Previously, workers sent data to the leader using the client encoding.
That mostly worked, but the leader the converted the data back to the
server encoding. Since not all encoding conversions are reversible,
that could provoke failures. Fix by using the database encoding for
all communication between worker and leader.
Also, while temporary changes to GUC settings, as from the SET clause
of a function, are in general OK for parallel query, changing
client_encoding this way inside of a parallel worker is not OK.
Previously, that would have confused the leader; with these changes,
it would not confuse the leader, but it wouldn't do anything either.
So refuse such changes in parallel workers.
Also, the previous code naively assumed that when it received a
NotifyResonse from the worker, it could pass that directly back to the
user. But now that worker-to-leader communication always uses the
database encoding, that's clearly no longer correct - though,
actually, the old way was always broken for V2 clients. So
disassemble and reconstitute the message instead.
Issues reported by Peter Eisentraut. Patch by me, reviewed by
Peter Eisentraut.
These parameters are available for SSPI authentication only, to make
it possible to make it behave more like "normal gssapi", while
making it possible to maintain compatibility.
compat_realm is on by default, but can be turned off to make the
authentication use the full Kerberos realm instead of the NetBIOS name.
upn_username is off by default, and can be turned on to return the users
Kerberos UPN rather than the SAM-compatible name (a user in Active
Directory can have both a legacy SAM-compatible username and a new
Kerberos one. Normally they are the same, but not always)
Author: Christian Ullrich
Reviewed by: Robbie Harwood, Alvaro Herrera, me
OpenSSL has an unfortunate tendency to mix per-session state error
handling with per-thread error handling. This can cause problems when
programs that link to libpq with OpenSSL enabled have some other use of
OpenSSL; without care, one caller of OpenSSL may cause problems for the
other caller. Backend code might similarly be affected, for example
when a third party extension independently uses OpenSSL without taking
the appropriate precautions.
To fix, don't trust other users of OpenSSL to clear the per-thread error
queue. Instead, clear the entire per-thread queue ahead of certain I/O
operations when it appears that there might be trouble (these I/O
operations mostly need to call SSL_get_error() to check for success,
which relies on the queue being empty). This is slightly aggressive,
but it's pretty clear that the other callers have a very dubious claim
to ownership of the per-thread queue. Do this is both frontend and
backend code.
Finally, be more careful about clearing our own error queue, so as to
not cause these problems ourself. It's possibly that control previously
did not always reach SSLerrmessage(), where ERR_get_error() was supposed
to be called to clear the queue's earliest code. Make sure
ERR_get_error() is always called, so as to spare other users of OpenSSL
the possibility of similar problems caused by libpq (as opposed to
problems caused by a third party OpenSSL library like PHP's OpenSSL
extension). Again, do this is both frontend and backend code.
See bug #12799 and https://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=68276
Based on patches by Dave Vitek and Peter Eisentraut.
From: Peter Geoghegan <pg@bowt.ie>
Create a "bsd" auth method that works the same as "password" so far as
clients are concerned, but calls the BSD Authentication service to
check the password. This is currently only available on OpenBSD.
Marisa Emerson, reviewed by Thomas Munro
The PAM_RHOST item is set to the remote IP address or host name and can
be used by PAM modules. A pg_hba.conf option is provided to choose
between IP address and resolved host name.
From: Grzegorz Sampolski <grzsmp@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Haribabu Kommi <kommi.haribabu@gmail.com>
Commit c22650cd64 sparked a discussion
about diverse interpretations of "token user" in error messages. Expel
old and new specimens of that phrase by making all GetTokenInformation()
callers report errors the way GetTokenUser() has been reporting them.
These error conditions almost can't happen, so users are unlikely to
observe this change.
Reviewed by Tom Lane and Stephen Frost.
Whenever this function is used with the FORMAT_MESSAGE_FROM_SYSTEM flag,
it's good practice to include FORMAT_MESSAGE_IGNORE_INSERTS as well.
Otherwise, if the message contains any %n insertion markers, the function
will try to fetch argument strings to substitute --- which we are not
passing, possibly leading to a crash. This is exactly analogous to the
rule about not giving printf() a format string you're not in control of.
Noted and patched by Christian Ullrich.
Back-patch to all supported branches.
Commit ac1d794 ("Make idle backends exit if the postmaster dies.")
introduced a regression on, at least, large linux systems. Constantly
adding the same postmaster_alive_fds to the OSs internal datastructures
for implementing poll/select can cause significant contention; leading
to a performance regression of nearly 3x in one example.
This can be avoided by using e.g. linux' epoll, which avoids having to
add/remove file descriptors to the wait datastructures at a high rate.
Unfortunately the current latch interface makes it hard to allocate any
persistent per-backend resources.
Replace, with a backward compatibility layer, WaitLatchOrSocket with a
new WaitEventSet API. Users can allocate such a Set across multiple
calls, and add more than one file-descriptor to wait on. The latter has
been added because there's upcoming postgres features where that will be
helpful.
In addition to the previously existing poll(2), select(2),
WaitForMultipleObjects() implementations also provide an epoll_wait(2)
based implementation to address the aforementioned performance
problem. Epoll is only available on linux, but that is the most likely
OS for machines large enough (four sockets) to reproduce the problem.
To actually address the aforementioned regression, create and use a
long-lived WaitEventSet for FE/BE communication. There are additional
places that would benefit from a long-lived set, but that's a task for
another day.
Thanks to Amit Kapila, who helped make the windows code I blindly wrote
actually work.
Reported-By: Dmitry Vasilyev Discussion:
CAB-SwXZh44_2ybvS5Z67p_CDz=XFn4hNAD=CnMEF+QqkXwFrGg@mail.gmail.com20160114143931.GG10941@awork2.anarazel.de
We used to require the server key file to have permissions 0600 or less
for best security. But some systems (such as Debian) have certificate
and key files managed by the operating system that can be shared with
other services. In those cases, the "postgres" user is made a member of
a special group that has access to those files, and the server key file
has permissions 0640. To accommodate that kind of setup, also allow the
key file to have permissions 0640 but only if owned by root.
From: Christoph Berg <myon@debian.org>
Reviewed-by: Alvaro Herrera <alvherre@alvh.no-ip.org>
We can never leak more than one token, but we shouldn't do that. We
don't bother closing it in the error paths since the process will
exit shortly anyway.
Christian Ullrich
Commit e710b65c inserted code in md5_crypt_verify to disable and later
re-enable interrupts, with a CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS call as part of the
second step, to process any interrupts that had been held off. Commit
6647248e removed the interrupt disable/re-enable code, but left behind
the CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS, even though this is now an entirely random,
pointless place for one. md5_crypt_verify doesn't run long enough to
need such a check, and if it did, this would still be the wrong place
to put one.
We tell people to examine the postmaster log if they're unsure why they are
getting auth failures, but actually only a few relatively-uncommon failure
cases were given their own log detail messages in commit 64e43c59b8.
Expand on that so that every failure case detected within md5_crypt_verify
gets a specific log detail message. This should cover pretty much every
ordinary password auth failure cause.
So far I've not noticed user demand for a similar level of auth detail
for the other auth methods, but sooner or later somebody might want to
work on them. This is not that patch, though.
Letting backends continue to run if the postmaster has exited prevents
PostgreSQL from being restarted, which in many environments is
catastrophic. Worse, if some other backend crashes, we no longer have
any protection against shared memory corruption. So, arrange for them
to exit instead. We don't want to expend many cycles on this, but
including postmaster death in the set of things that we wait for when
a backend is idle seems cheap enough.
Rajeev Rastogi and Robert Haas
With include_realm=1 being set down in parse_hba_auth_opt, if multiple
options are passed on the pg_hba line, such as:
host all all 0.0.0.0/0 gss include_realm=0 krb_realm=XYZ.COM
We would mistakenly reset include_realm back to 1. Instead, we need to
set include_realm=1 up in parse_hba_line, prior to parsing any of the
additional options.
Discovered by Jeff McCormick during testing.
Bug introduced by 9a08841.
Back-patch to 9.5
Commit 2bd9e412f9 introduced a mechanism
for relaying protocol messages from a background worker to another
backend via a shm_mq. However, there was no provision for shutting
down the communication channel. Therefore, a protocol message sent
late in the shutdown sequence, such as a DEBUG message resulting from
cranking up log_min_messages, could crash the server. To fix, install
an on_dsm_detach callback that disables sending messages to the shm_mq
when the associated DSM is detached.
Remove configure's checks for HAVE_POSIX_SIGNALS, HAVE_SIGPROCMASK, and
HAVE_SIGSETJMP. These APIs are required by the Single Unix Spec v2
(POSIX 1997), which we generally consider to define our minimum required
set of Unix APIs. Moreover, no buildfarm member has reported not having
them since 2012 or before, which means that even if the code is still live
somewhere, it's untested --- and we've made plenty of signal-handling
changes of late. So just take these APIs as given and save the cycles for
configure probes for them.
However, we can't remove as much C code as I'd hoped, because the Windows
port evidently still uses the non-POSIX code paths for signal masking.
Since we're largely emulating these BSD-style APIs for Windows anyway, it
might be a good thing to switch over to POSIX-like notation and thereby
remove a few more #ifdefs. But I'm not in a position to code or test that.
In the meantime, we can at least make things a bit more transparent by
testing for WIN32 explicitly in these places.
Commit c9b0cbe98b accidentally broke the
order of operations during postmaster shutdown: it resulted in removing
the per-socket lockfiles after, not before, postmaster.pid. This creates
a race-condition hazard for a new postmaster that's started immediately
after observing that postmaster.pid has disappeared; if it sees the
socket lockfile still present, it will quite properly refuse to start.
This error appears to be the explanation for at least some of the
intermittent buildfarm failures we've seen in the pg_upgrade test.
Another problem, which has been there all along, is that the postmaster
has never bothered to close() its listen sockets, but has just allowed them
to close at process death. This creates a different race condition for an
incoming postmaster: it might be unable to bind to the desired listen
address because the old postmaster is still incumbent. This might explain
some odd failures we've seen in the past, too. (Note: this is not related
to the fact that individual backends don't close their client communication
sockets. That behavior is intentional and is not changed by this patch.)
Fix by adding an on_proc_exit function that closes the postmaster's ports
explicitly, and (in 9.3 and up) reshuffling the responsibility for where
to unlink the Unix socket files. Lock file unlinking can stay where it
is, but teach it to unlink the lock files in reverse order of creation.
While postgres' use of SSL renegotiation is a good idea in theory, it
turned out to not work well in practice. The specification and openssl's
implementation of it have lead to several security issues. Postgres' use
of renegotiation also had its share of bugs.
Additionally OpenSSL has a bunch of bugs around renegotiation, reported
and open for years, that regularly lead to connections breaking with
obscure error messages. We tried increasingly complex workarounds to get
around these bugs, but we didn't find anything complete.
Since these connection breakages often lead to hard to debug problems,
e.g. spuriously failing base backups and significant latency spikes when
synchronous replication is used, we have decided to change the default
setting for ssl renegotiation to 0 (disabled) in the released
backbranches and remove it entirely in 9.5 and master.
Author: Andres Freund
Discussion: 20150624144148.GQ4797@alap3.anarazel.de
Backpatch: 9.5 and master, 9.0-9.4 get a different patch
We're interested in the buffer size of the socket that's connected to the
client, not the one that's listening for new connections. It happened to
work, as default buffer size is the same on both, but it was clearly not
wrong.
Spotted by Tom Lane
It's unnecessary to set it if the default is higher in the first place.
Furthermore, setting SO_SNDBUF disables the so-called "dynamic send
buffering" feature, which hurts performance further. This can be seen
especially when the network between the client and the server has high
latency.
Chen Huajun
Free the contexts holding this data after we're done using it, by the
expedient of attaching them to the PostmasterContext which we were
already taking care to delete (and where, indeed, this data used to live
before commits e5e2fc842c and 7c45e3a3c6). This saves a
probably-usually-negligible amount of space per running backend. It also
avoids leaving potentially-security-sensitive data lying around in memory
in processes that don't need it. You'd have to be unusually paranoid to
think that that amounts to a live security bug, so I've not gone so far as
to forcibly zero the memory; but there surely isn't a good reason to keep
this data around.
Arguably this is a memory management bug in the aforementioned commits,
but it doesn't seem important enough to back-patch.
PostgreSQL already checked the vast majority of these, missing this
handful that nearly cannot fail. If putenv() failed with ENOMEM in
pg_GSS_recvauth(), authentication would proceed with the wrong keytab
file. If strftime() returned zero in cache_locale_time(), using the
unspecified buffer contents could lead to information exposure or a
crash. Back-patch to 9.0 (all supported versions).
Other unchecked calls to these functions, especially those in frontend
code, pose negligible security concern. This patch does not address
them. Nonetheless, it is always better to check return values whose
specification provides for indicating an error.
In passing, fix an off-by-one error in strftime_win32()'s invocation of
WideCharToMultiByte(). Upon retrieving a value of exactly MAX_L10N_DATA
bytes, strftime_win32() would overrun the caller's buffer by one byte.
MAX_L10N_DATA is chosen to exceed the length of every possible value, so
the vulnerable scenario probably does not arise.
Security: CVE-2015-3166
Reentering this function with the right timing caused a double free,
typically crashing the backend. By synchronizing a disconnection with
the authentication timeout, an unauthenticated attacker could achieve
this somewhat consistently. Call be_tls_close() solely from within
proc_exit_prepare(). Back-patch to 9.0 (all supported versions).
Benkocs Norbert Attila
Security: CVE-2015-3165
The default behavior for GSS and SSPI authentication methods has long
been to strip the realm off of the principal, however, this is not a
secure approach in multi-realm environments and the use-case for the
parameter at all has been superseded by the regex-based mapping support
available in pg_ident.conf.
Change the default for include_realm to be '1', meaning that we do
NOT remove the realm from the principal by default. Any installations
which depend on the existing behavior will need to update their
configurations (ideally by leaving include_realm set to 1 and adding a
mapping in pg_ident.conf, but alternatively by explicitly setting
include_realm=0 prior to upgrading). Note that the mapping capability
exists in all currently supported versions of PostgreSQL and so this
change can be done today. Barring that, existing users can update their
configurations today to explicitly set include_realm=0 to ensure that
the prior behavior is maintained when they upgrade.
This needs to be noted in the release notes.
Per discussion with Magnus and Peter.
This does four basic things. First, it provides convenience routines
to coordinate the startup and shutdown of parallel workers. Second,
it synchronizes various pieces of state (e.g. GUCs, combo CID
mappings, transaction snapshot) from the parallel group leader to the
worker processes. Third, it prohibits various operations that would
result in unsafe changes to that state while parallelism is active.
Finally, it propagates events that would result in an ErrorResponse,
NoticeResponse, or NotifyResponse message being sent to the client
from the parallel workers back to the master, from which they can then
be sent on to the client.
Robert Haas, Amit Kapila, Noah Misch, Rushabh Lathia, Jeevan Chalke.
Suggestions and review from Andres Freund, Heikki Linnakangas, Noah
Misch, Simon Riggs, Euler Taveira, and Jim Nasby.
Since both forms are arguably legal I wasn't sure about changing
this. But then Tom argued for 'therefore'...
Author: Dmitriy Olshevskiy
Discussion: 34789.1430067832@sss.pgh.pa.us
This view shows information about all connections, such as if the
connection is using SSL, which cipher is used, and which client
certificate (if any) is used.
Reviews by Alex Shulgin, Heikki Linnakangas, Andres Freund & Michael Paquier
In investigating yesterday's crash report from Hugo Osvaldo Barrera, I only
looked back as far as commit f3aec2c7f5 where the breakage occurred
(which is why I thought the IPv4-in-IPv6 business was undocumented). But
actually the logic dates back to commit 3c9bb8886d and was simply
broken by erroneous refactoring in the later commit. A bit of archives
excavation shows that we added the whole business in response to a report
that some 2003-era Linux kernels would report IPv4 connections as having
IPv4-in-IPv6 addresses. The fact that we've had no complaints since 9.0
seems to be sufficient confirmation that no modern kernels do that, so
let's just rip it all out rather than trying to fix it.
Do this in the back branches too, thus essentially deciding that our
effective behavior since 9.0 is correct. If there are any platforms on
which the kernel reports IPv4-in-IPv6 addresses as such, yesterday's fix
would have made for a subtle and potentially security-sensitive change in
the effective meaning of IPv4 pg_hba.conf entries, which does not seem like
a good thing to do in minor releases. So let's let the post-9.0 behavior
stand, and change the documentation to match it.
In passing, I failed to resist the temptation to wordsmith the description
of pg_hba.conf IPv4 and IPv6 address entries a bit. A lot of this text
hasn't been touched since we were IPv4-only.
The previous coding copied garbage into a local variable, pretty much
ensuring that the intended test of an IPv6 connection address against a
promoted IPv4 address from pg_hba.conf would never match. The lack of
field complaints likely indicates that nobody realized this was supposed
to work, which is unsurprising considering that no user-facing docs suggest
it should work.
In principle this could have led to a SIGSEGV due to reading off the end of
memory, but since the source address would have pointed to somewhere in the
function's stack frame, that's quite unlikely. What led to discovery of
the bug is Hugo Osvaldo Barrera's report of a crash after an OS upgrade,
which is probably because he is now running a system in which memcpy raises
abort() upon detecting overlapping source and destination areas. (You'd
have to additionally suppose some things about the stack frame layout to
arrive at this conclusion, but it seems plausible.)
This has been broken since the code was added, in commit f3aec2c7f5,
so back-patch to all supported branches.
This reverts the removal of the call in commit (272923a0). It turns out it
wasn't superfluous after all: without it, renegotiation fails if a client
certificate was used. The rest of the changes in that commit are still OK
and not reverted.
Per investigation of bug #12769 by Arne Scheffer, although this doesn't fix
the reported bug yet.
The client socket is always in non-blocking mode, and if we actually want
blocking behaviour, we emulate it by sleeping and retrying. But we have
retry loops at different layers for reads and writes, which was confusing.
To simplify, remove all the sleeping and retrying code from the lower
levels, from be_tls_read and secure_raw_read and secure_raw_write, and put
all the logic in secure_read() and secure_write().
At least in all modern versions of OpenSSL, it is enough to call
SSL_renegotiate() once, and then forget about it. Subsequent SSL_write()
and SSL_read() calls will finish the handshake.
The SSL_set_session_id_context() call is unnecessary too. We only have
one SSL context, and the SSL session was created with that to begin with.
We'd leak the ident_serv data structure if the second pg_getaddrinfo_all
(the one for the local address) failed. This is not of great consequence
because a failure return here just leads directly to backend exit(), but
if this function is going to try to clean up after itself at all, it should
not have such holes in the logic. Try to fix it in a future-proof way by
having all the failure exits go through the same cleanup path, rather than
"optimizing" some of them.
Per Coverity. Back-patch to 9.2, which is as far back as this patch
applies cleanly.
We used to handle authentication_timeout by setting
ImmediateInterruptOK to true during large parts of the authentication
phase of a new connection. While that happens to work acceptably in
practice, it's not particularly nice and has ugly corner cases.
Previous commits converted the FE/BE communication to use latches and
implemented support for interrupt handling during both
send/recv. Building on top of that work we can get rid of
ImmediateInterruptOK during authentication, by immediately treating
timeouts during authentication as a reason to die. As die interrupts
are handled immediately during client communication that provides a
sensibly quick reaction time to authentication timeout.
Additionally add a few CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS() to some more complex
authentication methods. More could be added, but this already should
provides a reasonable coverage.
While it this overall increases the maximum time till a timeout is
reacted to, it greatly reduces complexity and increases
reliability. That seems like a overall win. If the increase proves to
be noticeable we can deal with those cases by moving to nonblocking
network code and add interrupt checking there.
Reviewed-By: Heikki Linnakangas
Up to now it was impossible to terminate a backend that was trying to
send/recv data to/from the client when the socket's buffer was already
full/empty. While the send/recv calls itself might have gotten
interrupted by signals on some platforms, we just immediately retried.
That could lead to situations where a backend couldn't be terminated ,
after a client died without the connection being closed, because it
was blocked in send/recv.
The problem was far more likely to be hit when sending data than when
reading. That's because while reading a command from the client, and
during authentication, we processed interrupts immediately . That
primarily left COPY FROM STDIN as being problematic for recv.
Change things so that that we process 'die' events immediately when
the appropriate signal arrives. We can't sensibly react to query
cancels at that point, because we might loose sync with the client as
we could be in the middle of writing a message.
We don't interrupt writes if the write buffer isn't full, as indicated
by write() returning EWOULDBLOCK, as that would lead to fewer error
messages reaching clients.
Per discussion with Kyotaro HORIGUCHI and Heikki Linnakangas
Discussion: 20140927191243.GD5423@alap3.anarazel.de
Up to now large swathes of backend code ran inside signal handlers
while reading commands from the client, to allow for speedy reaction to
asynchronous events. Most prominently shared invalidation and NOTIFY
handling. That means that complex code like the starting/stopping of
transactions is run in signal handlers... The required code was
fragile and verbose, and is likely to contain bugs.
That approach also severely limited what could be done while
communicating with the client. As the read might be from within
openssl it wasn't safely possible to trigger an error, e.g. to cancel
a backend in idle-in-transaction state. We did that in some cases,
namely fatal errors, nonetheless.
Now that FE/BE communication in the backend employs non-blocking
sockets and latches to block, we can quite simply interrupt reads from
signal handlers by setting the latch. That allows us to signal an
interrupted read, which is supposed to be retried after returning from
within the ssl library.
As signal handlers now only need to set the latch to guarantee timely
interrupt processing, remove a fair amount of complicated & fragile
code from async.c and sinval.c.
We could now actually start to process some kinds of interrupts, like
sinval ones, more often that before, but that seems better done
separately.
This work will hopefully allow to handle cases like being blocked by
sending data, interrupting idle transactions and similar to be
implemented without too much effort. In addition to allowing getting
rid of ImmediateInterruptOK, that is.
Author: Andres Freund
Reviewed-By: Heikki Linnakangas
This allows to introduce more elaborate handling of interrupts while
reading from a socket. Currently some interrupt handlers have to do
significant work from inside signal handlers, and it's very hard to
correctly write code to do so. Generic signal handler limitations,
combined with the fact that we can't safely jump out of a signal
handler while reading from the client have prohibited implementation
of features like timeouts for idle-in-transaction.
Additionally we use the latch code to wait in a couple places where we
previously only had waiting code on windows as other platforms just
busy looped.
This can increase the number of systemcalls happening during FE/BE
communication. Benchmarks so far indicate that the impact isn't very
high, and there's room for optimization in the latch code. The chance
of cleaning up the usage of latches gives us, seem to outweigh the
risk of small performance regressions.
This commit theoretically can't used without the next patch in the
series, as WaitLatchOrSocket is not defined to be fully signal
safe. As we already do that in some cases though, it seems better to
keep the commits separate, so they're easier to understand.
Author: Andres Freund
Reviewed-By: Heikki Linnakangas
If any error occurred while we were in the middle of reading a protocol
message from the client, we could lose sync, and incorrectly try to
interpret a part of another message as a new protocol message. That will
usually lead to an "invalid frontend message" error that terminates the
connection. However, this is a security issue because an attacker might
be able to deliberately cause an error, inject a Query message in what's
supposed to be just user data, and have the server execute it.
We were quite careful to not have CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS() calls or other
operations that could ereport(ERROR) in the middle of processing a message,
but a query cancel interrupt or statement timeout could nevertheless cause
it to happen. Also, the V2 fastpath and COPY handling were not so careful.
It's very difficult to recover in the V2 COPY protocol, so we will just
terminate the connection on error. In practice, that's what happened
previously anyway, as we lost protocol sync.
To fix, add a new variable in pqcomm.c, PqCommReadingMsg, that is set
whenever we're in the middle of reading a message. When it's set, we cannot
safely ERROR out and continue running, because we might've read only part
of a message. PqCommReadingMsg acts somewhat similarly to critical sections
in that if an error occurs while it's set, the error handler will force the
connection to be terminated, as if the error was FATAL. It's not
implemented by promoting ERROR to FATAL in elog.c, like ERROR is promoted
to PANIC in critical sections, because we want to be able to use
PG_TRY/CATCH to recover and regain protocol sync. pq_getmessage() takes
advantage of that to prevent an OOM error from terminating the connection.
To prevent unnecessary connection terminations, add a holdoff mechanism
similar to HOLD/RESUME_INTERRUPTS() that can be used hold off query cancel
interrupts, but still allow die interrupts. The rules on which interrupts
are processed when are now a bit more complicated, so refactor
ProcessInterrupts() and the calls to it in signal handlers so that the
signal handlers always call it if ImmediateInterruptOK is set, and
ProcessInterrupts() can decide to not do anything if the other conditions
are not met.
Reported by Emil Lenngren. Patch reviewed by Noah Misch and Andres Freund.
Backpatch to all supported versions.
Security: CVE-2015-0244
strncpy() has a well-deserved reputation for being unsafe, so make an
effort to get rid of nearly all occurrences in HEAD.
A large fraction of the remaining uses were passing length less than or
equal to the known strlen() of the source, in which case no null-padding
can occur and the behavior is equivalent to memcpy(), though doubtless
slower and certainly harder to reason about. So just use memcpy() in
these cases.
In other cases, use either StrNCpy() or strlcpy() as appropriate (depending
on whether padding to the full length of the destination buffer seems
useful).
I left a few strncpy() calls alone in the src/timezone/ code, to keep it
in sync with upstream (the IANA tzcode distribution). There are also a
few such calls in ecpg that could possibly do with more analysis.
AFAICT, none of these changes are more than cosmetic, except for the four
occurrences in fe-secure-openssl.c, which are in fact buggy: an overlength
source leads to a non-null-terminated destination buffer and ensuing
misbehavior. These don't seem like security issues, first because no stack
clobber is possible and second because if your values of sslcert etc are
coming from untrusted sources then you've got problems way worse than this.
Still, it's undesirable to have unpredictable behavior for overlength
inputs, so back-patch those four changes to all active branches.
Robert Haas
Magnus Hagander
Peter Eisentraut
Tom Lane
Noah Misch
Andres Freund
Bruce Momjian
Stephen Frost
Heikki Linnakangas