Commit Graph

6 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Bruce Momjian c8e1ba736b Update copyright for 2023
Backpatch-through: 11
2023-01-02 15:00:37 -05:00
Bruce Momjian 27b77ecf9f Update copyright for 2022
Backpatch-through: 10
2022-01-07 19:04:57 -05:00
Tom Lane 46d665bc26 Allow psql's other uses of simple_prompt() to be interrupted by ^C.
This fills in the work left un-done by 5f1148224.  \prompt can
be canceled out of now, and so can password prompts issued during
\connect.  (We don't need to do anything for password prompts
issued during startup, because we aren't yet trapping SIGINT
at that point.)

Nathan Bossart

Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/747443.1635536754@sss.pgh.pa.us
2021-11-19 12:11:46 -05:00
Tom Lane 5f1148224b Provide a variant of simple_prompt() that can be interrupted by ^C.
Up to now, you couldn't escape out of psql's \password command
by typing control-C (or other local spelling of SIGINT).  This
is pretty user-unfriendly, so improve it.  To do so, we have to
modify the functions provided by pg_get_line.c; but we don't
want to mess with psql's SIGINT handler setup, so provide an
API that lets that handler cause the cancel to occur.

This relies on the assumption that we won't do any major harm by
longjmp'ing out of fgets().  While that's obviously a little shaky,
we've long had the same assumption in the main input loop, and few
issues have been reported.

psql has some other simple_prompt() calls that could usefully
be improved the same way; for now, just deal with \password.

Nathan Bossart, minor tweaks by me

Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/747443.1635536754@sss.pgh.pa.us
2021-11-17 19:09:54 -05:00
Bruce Momjian ca3b37487b Update copyright for 2021
Backpatch-through: 9.5
2021-01-02 13:06:25 -05:00
Tom Lane 67a472d71c Remove arbitrary restrictions on password length.
This patch started out with the goal of harmonizing various arbitrary
limits on password length, but after awhile a better idea emerged:
let's just get rid of those fixed limits.

recv_password_packet() has an arbitrary limit on the packet size,
which we don't really need, so just drop it.  (Note that this doesn't
really affect anything for MD5 or SCRAM password verification, since
those will hash the user's password to something shorter anyway.
It does matter for auth methods that require a cleartext password.)

Likewise remove the arbitrary error condition in pg_saslprep().

The remaining limits are mostly in client-side code that prompts
for passwords.  To improve those, refactor simple_prompt() so that
it allocates its own result buffer that can be made as big as
necessary.  Actually, it proves best to make a separate routine
pg_get_line() that has essentially the semantics of fgets(), except
that it allocates a suitable result buffer and hence will never
return a truncated line.  (pg_get_line has a lot of potential
applications to replace randomly-sized fgets buffers elsewhere,
but I'll leave that for another patch.)

I built pg_get_line() atop stringinfo.c, which requires moving
that code to src/common/; but that seems fine since it was a poor
fit for src/port/ anyway.

This patch is mostly mine, but it owes a good deal to Nathan Bossart
who pressed for a solution to the password length problem and
created a predecessor patch.  Also thanks to Peter Eisentraut and
Stephen Frost for ideas and discussion.

Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/09512C4F-8CB9-4021-B455-EF4C4F0D55A0@amazon.com
2020-09-03 20:09:18 -04:00