Reject tabs and linefeeds in usernames and passwords that are being

stored in pg_pwd, to guard against failures of the sort observed by
Tom Yackel.  Note: in the case of encrypted passwords this is no
restriction, since the string we are interested in is the MD5 hash.
This commit is contained in:
Tom Lane 2001-11-01 18:09:58 +00:00
parent bdea97ea95
commit 7663e6bb70
1 changed files with 47 additions and 18 deletions

View File

@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
* Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2001, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
* Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
*
* $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/backend/commands/user.c,v 1.86 2001/10/28 06:25:42 momjian Exp $
* $Header: /cvsroot/pgsql/src/backend/commands/user.c,v 1.87 2001/11/01 18:09:58 tgl Exp $
*
*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
@ -44,6 +44,10 @@ extern bool Password_encryption;
*
* This function set is both a trigger function for direct updates to pg_shadow
* as well as being called directly from create/alter/drop user.
*
* We raise an error to force transaction rollback if we detect an illegal
* username or password --- illegal being defined as values that would
* mess up the pg_pwd parser.
*---------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
static void
@ -85,26 +89,51 @@ write_password_file(Relation rel)
bool null_n,
null_p,
null_v;
char *str_n,
*str_p,
*str_v;
int i;
datum_n = heap_getattr(tuple, Anum_pg_shadow_usename, dsc, &null_n);
if (null_n)
continue; /* don't allow empty users */
datum_p = heap_getattr(tuple, Anum_pg_shadow_passwd, dsc, &null_p);
continue; /* ignore NULL usernames */
str_n = DatumGetCString(DirectFunctionCall1(nameout, datum_n));
datum_p = heap_getattr(tuple, Anum_pg_shadow_passwd, dsc, &null_p);
/*
* It could be argued that people having a null password shouldn't
* be allowed to connect, because they need to have a password set
* up first. If you think assuming an empty password in that case
* is better, erase the following line.
* It can be argued that people having a null password shouldn't
* be allowed to connect under password authentication, because
* they need to have a password set up first. If you think assuming an
* empty password in that case is better, change this logic to look
* something like the code for valuntil.
*/
if (null_p)
{
pfree(str_n);
continue;
}
str_p = DatumGetCString(DirectFunctionCall1(textout, datum_p));
datum_v = heap_getattr(tuple, Anum_pg_shadow_valuntil, dsc, &null_v);
if (null_v)
str_v = pstrdup("\\N");
else
str_v = DatumGetCString(DirectFunctionCall1(nabstimeout, datum_v));
/*
* These fake entries are not really necessary. To remove them,
* the parser in backend/libpq/crypt.c would need to be adjusted.
* Initdb might also need adjustments.
* Check for illegal characters in the username and password.
*/
i = strcspn(str_n, CRYPT_PWD_FILE_SEPSTR "\n");
if (str_n[i] != '\0')
elog(ERROR, "Invalid user name '%s'", str_n);
i = strcspn(str_p, CRYPT_PWD_FILE_SEPSTR "\n");
if (str_p[i] != '\0')
elog(ERROR, "Invalid user password '%s'", str_p);
/*
* The extra columns we emit here are not really necessary. To remove
* them, the parser in backend/libpq/crypt.c would need to be
* adjusted. Initdb might also need adjustments.
*/
fprintf(fp,
"%s"
@ -122,12 +151,13 @@ write_password_file(Relation rel)
"%s"
CRYPT_PWD_FILE_SEPSTR
"%s\n",
DatumGetCString(DirectFunctionCall1(nameout, datum_n)),
null_p ? "" :
DatumGetCString(DirectFunctionCall1(textout, datum_p)),
null_v ? "\\N" :
DatumGetCString(DirectFunctionCall1(nabstimeout, datum_v))
);
str_n,
str_p,
str_v);
pfree(str_n);
pfree(str_p);
pfree(str_v);
}
heap_endscan(scan);
@ -137,8 +167,7 @@ write_password_file(Relation rel)
FreeFile(fp);
/*
* And rename the temp file to its final name, deleting the old
* pg_pwd.
* Rename the temp file to its final name, deleting the old pg_pwd.
*/
if (rename(tempname, filename))
elog(ERROR, "rename %s to %s: %m", tempname, filename);