The basic rule we follow here is to always first include 'postgres.h' or
'postgres_fe.h' whichever is applicable, then system header includes and
then Postgres header includes. In this, we also follow that all the
Postgres header includes are in order based on their ASCII value. We
generally follow these rules, but the code has deviated in many places.
This commit makes it consistent just for contrib modules. The later
commits will enforce similar rules in other parts of code.
Author: Vignesh C
Reviewed-by: Amit Kapila
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CALDaNm2Sznv8RR6Ex-iJO6xAdsxgWhCoETkaYX=+9DW3q0QCfA@mail.gmail.com
This removes a portion of infrastructure introduced by fe0a0b5 to allow
compilation of Postgres in environments where no strong random source is
available, meaning that there is no linking to OpenSSL and no
/dev/urandom (Windows having its own CryptoAPI). No systems shipped
this century lack /dev/urandom, and the buildfarm is actually not
testing this switch at all, so just remove it. This simplifies
particularly some backend code which included a fallback implementation
using shared memory, and removes a set of alternate regression output
files from pgcrypto.
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Tom Lane
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20181230063219.GG608@paquier.xyz
This adds a new routine, pg_strong_random() for generating random bytes,
for use in both frontend and backend. At the moment, it's only used in
the backend, but the upcoming SCRAM authentication patches need strong
random numbers in libpq as well.
pg_strong_random() is based on, and replaces, the existing implementation
in pgcrypto. It can acquire strong random numbers from a number of sources,
depending on what's available:
- OpenSSL RAND_bytes(), if built with OpenSSL
- On Windows, the native cryptographic functions are used
- /dev/urandom
Unlike the current pgcrypto function, the source is chosen by configure.
That makes it easier to test different implementations, and ensures that
we don't accidentally fall back to a less secure implementation, if the
primary source fails. All of those methods are quite reliable, it would be
pretty surprising for them to fail, so we'd rather find out by failing
hard.
If no strong random source is available, we fall back to using erand48(),
seeded from current timestamp, like PostmasterRandom() was. That isn't
cryptographically secure, but allows us to still work on platforms that
don't have any of the above stronger sources. Because it's not very secure,
the built-in implementation is only used if explicitly requested with
--disable-strong-random.
This replaces the more complicated Fortuna algorithm we used to have in
pgcrypto, which is unfortunate, but all modern platforms have /dev/urandom,
so it doesn't seem worth the maintenance effort to keep that. pgcrypto
functions that require strong random numbers will be disabled with
--disable-strong-random.
Original patch by Magnus Hagander, tons of further work by Michael Paquier
and me.
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqRy3krN8quR9XujMVVHYtXJ0_60nqgVc6oUk8ygyVkZsA@mail.gmail.com
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqRWkNYRRPJA7-cF+LfroYV10pvjdz6GNvxk-Eee9FypKA@mail.gmail.com
Changes needed to build at all:
- Check for SSL_new in configure, now that SSL_library_init is a macro.
- Do not access struct members directly. This includes some new code in
pgcrypto, to use the resource owner mechanism to ensure that we don't
leak OpenSSL handles, now that we can't embed them in other structs
anymore.
- RAND_SSLeay() -> RAND_OpenSSL()
Changes that were needed to silence deprecation warnings, but were not
strictly necessary:
- RAND_pseudo_bytes() -> RAND_bytes().
- SSL_library_init() and OpenSSL_config() -> OPENSSL_init_ssl()
- ASN1_STRING_data() -> ASN1_STRING_get0_data()
- DH_generate_parameters() -> DH_generate_parameters()
- Locking callbacks are not needed with OpenSSL 1.1.0 anymore. (Good
riddance!)
Also change references to SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER with OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER,
for the sake of consistency. OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER has existed since time
immemorial.
Fix SSL test suite to work with OpenSSL 1.1.0. CA certificates must have
the "CA:true" basic constraint extension now, or OpenSSL will refuse them.
Regenerate the test certificates with that. The "openssl" binary, used to
generate the certificates, is also now more picky, and throws an error
if an X509 extension is specified in "req_extensions", but that section
is empty.
Backpatch to all supported branches, per popular demand. In back-branches,
we still support OpenSSL 0.9.7 and above. OpenSSL 0.9.6 should still work
too, but I didn't test it. In master, we only support 0.9.8 and above.
Patch by Andreas Karlsson, with additional changes by me.
Discussion: <20160627151604.GD1051@msg.df7cb.de>
pgcrypto already supports key-stretching during symmetric encryption,
including the salted-and-iterated method; but the number of iterations
was not configurable. This commit implements a new s2k-count parameter
to pgp_sym_encrypt() which permits selecting a larger number of
iterations.
Author: Jeff Janes
Specifically, on-stack memset() might be removed, so:
* Replace memset() with px_memset()
* Add px_memset to copy_crlf()
* Add px_memset to pgp-s2k.c
Patch by Marko Kreen
Report by PVS-Studio
Backpatch through 8.4.
pgp.h used to require including mbuf.h and px.h first. Include those in
pgp.h, so that it can be used without prerequisites. Remove mbuf.h
inclusions in .c files where mbuf.h features are not used
directly. (px.h was always used.)
This warning is new in gcc 4.6 and part of -Wall. This patch cleans
up most of the noise, but there are some still warnings that are
trickier to remove.
Amit Kapila
Michael Paquier
Heikki Linnakangas
Alvaro Herrera
Bruce Momjian
Peter Eisentraut
Magnus Hagander
Tom Lane