Prevent access to external files/URLs via contrib/xml2's xslt_process().

libxslt offers the ability to read and write both files and URLs through
stylesheet commands, thus allowing unprivileged database users to both read
and write data with the privileges of the database server.  Disable that
through proper use of libxslt's security options.

Also, remove xslt_process()'s ability to fetch documents and stylesheets
from external files/URLs.  While this was a documented "feature", it was
long regarded as a terrible idea.  The fix for CVE-2012-3489 broke that
capability, and rather than expend effort on trying to fix it, we're just
going to summarily remove it.

While the ability to write as well as read makes this security hole
considerably worse than CVE-2012-3489, the problem is mitigated by the fact
that xslt_process() is not available unless contrib/xml2 is installed,
and the longstanding warnings about security risks from that should have
discouraged prudent DBAs from installing it in security-exposed databases.

Reported and fixed by Peter Eisentraut.

Security: CVE-2012-3488

contrib/xml2/expected/xml2.out

@@ -145,3 +145,18 @@ values
 Value</attribute></attributes>');
 create index idx_xpath on t1 ( xpath_string
 ('/attributes/attribute[@name="attr_1"]/text()', xml_data::text));
+-- possible security exploit
+SELECT xslt_process('<xml><foo>Hello from XML</foo></xml>',
+$$<xsl:stylesheet version="1.0"
+      xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform"
+      xmlns:sax="http://icl.com/saxon"
+      extension-element-prefixes="sax">
+
+  <xsl:template match="//foo">
+    <sax:output href="0wn3d.txt" method="text">
+      <xsl:value-of select="'0wn3d via xml2 extension and libxslt'"/>
+      <xsl:apply-templates/>
+    </sax:output>
+  </xsl:template>
+</xsl:stylesheet>$$);
+ERROR:  failed to apply stylesheet

contrib/xml2/expected/xml2_1.out

@@ -107,3 +107,18 @@ values
 Value</attribute></attributes>');
 create index idx_xpath on t1 ( xpath_string
 ('/attributes/attribute[@name="attr_1"]/text()', xml_data::text));
+-- possible security exploit
+SELECT xslt_process('<xml><foo>Hello from XML</foo></xml>',
+$$<xsl:stylesheet version="1.0"
+      xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform"
+      xmlns:sax="http://icl.com/saxon"
+      extension-element-prefixes="sax">
+
+  <xsl:template match="//foo">
+    <sax:output href="0wn3d.txt" method="text">
+      <xsl:value-of select="'0wn3d via xml2 extension and libxslt'"/>
+      <xsl:apply-templates/>
+    </sax:output>
+  </xsl:template>
+</xsl:stylesheet>$$);
+ERROR:  xslt_process() is not available without libxslt

contrib/xml2/sql/xml2.sql

@@ -80,3 +80,18 @@ Value</attribute></attributes>');
 
 create index idx_xpath on t1 ( xpath_string
 ('/attributes/attribute[@name="attr_1"]/text()', xml_data::text));
+
+-- possible security exploit
+SELECT xslt_process('<xml><foo>Hello from XML</foo></xml>',
+$$<xsl:stylesheet version="1.0"
+      xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform"
+      xmlns:sax="http://icl.com/saxon"
+      extension-element-prefixes="sax">
+
+  <xsl:template match="//foo">
+    <sax:output href="0wn3d.txt" method="text">
+      <xsl:value-of select="'0wn3d via xml2 extension and libxslt'"/>
+      <xsl:apply-templates/>
+    </sax:output>
+  </xsl:template>
+</xsl:stylesheet>$$);

contrib/xml2/xslt_proc.c

@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
 
 #include <libxslt/xslt.h>
 #include <libxslt/xsltInternals.h>
+#include <libxslt/security.h>
 #include <libxslt/transform.h>
 #include <libxslt/xsltutils.h>
 
@@ -64,7 +65,10 @@ xslt_process(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
 	xsltStylesheetPtr stylesheet = NULL;
 	xmlDocPtr	doctree;
 	xmlDocPtr	restree;
-	xmlDocPtr	ssdoc = NULL;
+	xmlDocPtr	ssdoc;
+	xsltSecurityPrefsPtr xslt_sec_prefs;
+	bool		xslt_sec_prefs_error;
+	xsltTransformContextPtr xslt_ctxt;
 	xmlChar    *resstr;
 	int			resstat;
 	int			reslen;
@@ -81,34 +85,27 @@ xslt_process(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
 	/* Setup parser */
 	pgxml_parser_init();
 
-	/* Check to see if document is a file or a literal */
-
-	if (VARDATA(doct)[0] == '<')
-		doctree = xmlParseMemory((char *) VARDATA(doct), VARSIZE(doct) - VARHDRSZ);
-	else
-		doctree = xmlParseFile(text_to_cstring(doct));
+	/* Parse document */
+	doctree = xmlParseMemory((char *) VARDATA(doct),
+							 VARSIZE(doct) - VARHDRSZ);
 
 	if (doctree == NULL)
 		xml_ereport(ERROR, ERRCODE_EXTERNAL_ROUTINE_EXCEPTION,
 					"error parsing XML document");
 
 	/* Same for stylesheet */
-	if (VARDATA(ssheet)[0] == '<')
+	ssdoc = xmlParseMemory((char *) VARDATA(ssheet),
+						   VARSIZE(ssheet) - VARHDRSZ);
+
+	if (ssdoc == NULL)
 	{
-		ssdoc = xmlParseMemory((char *) VARDATA(ssheet),
-							   VARSIZE(ssheet) - VARHDRSZ);
-		if (ssdoc == NULL)
-		{
-			xmlFreeDoc(doctree);
-			xml_ereport(ERROR, ERRCODE_EXTERNAL_ROUTINE_EXCEPTION,
-						"error parsing stylesheet as XML document");
-		}
-
-		stylesheet = xsltParseStylesheetDoc(ssdoc);
+		xmlFreeDoc(doctree);
+		xml_ereport(ERROR, ERRCODE_EXTERNAL_ROUTINE_EXCEPTION,
+					"error parsing stylesheet as XML document");
 	}
-	else
-		stylesheet = xsltParseStylesheetFile((xmlChar *) text_to_cstring(ssheet));
 
+	/* After this call we need not free ssdoc separately */
+	stylesheet = xsltParseStylesheetDoc(ssdoc);
 
 	if (stylesheet == NULL)
 	{
@@ -118,12 +115,50 @@ xslt_process(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
 					"failed to parse stylesheet");
 	}
 
-	restree = xsltApplyStylesheet(stylesheet, doctree, params);
+	xslt_ctxt = xsltNewTransformContext(stylesheet, doctree);
+
+	xslt_sec_prefs_error = false;
+	if ((xslt_sec_prefs = xsltNewSecurityPrefs()) == NULL)
+		xslt_sec_prefs_error = true;
+
+	if (xsltSetSecurityPrefs(xslt_sec_prefs, XSLT_SECPREF_READ_FILE,
+							 xsltSecurityForbid) != 0)
+		xslt_sec_prefs_error = true;
+	if (xsltSetSecurityPrefs(xslt_sec_prefs, XSLT_SECPREF_WRITE_FILE,
+							 xsltSecurityForbid) != 0)
+		xslt_sec_prefs_error = true;
+	if (xsltSetSecurityPrefs(xslt_sec_prefs, XSLT_SECPREF_CREATE_DIRECTORY,
+							 xsltSecurityForbid) != 0)
+		xslt_sec_prefs_error = true;
+	if (xsltSetSecurityPrefs(xslt_sec_prefs, XSLT_SECPREF_READ_NETWORK,
+							 xsltSecurityForbid) != 0)
+		xslt_sec_prefs_error = true;
+	if (xsltSetSecurityPrefs(xslt_sec_prefs, XSLT_SECPREF_WRITE_NETWORK,
+							 xsltSecurityForbid) != 0)
+		xslt_sec_prefs_error = true;
+	if (xsltSetCtxtSecurityPrefs(xslt_sec_prefs, xslt_ctxt) != 0)
+		xslt_sec_prefs_error = true;
+
+	if (xslt_sec_prefs_error)
+	{
+		xsltFreeStylesheet(stylesheet);
+		xmlFreeDoc(doctree);
+		xsltFreeSecurityPrefs(xslt_sec_prefs);
+		xsltFreeTransformContext(xslt_ctxt);
+		xsltCleanupGlobals();
+		xml_ereport(ERROR, ERRCODE_EXTERNAL_ROUTINE_EXCEPTION,
+					"could not set libxslt security preferences");
+	}
+
+	restree = xsltApplyStylesheetUser(stylesheet, doctree, params,
+									  NULL, NULL, xslt_ctxt);
 
 	if (restree == NULL)
 	{
 		xsltFreeStylesheet(stylesheet);
 		xmlFreeDoc(doctree);
+		xsltFreeSecurityPrefs(xslt_sec_prefs);
+		xsltFreeTransformContext(xslt_ctxt);
 		xsltCleanupGlobals();
 		xml_ereport(ERROR, ERRCODE_EXTERNAL_ROUTINE_EXCEPTION,
 					"failed to apply stylesheet");
@@ -134,6 +169,8 @@ xslt_process(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
 	xsltFreeStylesheet(stylesheet);
 	xmlFreeDoc(restree);
 	xmlFreeDoc(doctree);
+	xsltFreeSecurityPrefs(xslt_sec_prefs);
+	xsltFreeTransformContext(xslt_ctxt);
 
 	xsltCleanupGlobals();
 

doc/src/sgml/xml2.sgml

@@ -394,14 +394,6 @@ WHERE t.author_id = p.person_id;
     contain commas!
    </para>
 
-   <para>
-    Also note that if either the document or stylesheet values do not
-    begin with a &lt; then they will be treated as URLs and libxslt will
-    fetch them. It follows that you can use <function>xslt_process</> as a
-    means to fetch the contents of URLs &mdash; you should be aware of the
-    security implications of this.
-   </para>
-
    <para>
     There is also a two-parameter version of <function>xslt_process</> which
     does not pass any parameters to the transformation.