Report OpenSSL errors during initialization as PXE_CIPHER_INIT since
that's just what they were, and not generic unknown errors. This also
removes the last users of the generic error, and thus it can be removed.
Discussion: http://postgr.es/m/C89D932C-501E-4473-9750-638CFCD9095E@yesql.se
Use the padding provided by OpenSSL instead of doing it ourselves.
The internal implementation was once applicable to the non-OpenSSL
code paths, but those have since been removed. The padding algorithm
is still the same.
The OpenSSL padding implementation is stricter than the previous
internal one: Bad padding during decryption is now an error, and
encryption without padding now requires the input size to be a
multiple of the block size, otherwise it is also an error.
Previously, these cases silently proceeded, in spite of the
documentation saying otherwise.
Add some test cases about this, too. (The test cases are in
rijndael.sql, but they apply to all encryption algorithms.)
Reviewed-by: Jacob Champion <pchampion@vmware.com>
Reviewed-by: Nathan Bossart <nathandbossart@gmail.com>
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/flat/ba94c26b-0c58-c97e-7a44-f44e08b4cca2%40enterprisedb.com
The PX layer in pgcrypto is handling digest padding on its own uniformly
for all backend implementations. Starting with OpenSSL 3.0.0, DecryptUpdate
doesn't flush the last block in case padding is enabled so explicitly
disable it as we don't use it.
This will be backpatched to all supported version once there is sufficient
testing in the buildfarm of OpenSSL 3.
Reviewed-by: Peter Eisentraut, Michael Paquier
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/FEF81714-D479-4512-839B-C769D2605F8A@yesql.se
The following routines are called within pgcrypto when handling digests
but there were no checks for failures:
- EVP_MD_CTX_size (can fail with -1 as of 3.0.0)
- EVP_MD_CTX_block_size (can fail with -1 as of 3.0.0)
- EVP_DigestInit_ex
- EVP_DigestUpdate
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex
A set of elog(ERROR) is added by this commit to detect such failures,
that should never happen except in the event of a processing failure
internal to OpenSSL.
Note that it would be possible to use ERR_reason_error_string() to get
more context about such errors, but these refer mainly to the internals
of OpenSSL, so it is not really obvious how useful that would be. This
is left out for simplicity.
Per report from Coverity. Thanks to Tom Lane for the discussion.
Backpatch-through: 9.5
PXE_DECRYPT_FAILED exists already for decryption errors, and an
equivalent for encryption did not exist. There is one code path that
deals with such failures for OpenSSL but it used PXE_ERR_GENERIC, which
was inconsistent. This switches this code path to use the new error
PXE_ENCRYPT_FAILED instead of PXE_ERR_GENERIC, making the code used for
encryption more consistent with the decryption.
Author: Daniel Gustafsson
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/03049139-CB7A-436E-B71B-42696D3E2EF7@yesql.se
When allocating a EVP context, it would have been possible to leak some
memory allocated directly by OpenSSL, that PostgreSQL lost track of if
the initialization of the context allocated failed. The cleanup can be
done with EVP_MD_CTX_destroy().
Note that EVP APIs exist since OpenSSL 0.9.7 and we have in the tree
equivalent implementations for older versions since ce9b75d (code
removed with 9b7cd59a as of 10~). However, in 9.5 and 9.6, the existing
code makes use of EVP_MD_CTX_destroy() and EVP_MD_CTX_create() without
an equivalent implementation when building the tree with OpenSSL 0.9.6
or older, meaning that this code is in reality broken with such versions
since it got introduced in e2838c5. As we have heard no complains about
that, it does not seem worth bothering with in 9.5 and 9.6, so I have
left that out for simplicity.
Author: Michael Paquier
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20201015072212.GC2305@paquier.xyz
Backpatch-through: 9.5
PX_OWN_ALLOC was intended as a way to disable the use of palloc(), and
over the time new palloc() or equivalent calls have been added like in
32984d8, making this extra layer losing its original purpose. This
simplifies on the way some code paths to use palloc0() rather than
palloc() followed by memset(0).
Author: Daniel Gustafsson
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/A5BFAA1A-B2E8-4CBC-895E-7B1B9475A527@yesql.se
The basic rule we follow here is to always first include 'postgres.h' or
'postgres_fe.h' whichever is applicable, then system header includes and
then Postgres header includes. In this, we also follow that all the
Postgres header includes are in order based on their ASCII value. We
generally follow these rules, but the code has deviated in many places.
This commit makes it consistent just for contrib modules. The later
commits will enforce similar rules in other parts of code.
Author: Vignesh C
Reviewed-by: Amit Kapila
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CALDaNm2Sznv8RR6Ex-iJO6xAdsxgWhCoETkaYX=+9DW3q0QCfA@mail.gmail.com
This adds a new routine, pg_strong_random() for generating random bytes,
for use in both frontend and backend. At the moment, it's only used in
the backend, but the upcoming SCRAM authentication patches need strong
random numbers in libpq as well.
pg_strong_random() is based on, and replaces, the existing implementation
in pgcrypto. It can acquire strong random numbers from a number of sources,
depending on what's available:
- OpenSSL RAND_bytes(), if built with OpenSSL
- On Windows, the native cryptographic functions are used
- /dev/urandom
Unlike the current pgcrypto function, the source is chosen by configure.
That makes it easier to test different implementations, and ensures that
we don't accidentally fall back to a less secure implementation, if the
primary source fails. All of those methods are quite reliable, it would be
pretty surprising for them to fail, so we'd rather find out by failing
hard.
If no strong random source is available, we fall back to using erand48(),
seeded from current timestamp, like PostmasterRandom() was. That isn't
cryptographically secure, but allows us to still work on platforms that
don't have any of the above stronger sources. Because it's not very secure,
the built-in implementation is only used if explicitly requested with
--disable-strong-random.
This replaces the more complicated Fortuna algorithm we used to have in
pgcrypto, which is unfortunate, but all modern platforms have /dev/urandom,
so it doesn't seem worth the maintenance effort to keep that. pgcrypto
functions that require strong random numbers will be disabled with
--disable-strong-random.
Original patch by Magnus Hagander, tons of further work by Michael Paquier
and me.
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqRy3krN8quR9XujMVVHYtXJ0_60nqgVc6oUk8ygyVkZsA@mail.gmail.com
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqRWkNYRRPJA7-cF+LfroYV10pvjdz6GNvxk-Eee9FypKA@mail.gmail.com
The old "low-level" API is deprecated, and doesn't support hardware
acceleration. And this makes the code simpler, too.
Discussion: <561274F1.1030000@iki.fi>
LibreSSL defines OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER to claim that it is version 2.0.0,
but it doesn't have the functions added in OpenSSL 1.1.0. Add autoconf
checks for the individual functions we need, and stop relying on
OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER.
Backport to 9.5 and 9.6, like the patch that broke this. In the
back-branches, there are still a few OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER checks left,
to check for OpenSSL 0.9.8 or 0.9.7. I left them as they were - LibreSSL
has all those functions, so they work as intended.
Per buildfarm member curculio.
Discussion: <2442.1473957669@sss.pgh.pa.us>
Changes needed to build at all:
- Check for SSL_new in configure, now that SSL_library_init is a macro.
- Do not access struct members directly. This includes some new code in
pgcrypto, to use the resource owner mechanism to ensure that we don't
leak OpenSSL handles, now that we can't embed them in other structs
anymore.
- RAND_SSLeay() -> RAND_OpenSSL()
Changes that were needed to silence deprecation warnings, but were not
strictly necessary:
- RAND_pseudo_bytes() -> RAND_bytes().
- SSL_library_init() and OpenSSL_config() -> OPENSSL_init_ssl()
- ASN1_STRING_data() -> ASN1_STRING_get0_data()
- DH_generate_parameters() -> DH_generate_parameters()
- Locking callbacks are not needed with OpenSSL 1.1.0 anymore. (Good
riddance!)
Also change references to SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER with OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER,
for the sake of consistency. OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER has existed since time
immemorial.
Fix SSL test suite to work with OpenSSL 1.1.0. CA certificates must have
the "CA:true" basic constraint extension now, or OpenSSL will refuse them.
Regenerate the test certificates with that. The "openssl" binary, used to
generate the certificates, is also now more picky, and throws an error
if an X509 extension is specified in "req_extensions", but that section
is empty.
Backpatch to all supported branches, per popular demand. In back-branches,
we still support OpenSSL 0.9.7 and above. OpenSSL 0.9.6 should still work
too, but I didn't test it. In master, we only support 0.9.8 and above.
Patch by Andreas Karlsson, with additional changes by me.
Discussion: <20160627151604.GD1051@msg.df7cb.de>
OpenSSL officially only supports 1.0.1 and newer. Some OS distributions
still provide patches for 0.9.8, but anything older than that is not
interesting anymore. Let's simplify things by removing compatibility code.
Andreas Karlsson, with small changes by me.
Specifically, on-stack memset() might be removed, so:
* Replace memset() with px_memset()
* Add px_memset to copy_crlf()
* Add px_memset to pgp-s2k.c
Patch by Marko Kreen
Report by PVS-Studio
Backpatch through 8.4.
Few cleanups and couple of new things:
- add SHA2 algorithm to older OpenSSL
- add BIGNUM math to have public-key cryptography work on non-OpenSSL
build.
- gen_random_bytes() function
The status of SHA2 algoritms and public-key encryption can now be
changed to 'always available.'
That makes pgcrypto functionally complete and unless there will be new
editions of AES, SHA2 or OpenPGP standards, there is no major changes
planned.
pgcrypto crypt()/md5 and hmac() leak memory when compiled against
OpenSSL as openssl.c digest ->reset will do two DigestInit calls
against a context. This happened to work with OpenSSL 0.9.6
but not with 0.9.7+.
Reason for the messy code was that I tried to avoid creating
wrapper structure to transport algorithm info and tried to use
OpenSSL context for it. The fix is to create wrapper structure.
It also uses newer digest API to avoid memory allocations
on reset with newer OpenSSLs.
Thanks to Daniel Blaisdell for reporting it.
OpenSSL 0.9.6x. The DES functions use the older 'des_'
API, but the newer 3DES functions use the 0.9.7x-only
'DES_' API.
I think I just used /usr/include/openssl/des.h for reference
when implementing them, and had upgraded OpenSSL in the
meantime.
Following patch converts DES also to newer API and provides
compatibility functions for OpenSSL < 0.9.7.
I chose this route because:
- openssl.c uses few DES functions.
- compatibility for old 'des_' API is going away at some point
of time from OpenSSL.
- as seen from macros, new API is saner
- Thus pgcrypto supports any OpenSSL version from 0.9.5 to 1.0
Tested with OpenSSL 0.9.6c and 0.9.7e.
Marko Kreen
- Move openssl random provider to openssl.c and builtin provider
to internal.c
- Make px_random_bytes use Fortuna, instead of giving error.
- Retarget random.c to aquiring system randomness, for initial seeding
of Fortuna. There is ATM 2 functions for Windows,
reader from /dev/urandom and the regular time()/getpid() silliness.
Marko Kreen
(currently in beta) when cryptolib = openssl. According to the
following checkin message from several years ago, OpenSSL application
developers should no longer rely on <openssl/evp.h> to include
everything they need:
http://cvs.openssl.org/chngview?cn=9888
This patch adds the necessary header files. It doesn't appear to
break anything when building against OpenSSL 0.9.7.
BTW, core appears to build and work fine with OpenSSL 0.9.8. I've
built 7.3 through HEAD against 0.9.8-beta6 without noticing any
problems.
Michael Fuhr
* openssl.c: Add 3des and AES support
* README.pgcrypto: list only supported ciphers for openssl
OpenSSL has pre-processor symbol OPENSSL_NO_AES, which
isn't that helpful for detecting if it _does_ exist.
Thus the hack with AES_ENCRYPT.
Marko Kreen
* Use error codes instead of -1
* px_strerror for new error codes
* calling convention change for px_gen_salt - return error code
* use px_strerror in pgcrypto.c
Marko Kreen
It was a bad style to begin with, and now several loops can be clearer.
* pgcrypto.c: Fix function comments
* crypt-gensalt.c, crypt-blowfish.c: stop messing with errno
* openssl.c: use px_free instead pfree
* px.h: make redefining px_alloc/px_realloc/px_free easier
Marko Kreen
0.9.7x have EVP_DigestFinal function which which clears all of
EVP_MD_CTX. This makes pgcrypto crash in functions which
re-use one digest context several times: hmac() and crypt()
with md5 algorithm.
Following patch fixes it by carring the digest info around
EVP_DigestFinal and re-initializing cipher.
Marko Kreen.
is pgcrypto bug as it assumed too much about inner workings of OpenSSL.
Following patch stops pgcrypto using EVP* functions for ciphers and lets
it manage ciphers itself.
This patch supports Blowfish, DES and CAST5 algorithms.
Marko Kreen
failures on FreeBSD. This patch replaces uint -> unsigned.
This was reported by Daniel Holtzman against 0.4pre3 standalone
package, but it needs fixing in contrib/pgcrypto too.
Marko Kreen
Robert Haas
Heikki Linnakangas
Tom Lane
Daniel Gustafsson
Peter Eisentraut
Michael Paquier
Amit Kapila
Bruce Momjian
Fujii Masao
Peter Eisentraut
Magnus Hagander
Neil Conway
PostgreSQL Daemon