We should have done it this way all along, but we accidentally got
away with using the wrong BIO field up until OpenSSL 3.2. There,
the library's BIO routines that we rely on use the "data" field
for their own purposes, and our conflicting use causes assorted
weird behaviors up to and including core dumps when SSL connections
are attempted. Switch to using the approved field for the purpose,
i.e. app_data.
While at it, remove our configure probes for BIO_get_data as well
as the fallback implementation. BIO_{get,set}_app_data have been
there since long before any OpenSSL version that we still support,
even in the back branches.
Also, update src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl to allow for a minor
change in an error message spelling that evidently came in with 3.2.
Tristan Partin and Bo Andreson. Back-patch to all supported branches.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CAN55FZ1eDDYsYaL7mv+oSLUij2h_u6hvD4Qmv-7PK7jkji0uyQ@mail.gmail.com
OpenSSL 1.1.1 and newer versions have added support for RSA-PSS
certificates, which requires the use of a specific routine in OpenSSL to
determine which hash function to use when compiling it when using
channel binding in SCRAM-SHA-256. X509_get_signature_nid(), that is the
original routine the channel binding code has relied on, is not able to
determine which hash algorithm to use for such certificates. However,
X509_get_signature_info(), new to OpenSSL 1.1.1, is able to do it. This
commit switches the channel binding logic to rely on
X509_get_signature_info() over X509_get_signature_nid(), which would be
the choice when building with 1.1.1 or newer.
The error could have been triggered on the client or the server, hence
libpq and the backend need to have their related code paths patched.
Note that attempting to load an RSA-PSS certificate with OpenSSL 1.1.0
or older leads to a failure due to an unsupported algorithm.
The discovery of relying on X509_get_signature_info() comes from Jacob,
the tests have been written by Heikki (with few tweaks from me), while I
have bundled the whole together while adding the bits needed for MSVC
and meson.
This issue exists since channel binding exists, so backpatch all the way
down. Some tests are added in 15~, triggered if compiling with OpenSSL
1.1.1 or newer, where the certificate and key files can easily be
generated for RSA-PSS.
Reported-by: Gunnar "Nick" Bluth
Author: Jacob Champion, Heikki Linnakangas
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/17760-b6c61e752ec07060@postgresql.org
Backpatch-through: 11
In OpenSSL there are two types of BIO's (I/O abstractions):
source/sink and filters. A source/sink BIO is a source and/or
sink of data, ie one acting on a socket or a file. A filter
BIO takes a stream of input from another BIO and transforms it.
In order for BIO_find_type() to be able to traverse the chain
of BIO's and correctly find all BIO's of a certain type they
shall have the type bit set accordingly, source/sink BIO's
(what PostgreSQL implements) use BIO_TYPE_SOURCE_SINK and
filter BIO's use BIO_TYPE_FILTER. In addition to these, file
descriptor based BIO's should have the descriptor bit set,
BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR.
The PostgreSQL implementation didn't set the type bits, which
went unnoticed for a long time as it's only really relevant
for code auditing the OpenSSL installation, or doing similar
tasks. It is required by the API though, so this fixes it.
Backpatch through 9.6 as this has been wrong for a long time.
Author: Itamar Gafni
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/SN6PR06MB39665EC10C34BB20956AE4578AF39@SN6PR06MB3966.namprd06.prod.outlook.com
Backpatch-through: 9.6
SSL renegotiation is already disabled as of 48d23c72, however this does
not prevent the server to comply with a client willing to use
renegotiation. In the last couple of years, renegotiation had its set
of security issues and flaws (like the recent CVE-2021-3449), and it
could be possible to crash the backend with a client attempting
renegotiation.
This commit takes one extra step by disabling renegotiation in the
backend in the same way as SSL compression (f9264d15) or tickets
(97d3a0b0). OpenSSL 1.1.0h has added an option named
SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION able to achieve that. In older versions
there is an option called SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS that
was undocumented, and could be set within the SSL object created when
the TLS connection opens, but I have decided not to use it, as it feels
trickier to rely on, and it is not official. Note that this option is
not usable in OpenSSL < 1.1.0h as the internal contents of the *SSL
object are hidden to applications.
SSL renegotiation concerns protocols up to TLSv1.2.
Per original report from Robert Haas, with a patch based on a suggestion
by Andres Freund.
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Daniel Gustafsson
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/YKZBXx7RhU74FlTE@paquier.xyz
Backpatch-through: 9.6
While back-patching e0e569e1d, I noted that there were some other
places where we ought to be applying DH_free(); namely, where we
load some DH parameters from a file and then reject them as not
being sufficiently secure. While it seems really unlikely that
anybody would hit these code paths in production, let alone do
so repeatedly, let's fix it for consistency.
Back-patch to v10 where this code was introduced.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/16160-18367e56e9a28264@postgresql.org
When loading DH parameters used for the generation of ephemeral DH keys
in the backend, the code has never bothered releasing the memory used
for the DH information loaded from a file or from libpq's default. This
commit makes sure that the information is properly free()'d.
Back-patch of e0e569e1d. We originally thought the leak was minor and
not worth back-patching, but Jelte Fennema pointed out that repeated
SIGHUP's can result in very serious bloat of the postmaster, which is
then multiplied by being duplicated into eadh forked child.
Back-patch to v10; the code looked different before c0a15e07c,
and didn't have a leak in the actually-live code paths.
Michael Paquier
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/16160-18367e56e9a28264@postgresql.org
After reading the root cert list from the ssl_ca_file, immediately
install it as client CA list of the new SSL context. That gives the
SSL context ownership of the list, so that SSL_CTX_free will free it.
This avoids a permanent memory leak if we fail further down in
be_tls_init(), which could happen if bogus CRL data is offered.
The leak could only amount to something if the CRL parameters get
broken after server start (else we'd just quit) and then the server
is SIGHUP'd many times without fixing the CRL data. That's rather
unlikely perhaps, but it seems worth fixing, if only because the
code is clearer this way.
While we're here, add some comments about the memory management
aspects of this logic.
Noted by Jelte Fennema and independently by Andres Freund.
Back-patch to v10; before commit de41869b6 it doesn't matter,
since we'd not re-execute this code during SIGHUP.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/16160-18367e56e9a28264@postgresql.org
Some older OpenSSL versions (0.9.8 branch) define TLS*_VERSION macros
but not the corresponding SSL_OP_NO_* macro, which causes the code for
handling ssl_min_protocol_version/ssl_max_protocol_version to fail to
compile. To fix, add more #ifdefs and error handling.
Reported-by: Victor Wagner <vitus@wagner.pp.ru>
Reviewed-by: Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/flat/20190924101859.09383b4f%40fafnir.local.vm
This is still using the 2.0 version of pg_bsd_indent.
I thought it would be good to commit this separately,
so as to document the differences between 2.0 and 2.1 behavior.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/16296.1558103386@sss.pgh.pa.us
Be more consistent about use of XXXGetDatum macros in new jsonpath
code. This is mostly to avoid having code that looks randomly
different from everyplace else that's doing the exact same thing.
In pg_regress.c, avoid an unreferenced-function warning from
compilers that don't understand pg_attribute_unused(). Putting
the function inside the same #ifdef as its only caller is more
straightforward coding anyway.
In be-secure-openssl.c, avoid use of pg_attribute_unused() on a label.
That's pretty creative, but there's no good reason to suppose that
it's portable, and there's absolutely no need to use goto's here in the
first place. (This wasn't actually causing any buildfarm complaints,
but it's new code in v12 so it has no portability track record.)
In case of a reload, we just want to LOG errors instead of FATAL when
processing SSL configuration, but the more recent code for the
ssl_*_protocol_version settings didn't behave like that.
Author: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Reviewed-by: Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
Commit cfdf4dc4 added an assertion that every WaitLatch() or similar
handles postmaster death. One place did not, but was missed in
review and testing due to the need for an SSL connection. Fix, by
asking for WL_EXIT_ON_PM_DEATH.
Reported-by: Christoph Berg
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20181124143845.GA15039%40msg.df7cb.de
Users of the WaitEventSet and WaitLatch() APIs can now choose between
asking for WL_POSTMASTER_DEATH and then handling it explicitly, or asking
for WL_EXIT_ON_PM_DEATH to trigger immediate exit on postmaster death.
This reduces code duplication, since almost all callers want the latter.
Repair all code that was previously ignoring postmaster death completely,
or requesting the event but ignoring it, or requesting the event but then
doing an unconditional PostmasterIsAlive() call every time through its
event loop (which is an expensive syscall on platforms for which we don't
have USE_POSTMASTER_DEATH_SIGNAL support).
Assert that callers of WaitLatchXXX() under the postmaster remember to
ask for either WL_POSTMASTER_DEATH or WL_EXIT_ON_PM_DEATH, to prevent
future bugs.
The only process that doesn't handle postmaster death is syslogger. It
waits until all backends holding the write end of the syslog pipe
(including the postmaster) have closed it by exiting, to be sure to
capture any parting messages. By using the WaitEventSet API directly
it avoids the new assertion, and as a by-product it may be slightly
more efficient on platforms that have epoll().
Author: Thomas Munro
Reviewed-by: Kyotaro Horiguchi, Heikki Linnakangas, Tom Lane
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CAEepm%3D1TCviRykkUb69ppWLr_V697rzd1j3eZsRMmbXvETfqbQ%40mail.gmail.com,
https://postgr.es/m/CAEepm=2LqHzizbe7muD7-2yHUbTOoF7Q+qkSD5Q41kuhttRTwA@mail.gmail.com
As already explained in configure.in, using the OpenSSL version number
to detect presence of functions doesn't work, because LibreSSL reports
incompatible version numbers. Fortunately, the functions we need here
are actually macros, so we can just test for them directly.
There are some problems with the tls-unique channel binding type. It's not
supported by all SSL libraries, and strictly speaking it's not defined for
TLS 1.3 at all, even though at least in OpenSSL, the functions used for it
still seem to work with TLS 1.3 connections. And since we had no
mechanism to negotiate what channel binding type to use, there would be
awkward interoperability issues if a server only supported some channel
binding types. tls-server-end-point seems feasible to support with any SSL
library, so let's just stick to that.
This removes the scram_channel_binding libpq option altogether, since there
is now only one supported channel binding type.
This also removes all the channel binding tests from the SSL test suite.
They were really just testing the scram_channel_binding option, which
is now gone. Channel binding is used if both client and server support it,
so it is used in the existing tests. It would be good to have some tests
specifically for channel binding, to make sure it really is used, and the
different combinations of a client and a server that support or doesn't
support it. The current set of settings we have make it hard to write such
tests, but I did test those things manually, by disabling
HAVE_BE_TLS_GET_CERTIFICATE_HASH and/or
HAVE_PGTLS_GET_PEER_CERTIFICATE_HASH.
I also removed the SCRAM_CHANNEL_BINDING_TLS_END_POINT constant. This is a
matter of taste, but IMO it's more readable to just use the
"tls-server-end-point" string.
Refactor the checks on whether the SSL library supports the functions
needed for tls-server-end-point channel binding. Now the server won't
advertise, and the client won't choose, the SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS variant, if
compiled with an OpenSSL version too old to support it.
In the passing, add some sanity checks to check that the chosen SASL
mechanism, SCRAM-SHA-256 or SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS, matches whether the SCRAM
exchange used channel binding or not. For example, if the client selects
the non-channel-binding variant SCRAM-SHA-256, but in the SCRAM message
uses channel binding anyway. It's harmless from a security point of view,
I believe, and I'm not sure if there are some other conditions that would
cause the connection to fail, but it seems better to be strict about these
things and check explicitly.
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/ec787074-2305-c6f4-86aa-6902f98485a4%40iki.fi
This allows specifying an external command for prompting for or
otherwise obtaining passphrases for SSL key files. This is useful
because in many cases there is no TTY easily available during service
startup.
Also add a setting ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload, which allows
supporting SSL configuration reload even if SSL files need passphrases.
Reviewed-by: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Fix the warnings created by the compiler warning options
-Wformat-overflow=2 -Wformat-truncation=2, supported since GCC 7. This
is a more aggressive variant of the fixes in
6275f5d28a, which GCC 7 warned about by
default.
The issues are all harmless, but some dubious coding patterns are
cleaned up.
One issue that is of external interest is that BGW_MAXLEN is increased
from 64 to 96. Apparently, the old value would cause the bgw_name of
logical replication workers to be truncated in some circumstances.
But this doesn't actually add those warning options. It appears that
the warnings depend a bit on compilation and optimization options, so it
would be annoying to have to keep up with that. This is more of a
once-in-a-while cleanup.
Reviewed-by: Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
The existing "connection authorized" server log messages used OpenSSL
API calls directly, even though similar abstracted API calls exist.
Change to use the latter instead.
Change the function prototype for the functions that return the TLS
version and the cipher to return const char * directly instead of
copying into a buffer. That makes them slightly easier to use.
Add bits= to the message. psql shows that, so we might as well show the
same information on the client and server.
Reviewed-by: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Reviewed-by: Michael Paquier <michael.paquier@gmail.com>
Some things in be-secure-openssl.c and fe-secure-openssl.c were not
actually specific to OpenSSL but could also be used by other
implementations. In order to avoid copy-and-pasting, move some of that
code to common files.
Move the documentation of the SSL API calls are supposed to do into the
headers files, instead of keeping them in the files for the OpenSSL
implementation. That way, they don't have to be duplicated or be
inconsistent when other implementations are added.
It seems we can't easily work around the lack of
X509_get_signature_nid(), so revert the previous attempts and just
disable the tls-server-end-point feature if we don't have it.
This adds a second standard channel binding type for SCRAM. It is
mainly intended for third-party clients that cannot implement
tls-unique, for example JDBC.
Author: Michael Paquier <michael.paquier@gmail.com>
This is the basic feature set using OpenSSL to support the feature. In
order to allow the frontend and the backend to fetch the sent and
expected TLS Finished messages, a PG-like API is added to be able to
make the interface pluggable for other SSL implementations.
This commit also adds a infrastructure to facilitate the addition of
future channel binding types as well as libpq parameters to control the
SASL mechanism names and channel binding names. Those will be added by
upcoming commits.
Some tests are added to the SSL test suite to test SCRAM authentication
with channel binding.
Author: Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
Reviewed-by: Peter Eisentraut <peter.eisentraut@2ndquadrant.com>
We don't actually support session tickets, since we do not create an SSL
session identifier. But it seems that OpenSSL will issue a session ticket
on-demand anyway, which will then fail when used. This results in
reconnection failures when using ticket-aware client-side SSL libraries
(such as the Npgsql .NET driver), as reported by Shay Rojansky.
To fix, just tell OpenSSL not to issue tickets. At some point in the
far future, we might consider enabling tickets instead. But the security
implications of that aren't entirely clear; and besides it would have
little benefit except for very short-lived database connections, which is
Something We're Bad At anyhow. It would take a lot of other work to get
to a point where that would really be an exciting thing to do.
While at it, also tell OpenSSL not to use a session cache. This doesn't
really do anything, since a backend would never populate the cache anyway,
but it might gain some micro-efficiencies and/or reduce security
exposures.
Patch by me, per discussion with Heikki Linnakangas and Shay Rojansky.
Back-patch to all supported versions.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CADT4RqBU8N-csyZuzaook-c795dt22Zcwg1aHWB6tfVdAkodZA@mail.gmail.com
Commit c0a15e07c moved the setting of OpenSSL's SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE option
into a new subroutine initialize_dh(), but forgot to remove it from where
it was. SSL_CTX_set_options() is a trivial function, amounting indeed to
just "ctx->options |= op", hence there's no reason to contort the code or
break separation of concerns to avoid calling it twice. So separating the
DH setup from disabling of old protocol versions is a good change, but we
need to finish the job.
Noted while poking into the question of SSL session tickets.
1024 bits is considered weak these days, but OpenSSL always passes 1024 as
the key length to the tmp_dh callback. All the code to handle other key
lengths is, in fact, dead.
To remedy those issues:
* Only include hard-coded 2048-bit parameters.
* Set the parameters directly with SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(), without the
callback
* The name of the file containing the DH parameters is now a GUC. This
replaces the old hardcoded "dh1024.pem" filename. (The files for other
key lengths, dh512.pem, dh2048.pem, etc. were never actually used.)
This is not a new problem, but it doesn't seem worth the risk and churn to
backport. If you care enough about the strength of the DH parameters on
old versions, you can create custom DH parameters, with as many bits as you
wish, and put them in the "dh1024.pem" file.
Per report by Nicolas Guini and Damian Quiroga. Reviewed by Michael Paquier.
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAMxBoUyjOOautVozN6ofzym828aNrDjuCcOTcCquxjwS-L2hGQ@mail.gmail.com
Don't move parenthesized lines to the left, even if that means they
flow past the right margin.
By default, BSD indent lines up statement continuation lines that are
within parentheses so that they start just to the right of the preceding
left parenthesis. However, traditionally, if that resulted in the
continuation line extending to the right of the desired right margin,
then indent would push it left just far enough to not overrun the margin,
if it could do so without making the continuation line start to the left of
the current statement indent. That makes for a weird mix of indentations
unless one has been completely rigid about never violating the 80-column
limit.
This behavior has been pretty universally panned by Postgres developers.
Hence, disable it with indent's new -lpl switch, so that parenthesized
lines are always lined up with the preceding left paren.
This patch is much less interesting than the first round of indent
changes, but also bulkier, so I thought it best to separate the effects.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/E1dAmxK-0006EE-1r@gemulon.postgresql.org
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/30527.1495162840@sss.pgh.pa.us
Leave OpenSSL's default passphrase collection callback in place during
the first call of secure_initialize() in server startup. Although that
doesn't work terribly well in daemon contexts, some people feel we should
not break it for anyone who was successfully using it before. We still
block passphrase demands during SIGHUP, meaning that you can't adjust SSL
configuration on-the-fly if you used a passphrase, but this is no worse
than what it was before commit de41869b6. And we block passphrase demands
during EXEC_BACKEND reloads; that behavior wasn't useful either, but at
least now it's documented.
Tweak some related log messages for more readability, and avoid issuing
essentially duplicate messages about reload failure caused by a passphrase.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/29982.1483412575@sss.pgh.pa.us
OpenSSL's default behavior when loading a passphrase-protected key file
is to open /dev/tty and demand the password from there. It was kinda
sorta okay to allow that to happen at server start, but really that was
never workable in standard daemon environments. And it was a complete
fail on Windows, where the same thing would happen at every backend launch.
Yesterday's commit de41869b6 put the final nail in the coffin by causing
that to happen at every SIGHUP; even if you've still got a terminal acting
as the server's TTY, having the postmaster freeze until you enter the
passphrase again isn't acceptable.
Hence, override the default behavior with a callback that returns an empty
string, ensuring failure. Change the documentation to say that you can't
have a passphrase-protected server key, period.
If we can think of a production-grade way of collecting a passphrase from
somewhere, we might do that once at server startup and use this callback
to feed it to OpenSSL, but it's far from clear that anyone cares enough
to invest that much work in the feature. The lack of complaints about
the existing fractionally-baked behavior suggests nobody's using it anyway.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/29982.1483412575@sss.pgh.pa.us
It is no longer necessary to restart the server to enable, disable,
or reconfigure SSL. Instead, we just create a new SSL_CTX struct
(by re-reading all relevant files) whenever we get SIGHUP. Testing
shows that this is fast enough that it shouldn't be a problem.
In conjunction with that, downgrade the logic that complains about
pg_hba.conf "hostssl" lines when SSL isn't active: now that's just
a warning condition not an error.
An issue that still needs to be addressed is what shall we do with
passphrase-protected server keys? As this stands, the server would
demand the passphrase again on every SIGHUP, which is certainly
impractical. But the case was only barely supported before, so that
does not seem a sufficient reason to hold up committing this patch.
Andreas Karlsson, reviewed by Michael Banck and Michael Paquier
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/556A6E8A.9030400@proxel.se
WaitLatch, WaitLatchOrSocket, and WaitEventSetWait now taken an
additional wait_event_info parameter; legal values are defined in
pgstat.h. This makes it possible to uniquely identify every point in
the core code where we are waiting for a latch; extensions can pass
WAIT_EXTENSION.
Because latches were the major wait primitive not previously covered
by this patch, it is now possible to see information in
pg_stat_activity on a large number of important wait events not
previously addressed, such as ClientRead, ClientWrite, and SyncRep.
Unfortunately, many of the wait events added by this patch will fail
to appear in pg_stat_activity because they're only used in background
processes which don't currently appear in pg_stat_activity. We should
fix this either by creating a separate view for such information, or
else by deciding to include them in pg_stat_activity after all.
Michael Paquier and Robert Haas, reviewed by Alexander Korotkov and
Thomas Munro.
LibreSSL defines OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER to claim that it is version 2.0.0,
but it doesn't have the functions added in OpenSSL 1.1.0. Add autoconf
checks for the individual functions we need, and stop relying on
OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER.
Backport to 9.5 and 9.6, like the patch that broke this. In the
back-branches, there are still a few OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER checks left,
to check for OpenSSL 0.9.8 or 0.9.7. I left them as they were - LibreSSL
has all those functions, so they work as intended.
Per buildfarm member curculio.
Discussion: <2442.1473957669@sss.pgh.pa.us>
Changes needed to build at all:
- Check for SSL_new in configure, now that SSL_library_init is a macro.
- Do not access struct members directly. This includes some new code in
pgcrypto, to use the resource owner mechanism to ensure that we don't
leak OpenSSL handles, now that we can't embed them in other structs
anymore.
- RAND_SSLeay() -> RAND_OpenSSL()
Changes that were needed to silence deprecation warnings, but were not
strictly necessary:
- RAND_pseudo_bytes() -> RAND_bytes().
- SSL_library_init() and OpenSSL_config() -> OPENSSL_init_ssl()
- ASN1_STRING_data() -> ASN1_STRING_get0_data()
- DH_generate_parameters() -> DH_generate_parameters()
- Locking callbacks are not needed with OpenSSL 1.1.0 anymore. (Good
riddance!)
Also change references to SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER with OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER,
for the sake of consistency. OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER has existed since time
immemorial.
Fix SSL test suite to work with OpenSSL 1.1.0. CA certificates must have
the "CA:true" basic constraint extension now, or OpenSSL will refuse them.
Regenerate the test certificates with that. The "openssl" binary, used to
generate the certificates, is also now more picky, and throws an error
if an X509 extension is specified in "req_extensions", but that section
is empty.
Backpatch to all supported branches, per popular demand. In back-branches,
we still support OpenSSL 0.9.7 and above. OpenSSL 0.9.6 should still work
too, but I didn't test it. In master, we only support 0.9.8 and above.
Patch by Andreas Karlsson, with additional changes by me.
Discussion: <20160627151604.GD1051@msg.df7cb.de>