This reverts commit 1826987a46.
The overall design was deemed unacceptable, in discussion following the
previous commit message; we might find some parts of it still
salvageable, but I don't want to be on the hook for fixing it, so let's
wait until we have a new patch.
The previous representation using a boolean column for each attribute
would not scale as well as we want to add further attributes.
Extra auxilliary functions are added to go along with this change, to
make up for the lost convenience of access of the old representation.
Catalog version bumped due to change in catalogs and the new functions.
Author: Adam Brightwell, minor tweaks by Álvaro
Reviewed by: Stephen Frost, Andres Freund, Álvaro Herrera
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
They don't actually do anything yet; that will get fixed in a
follow-on commit. But this gets the basic infrastructure in place,
including CREATE/ALTER/DROP EVENT TRIGGER; support for COMMENT,
SECURITY LABEL, and ALTER EXTENSION .. ADD/DROP EVENT TRIGGER;
pg_dump and psql support; and documentation for the anticipated
initial feature set.
Dimitri Fontaine, with review and a bunch of additional hacking by me.
Thom Brown extensively reviewed earlier versions of this patch set,
but there's not a whole lot of that code left in this commit, as it
turns out.
Because permissions are assigned to element types, not array types,
complaining about permission denied on an array type would be
misleading to users. So adjust the reporting to refer to the element
type instead.
In order not to duplicate the required logic in two dozen places,
refactor the permission denied reporting for types a bit.
pointed out by Yeb Havinga during the review of the type privilege
feature
Hitherto, the information schema only showed explicitly granted
privileges that were visible in the *acl catalog columns. If no
privileges had been granted, the implicit privileges were not shown.
To fix that, add an SQL-accessible version of the acldefault()
function, and use that inside the aclexplode() calls to substitute the
catalog-specific default privilege set for null values.
reviewed by Abhijit Menon-Sen
This adds support for the more or less SQL-conforming USAGE privilege
on types and domains. The intent is to be able restrict which users
can create dependencies on types, which restricts the way in which
owners can alter types.
reviewed by Yeb Havinga
Instead, foreign tables are treated just like views: permissions can
be granted using GRANT privilege ON [TABLE] foreign_table_name TO role,
and revoked similarly. GRANT/REVOKE .. FOREIGN TABLE is no longer
supported, just as we don't support GRANT/REVOKE .. VIEW. The set of
accepted permissions for foreign tables is now identical to the set for
regular tables, and views.
Per report from Thom Brown, and subsequent discussion.
This mostly involves making it work with the objectaddress.c framework,
which does most of the heavy lifting. In that vein, change
GetForeignDataWrapperOidByName to get_foreign_data_wrapper_oid and
GetForeignServerOidByName to get_foreign_server_oid, to match the
pattern we use for other object types.
Robert Haas and Shigeru Hanada
Formerly, any member of a role could change the role's comment, as of
course could superusers; but holders of CREATEROLE privilege could not,
unless they were also members. This led to the odd situation that a
CREATEROLE holder could create a role but then could not comment on it.
It also seems a bit dubious to let an unprivileged user change his own
comment, let alone those of group roles he belongs to. So, change the
rule to be "you must be superuser to comment on a superuser role, or
hold CREATEROLE to comment on non-superuser roles". This is the same
as the privilege check for creating/dropping roles, and thus fits much
better with the rule for other object types, namely that only the owner
of an object can comment on it.
In passing, clean up the documentation for COMMENT a little bit.
Per complaint from Owen Jacobson and subsequent discussion.
Remove the unconditional superuser permissions check in CREATE EXTENSION,
and instead define a "superuser" extension property, which when false
(not the default) skips the superuser permissions check. In this case
the calling user only needs enough permissions to execute the commands
in the extension's installation script. The superuser property is also
enforced in the same way for ALTER EXTENSION UPDATE cases.
In other ALTER EXTENSION cases and DROP EXTENSION, test ownership of
the extension rather than superuserness. ALTER EXTENSION ADD/DROP needs
to insist on ownership of the target object as well; to do that without
duplicating code, refactor comment.c's big switch for permissions checks
into a separate function in objectaddress.c.
I also removed the superuserness checks in pg_available_extensions and
related functions; there's no strong reason why everybody shouldn't
be able to see that info.
Also invent an IF NOT EXISTS variant of CREATE EXTENSION, and use that
in pg_dump, so that dumps won't fail for installed-by-default extensions.
We don't have any of those yet, but we will soon.
This is all per discussion of wrapping the standard procedural languages
into extensions. I'll make those changes in a separate commit; this is
just putting the core infrastructure in place.
- collowner field
- CREATE COLLATION
- ALTER COLLATION
- DROP COLLATION
- COMMENT ON COLLATION
- integration with extensions
- pg_dump support for the above
- dependency management
- psql tab completion
- psql \dO command
Foreign tables are a core component of SQL/MED. This commit does
not provide a working SQL/MED infrastructure, because foreign tables
cannot yet be queried. Support for foreign table scans will need to
be added in a future patch. However, this patch creates the necessary
system catalog structure, syntax support, and support for ancillary
operations such as COMMENT and SECURITY LABEL.
Shigeru Hanada, heavily revised by Robert Haas
unqualified names.
- Add a missing_ok parameter to get_tablespace_oid.
- Avoid duplicating get_tablespace_od guts in objectNamesToOids.
- Add a missing_ok parameter to get_database_oid.
- Replace get_roleid and get_role_checked with get_role_oid.
- Add get_namespace_oid, get_language_oid, get_am_oid.
- Refactor existing code to use new interfaces.
Thanks to KaiGai Kohei for the review.
Instead of expensive cross joins to resolve the ACL, add table-returning
function aclexplode() that expands the ACL into a useful form, and join
against that.
Also, implement the role_*_grants views as a thin layer over the respective
*_privileges views instead of essentially repeating the same code twice.
fixes bug #4596
by Joachim Wieland, with cleanup by me
the privileges that will be applied to subsequently-created objects.
Such adjustments are always per owning role, and can be restricted to objects
created in particular schemas too. A notable benefit is that users can
override the traditional default privilege settings, eg, the PUBLIC EXECUTE
privilege traditionally granted by default for functions.
Petr Jelinek
This doesn't do any remote or external things yet, but it gives modules
like plproxy and dblink a standardized and future-proof system for
managing their connection information.
Martin Pihlak and Peter Eisentraut
Oleg Bartunov and Teodor Sigaev, but I did a lot of editorializing,
so anything that's broken is probably my fault.
Documentation is nonexistent as yet, but let's land the patch so we can
get some portability testing done.
A DBA is allowed to create a language in his database if it's marked
"tmpldbacreate" in pg_pltemplate. The factory default is that this is set
for all standard trusted languages, but of course a superuser may adjust
the settings. In service of this, add the long-foreseen owner column to
pg_language; renaming, dropping, and altering owner of a PL now follow
normal ownership rules instead of being superuser-only.
Jeremy Drake, with some editorialization by Tom Lane.
FAMILY; and add FAMILY option to CREATE OPERATOR CLASS to allow adding a
class to a pre-existing family. Per previous discussion. Man, what a
tedious lot of cutting and pasting ...
can create or modify rules for the table. Do setRuleCheckAsUser() while
loading rules into the relcache, rather than when defining a rule. This
ensures that permission checks for tables referenced in a rule are done with
respect to the current owner of the rule's table, whereas formerly ALTER TABLE
OWNER would fail to update the permission checking for associated rules.
Removal of separate RULE privilege is needed to prevent various scenarios
in which a grantee of RULE privilege could effectively have any privilege
of the table owner. For backwards compatibility, GRANT/REVOKE RULE is still
accepted, but it doesn't do anything. Per discussion here:
http://archives.postgresql.org/pgsql-hackers/2006-04/msg01138.php
in various places that were previously doing ad hoc pg_database searches.
This may speed up database-related privilege checks a little bit, but
the main motivation is to eliminate the performance reason for having
ReverifyMyDatabase do such a lot of stuff (viz, avoiding repeat scans
of pg_database during backend startup). The locking reason for having
that routine is about to go away, and it'd be good to have the option
to break it up.
Continue to support GRANT ON [TABLE] for sequences for backward
compatibility; issue warning for invalid sequence permissions.
[Backward compatibility warning message.]
Add USAGE permission for sequences that allows only currval() and
nextval(), not setval().
Mention object name in grant/revoke warnings because of possible
multi-object operations.
comment line where output as too long, and update typedefs for /lib
directory. Also fix case where identifiers were used as variable names
in the backend, but as typedefs in ecpg (favor the backend for
indenting).
Backpatch to 8.1.X.
process of dropping roles by dropping objects owned by them and privileges
granted to them, or giving the owned objects to someone else, through the
use of the data stored in the new pg_shdepend catalog.
Some refactoring of the GRANT/REVOKE code was needed, as well as ALTER OWNER
code. Further cleanup of code duplication in the GRANT code seems necessary.
Implemented by me after an idea from Tom Lane, who also provided various kind
of implementation advice.
Regression tests pass. Some tests for the new functionality are also added,
as well as rudimentary documentation.
functionality, but I still need to make another pass looking at places
that incidentally use arrays (such as ACL manipulation) to make sure they
are null-safe. Contrib needs work too.
I have not changed the behaviors that are still under discussion about
array comparison and what to do with lower bounds.
create circularity of role memberships. This is a minimum-impact fix
for the problem reported by Florian Pflug. I thought about removing
the superuser_arg test from is_member_of_role() altogether, as it seems
redundant for many of the callers --- but not all, and it's way too late
in the 8.1 cycle to be making large changes. Perhaps reconsider this
later.
