pl[^_]+_call_handler$'
AND p1.proname !~ '^RI_FKey_'
AND p1.proname !~ 'costestimate$'
AND p1.proname != 'update_pg_pwd';
AND p1.proname != 'update_pg_pwd_and_pg_group';
-- Look for conflicting proc definitions (same names and input datatypes).
-- (This test should be dead code now that we have the unique index