Allow pg_shadow to be MD5 encrypted.
Add ENCRYPTED/UNENCRYPTED option to CREATE/ALTER user.
Add password_encryption postgresql.conf option.
Update wire protocol version to 2.1.
system supports SO_PEERCRED requests for Unix sockets. This is an
amalgamation of patches submitted by Helge Bahmann and Oliver Elphick,
with some editorializing by yours truly.
a new postmaster child process. This should eliminate problems with
authentication blocking (e.g., ident, SSL init) and also reduce problems
with the accept queue filling up under heavy load.
The option to send elog output to a different file per backend (postgres -o)
has been disabled for now because the initialization would have to happen
in a different order and it's not clear we want to keep this anyway.
(rather than compile time). For libpq, even when Kerberos support is
compiled in, the default user name should still fall back to geteuid()
if it can't be determined via the Kerberos system.
A couple of fixes for string type configuration parameters, now that there
is one.
files to restrict the set of users that can connect to a database
but can still use the pg_shadow password. (You just leave off the
password field in the secondary file.)
Most (nearly all) of the work was done by David Wragg <dpw@doc.ic.ac.uk>
He patched 6.5.3. I've updated it for 7.0RC5.
It works for MIT kerberos 1.1.1 (and previously for 1.0.6 as well).
I've got the patch against 6.5.3, plus kerberized RPMS.
Mike Wyer <mw@doc.ic.ac.uk> || "Woof?"
When drawing up a very simple "text-drawing" of how the negotiation is done,
I realised I had done this last part (fallback) in a very stupid way. Patch
#4 fixes this, and does it in a much better way.
Included is also the simple text-drawing of how the negotiation is done.
//Magnus
authentifica
tion
working with postgresql-6.4.2 and KTH-KRB Ebones
(http://www.pdc.kth.se/kth-kr
b) on a dec alpha running DU 4.0D using the native compiler. The
following
patch does the trick.
The rationale behind this is as follows. The KTH-KRB code header files
defines
lots of lengths like INST_SZ,REALM_SZ and KRB_SENDAUTH_VLEN. It also has
a
habit of doing things like
chararray[LENGTH] = '\0'
to ensure null terminated strings. In my instance this just happens to
blat
the kerberos principal instance string leading to error like
pg_krb4_recvauth: kerberos error: Can't decode authenticator
(krb_rd_req
)
The application code that comes with KTH-KRB uses "KRB_SENDAUTH_VLEN +
1" and
sometimes uses "INST_SZ + 1" so it seems safest to put that 1 char
buffer in
the appropriate place.
Rodney McDuff
Making PQrequestCancel safe to call in a signal handler turned out to be
much easier than I feared. So here are the diffs.
Some notes:
* I modified the postmaster's packet "iodone" callback interface to allow
the callback routine to return a continue-or-drop-connection return
code; this was necessary to allow the connection to be closed after
receiving a Cancel, rather than proceeding to launch a new backend...
Being a neatnik, I also made the iodone proc have a typechecked
parameter list.
* I deleted all code I could find that had to do with OOB.
* I made some edits to ensure that all signals mentioned in the code
are referred to symbolically not by numbers ("SIGUSR2" not "2").
I think Bruce may have already done at least some of the same edits;
I hope that merging these patches is not too painful.
have > 20000 users and each (potentially) needs a separate database
which is > only accessible to them. Rather than having 20000 lines
in pg_hba.conf, > I've patched Postgres so that the special token
"sameuser" in the > database field of pg_hba.conf allows access
only to the username which > is connecting.
seems that my last post didn't make it through. That's good
since the diff itself didn't covered the renaming of
pg_user.h to pg_shadow.h and it's new content.
Here it's again. The complete regression test passwd with
only some float diffs. createuser and destroyuser work.
pg_shadow cannot be read by ordinary user.
I haven't had final confirmation from Peter yet, but the attached patch
needs to be applied for the Beta otherwise password and crypt
authentication just won't work.
It puts back the loop in libpq and also fixes a couple of problems with
maintaining compatability with pre-6.3 drivers.
Attached is the patch to fix the warning messages from my code. I also
fixed one which wasn't my code. Apart from the usual warnings about the
bison/yacc generated code I only have one other warning message. This
is in gramm.y around line 2234. I wasn't sure of the fix.
I've also replaced all the calls to free() in gramm.y to calls to
pfree(). Without these I was getting backend crashes with GRANT. This
might already have been fixed.
I've completed the patch to fix the protocol and authentication issues I
was discussing a couple of weeks ago. The particular changes are:
- the protocol has a version number
- network byte order is used throughout
- the pg_hba.conf file is used to specify what method is used to
authenticate a frontend (either password, ident, trust, reject, krb4
or krb5)
- support for multiplexed backends is removed
- appropriate changes to man pages
- the -a switch to many programs to specify an authentication service
no longer has any effect
- the libpq.so version number has changed to 1.1
The new backend still supports the old protocol so old interfaces won't
break.
Bruce Momjian
Peter Eisentraut
Tom Lane
Marc G. Fournier
Thomas G. Lockhart