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Support SCRAM-SHA-256 authentication (RFC 5802 and 7677). 

This introduces a new generic SASL authentication method, similar to the
GSS and SSPI methods. The server first tells the client which SASL
authentication mechanism to use, and then the mechanism-specific SASL
messages are exchanged in AuthenticationSASLcontinue and PasswordMessage
messages. Only SCRAM-SHA-256 is supported at the moment, but this allows
adding more SASL mechanisms in the future, without changing the overall
protocol.

Support for channel binding, aka SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS is left for later.

The SASLPrep algorithm, for pre-processing the password, is not yet
implemented. That could cause trouble, if you use a password with
non-ASCII characters, and a client library that does implement SASLprep.
That will hopefully be added later.

Authorization identities, as specified in the SCRAM-SHA-256 specification,
are ignored. SET SESSION AUTHORIZATION provides more or less the same
functionality, anyway.

If a user doesn't exist, perform a "mock" authentication, by constructing
an authentic-looking challenge on the fly. The challenge is derived from
a new system-wide random value, "mock authentication nonce", which is
created at initdb, and stored in the control file. We go through these
motions, in order to not give away the information on whether the user
exists, to unauthenticated users.

Bumps PG_CONTROL_VERSION, because of the new field in control file.

Patch by Michael Paquier and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed at different
stages by Robert Haas, Stephen Frost, David Steele, Aleksander Alekseev,
and many others.

Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqRbR3GmFYdedCAhzukfKrgBLTLtMvENOmPrVWREsZkF8g%40mail.gmail.com
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqSMXU35g%3DW9X74HVeQp0uvgJxvYOuA4A-A3M%2B0wfEBv-w%40mail.gmail.com
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/55192AFE.6080106@iki.fi
This commit is contained in:
Heikki Linnakangas 2017-03-07 14:25:40 +02:00
parent 273c458a2b
commit 818fd4a67d
38 changed files with 2866 additions and 77 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

4
contrib/pgcrypto/.gitignore vendored
View File

@ -1,7 +1,3 @@
# Source file copied from src/common
/sha2.c
/sha2_openssl.c
# Generated subdirectories
/log/
/results/

11
contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
View File

@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
# contrib/pgcrypto/Makefile
INT_SRCS = md5.c sha1.c sha2.c internal.c internal-sha2.c blf.c rijndael.c \
INT_SRCS = md5.c sha1.c internal.c internal-sha2.c blf.c rijndael.c \
pgp-mpi-internal.c imath.c
INT_TESTS = sha2
OSSL_SRCS = openssl.c pgp-mpi-openssl.c sha2_openssl.c
OSSL_SRCS = openssl.c pgp-mpi-openssl.c
OSSL_TESTS = sha2 des 3des cast5
ZLIB_TST = pgp-compression
@ -59,13 +59,6 @@ SHLIB_LINK += $(filter -leay32, $(LIBS))
SHLIB_LINK += -lws2_32
endif
# Compiling pgcrypto with those two raw files is necessary as long
# as none of their routines are used by the backend code. Note doing
# so can either result in library loading failures or linking resolution
# failures at compilation depending on the environment used.
sha2.c sha2_openssl.c: % : $(top_srcdir)/src/common/%
rm -f $@ && $(LN_S) $< .
rijndael.o: rijndael.tbl
rijndael.tbl:

25
doc/src/sgml/catalogs.sgml
View File

@ -1334,14 +1334,8 @@
<entry><structfield>rolpassword</structfield></entry>
<entry><type>text</type></entry>
<entry>
Password (possibly encrypted); null if none. If the password
is encrypted, this column will begin with the string <literal>md5</>
followed by a 32-character hexadecimal MD5 hash. The MD5 hash
will be of the user's password concatenated to their user name.
For example, if user <literal>joe</> has password <literal>xyzzy</>,
<productname>PostgreSQL</> will store the md5 hash of
<literal>xyzzyjoe</>. A password that does not follow that
format is assumed to be unencrypted.
Password (possibly encrypted); null if none. The format depends
on the form of encryption used.
</entry>
</row>
@ -1355,6 +1349,21 @@
</tgroup>
</table>
<para>
For an MD5 encrypted password, <structfield>rolpassword</structfield>
column will begin with the string <literal>md5</> followed by a
32-character hexadecimal MD5 hash. The MD5 hash will be of the user's
password concatenated to their user name. For example, if user
<literal>joe</> has password <literal>xyzzy</>, <productname>PostgreSQL</>
will store the md5 hash of <literal>xyzzyjoe</>. If the password is
encrypted with SCRAM-SHA-256, it consists of 5 fields separated by colons.
The first field is the constant <literal>scram-sha-256</literal>, to
identify the password as a SCRAM-SHA-256 verifier. The second field is a
salt, Base64-encoded, and the third field is the number of iterations used
to generate the password. The fourth field and fifth field are the stored
key and server key, respectively, in hexadecimal format. A password that
does not follow either of those formats is assumed to be unencrypted.
</para>
</sect1>

59
doc/src/sgml/client-auth.sgml
View File

@ -422,6 +422,17 @@ hostnossl <replaceable>database</replaceable> <replaceable>user</replaceable>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
<term><literal>scram</></term>
<listitem>
<para>
Perform SCRAM-SHA-256 authentication to verify the user's
password.
See <xref linkend="auth-password"> for details.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
<term><literal>password</></term>
<listitem>
@ -673,13 +684,19 @@ host postgres all 192.168.93.0/24 ident
# "postgres" if the user's password is correctly supplied.
#
# TYPE DATABASE USER ADDRESS METHOD
host postgres all 192.168.12.10/32 md5
host postgres all 192.168.12.10/32 scram
# Allow any user from hosts in the example.com domain to connect to
# any database if the user's password is correctly supplied.
#
# Most users use SCRAM authentication, but some users use older clients
# that don't support SCRAM authentication, and need to be able to log
# in using MD5 authentication. Such users are put in the @md5users
# group, everyone else must use SCRAM.
#
# TYPE DATABASE USER ADDRESS METHOD
host all all .example.com md5
host all @md5users .example.com md5
host all all .example.com scram
# In the absence of preceding "host" lines, these two lines will
# reject all connections from 192.168.54.1 (since that entry will be
@ -907,21 +924,37 @@ omicron bryanh guest1
</indexterm>
<para>
The password-based authentication methods are <literal>md5</>
and <literal>password</>. These methods operate
The password-based authentication methods are <literal>scram</>
<literal>md5</> and <literal>password</>. These methods operate
similarly except for the way that the password is sent across the
connection, namely MD5-hashed and clear-text respectively.
connection.
</para>
<para>
If you are at all concerned about password
<quote>sniffing</> attacks then <literal>md5</> is preferred.
Plain <literal>password</> should always be avoided if possible.
However, <literal>md5</> cannot be used with the <xref
linkend="guc-db-user-namespace"> feature. If the connection is
protected by SSL encryption then <literal>password</> can be used
safely (though SSL certificate authentication might be a better
choice if one is depending on using SSL).
Plain <literal>password</> sends the password in clear-text, and is
therefore vulnerable to password <quote>sniffing</> attacks. It should
always be avoided if possible. If the connection is protected by SSL
encryption then <literal>password</> can be used safely, though.
(Though SSL certificate authentication might be a better choice if one
is depending on using SSL).
</para>
<para>
<literal>scram</> performs SCRAM-SHA-256 authentication, as described
in <ulink url="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5802">RFC5802</ulink>. It
is a challenge-response scheme, that prevents password sniffing on
untrusted connections. It is more secure than the <literal>md5</>
method, but might not be supported by older clients.
</para>
<para>
In <literal>md5</>, the client sends a hash of a random challenge,
generated by the server, and the password. It prevents password sniffing,
but is less secure than <literal>scram</>, and provides no protection
if an attacker manages to steal the password hash from the server.
<literal>md5</> cannot be used with the <xref
linkend="guc-db-user-namespace"> feature.
</para>
<para>

7
doc/src/sgml/config.sgml
View File

@ -1193,9 +1193,10 @@ include_dir 'conf.d'
password is to be encrypted. The default value is <literal>md5</>, which
stores the password as an MD5 hash. Setting this to <literal>plain</> stores
it in plaintext. <literal>on</> and <literal>off</> are also accepted, as
aliases for <literal>md5</> and <literal>plain</>, respectively.
</para>
aliases for <literal>md5</> and <literal>plain</>, respectively. Setting
this parameter to <literal>scram</> will encrypt the password with
SCRAM-SHA-256.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>

147
doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml
View File

@ -228,11 +228,11 @@
The server then sends an appropriate authentication request message,
to which the frontend must reply with an appropriate authentication
response message (such as a password).
For all authentication methods except GSSAPI and SSPI, there is at most
one request and one response. In some methods, no response
For all authentication methods except GSSAPI, SSPI and SASL, there is at
most one request and one response. In some methods, no response
at all is needed from the frontend, and so no authentication request
occurs. For GSSAPI and SSPI, multiple exchanges of packets may be needed
to complete the authentication.
occurs. For GSSAPI, SSPI and SASL, multiple exchanges of packets may be
needed to complete the authentication.
</para>
<para>
@ -366,6 +366,35 @@
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
<term>AuthenticationSASL</term>
<listitem>
<para>
The frontend must now initiate a SASL negotiation, using the SASL
mechanism specified in the message. The frontend will send a
PasswordMessage with the first part of the SASL data stream in
response to this. If further messages are needed, the server will
respond with AuthenticationSASLContinue.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
<term>AuthenticationSASLContinue</term>
<listitem>
<para>
This message contains the response data from the previous step
of SASL negotiation (AuthenticationSASL, or a previous
AuthenticationSASLContinue). If the SASL data in this message
indicates more data is needed to complete the authentication,
the frontend must send that data as another PasswordMessage. If
SASL authentication is completed by this message, the server
will next send AuthenticationOk to indicate successful authentication
or ErrorResponse to indicate failure.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
</variablelist>
</para>
@ -2782,6 +2811,114 @@ AuthenticationGSSContinue (B)
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
<term>
AuthenticationSASL (B)
</term>
<listitem>
<para>
<variablelist>
<varlistentry>
<term>
Byte1('R')
</term>
<listitem>
<para>
Identifies the message as an authentication request.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
<term>
Int32
</term>
<listitem>
<para>
Length of message contents in bytes, including self.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
<term>
Int32(10)
</term>
<listitem>
<para>
Specifies that SASL authentication is started.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
<term>
String
</term>
<listitem>
<para>
Name of a SASL authentication mechanism.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
</variablelist>
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
<term>
AuthenticationSASLContinue (B)
</term>
<listitem>
<para>
<variablelist>
<varlistentry>
<term>
Byte1('R')
</term>
<listitem>
<para>
Identifies the message as an authentication request.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
<term>
Int32
</term>
<listitem>
<para>
Length of message contents in bytes, including self.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
<term>
Int32(11)
</term>
<listitem>
<para>
Specifies that this message contains SASL-mechanism specific
data.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
<term>
Byte<replaceable>n</replaceable>
</term>
<listitem>
<para>
SASL data, specific to the SASL mechanism being used.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
</variablelist>
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry>
<term>
@ -4544,7 +4681,7 @@ PasswordMessage (F)
<listitem>
<para>
Identifies the message as a password response. Note that
this is also used for GSSAPI and SSPI response messages
this is also used for GSSAPI, SSPI and SASL response messages
(which is really a design error, since the contained data
is not a null-terminated string in that case, but can be
arbitrary binary data).

17
doc/src/sgml/ref/create_role.sgml
View File

@ -231,12 +231,17 @@ CREATE ROLE <replaceable class="PARAMETER">name</replaceable> [ [ WITH ] <replac
encrypted in the system catalogs. (If neither is specified,
the default behavior is determined by the configuration
parameter <xref linkend="guc-password-encryption">.) If the
presented password string is already in MD5-encrypted format,
then it is stored encrypted as-is, regardless of whether
<literal>ENCRYPTED</> or <literal>UNENCRYPTED</> is specified
(since the system cannot decrypt the specified encrypted
password string). This allows reloading of encrypted
passwords during dump/restore.
presented password string is already in MD5-encrypted or
SCRAM-encrypted format, then it is stored encrypted as-is,
regardless of whether <literal>ENCRYPTED</> or <literal>UNENCRYPTED</>
is specified (since the system cannot decrypt the specified encrypted
password string). This allows reloading of encrypted passwords
during dump/restore.
</para>
<para>
Note that older clients might lack support for the SCRAM
authentication mechanism.
</para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>

24
src/backend/access/transam/xlog.c
View File

@ -65,6 +65,7 @@
#include "storage/reinit.h"
#include "storage/smgr.h"
#include "storage/spin.h"
#include "utils/backend_random.h"
#include "utils/builtins.h"
#include "utils/guc.h"
#include "utils/memutils.h"
@ -4664,6 +4665,16 @@ GetSystemIdentifier(void)
return ControlFile->system_identifier;
}
/*
* Returns the random nonce from control file.
*/
char *
GetMockAuthenticationNonce(void)
{
Assert(ControlFile != NULL);
return ControlFile->mock_authentication_nonce;
}
/*
* Are checksums enabled for data pages?
*/
@ -4914,6 +4925,7 @@ BootStrapXLOG(void)
char *recptr;
bool use_existent;
uint64 sysidentifier;
char mock_auth_nonce[MOCK_AUTH_NONCE_LEN];
struct timeval tv;
pg_crc32c crc;
@ -4934,6 +4946,17 @@ BootStrapXLOG(void)
sysidentifier |= ((uint64) tv.tv_usec) << 12;
sysidentifier |= getpid() & 0xFFF;
/*
* Generate a random nonce. This is used for authentication requests
* that will fail because the user does not exist. The nonce is used to
* create a genuine-looking password challenge for the non-existent user,
* in lieu of an actual stored password.
*/
if (!pg_backend_random(mock_auth_nonce, MOCK_AUTH_NONCE_LEN))
ereport(PANIC,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INTERNAL_ERROR),
errmsg("could not generation secret authorization token")));
/* First timeline ID is always 1 */
ThisTimeLineID = 1;
@ -5040,6 +5063,7 @@ BootStrapXLOG(void)
memset(ControlFile, 0, sizeof(ControlFileData));
/* Initialize pg_control status fields */
ControlFile->system_identifier = sysidentifier;
memcpy(ControlFile->mock_authentication_nonce, mock_auth_nonce, MOCK_AUTH_NONCE_LEN);
ControlFile->state = DB_SHUTDOWNED;
ControlFile->time = checkPoint.time;
ControlFile->checkPoint = checkPoint.redo;

14
src/backend/commands/user.c
View File

@ -139,7 +139,12 @@ CreateRole(ParseState *pstate, CreateRoleStmt *stmt)
parser_errposition(pstate, defel->location)));
dpassword = defel;
if (strcmp(defel->defname, "encryptedPassword") == 0)
password_type = PASSWORD_TYPE_MD5;
{
if (Password_encryption == PASSWORD_TYPE_SCRAM)
password_type = PASSWORD_TYPE_SCRAM;
else
password_type = PASSWORD_TYPE_MD5;
}
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "unencryptedPassword") == 0)
password_type = PASSWORD_TYPE_PLAINTEXT;
}
@ -542,7 +547,12 @@ AlterRole(AlterRoleStmt *stmt)
errmsg("conflicting or redundant options")));
dpassword = defel;
if (strcmp(defel->defname, "encryptedPassword") == 0)
password_type = PASSWORD_TYPE_MD5;
{
if (Password_encryption == PASSWORD_TYPE_SCRAM)
password_type = PASSWORD_TYPE_SCRAM;
else
password_type = PASSWORD_TYPE_MD5;
}
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "unencryptedPassword") == 0)
password_type = PASSWORD_TYPE_PLAINTEXT;
}

2
src/backend/libpq/Makefile
View File

@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ include $(top_builddir)/src/Makefile.global
# be-fsstubs is here for historical reasons, probably belongs elsewhere
OBJS = be-fsstubs.o be-secure.o auth.o crypt.o hba.o ifaddr.o pqcomm.o \
pqformat.o pqmq.o pqsignal.o
pqformat.o pqmq.o pqsignal.o auth-scram.o
ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
OBJS += be-secure-openssl.o

1032
src/backend/libpq/auth-scram.c Normal file
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File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

136
src/backend/libpq/auth.c
View File

@ -30,10 +30,12 @@
#include "libpq/crypt.h"
#include "libpq/libpq.h"
#include "libpq/pqformat.h"
#include "libpq/scram.h"
#include "miscadmin.h"
#include "replication/walsender.h"
#include "storage/ipc.h"
#include "utils/backend_random.h"
#include "utils/timestamp.h"
/*----------------------------------------------------------------
@ -197,6 +199,12 @@ static int pg_SSPI_make_upn(char *accountname,
static int CheckRADIUSAuth(Port *port);
/*----------------------------------------------------------------
* SASL authentication
*----------------------------------------------------------------
*/
static int CheckSASLAuth(Port *port, char **logdetail);
/*
* Maximum accepted size of GSS and SSPI authentication tokens.
*
@ -212,6 +220,13 @@ static int CheckRADIUSAuth(Port *port);
*/
#define PG_MAX_AUTH_TOKEN_LENGTH 65535
/*
* Maximum accepted size of SASL messages.
*
* The messages that the server or libpq generate are much smaller than this,
* but have some headroom.
*/
#define PG_MAX_SASL_MESSAGE_LENGTH 1024
/*----------------------------------------------------------------
* Global authentication functions
@ -275,6 +290,7 @@ auth_failed(Port *port, int status, char *logdetail)
break;
case uaPassword:
case uaMD5:
case uaSASL:
errstr = gettext_noop("password authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
/* We use it to indicate if a .pgpass password failed. */
errcode_return = ERRCODE_INVALID_PASSWORD;
@ -542,6 +558,10 @@ ClientAuthentication(Port *port)
status = CheckPasswordAuth(port, &logdetail);
break;
case uaSASL:
status = CheckSASLAuth(port, &logdetail);
break;
case uaPAM:
#ifdef USE_PAM
status = CheckPAMAuth(port, port->user_name, "");
@ -762,6 +782,122 @@ CheckPasswordAuth(Port *port, char **logdetail)
return result;
}
/*----------------------------------------------------------------
* SASL authentication system
*----------------------------------------------------------------
*/
static int
CheckSASLAuth(Port *port, char **logdetail)
{
int mtype;
StringInfoData buf;
void *scram_opaq;
char *output = NULL;
int outputlen = 0;
int result;
char *shadow_pass;
bool doomed = false;
/*
* SASL auth is not supported for protocol versions before 3, because it
* relies on the overall message length word to determine the SASL payload
* size in AuthenticationSASLContinue and PasswordMessage messages. (We
* used to have a hard rule that protocol messages must be parsable
* without relying on the length word, but we hardly care about older
* protocol version anymore.)
*/
if (PG_PROTOCOL_MAJOR(FrontendProtocol) < 3)
ereport(FATAL,
(errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
errmsg("SASL authentication is not supported in protocol version 2")));
/*
* Send first the authentication request to user.
*/
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_SASL, SCRAM_SHA256_NAME,
strlen(SCRAM_SHA256_NAME) + 1);
/*
* If the user doesn't exist, or doesn't have a valid password, or it's
* expired, we still go through the motions of SASL authentication, but
* tell the authentication method that the authentication is "doomed".
* That is, it's going to fail, no matter what.
*
* This is because we don't want to reveal to an attacker what usernames
* are valid, nor which users have a valid password.
*/
if (get_role_password(port->user_name, &shadow_pass, logdetail) != STATUS_OK)
doomed = true;
/* Initialize the status tracker for message exchanges */
scram_opaq = pg_be_scram_init(port->user_name, shadow_pass, doomed);
/*
* Loop through SASL message exchange. This exchange can consist of
* multiple messages sent in both directions. First message is always
* from the client. All messages from client to server are password
* packets (type 'p').
*/
do
{
pq_startmsgread();
mtype = pq_getbyte();
if (mtype != 'p')
{
/* Only log error if client didn't disconnect. */
if (mtype != EOF)
{
ereport(COMMERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
errmsg("expected SASL response, got message type %d",
mtype)));
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
else
return STATUS_EOF;
}
/* Get the actual SASL message */
initStringInfo(&buf);
if (pq_getmessage(&buf, PG_MAX_SASL_MESSAGE_LENGTH))
{
/* EOF - pq_getmessage already logged error */
pfree(buf.data);
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
elog(DEBUG4, "Processing received SASL token of length %d", buf.len);
/*
* we pass 'logdetail' as NULL when doing a mock authentication,
* because we should already have a better error message in that case
*/
result = pg_be_scram_exchange(scram_opaq, buf.data, buf.len,
&output, &outputlen,
doomed ? NULL : logdetail);
/* input buffer no longer used */
pfree(buf.data);
if (outputlen > 0)
{
/*
* Negotiation generated data to be sent to the client.
*/
elog(DEBUG4, "sending SASL response token of length %u", outputlen);
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_SASL_CONT, output, outputlen);
}
} while (result == SASL_EXCHANGE_CONTINUE);
/* Oops, Something bad happened */
if (result != SASL_EXCHANGE_SUCCESS)
{
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
return STATUS_OK;
}
/*----------------------------------------------------------------

27
src/backend/libpq/crypt.c
View File

@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
#include "catalog/pg_authid.h"
#include "common/md5.h"
#include "libpq/crypt.h"
#include "libpq/scram.h"
#include "miscadmin.h"
#include "utils/builtins.h"
#include "utils/syscache.h"
@ -111,6 +112,8 @@ get_password_type(const char *shadow_pass)
{
if (strncmp(shadow_pass, "md5", 3) == 0 && strlen(shadow_pass) == MD5_PASSWD_LEN)
return PASSWORD_TYPE_MD5;
if (strncmp(shadow_pass, "scram-sha-256:", strlen("scram-sha-256:")) == 0)
return PASSWORD_TYPE_SCRAM;
return PASSWORD_TYPE_PLAINTEXT;
}
@ -150,9 +153,31 @@ encrypt_password(PasswordType target_type, const char *role,
elog(ERROR, "password encryption failed");
return encrypted_password;
case PASSWORD_TYPE_SCRAM:
/*
* cannot convert a SCRAM verifier to an MD5 hash, so fall
* through to save the SCRAM verifier instead.
*/
case PASSWORD_TYPE_MD5:
return pstrdup(password);
}
case PASSWORD_TYPE_SCRAM:
switch (guessed_type)
{
case PASSWORD_TYPE_PLAINTEXT:
return scram_build_verifier(role, password, 0);
case PASSWORD_TYPE_MD5:
/*
* cannot convert an MD5 hash to a SCRAM verifier, so fall
* through to save the MD5 hash instead.
*/
case PASSWORD_TYPE_SCRAM:
return pstrdup(password);
}
}
/*
@ -160,7 +185,7 @@ encrypt_password(PasswordType target_type, const char *role,
* handle every combination of source and target password types.
*/
elog(ERROR, "cannot encrypt password to requested type");
return NULL; /* keep compiler quiet */
return NULL; /* keep compiler quiet */
}
/*

3
src/backend/libpq/hba.c
View File

@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ static const char *const UserAuthName[] =
"ident",
"password",
"md5",
"scram",
"gss",
"sspi",
"pam",
@ -1323,6 +1324,8 @@ parse_hba_line(TokenizedLine *tok_line, int elevel)
}
parsedline->auth_method = uaMD5;
}
else if (strcmp(token->string, "scram") == 0)
parsedline->auth_method = uaSASL;
else if (strcmp(token->string, "pam") == 0)
#ifdef USE_PAM
parsedline->auth_method = uaPAM;

8
src/backend/libpq/pg_hba.conf.sample
View File

@ -42,10 +42,10 @@
# or "samenet" to match any address in any subnet that the server is
# directly connected to.
#
# METHOD can be "trust", "reject", "md5", "password", "gss", "sspi",
# "ident", "peer", "pam", "ldap", "radius" or "cert". Note that
# "password" sends passwords in clear text; "md5" is preferred since
# it sends encrypted passwords.
# METHOD can be "trust", "reject", "md5", "password", "scram", "gss",
# "sspi", "ident", "peer", "pam", "ldap", "radius" or "cert". Note that
# "password" sends passwords in clear text; "md5" or "scram" are preferred
# since they send encrypted passwords.
#
# OPTIONS are a set of options for the authentication in the format
# NAME=VALUE. The available options depend on the different

1
src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
View File

@ -409,6 +409,7 @@ static const struct config_enum_entry force_parallel_mode_options[] = {
static const struct config_enum_entry password_encryption_options[] = {
{"plain", PASSWORD_TYPE_PLAINTEXT, false},
{"md5", PASSWORD_TYPE_MD5, false},
{"scram", PASSWORD_TYPE_SCRAM, false},
{"off", PASSWORD_TYPE_PLAINTEXT, false},
{"on", PASSWORD_TYPE_MD5, false},
{"true", PASSWORD_TYPE_MD5, true},

2
src/backend/utils/misc/postgresql.conf.sample
View File

@ -84,7 +84,7 @@
#ssl_key_file = 'server.key'
#ssl_ca_file = ''
#ssl_crl_file = ''
#password_encryption = md5 # md5 or plain
#password_encryption = md5 # md5, scram or plain
#db_user_namespace = off
#row_security = on

21
src/bin/initdb/initdb.c
View File

@ -75,7 +75,7 @@
extern const char *select_default_timezone(const char *share_path);
static const char *const auth_methods_host[] = {
"trust", "reject", "md5", "password", "ident", "radius",
"trust", "reject", "md5", "password", "scram", "ident", "radius",
#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
"gss",
#endif
@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ static const char *const auth_methods_host[] = {
NULL
};
static const char *const auth_methods_local[] = {
"trust", "reject", "md5", "password", "peer", "radius",
"trust", "reject", "md5", "scram", "password", "peer", "radius",
#ifdef USE_PAM
"pam", "pam ",
#endif
@ -1128,6 +1128,14 @@ setup_config(void)
"#update_process_title = off");
#endif
if (strcmp(authmethodlocal, "scram") == 0 ||
strcmp(authmethodhost, "scram") == 0)
{
conflines = replace_token(conflines,
"#password_encryption = md5",
"password_encryption = scram");
}
snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/postgresql.conf", pg_data);
writefile(path, conflines);
@ -2307,14 +2315,17 @@ static void
check_need_password(const char *authmethodlocal, const char *authmethodhost)
{
if ((strcmp(authmethodlocal, "md5") == 0 ||
strcmp(authmethodlocal, "password") == 0) &&
strcmp(authmethodlocal, "password") == 0 ||
strcmp(authmethodlocal, "scram") == 0) &&
(strcmp(authmethodhost, "md5") == 0 ||
strcmp(authmethodhost, "password") == 0) &&
strcmp(authmethodhost, "password") == 0 ||
strcmp(authmethodlocal, "scram") == 0) &&
!(pwprompt || pwfilename))
{
fprintf(stderr, _("%s: must specify a password for the superuser to enable %s authentication\n"), progname,
(strcmp(authmethodlocal, "md5") == 0 ||
strcmp(authmethodlocal, "password") == 0)
strcmp(authmethodlocal, "password") == 0 ||
strcmp(authmethodlocal, "scram") == 0)
? authmethodlocal
: authmethodhost);
exit(1);

12
src/bin/pg_controldata/pg_controldata.c
View File

@ -92,11 +92,13 @@ main(int argc, char *argv[])
char pgctime_str[128];
char ckpttime_str[128];
char sysident_str[32];
char mock_auth_nonce_str[MOCK_AUTH_NONCE_LEN * 2 + 1];
const char *strftime_fmt = "%c";
const char *progname;
XLogSegNo segno;
char xlogfilename[MAXFNAMELEN];
int c;
int i;
set_pglocale_pgservice(argv[0], PG_TEXTDOMAIN("pg_controldata"));
@ -186,11 +188,15 @@ main(int argc, char *argv[])
XLogFileName(xlogfilename, ControlFile->checkPointCopy.ThisTimeLineID, segno);
/*
* Format system_identifier separately to keep platform-dependent format
* code out of the translatable message string.
* Format system_identifier and mock_authentication_nonce separately to
* keep platform-dependent format code out of the translatable message
* string.
*/
snprintf(sysident_str, sizeof(sysident_str), UINT64_FORMAT,
ControlFile->system_identifier);
for (i = 0; i < MOCK_AUTH_NONCE_LEN; i++)
snprintf(&mock_auth_nonce_str[i * 2], 3, "%02x",
(unsigned char) ControlFile->mock_authentication_nonce[i]);
printf(_("pg_control version number: %u\n"),
ControlFile->pg_control_version);
@ -302,5 +308,7 @@ main(int argc, char *argv[])
(ControlFile->float8ByVal ? _("by value") : _("by reference")));
printf(_("Data page checksum version: %u\n"),
ControlFile->data_checksum_version);
printf(_("Mock authentication nonce: %s\n"),
mock_auth_nonce_str);
return 0;
}

6
src/common/Makefile
View File

@ -40,9 +40,9 @@ override CPPFLAGS += -DVAL_LDFLAGS_EX="\"$(LDFLAGS_EX)\""
override CPPFLAGS += -DVAL_LDFLAGS_SL="\"$(LDFLAGS_SL)\""
override CPPFLAGS += -DVAL_LIBS="\"$(LIBS)\""
OBJS_COMMON = config_info.o controldata_utils.o exec.o ip.o keywords.o \
md5.o pg_lzcompress.o pgfnames.o psprintf.o relpath.o rmtree.o \
string.o username.o wait_error.o
OBJS_COMMON = base64.o config_info.o controldata_utils.o exec.o ip.o \
keywords.o md5.o pg_lzcompress.o pgfnames.o psprintf.o relpath.o \
rmtree.o scram-common.o string.o username.o wait_error.o
ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
OBJS_COMMON += sha2_openssl.o

199
src/common/base64.c Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*
* base64.c
* Encoding and decoding routines for base64 without whitespace.
*
* Copyright (c) 2001-2016, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
*
*
* IDENTIFICATION
* src/common/base64.c
*
*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
#ifndef FRONTEND
#include "postgres.h"
#else
#include "postgres_fe.h"
#endif
#include "common/base64.h"
/*
* BASE64
*/
static const char _base64[] =
"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/";
static const int8 b64lookup[128] = {
-1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1,
-1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1,
-1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, 62, -1, -1, -1, 63,
52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1,
-1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14,
15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1,
-1, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40,
41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, -1, -1, -1, -1, -1,
};
/*
* pg_b64_encode
*
* Encode into base64 the given string. Returns the length of the encoded
* string.
*/
int
pg_b64_encode(const char *src, int len, char *dst)
{
char *p;
const char *s,
*end = src + len;
int pos = 2;
uint32 buf = 0;
s = src;
p = dst;
while (s < end)
{
buf |= (unsigned char) *s << (pos << 3);
pos--;
s++;
/* write it out */
if (pos < 0)
{
*p++ = _base64[(buf >> 18) & 0x3f];
*p++ = _base64[(buf >> 12) & 0x3f];
*p++ = _base64[(buf >> 6) & 0x3f];
*p++ = _base64[buf & 0x3f];
pos = 2;
buf = 0;
}
}
if (pos != 2)
{
*p++ = _base64[(buf >> 18) & 0x3f];
*p++ = _base64[(buf >> 12) & 0x3f];
*p++ = (pos == 0) ? _base64[(buf >> 6) & 0x3f] : '=';
*p++ = '=';
}
return p - dst;
}
/*
* pg_b64_decode
*
* Decode the given base64 string. Returns the length of the decoded
* string on success, and -1 in the event of an error.
*/
int
pg_b64_decode(const char *src, int len, char *dst)
{
const char *srcend = src + len,
*s = src;
char *p = dst;
char c;
int b = 0;
uint32 buf = 0;
int pos = 0,
end = 0;
while (s < srcend)
{
c = *s++;
/* Leave if a whitespace is found */
if (c == ' ' || c == '\t' || c == '\n' || c == '\r')
return -1;
if (c == '=')
{
/* end sequence */
if (!end)
{
if (pos == 2)
end = 1;
else if (pos == 3)
end = 2;
else
{
/*
* Unexpected "=" character found while decoding base64
* sequence.
*/
return -1;
}
}
b = 0;
}
else
{
b = -1;
if (c > 0 && c < 127)
b = b64lookup[(unsigned char) c];
if (b < 0)
{
/* invalid symbol found */
return -1;
}
}
/* add it to buffer */
buf = (buf << 6) + b;
pos++;
if (pos == 4)
{
*p++ = (buf >> 16) & 255;
if (end == 0 || end > 1)
*p++ = (buf >> 8) & 255;
if (end == 0 || end > 2)
*p++ = buf & 255;
buf = 0;
pos = 0;
}
}
if (pos != 0)
{
/*
* base64 end sequence is invalid. Input data is missing padding, is
* truncated or is otherwise corrupted.
*/
return -1;
}
return p - dst;
}
/*
* pg_b64_enc_len
*
* Returns to caller the length of the string if it were encoded with
* base64 based on the length provided by caller. This is useful to
* estimate how large a buffer allocation needs to be done before doing
* the actual encoding.
*/
int
pg_b64_enc_len(int srclen)
{
/* 3 bytes will be converted to 4 */
return (srclen + 2) * 4 / 3;
}
/*
* pg_b64_dec_len
*
* Returns to caller the length of the string if it were to be decoded
* with base64, based on the length given by caller. This is useful to
* estimate how large a buffer allocation needs to be done before doing
* the actual decoding.
*/
int
pg_b64_dec_len(int srclen)
{
return (srclen * 3) >> 2;
}

196
src/common/scram-common.c Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
* scram-common.c
* Shared frontend/backend code for SCRAM authentication
*
* This contains the common low-level functions needed in both frontend and
* backend, for implement the Salted Challenge Response Authentication
* Mechanism (SCRAM), per IETF's RFC 5802.
*
* Portions Copyright (c) 2016, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
*
* IDENTIFICATION
* src/common/scram-common.c
*
*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
#ifndef FRONTEND
#include "postgres.h"
#include "utils/memutils.h"
#else
#include "postgres_fe.h"
#endif
#include "common/scram-common.h"
#define HMAC_IPAD 0x36
#define HMAC_OPAD 0x5C
/*
* Calculate HMAC per RFC2104.
*
* The hash function used is SHA-256.
*/
void
scram_HMAC_init(scram_HMAC_ctx *ctx, const uint8 *key, int keylen)
{
uint8 k_ipad[SHA256_HMAC_B];
int i;
uint8 keybuf[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
/*
* If the key is longer than the block size (64 bytes for SHA-256), pass
* it through SHA-256 once to shrink it down.
*/
if (keylen > SHA256_HMAC_B)
{
pg_sha256_ctx sha256_ctx;
pg_sha256_init(&sha256_ctx);
pg_sha256_update(&sha256_ctx, key, keylen);
pg_sha256_final(&sha256_ctx, keybuf);
key = keybuf;
keylen = SCRAM_KEY_LEN;
}
memset(k_ipad, HMAC_IPAD, SHA256_HMAC_B);
memset(ctx->k_opad, HMAC_OPAD, SHA256_HMAC_B);
for (i = 0; i < keylen; i++)
{
k_ipad[i] ^= key[i];
ctx->k_opad[i] ^= key[i];
}
/* tmp = H(K XOR ipad, text) */
pg_sha256_init(&ctx->sha256ctx);
pg_sha256_update(&ctx->sha256ctx, k_ipad, SHA256_HMAC_B);
}
/*
* Update HMAC calculation
* The hash function used is SHA-256.
*/
void
scram_HMAC_update(scram_HMAC_ctx *ctx, const char *str, int slen)
{
pg_sha256_update(&ctx->sha256ctx, (const uint8 *) str, slen);
}
/*
* Finalize HMAC calculation.
* The hash function used is SHA-256.
*/
void
scram_HMAC_final(uint8 *result, scram_HMAC_ctx *ctx)
{
uint8 h[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
pg_sha256_final(&ctx->sha256ctx, h);
/* H(K XOR opad, tmp) */
pg_sha256_init(&ctx->sha256ctx);
pg_sha256_update(&ctx->sha256ctx, ctx->k_opad, SHA256_HMAC_B);
pg_sha256_update(&ctx->sha256ctx, h, SCRAM_KEY_LEN);
pg_sha256_final(&ctx->sha256ctx, result);
}
/*
* Iterate hash calculation of HMAC entry using given salt.
* scram_Hi() is essentially PBKDF2 (see RFC2898) with HMAC() as the
* pseudorandom function.
*/
static void
scram_Hi(const char *str, const char *salt, int saltlen, int iterations, uint8 *result)
{
int str_len = strlen(str);
uint32 one = htonl(1);
int i,
j;
uint8 Ui[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
uint8 Ui_prev[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
scram_HMAC_ctx hmac_ctx;
/* First iteration */
scram_HMAC_init(&hmac_ctx, (uint8 *) str, str_len);
scram_HMAC_update(&hmac_ctx, salt, saltlen);
scram_HMAC_update(&hmac_ctx, (char *) &one, sizeof(uint32));
scram_HMAC_final(Ui_prev, &hmac_ctx);
memcpy(result, Ui_prev, SCRAM_KEY_LEN);
/* Subsequent iterations */
for (i = 2; i <= iterations; i++)
{
scram_HMAC_init(&hmac_ctx, (uint8 *) str, str_len);
scram_HMAC_update(&hmac_ctx, (const char *) Ui_prev, SCRAM_KEY_LEN);
scram_HMAC_final(Ui, &hmac_ctx);
for (j = 0; j < SCRAM_KEY_LEN; j++)
result[j] ^= Ui[j];
memcpy(Ui_prev, Ui, SCRAM_KEY_LEN);
}
}
/*
* Calculate SHA-256 hash for a NULL-terminated string. (The NULL terminator is
* not included in the hash).
*/
void
scram_H(const uint8 *input, int len, uint8 *result)
{
pg_sha256_ctx ctx;
pg_sha256_init(&ctx);
pg_sha256_update(&ctx, input, len);
pg_sha256_final(&ctx, result);
}
/*
* Normalize a password for SCRAM authentication.
*/
static void
scram_Normalize(const char *password, char *result)
{
/*
* XXX: Here SASLprep should be applied on password. However, per RFC5802,
* it is required that the password is encoded in UTF-8, something that is
* not guaranteed in this protocol. We may want to revisit this
* normalization function once encoding functions are available as well in
* the frontend in order to be able to encode properly this string, and
* then apply SASLprep on it.
*/
memcpy(result, password, strlen(password) + 1);
}
/*
* Encrypt password for SCRAM authentication. This basically applies the
* normalization of the password and a hash calculation using the salt
* value given by caller.
*/
static void
scram_SaltedPassword(const char *password, const char *salt, int saltlen, int iterations,
uint8 *result)
{
char *pwbuf;
pwbuf = (char *) malloc(strlen(password) + 1);
scram_Normalize(password, pwbuf);
scram_Hi(pwbuf, salt, saltlen, iterations, result);
free(pwbuf);
}
/*
* Calculate ClientKey or ServerKey.
*/
void
scram_ClientOrServerKey(const char *password,
const char *salt, int saltlen, int iterations,
const char *keystr, uint8 *result)
{
uint8 keybuf[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
scram_HMAC_ctx ctx;
scram_SaltedPassword(password, salt, saltlen, iterations, keybuf);
scram_HMAC_init(&ctx, keybuf, SCRAM_KEY_LEN);
scram_HMAC_update(&ctx, keystr, strlen(keystr));
scram_HMAC_final(result, &ctx);
}

1
src/include/access/xlog.h
View File

@ -256,6 +256,7 @@ extern char *XLogFileNameP(TimeLineID tli, XLogSegNo segno);
extern void UpdateControlFile(void);
extern uint64 GetSystemIdentifier(void);
extern char *GetMockAuthenticationNonce(void);
extern bool DataChecksumsEnabled(void);
extern XLogRecPtr GetFakeLSNForUnloggedRel(void);
extern Size XLOGShmemSize(void);

11
src/include/catalog/pg_control.h
View File

@ -20,8 +20,10 @@
#include "port/pg_crc32c.h"
#define MOCK_AUTH_NONCE_LEN 32
/* Version identifier for this pg_control format */
#define PG_CONTROL_VERSION 1001
#define PG_CONTROL_VERSION 1002
/*
* Body of CheckPoint XLOG records. This is declared here because we keep
@ -222,6 +224,13 @@ typedef struct ControlFileData
/* Are data pages protected by checksums? Zero if no checksum version */
uint32 data_checksum_version;
/*
* Random nonce, used in authentication requests that need to proceed
* based on values that are cluster-unique, like a SASL exchange that
* failed at an early stage.
*/
char mock_authentication_nonce[MOCK_AUTH_NONCE_LEN];
/* CRC of all above ... MUST BE LAST! */
pg_crc32c crc;
} ControlFileData;

19
src/include/common/base64.h Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
/*
* base64.h
* Encoding and decoding routines for base64 without whitespace
* support.
*
* Portions Copyright (c) 2001-2016, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
*
* src/include/common/base64.h
*/
#ifndef BASE64_H
#define BASE64_H
/* base 64 */
extern int pg_b64_encode(const char *src, int len, char *dst);
extern int pg_b64_decode(const char *src, int len, char *dst);
extern int pg_b64_enc_len(int srclen);
extern int pg_b64_dec_len(int srclen);
#endif /* BASE64_H */

62
src/include/common/scram-common.h Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*
* scram-common.h
* Declarations for helper functions used for SCRAM authentication
*
* Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2016, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
* Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
*
* src/include/common/relpath.h
*
*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
#ifndef SCRAM_COMMON_H
#define SCRAM_COMMON_H
#include "common/sha2.h"
/* Length of SCRAM keys (client and server) */
#define SCRAM_KEY_LEN PG_SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH
/* length of HMAC */
#define SHA256_HMAC_B PG_SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH
/*
* Size of random nonce generated in the authentication exchange. This
* is in "raw" number of bytes, the actual nonces sent over the wire are
* encoded using only ASCII-printable characters.
*/
#define SCRAM_RAW_NONCE_LEN 10
/* length of salt when generating new verifiers */
#define SCRAM_SALT_LEN 10
/* number of bytes used when sending iteration number during exchange */
#define SCRAM_ITERATION_LEN 10
/* default number of iterations when generating verifier */
#define SCRAM_ITERATIONS_DEFAULT 4096
/* Base name of keys used for proof generation */
#define SCRAM_SERVER_KEY_NAME "Server Key"
#define SCRAM_CLIENT_KEY_NAME "Client Key"
/*
* Context data for HMAC used in SCRAM authentication.
*/
typedef struct
{
pg_sha256_ctx sha256ctx;
uint8 k_opad[SHA256_HMAC_B];
} scram_HMAC_ctx;
extern void scram_HMAC_init(scram_HMAC_ctx *ctx, const uint8 *key, int keylen);
extern void scram_HMAC_update(scram_HMAC_ctx *ctx, const char *str, int slen);
extern void scram_HMAC_final(uint8 *result, scram_HMAC_ctx *ctx);
extern void scram_H(const uint8 *str, int len, uint8 *result);
extern void scram_ClientOrServerKey(const char *password, const char *salt,
int saltlen, int iterations,
const char *keystr, uint8 *result);
#endif /* SCRAM_COMMON_H */

3
src/include/libpq/crypt.h
View File

@ -24,7 +24,8 @@
typedef enum PasswordType
{
PASSWORD_TYPE_PLAINTEXT = 0,
PASSWORD_TYPE_MD5
PASSWORD_TYPE_MD5,
PASSWORD_TYPE_SCRAM
} PasswordType;
extern PasswordType get_password_type(const char *shadow_pass);

1
src/include/libpq/hba.h
View File

@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ typedef enum UserAuth
uaIdent,
uaPassword,
uaMD5,
uaSASL,
uaGSS,
uaSSPI,
uaPAM,

2
src/include/libpq/pqcomm.h
View File

@ -172,6 +172,8 @@ extern bool Db_user_namespace;
#define AUTH_REQ_GSS 7 /* GSSAPI without wrap() */
#define AUTH_REQ_GSS_CONT 8 /* Continue GSS exchanges */
#define AUTH_REQ_SSPI 9 /* SSPI negotiate without wrap() */
#define AUTH_REQ_SASL 10 /* SASL */
#define AUTH_REQ_SASL_CONT 11 /* continue SASL exchange */
typedef uint32 AuthRequest;

35
src/include/libpq/scram.h Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*
* scram.h
* Interface to libpq/scram.c
*
* Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2016, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
* Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
*
* src/include/libpq/scram.h
*
*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
#ifndef PG_SCRAM_H
#define PG_SCRAM_H
/* Name of SCRAM-SHA-256 per IANA */
#define SCRAM_SHA256_NAME "SCRAM-SHA-256"
/* Status codes for message exchange */
#define SASL_EXCHANGE_CONTINUE 0
#define SASL_EXCHANGE_SUCCESS 1
#define SASL_EXCHANGE_FAILURE 2
/* Routines dedicated to authentication */
extern void *pg_be_scram_init(const char *username, const char *shadow_pass, bool doomed);
extern int pg_be_scram_exchange(void *opaq, char *input, int inputlen,
char **output, int *outputlen, char **logdetail);
/* Routines to handle and check SCRAM-SHA-256 verifier */
extern char *scram_build_verifier(const char *username,
const char *password,
int iterations);
extern bool is_scram_verifier(const char *verifier);
#endif /* PG_SCRAM_H */

5
src/interfaces/libpq/.gitignore vendored
View File

@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
/exports.list
/base64.c
/chklocale.c
/crypt.c
/getaddrinfo.c
@ -7,8 +8,12 @@
/inet_net_ntop.c
/noblock.c
/open.c
/pg_strong_random.c
/pgstrcasecmp.c
/pqsignal.c
/scram-common.c
/sha2.c
/sha2_openssl.c
/snprintf.c
/strerror.c
/strlcpy.c

20
src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
View File

@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ LIBS := $(LIBS:-lpgport=)
# We can't use Makefile variables here because the MSVC build system scrapes
# OBJS from this file.
OBJS= fe-auth.o fe-connect.o fe-exec.o fe-misc.o fe-print.o fe-lobj.o \
OBJS= fe-auth.o fe-auth-scram.o fe-connect.o fe-exec.o fe-misc.o fe-print.o fe-lobj.o \
fe-protocol2.o fe-protocol3.o pqexpbuffer.o fe-secure.o \
libpq-events.o
# libpgport C files we always use
@ -39,13 +39,22 @@ OBJS += chklocale.o inet_net_ntop.o noblock.o pgstrcasecmp.o pqsignal.o \
thread.o
# libpgport C files that are needed if identified by configure
OBJS += $(filter crypt.o getaddrinfo.o getpeereid.o inet_aton.o open.o system.o snprintf.o strerror.o strlcpy.o win32error.o win32setlocale.o, $(LIBOBJS))
ifeq ($(enable_strong_random), yes)
OBJS += pg_strong_random.o
else
OBJS += erand48.o
endif
# src/backend/utils/mb
OBJS += encnames.o wchar.o
# src/common
OBJS += ip.o md5.o
OBJS += base64.o ip.o md5.o scram-common.o
ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
OBJS += fe-secure-openssl.o
OBJS += fe-secure-openssl.o sha2_openssl.o
else
OBJS += sha2.o
endif
ifeq ($(PORTNAME), cygwin)
@ -93,7 +102,7 @@ backend_src = $(top_srcdir)/src/backend
# For some libpgport modules, this only happens if configure decides
# the module is needed (see filter hack in OBJS, above).
chklocale.c crypt.c getaddrinfo.c getpeereid.c inet_aton.c inet_net_ntop.c noblock.c open.c system.c pgsleep.c pgstrcasecmp.c pqsignal.c snprintf.c strerror.c strlcpy.c thread.c win32error.c win32setlocale.c: % : $(top_srcdir)/src/port/%
chklocale.c crypt.c erand48.c getaddrinfo.c getpeereid.c inet_aton.c inet_net_ntop.c noblock.c open.c system.c pgsleep.c pg_strong_random.c pgstrcasecmp.c pqsignal.c snprintf.c strerror.c strlcpy.c thread.c win32error.c win32setlocale.c: % : $(top_srcdir)/src/port/%
rm -f $@ && $(LN_S) $< .
ip.c md5.c: % : $(top_srcdir)/src/common/%
@ -102,6 +111,9 @@ ip.c md5.c: % : $(top_srcdir)/src/common/%
encnames.c wchar.c: % : $(backend_src)/utils/mb/%
rm -f $@ && $(LN_S) $< .
base64.c scram-common.c sha2.c sha2_openssl.c: % : $(top_srcdir)/src/common/%
rm -f $@ && $(LN_S) $< .
distprep: libpq-dist.rc

640
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth-scram.c Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,640 @@
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*
* fe-auth-scram.c
* The front-end (client) implementation of SCRAM authentication.
*
* Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2016, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
* Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
*
* IDENTIFICATION
* src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth-scram.c
*
*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
#include "postgres_fe.h"
#include "common/base64.h"
#include "common/scram-common.h"
#include "fe-auth.h"
/* These are needed for getpid(), in the fallback implementation */
#ifndef HAVE_STRONG_RANDOM
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#endif
/*
* Status of exchange messages used for SCRAM authentication via the
* SASL protocol.
*/
typedef enum
{
FE_SCRAM_INIT,
FE_SCRAM_NONCE_SENT,
FE_SCRAM_PROOF_SENT,
FE_SCRAM_FINISHED
} fe_scram_state_enum;
typedef struct
{
fe_scram_state_enum state;
/* These are supplied by the user */
const char *username;
const char *password;
/* We construct these */
char *client_nonce;
char *client_first_message_bare;
char *client_final_message_without_proof;
/* These come from the server-first message */
char *server_first_message;
char *salt;
int saltlen;
int iterations;
char *nonce;
/* These come from the server-final message */
char *server_final_message;
char ServerProof[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
} fe_scram_state;
static bool read_server_first_message(fe_scram_state *state, char *input,
PQExpBuffer errormessage);
static bool read_server_final_message(fe_scram_state *state, char *input,
PQExpBuffer errormessage);
static char *build_client_first_message(fe_scram_state *state,
PQExpBuffer errormessage);
static char *build_client_final_message(fe_scram_state *state,
PQExpBuffer errormessage);
static bool verify_server_proof(fe_scram_state *state);
static void calculate_client_proof(fe_scram_state *state,
const char *client_final_message_without_proof,
uint8 *result);
static bool pg_frontend_random(char *dst, int len);
/*
* Initialize SCRAM exchange status.
*/
void *
pg_fe_scram_init(const char *username, const char *password)
{
fe_scram_state *state;
state = (fe_scram_state *) malloc(sizeof(fe_scram_state));
if (!state)
return NULL;
memset(state, 0, sizeof(fe_scram_state));
state->state = FE_SCRAM_INIT;
state->username = username;
state->password = password;
return state;
}
/*
* Free SCRAM exchange status
*/
void
pg_fe_scram_free(void *opaq)
{
fe_scram_state *state = (fe_scram_state *) opaq;
/* client messages */
if (state->client_nonce)
free(state->client_nonce);
if (state->client_first_message_bare)
free(state->client_first_message_bare);
if (state->client_final_message_without_proof)
free(state->client_final_message_without_proof);
/* first message from server */
if (state->server_first_message)
free(state->server_first_message);
if (state->salt)
free(state->salt);
if (state->nonce)
free(state->nonce);
/* final message from server */
if (state->server_final_message)
free(state->server_final_message);
free(state);
}
/*
* Exchange a SCRAM message with backend.
*/
void
pg_fe_scram_exchange(void *opaq, char *input, int inputlen,
char **output, int *outputlen,
bool *done, bool *success, PQExpBuffer errorMessage)
{
fe_scram_state *state = (fe_scram_state *) opaq;
*done = false;
*success = false;
*output = NULL;
*outputlen = 0;
/*
* Check that the input length agrees with the string length of the input.
* We can ignore inputlen after this.
*/
if (state->state != FE_SCRAM_INIT)
{
if (inputlen == 0)
{
printfPQExpBuffer(errorMessage,
libpq_gettext("malformed SCRAM message (empty message)\n"));
goto error;
}
if (inputlen != strlen(input))
{
printfPQExpBuffer(errorMessage,
libpq_gettext("malformed SCRAM message (length mismatch)\n"));
goto error;
}
}
switch (state->state)
{
case FE_SCRAM_INIT:
/* Begin the SCRAM handshake, by sending client nonce */
*output = build_client_first_message(state, errorMessage);
if (*output == NULL)
goto error;
*outputlen = strlen(*output);
*done = false;
state->state = FE_SCRAM_NONCE_SENT;
break;
case FE_SCRAM_NONCE_SENT:
/* Receive salt and server nonce, send response. */
if (!read_server_first_message(state, input, errorMessage))
goto error;
*output = build_client_final_message(state, errorMessage);
if (*output == NULL)
goto error;
*outputlen = strlen(*output);
*done = false;
state->state = FE_SCRAM_PROOF_SENT;
break;
case FE_SCRAM_PROOF_SENT:
/* Receive server proof */
if (!read_server_final_message(state, input, errorMessage))
goto error;
/*
* Verify server proof, to make sure we're talking to the genuine
* server. XXX: A fake server could simply not require
* authentication, though. There is currently no option in libpq
* to reject a connection, if SCRAM authentication did not happen.
*/
if (verify_server_proof(state))
*success = true;
else
{
*success = false;
printfPQExpBuffer(errorMessage,
libpq_gettext("invalid server proof\n"));
}
*done = true;
state->state = FE_SCRAM_FINISHED;
break;
default:
/* shouldn't happen */
printfPQExpBuffer(errorMessage,
libpq_gettext("invalid SCRAM exchange state\n"));
goto error;
}
return;
error:
*done = true;
*success = false;
return;
}
/*
* Read value for an attribute part of a SASL message.
*/
static char *
read_attr_value(char **input, char attr, PQExpBuffer errorMessage)
{
char *begin = *input;
char *end;
if (*begin != attr)
{
printfPQExpBuffer(errorMessage,
libpq_gettext("malformed SCRAM message (%c expected)\n"),
attr);
return NULL;
}
begin++;
if (*begin != '=')
{
printfPQExpBuffer(errorMessage,
libpq_gettext("malformed SCRAM message (expected = in attr '%c')\n"),
attr);
return NULL;
}
begin++;
end = begin;
while (*end && *end != ',')
end++;
if (*end)
{
*end = '\0';
*input = end + 1;
}
else
*input = end;
return begin;
}
/*
* Build the first exchange message sent by the client.
*/
static char *
build_client_first_message(fe_scram_state *state, PQExpBuffer errormessage)
{
char raw_nonce[SCRAM_RAW_NONCE_LEN + 1];
char *buf;
char buflen;
int encoded_len;
/*
* Generate a "raw" nonce. This is converted to ASCII-printable form by
* base64-encoding it.
*/
if (!pg_frontend_random(raw_nonce, SCRAM_RAW_NONCE_LEN))
{
printfPQExpBuffer(errormessage,
libpq_gettext("failed to generate nonce\n"));
return NULL;
}
state->client_nonce = malloc(pg_b64_enc_len(SCRAM_RAW_NONCE_LEN) + 1);
if (state->client_nonce == NULL)
{
printfPQExpBuffer(errormessage,
libpq_gettext("out of memory\n"));
return NULL;
}
encoded_len = pg_b64_encode(raw_nonce, SCRAM_RAW_NONCE_LEN, state->client_nonce);
state->client_nonce[encoded_len] = '\0';
/*
* Generate message. The username is left empty as the backend uses the
* value provided by the startup packet. Also, as this username is not
* prepared with SASLprep, the message parsing would fail if it includes
* '=' or ',' characters.
*/
buflen = 8 + strlen(state->client_nonce) + 1;
buf = malloc(buflen);
if (buf == NULL)
{
printfPQExpBuffer(errormessage,
libpq_gettext("out of memory\n"));
return NULL;
}
snprintf(buf, buflen, "n,,n=,r=%s", state->client_nonce);
state->client_first_message_bare = strdup(buf + 3);
if (!state->client_first_message_bare)
{
free(buf);
printfPQExpBuffer(errormessage,
libpq_gettext("out of memory\n"));
return NULL;
}
return buf;
}
/*
* Build the final exchange message sent from the client.
*/
static char *
build_client_final_message(fe_scram_state *state, PQExpBuffer errormessage)
{
PQExpBufferData buf;
uint8 client_proof[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
char *result;
initPQExpBuffer(&buf);
/*
* Construct client-final-message-without-proof. We need to remember it
* for verifying the server proof in the final step of authentication.
*/
appendPQExpBuffer(&buf, "c=biws,r=%s", state->nonce);
if (PQExpBufferDataBroken(buf))
goto oom_error;
state->client_final_message_without_proof = strdup(buf.data);
if (state->client_final_message_without_proof == NULL)
goto oom_error;
/* Append proof to it, to form client-final-message. */
calculate_client_proof(state,
state->client_final_message_without_proof,
client_proof);
appendPQExpBuffer(&buf, ",p=");
if (!enlargePQExpBuffer(&buf, pg_b64_enc_len(SCRAM_KEY_LEN)))
goto oom_error;
buf.len += pg_b64_encode((char *) client_proof,
SCRAM_KEY_LEN,
buf.data + buf.len);
buf.data[buf.len] = '\0';
result = strdup(buf.data);
if (result == NULL)
goto oom_error;
termPQExpBuffer(&buf);
return result;
oom_error:
termPQExpBuffer(&buf);
printfPQExpBuffer(errormessage,
libpq_gettext("out of memory\n"));
return NULL;
}
/*
* Read the first exchange message coming from the server.
*/
static bool
read_server_first_message(fe_scram_state *state, char *input,
PQExpBuffer errormessage)
{
char *iterations_str;
char *endptr;
char *encoded_salt;
char *nonce;
state->server_first_message = strdup(input);
if (state->server_first_message == NULL)
{
printfPQExpBuffer(errormessage,
libpq_gettext("out of memory\n"));
return false;
}
/* parse the message */
nonce = read_attr_value(&input, 'r', errormessage);
if (nonce == NULL)
{
/* read_attr_value() has generated an error string */
return false;
}
/* Verify immediately that the server used our part of the nonce */
if (strncmp(nonce, state->client_nonce, strlen(state->client_nonce)) != 0)
{
printfPQExpBuffer(errormessage,
libpq_gettext("invalid SCRAM response (nonce mismatch)\n"));
return false;
}
state->nonce = strdup(nonce);
if (state->nonce == NULL)
{
printfPQExpBuffer(errormessage,
libpq_gettext("out of memory\n"));
return false;
}
encoded_salt = read_attr_value(&input, 's', errormessage);
if (encoded_salt == NULL)
{
/* read_attr_value() has generated an error string */
return false;
}
state->salt = malloc(pg_b64_dec_len(strlen(encoded_salt)));
if (state->salt == NULL)
{
printfPQExpBuffer(errormessage,
libpq_gettext("out of memory\n"));
return false;
}
state->saltlen = pg_b64_decode(encoded_salt,
strlen(encoded_salt),
state->salt);
iterations_str = read_attr_value(&input, 'i', errormessage);
if (iterations_str == NULL)
{
/* read_attr_value() has generated an error string */
return false;
}
state->iterations = strtol(iterations_str, &endptr, SCRAM_ITERATION_LEN);
if (*endptr != '\0' || state->iterations < 1)
{
printfPQExpBuffer(errormessage,
libpq_gettext("malformed SCRAM message (invalid iteration count)\n"));
return false;
}
if (*input != '\0')
printfPQExpBuffer(errormessage,
libpq_gettext("malformed SCRAM message (garbage at end of server-first-message)\n"));
return true;
}
/*
* Read the final exchange message coming from the server.
*/
static bool
read_server_final_message(fe_scram_state *state,
char *input,
PQExpBuffer errormessage)
{
char *encoded_server_proof;
int server_proof_len;
state->server_final_message = strdup(input);
if (!state->server_final_message)
{
printfPQExpBuffer(errormessage,
libpq_gettext("out of memory\n"));
return false;
}
/* Check for error result. */
if (*input == 'e')
{
char *errmsg = read_attr_value(&input, 'e', errormessage);
printfPQExpBuffer(errormessage,
libpq_gettext("error received from server in SASL exchange: %s\n"),
errmsg);
return false;
}
/* Parse the message. */
encoded_server_proof = read_attr_value(&input, 'v', errormessage);
if (encoded_server_proof == NULL)
{
/* read_attr_value() has generated an error message */
return false;
}
if (*input != '\0')
printfPQExpBuffer(errormessage,
libpq_gettext("malformed SCRAM message (garbage at end of server-final-message)\n"));
server_proof_len = pg_b64_decode(encoded_server_proof,
strlen(encoded_server_proof),
state->ServerProof);
if (server_proof_len != SCRAM_KEY_LEN)
{
printfPQExpBuffer(errormessage,
libpq_gettext("malformed SCRAM message (invalid server proof)\n"));
return false;
}
return true;
}
/*
* Calculate the client proof, part of the final exchange message sent
* by the client.
*/
static void
calculate_client_proof(fe_scram_state *state,
const char *client_final_message_without_proof,
uint8 *result)
{
uint8 StoredKey[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
uint8 ClientKey[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
uint8 ClientSignature[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
int i;
scram_HMAC_ctx ctx;
scram_ClientOrServerKey(state->password, state->salt, state->saltlen,
state->iterations, SCRAM_CLIENT_KEY_NAME, ClientKey);
scram_H(ClientKey, SCRAM_KEY_LEN, StoredKey);
scram_HMAC_init(&ctx, StoredKey, SCRAM_KEY_LEN);
scram_HMAC_update(&ctx,
state->client_first_message_bare,
strlen(state->client_first_message_bare));
scram_HMAC_update(&ctx, ",", 1);
scram_HMAC_update(&ctx,
state->server_first_message,
strlen(state->server_first_message));
scram_HMAC_update(&ctx, ",", 1);
scram_HMAC_update(&ctx,
client_final_message_without_proof,
strlen(client_final_message_without_proof));
scram_HMAC_final(ClientSignature, &ctx);
for (i = 0; i < SCRAM_KEY_LEN; i++)
result[i] = ClientKey[i] ^ ClientSignature[i];
}
/*
* Validate the server proof, received as part of the final exchange message
* received from the server.
*/
static bool
verify_server_proof(fe_scram_state *state)
{
uint8 ServerSignature[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
uint8 ServerKey[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
scram_HMAC_ctx ctx;
scram_ClientOrServerKey(state->password, state->salt, state->saltlen,
state->iterations, SCRAM_SERVER_KEY_NAME,
ServerKey);
/* calculate ServerSignature */
scram_HMAC_init(&ctx, ServerKey, SCRAM_KEY_LEN);
scram_HMAC_update(&ctx,
state->client_first_message_bare,
strlen(state->client_first_message_bare));
scram_HMAC_update(&ctx, ",", 1);
scram_HMAC_update(&ctx,
state->server_first_message,
strlen(state->server_first_message));
scram_HMAC_update(&ctx, ",", 1);
scram_HMAC_update(&ctx,
state->client_final_message_without_proof,
strlen(state->client_final_message_without_proof));
scram_HMAC_final(ServerSignature, &ctx);
if (memcmp(ServerSignature, state->ServerProof, SCRAM_KEY_LEN) != 0)
return false;
return true;
}
/*
* Random number generator.
*/
static bool
pg_frontend_random(char *dst, int len)
{
#ifdef HAVE_STRONG_RANDOM
return pg_strong_random(dst, len);
#else
int i;
char *end = dst + len;
static unsigned short seed[3];
static int mypid = 0;
pglock_thread();
if (mypid != getpid())
{
struct timeval now;
gettimeofday(&now, NULL);
seed[0] = now.tv_sec ^ getpid();
seed[1] = (unsigned short) (now.tv_usec);
seed[2] = (unsigned short) (now.tv_usec >> 16);
}
for (i = 0; dst < end; i++)
{
uint32 r;
int j;
/*
* pg_jrand48 returns a 32-bit integer. Fill the next 4 bytes from
* it.
*/
r = (uint32) pg_jrand48(seed);
for (j = 0; j < 4 && dst < end; j++)
{
*(dst++) = (char) (r & 0xFF);
r >>= 8;
}
}
pgunlock_thread();
return true;
#endif
}

112
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth.c
View File

@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
#include "common/md5.h"
#include "libpq-fe.h"
#include "libpq/scram.h"
#include "fe-auth.h"
@ -432,6 +433,87 @@ pg_SSPI_startup(PGconn *conn, int use_negotiate)
}
#endif /* ENABLE_SSPI */
/*
* Initialize SASL authentication exchange.
*/
static bool
pg_SASL_init(PGconn *conn, const char *auth_mechanism)
{
/*
* Check the authentication mechanism (only SCRAM-SHA-256 is supported at
* the moment.)
*/
if (strcmp(auth_mechanism, SCRAM_SHA256_NAME) == 0)
{
char *password = conn->connhost[conn->whichhost].password;
if (password == NULL)
password = conn->pgpass;
conn->password_needed = true;
if (password == NULL || password == '\0')
{
printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
PQnoPasswordSupplied);
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
conn->sasl_state = pg_fe_scram_init(conn->pguser, password);
if (!conn->sasl_state)
{
printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
libpq_gettext("out of memory\n"));
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
return STATUS_OK;
}
else
{
printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
libpq_gettext("SASL authentication mechanism %s not supported\n"),
(char *) conn->auth_req_inbuf);
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
}
/*
* Exchange a message for SASL communication protocol with the backend.
* This should be used after calling pg_SASL_init to set up the status of
* the protocol.
*/
static int
pg_SASL_exchange(PGconn *conn)
{
char *output;
int outputlen;
bool done;
bool success;
int res;
pg_fe_scram_exchange(conn->sasl_state,
conn->auth_req_inbuf, conn->auth_req_inlen,
&output, &outputlen,
&done, &success, &conn->errorMessage);
if (outputlen != 0)
{
/*
* Send the SASL response to the server. We don't care if it's the
* first or subsequent packet, just send the same kind of password
* packet.
*/
res = pqPacketSend(conn, 'p', output, outputlen);
free(output);
if (res != STATUS_OK)
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
if (done && !success)
return STATUS_ERROR;
return STATUS_OK;
}
/*
* Respond to AUTH_REQ_SCM_CREDS challenge.
*
@ -707,6 +789,36 @@ pg_fe_sendauth(AuthRequest areq, PGconn *conn)
break;
}
case AUTH_REQ_SASL:
/*
* The request contains the name (as assigned by IANA) of the
* authentication mechanism.
*/
if (pg_SASL_init(conn, conn->auth_req_inbuf) != STATUS_OK)
{
/* pg_SASL_init already set the error message */
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
/* fall through */
case AUTH_REQ_SASL_CONT:
if (conn->sasl_state == NULL)
{
printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
"fe_sendauth: invalid authentication request from server: AUTH_REQ_SASL_CONT without AUTH_REQ_SASL\n");
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
if (pg_SASL_exchange(conn) != STATUS_OK)
{
/* Use error message, if set already */
if (conn->errorMessage.len == 0)
printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
"fe_sendauth: error in SASL authentication\n");
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
break;
case AUTH_REQ_SCM_CREDS:
if (pg_local_sendauth(conn) != STATUS_OK)
return STATUS_ERROR;

8
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth.h
View File

@ -18,7 +18,15 @@
#include "libpq-int.h"
/* Prototypes for functions in fe-auth.c */
extern int pg_fe_sendauth(AuthRequest areq, PGconn *conn);
extern char *pg_fe_getauthname(PQExpBuffer errorMessage);
/* Prototypes for functions in fe-auth-scram.c */
extern void *pg_fe_scram_init(const char *username, const char *password);
extern void pg_fe_scram_free(void *opaq);
extern void pg_fe_scram_exchange(void *opaq, char *input, int inputlen,
char **output, int *outputlen,
bool *done, bool *success, PQExpBuffer errorMessage);
#endif /* FE_AUTH_H */

52
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
View File

@ -2720,6 +2720,49 @@ keep_going: /* We will come back to here until there is
}
}
#endif
/* Get additional payload for SASL, if any */
if ((areq == AUTH_REQ_SASL ||
areq == AUTH_REQ_SASL_CONT) &&
msgLength > 4)
{
int llen = msgLength - 4;
/*
* We can be called repeatedly for the same buffer. Avoid
* re-allocating the buffer in this case - just re-use the
* old buffer.
*/
if (llen != conn->auth_req_inlen)
{
if (conn->auth_req_inbuf)
{
free(conn->auth_req_inbuf);
conn->auth_req_inbuf = NULL;
}
conn->auth_req_inlen = llen;
conn->auth_req_inbuf = malloc(llen + 1);
if (!conn->auth_req_inbuf)
{
printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
libpq_gettext("out of memory allocating SASL buffer (%d)"),
llen);
goto error_return;
}
}
if (pqGetnchar(conn->auth_req_inbuf, llen, conn))
{
/* We'll come back when there is more data. */
return PGRES_POLLING_READING;
}
/*
* For safety and convenience, always ensure the in-buffer
* is NULL-terminated.
*/
conn->auth_req_inbuf[llen] = '\0';
}
/*
* OK, we successfully read the message; mark data consumed
@ -3506,6 +3549,15 @@ closePGconn(PGconn *conn)
conn->sspictx = NULL;
}
#endif
if (conn->sasl_state)
{
/*
* XXX: if support for more authentication mechanisms is added, this
* needs to call the right 'free' function.
*/
pg_fe_scram_free(conn->sasl_state);
conn->sasl_state = NULL;
}
}
/*

7
src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
View File

@ -453,7 +453,12 @@ struct pg_conn
PGresult *result; /* result being constructed */
PGresult *next_result; /* next result (used in single-row mode) */
/* Assorted state for SSL, GSS, etc */
/* Buffer to hold incoming authentication request data */
char *auth_req_inbuf;
int auth_req_inlen;
/* Assorted state for SASL, SSL, GSS, etc */
void *sasl_state;
#ifdef USE_SSL
bool allow_ssl_try; /* Allowed to try SSL negotiation */

12
src/tools/msvc/Mkvcbuild.pm
View File

@ -110,9 +110,9 @@ sub mkvcbuild
}
our @pgcommonallfiles = qw(
config_info.c controldata_utils.c exec.c ip.c keywords.c
base64.c config_info.c controldata_utils.c exec.c ip.c keywords.c
md5.c pg_lzcompress.c pgfnames.c psprintf.c relpath.c rmtree.c
string.c username.c wait_error.c);
scram-common.c string.c username.c wait_error.c);
if ($solution->{options}->{openssl})
{
@ -233,10 +233,16 @@ sub mkvcbuild
$libpq->AddReference($libpgport);
# The OBJS scraper doesn't know about ifdefs, so remove fe-secure-openssl.c
# if building without OpenSSL
# and sha2_openssl.c if building without OpenSSL, and remove sha2.c if
# building with OpenSSL.
if (!$solution->{options}->{openssl})
{
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-openssl.c');
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/common/sha2_openssl.c');
}
else
{
$libpq->RemoveFile('src/common/sha2.c');
}
my $libpqwalreceiver =