Hostile objects located within the installation-time search_path could
capture references in an extension's installation or upgrade script.
If the extension is being installed with superuser privileges, this
opens the door to privilege escalation. While such hazards have existed
all along, their urgency increases with the v13 "trusted extensions"
feature, because that lets a non-superuser control the installation path
for a superuser-privileged script. Therefore, make a number of changes
to make such situations more secure:
* Tweak the construction of the installation-time search_path to ensure
that references to objects in pg_catalog can't be subverted; and
explicitly add pg_temp to the end of the path to prevent attacks using
temporary objects.
* Disable check_function_bodies within installation/upgrade scripts,
so that any security gaps in SQL-language or PL-language function bodies
cannot create a risk of unwanted installation-time code execution.
* Adjust lookup of type input/receive functions and join estimator
functions to complain if there are multiple candidate functions. This
prevents capture of references to functions whose signature is not the
first one checked; and it's arguably more user-friendly anyway.
* Modify various contrib upgrade scripts to ensure that catalog
modification queries are executed with secure search paths. (These
are in-place modifications with no extension version changes, since
it is the update process itself that is at issue, not the end result.)
Extensions that depend on other extensions cannot be made fully secure
by these methods alone; therefore, revert the "trusted" marking that
commit eb67623c9 applied to earthdistance and hstore_plperl, pending
some better solution to that set of issues.
Also add documentation around these issues, to help extension authors
write secure installation scripts.
Patch by me, following an observation by Andres Freund; thanks
to Noah Misch for review.
Security: CVE-2020-14350
Some of the many error messages introduced in 458857cc missed 'FROM
unpackaged'. Also e016b724 and 45ffeb7e forgot to quote extension
version numbers.
Backpatch to 9.1, just like 458857cc which introduced the messages. Do
so because the error messages thrown when the wrong command is copy &
pasted aren't easy to understand.
We have seen one too many reports of people trying to use 9.1 extension
files in the old-fashioned way of sourcing them in psql. Not only does
that usually not work (due to failure to substitute for MODULE_PATHNAME
and/or @extschema@), but if it did work they'd get a collection of loose
objects not an extension. To prevent this, insert an \echo ... \quit
line that prints a suitable error message into each extension script file,
and teach commands/extension.c to ignore lines starting with \echo.
That should not only prevent any adverse consequences of loading a script
file the wrong way, but make it crystal clear to users that they need to
do it differently now.
Tom Lane, following an idea of Andrew Dunstan's. Back-patch into 9.1
... there is not going to be much value in this if we wait till 9.2.
Take care of some loose ends in the update-from-unpackaged script, and
apply some ugly hacks to ensure that it produces the same catalog state
as the fresh-install script. Per discussion, this seems like a safer
plan than having two different catalog states that both call themselves
"pg_trgm 1.0", even if it's not immediately clear that the subtle
differences would ever matter.
Also, fix the stub function gin_extract_trgm() so that it works instead
of just bleating. Needed because this function will get called during a
regular dump and reload, if there are any indexes using its opclass.
The user won't have an opportunity to update the extension till later,
so telling him to do so is unhelpful.
From first pass of testing. Notably, there seems to be no need for
adminpack--unpackaged--1.0.sql because none of the objects that the
old module creates would ever be dumped by pg_dump anyway (they are
all in pg_catalog).
This isn't fully tested as yet, in particular I'm not sure that the
"foo--unpackaged--1.0.sql" scripts are OK. But it's time to get some
buildfarm cycles on it.
sepgsql is not converted to an extension, mainly because it seems to
require a very nonstandard installation process.
Dimitri Fontaine and Tom Lane
Tom Lane
Andres Freund