Refactor the code for verifying user's password.

Split md5_crypt_verify() into three functions:
* get_role_password() to fetch user's password from pg_authid, and check
  its expiration.
* md5_crypt_verify() to check an MD5 authentication challenge
* plain_crypt_verify() to check a plaintext password.

get_role_password() will be needed as a separate function by the upcoming
SCRAM authentication patch set. Most of the remaining functionality in
md5_crypt_verify() was different for MD5 and plaintext authentication, so
split that for readability.

While we're at it, simplify the *_crypt_verify functions by using
stack-allocated buffers to hold the temporary MD5 hashes, instead of
pallocing.

Reviewed by Michael Paquier.

Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/3029e460-d47c-710e-507e-d8ba759d7cbb@iki.fi
This commit is contained in:
Heikki Linnakangas 2016-12-12 12:48:13 +02:00
parent 58445c5c8d
commit e7f051b8f9
3 changed files with 168 additions and 106 deletions

View File

@ -704,6 +704,7 @@ CheckMD5Auth(Port *port, char **logdetail)
{
char md5Salt[4]; /* Password salt */
char *passwd;
char *shadow_pass;
int result;
if (Db_user_namespace)
@ -722,12 +723,16 @@ CheckMD5Auth(Port *port, char **logdetail)
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_MD5, md5Salt, 4);
passwd = recv_password_packet(port);
if (passwd == NULL)
return STATUS_EOF; /* client wouldn't send password */
result = md5_crypt_verify(port->user_name, passwd, md5Salt, 4, logdetail);
result = get_role_password(port->user_name, &shadow_pass, logdetail);
if (result == STATUS_OK)
result = md5_crypt_verify(port->user_name, shadow_pass, passwd,
md5Salt, 4, logdetail);
if (shadow_pass)
pfree(shadow_pass);
pfree(passwd);
return result;
@ -743,16 +748,21 @@ CheckPasswordAuth(Port *port, char **logdetail)
{
char *passwd;
int result;
char *shadow_pass;
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_PASSWORD, NULL, 0);
passwd = recv_password_packet(port);
if (passwd == NULL)
return STATUS_EOF; /* client wouldn't send password */
result = md5_crypt_verify(port->user_name, passwd, NULL, 0, logdetail);
result = get_role_password(port->user_name, &shadow_pass, logdetail);
if (result == STATUS_OK)
result = plain_crypt_verify(port->user_name, shadow_pass, passwd,
logdetail);
if (shadow_pass)
pfree(shadow_pass);
pfree(passwd);
return result;

View File

@ -30,28 +30,28 @@
/*
* Check given password for given user, and return STATUS_OK or STATUS_ERROR.
* Fetch stored password for a user, for authentication.
*
* 'client_pass' is the password response given by the remote user. If
* 'md5_salt' is not NULL, it is a response to an MD5 authentication
* challenge, with the given salt. Otherwise, it is a plaintext password.
* Returns STATUS_OK on success. On error, returns STATUS_ERROR, and stores
* a palloc'd string describing the reason, for the postmaster log, in
* *logdetail. The error reason should *not* be sent to the client, to avoid
* giving away user information!
*
* In the error case, optionally store a palloc'd string at *logdetail
* that will be sent to the postmaster log (but not the client).
* If the password is expired, it is still returned in *shadow_pass, but the
* return code is STATUS_ERROR. On other errors, *shadow_pass is set to
* NULL.
*/
int
md5_crypt_verify(const char *role, char *client_pass,
char *md5_salt, int md5_salt_len, char **logdetail)
get_role_password(const char *role, char **shadow_pass, char **logdetail)
{
int retval = STATUS_ERROR;
char *shadow_pass,
*crypt_pwd;
TimestampTz vuntil = 0;
char *crypt_client_pass = client_pass;
HeapTuple roleTup;
Datum datum;
bool isnull;
*shadow_pass = NULL;
/* Get role info from pg_authid */
roleTup = SearchSysCache1(AUTHNAME, PointerGetDatum(role));
if (!HeapTupleIsValid(roleTup))
@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ md5_crypt_verify(const char *role, char *client_pass,
role);
return STATUS_ERROR; /* user has no password */
}
shadow_pass = TextDatumGetCString(datum);
*shadow_pass = TextDatumGetCString(datum);
datum = SysCacheGetAttr(AUTHNAME, roleTup,
Anum_pg_authid_rolvaliduntil, &isnull);
@ -79,104 +79,151 @@ md5_crypt_verify(const char *role, char *client_pass,
ReleaseSysCache(roleTup);
if (*shadow_pass == '\0')
if (**shadow_pass == '\0')
{
*logdetail = psprintf(_("User \"%s\" has an empty password."),
role);
pfree(*shadow_pass);
*shadow_pass = NULL;
return STATUS_ERROR; /* empty password */
}
/*
* Compare with the encrypted or plain password depending on the
* authentication method being used for this connection. (We do not
* bother setting logdetail for pg_md5_encrypt failure: the only possible
* error is out-of-memory, which is unlikely, and if it did happen adding
* a psprintf call would only make things worse.)
* Password OK, now check to be sure we are not past rolvaliduntil
*/
if (md5_salt)
if (isnull)
retval = STATUS_OK;
else if (vuntil < GetCurrentTimestamp())
{
/* MD5 authentication */
Assert(md5_salt_len > 0);
crypt_pwd = palloc(MD5_PASSWD_LEN + 1);
if (isMD5(shadow_pass))
{
/* stored password already encrypted, only do salt */
if (!pg_md5_encrypt(shadow_pass + strlen("md5"),
md5_salt, md5_salt_len,
crypt_pwd))
{
pfree(crypt_pwd);
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
}
else
{
/* stored password is plain, double-encrypt */
char *crypt_pwd2 = palloc(MD5_PASSWD_LEN + 1);
if (!pg_md5_encrypt(shadow_pass,
role,
strlen(role),
crypt_pwd2))
{
pfree(crypt_pwd);
pfree(crypt_pwd2);
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
if (!pg_md5_encrypt(crypt_pwd2 + strlen("md5"),
md5_salt, md5_salt_len,
crypt_pwd))
{
pfree(crypt_pwd);
pfree(crypt_pwd2);
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
pfree(crypt_pwd2);
}
}
else
{
/* Client sent password in plaintext */
if (isMD5(shadow_pass))
{
/* Encrypt user-supplied password to match stored MD5 */
crypt_client_pass = palloc(MD5_PASSWD_LEN + 1);
if (!pg_md5_encrypt(client_pass,
role,
strlen(role),
crypt_client_pass))
{
pfree(crypt_client_pass);
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
}
crypt_pwd = shadow_pass;
}
if (strcmp(crypt_client_pass, crypt_pwd) == 0)
{
/*
* Password OK, now check to be sure we are not past rolvaliduntil
*/
if (isnull)
retval = STATUS_OK;
else if (vuntil < GetCurrentTimestamp())
{
*logdetail = psprintf(_("User \"%s\" has an expired password."),
role);
retval = STATUS_ERROR;
}
else
retval = STATUS_OK;
}
else
*logdetail = psprintf(_("Password does not match for user \"%s\"."),
*logdetail = psprintf(_("User \"%s\" has an expired password."),
role);
if (crypt_pwd != shadow_pass)
pfree(crypt_pwd);
if (crypt_client_pass != client_pass)
pfree(crypt_client_pass);
retval = STATUS_ERROR;
}
else
retval = STATUS_OK;
return retval;
}
/*
* Check MD5 authentication response, and return STATUS_OK or STATUS_ERROR.
*
* 'shadow_pass' is the user's correct password or password hash, as stored
* in pg_authid.rolpassword.
* 'client_pass' is the response given by the remote user to the MD5 challenge.
* 'md5_salt' is the salt used in the MD5 authentication challenge.
*
* In the error case, optionally store a palloc'd string at *logdetail
* that will be sent to the postmaster log (but not the client).
*/
int
md5_crypt_verify(const char *role, const char *shadow_pass,
const char *client_pass,
const char *md5_salt, int md5_salt_len,
char **logdetail)
{
int retval;
char crypt_pwd[MD5_PASSWD_LEN + 1];
char crypt_pwd2[MD5_PASSWD_LEN + 1];
Assert(md5_salt_len > 0);
/*
* Compute the correct answer for the MD5 challenge.
*
* We do not bother setting logdetail for any pg_md5_encrypt failure
* below: the only possible error is out-of-memory, which is unlikely, and
* if it did happen adding a psprintf call would only make things worse.
*/
if (isMD5(shadow_pass))
{
/* stored password already encrypted, only do salt */
if (!pg_md5_encrypt(shadow_pass + strlen("md5"),
md5_salt, md5_salt_len,
crypt_pwd))
{
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
}
else
{
/* stored password is plain, double-encrypt */
if (!pg_md5_encrypt(shadow_pass,
role,
strlen(role),
crypt_pwd2))
{
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
if (!pg_md5_encrypt(crypt_pwd2 + strlen("md5"),
md5_salt, md5_salt_len,
crypt_pwd))
{
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
}
if (strcmp(client_pass, crypt_pwd) == 0)
retval = STATUS_OK;
else
{
*logdetail = psprintf(_("Password does not match for user \"%s\"."),
role);
retval = STATUS_ERROR;
}
return retval;
}
/*
* Check given password for given user, and return STATUS_OK or STATUS_ERROR.
*
* 'shadow_pass' is the user's correct password or password hash, as stored
* in pg_authid.rolpassword.
* 'client_pass' is the password given by the remote user.
*
* In the error case, optionally store a palloc'd string at *logdetail
* that will be sent to the postmaster log (but not the client).
*/
int
plain_crypt_verify(const char *role, const char *shadow_pass,
const char *client_pass,
char **logdetail)
{
int retval;
char crypt_client_pass[MD5_PASSWD_LEN + 1];
/*
* Client sent password in plaintext. If we have an MD5 hash stored, hash
* the password the client sent, and compare the hashes. Otherwise
* compare the plaintext passwords directly.
*/
if (isMD5(shadow_pass))
{
if (!pg_md5_encrypt(client_pass,
role,
strlen(role),
crypt_client_pass))
{
/*
* We do not bother setting logdetail for pg_md5_encrypt failure:
* the only possible error is out-of-memory, which is unlikely,
* and if it did happen adding a psprintf call would only make
* things worse.
*/
return STATUS_ERROR;
}
client_pass = crypt_client_pass;
}
if (strcmp(client_pass, shadow_pass) == 0)
retval = STATUS_OK;
else
{
*logdetail = psprintf(_("Password does not match for user \"%s\"."),
role);
retval = STATUS_ERROR;
}
return retval;
}

View File

@ -15,7 +15,12 @@
#include "datatype/timestamp.h"
extern int md5_crypt_verify(const char *role, char *client_pass,
char *md5_salt, int md5_salt_len, char **logdetail);
extern int get_role_password(const char *role, char **shadow_pass, char **logdetail);
extern int md5_crypt_verify(const char *role, const char *shadow_pass,
const char *client_pass, const char *md5_salt,
int md5_salt_len, char **logdetail);
extern int plain_crypt_verify(const char *role, const char *shadow_pass,
const char *client_pass, char **logdetail);
#endif