The code associated with EXEC SQL DEFINE was unreadable and full of
bugs, notably:
* It'd attempt to free a non-malloced string if the ecpg program
tries to redefine a macro that was defined on the command line.
* Possible memory stomp if user writes "-D=foo".
* Undef'ing or redefining a macro defined on the command line would
change the state visible to the next file, when multiple files are
specified on the command line. (While possibly that could have been
an intentional choice, the code clearly intends to revert to the
original macro state; it's just failing to consider this interaction.)
* Missing "break" in defining a new macro meant that redefinition
of an existing name would cause an extra entry to be added to the
definition list. While not immediately harmful, a subsequent undef
would result in the prior entry becoming visible again.
* The interactions with input buffering are subtle and were entirely
undocumented.
It's not that surprising that we hadn't noticed these bugs,
because there was no test coverage at all of either the -D
command line switch or multiple input files. This patch adds
such coverage (in a rather hacky way I guess).
In addition to the code bugs, the user documentation was confused
about whether the -D switch defines a C macro or an ecpg one, and
it failed to mention that you can write "-Dsymbol=value".
These problems are old, so back-patch to all supported branches.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/998011.1713217712@sss.pgh.pa.us
ecpg wants to emit a warning if it parses a SQL construct that the
backend can parse but will immediately throw a FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED
error for. The way it was testing for this was to see if the string
ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED appeared anywhere in the gram.y code.
This is, of course, not nearly good enough, as there are plenty of
rules in gram.y that throw that error only conditionally. There was
a hack dating to 2008 to suppress the warning in one rule that
doesn't even exist anymore, but nothing for other cases we've created
since then. End result was that you could get "unsupported feature
will be passed to server" warnings while compiling perfectly good SQL
code in ecpg. Somehow we'd not heard complaints about this, but
it was exposed by the recent addition of an ecpg test for a SQL/JSON
construct.
To fix, suppress the warning if the rule contains any "if" statement.
Manual comparison of gram.y with the generated preproc.y file shows
that the warning is now emitted only in rules where it's sensible.
This problem has existed for a long time, so back-patch to all
supported branches.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/603615.1712245382@sss.pgh.pa.us
If we are building with openssl but USE_SSL_ENGINE didn't get set,
initialize_SSL's variable "pkey" is declared but used nowhere.
Apparently this combination hasn't been exercised in the buildfarm
before now, because I've not seen this warning before, even though
the code has been like this a long time. Move the declaration
to silence the warning (and remove its useless initialization).
Per buildfarm member sawshark. Back-patch to all supported branches.
In OpenSSL 3.0.0 and later, ERR_reason_error_string randomly refuses
to provide a string for error codes representing system errno values
(e.g., "No such file or directory"). There is a poorly-documented way
to extract the errno from the SSL error code in this case, so do that
and apply strerror, rather than falling back to reporting the error
code's numeric value as we were previously doing.
Problem reported by David Zhang, although this is not his proposed
patch; it's instead based on a suggestion from Heikki Linnakangas.
Back-patch to all supported branches, since any of them are likely
to be used with recent OpenSSL.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/b6fb018b-f05c-4afd-abd3-318c649faf18@highgo.ca
intoasc(), a wrapper for PGTYPESinterval_to_asc that converts an
interval to its textual representation, used a plain memcpy() when
copying its result. This could miss a zero-termination in the result
string, leading to an incorrect result.
The routines in informix.c do not provide the length of their result
buffer, which would allow a replacement of strcpy() to safer strlcpy()
calls, but this requires an ABI breakage and that cannot happen in
back-branches.
Author: Oleg Tselebrovskiy
Reviewed-by: Ashutosh Bapat
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/bf47888585149f83b276861a1662f7e4@postgrespro.ru
Backpatch-through: 12
We previously supposed that it was okay for different threads to
call bindtextdomain() concurrently (cf. commit 1f655fdc3).
It now emerges that there's at least one gettext implementation
in which that triggers an abort() crash, so let's stop doing that.
Add mutexes guarding libpq's and ecpglib's calls, which are the
only ones that need worry about multithreaded callers.
Note: in libpq, we could perhaps have piggybacked on
default_threadlock() to avoid defining a new mutex variable.
I judge that not terribly safe though, since libpq_gettext could
be called from code that is holding the default mutex. If that
were the first such call in the process, it'd fail. An extra
mutex is cheap insurance against unforeseen interactions.
Per bug #18312 from Christian Maurer. Back-patch to all
supported versions.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/18312-bbbabc8113592b78@postgresql.org
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/264860.1707163416@sss.pgh.pa.us
Fix pthread-win32.h and pthread-win32.c to provide a more complete
emulation of POSIX pthread mutexes: define PTHREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER
and make sure that pthread_mutex_lock() can operate on a mutex
object that's been initialized that way. Then we don't need the
duplicative platform-specific logic in default_threadlock() and
pgtls_init(), which we'd otherwise need yet a third copy of for
an upcoming bug fix.
Also, since default_threadlock() supposes that pthread_mutex_lock()
cannot fail, try to ensure that that's actually true, by getting
rid of the malloc call that was formerly involved in initializing
an emulated mutex. We can define an extra state for the spinlock
field instead.
Also, replace the similar code in ecpglib/misc.c with this version.
While ecpglib's version at least had a POSIX-compliant API, it
also had the potential of failing during mutex init (but here,
because of CreateMutex failure rather than malloc failure). Since
all of misc.c's callers ignore failures, it seems like a wise idea
to avoid failures here too.
A further improvement in this area could be to unify libpq's and
ecpglib's implementations into a src/port/pthread-win32.c file.
But that doesn't seem like a bug fix, so I'll desist for now.
In preparation for the aforementioned bug fix, back-patch to all
supported branches.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/264860.1707163416@sss.pgh.pa.us
OpenSSL will sometimes return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL without having set
errno; this is apparently a reflection of recv(2)'s habit of not
setting errno when reporting EOF. Ensure that we treat such cases
the same as read EOF. Previously, we'd frequently report them like
"could not accept SSL connection: Success" which is confusing, or
worse report them with an unrelated errno left over from some
previous syscall.
To fix, ensure that errno is zeroed immediately before the call,
and report its value only when it's not zero afterwards; otherwise
report EOF.
For consistency, I've applied the same coding pattern in libpq's
pqsecure_raw_read(). Bare recv(2) shouldn't really return -1 without
setting errno, but in case it does we might as well cope.
Per report from Andres Freund. Back-patch to all supported versions.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20231208181451.deqnflwxqoehhxpe@awork3.anarazel.de
We should have done it this way all along, but we accidentally got
away with using the wrong BIO field up until OpenSSL 3.2. There,
the library's BIO routines that we rely on use the "data" field
for their own purposes, and our conflicting use causes assorted
weird behaviors up to and including core dumps when SSL connections
are attempted. Switch to using the approved field for the purpose,
i.e. app_data.
While at it, remove our configure probes for BIO_get_data as well
as the fallback implementation. BIO_{get,set}_app_data have been
there since long before any OpenSSL version that we still support,
even in the back branches.
Also, update src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl to allow for a minor
change in an error message spelling that evidently came in with 3.2.
Tristan Partin and Bo Andreson. Back-patch to all supported branches.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CAN55FZ1eDDYsYaL7mv+oSLUij2h_u6hvD4Qmv-7PK7jkji0uyQ@mail.gmail.com
The libpq code in charge of creating per-connection SSL objects was
prone to a race condition when loading the custom BIO methods needed by
my_SSL_set_fd(). As BIO methods are stored as a static variable, the
initialization of a connection could fail because it could be possible
to have one thread refer to my_bio_methods while it is being manipulated
by a second concurrent thread.
This error has been introduced by 8bb14cdd33, that has removed
ssl_config_mutex around the call of my_SSL_set_fd(), that itself sets
the custom BIO methods used in libpq. Like previously, the BIO method
initialization is now protected by the existing ssl_config_mutex, itself
initialized earlier for WIN32.
While on it, document that my_bio_methods is protected by
ssl_config_mutex, as this can be easy to miss.
Reported-by: Willi Mann
Author: Willi Mann, Michael Paquier
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/e77abc4c-4d03-4058-a9d7-ef0035657e04@celonis.com
Backpatch-through: 12
When using GSSAPI encryption in non-blocking mode, libpq sometimes
failed with "GSSAPI caller failed to retransmit all data needing
to be retried". The cause is that pqPutMsgEnd rounds its transmit
request down to an even multiple of 8K, and sometimes that can lead
to not requesting a write of data that was requested to be written
(but reported as not written) earlier. That can upset pg_GSS_write's
logic for dealing with not-yet-written data, since it's possible
the data in question had already been incorporated into an encrypted
packet that we weren't able to send during the previous call.
We could fix this with a one-or-two-line hack to disable pqPutMsgEnd's
round-down behavior, but that seems like making the caller work around
a behavior that pg_GSS_write shouldn't expose in this way. Instead,
adjust pg_GSS_write to never report a partial write: it either
reports a complete write, or reflects the failure of the lower-level
pqsecure_raw_write call. The requirement still exists for the caller
to present at least as much data as on the previous call, but with
the caller-visible write start point not moving there is no temptation
for it to present less. We lose some ability to reclaim buffer space
early, but I doubt that that will make much difference in practice.
This also gets rid of a rather dubious assumption that "any
interesting failure condition (from pqsecure_raw_write) will recur
on the next try". We've not seen failure reports traceable to that,
but I've never trusted it particularly and am glad to remove it.
Make the same adjustments to the equivalent backend routine
be_gssapi_write(). It is probable that there's no bug on the backend
side, since we don't have a notion of nonblock mode there; but we
should keep the logic the same to ease future maintenance.
Per bug #18210 from Lars Kanis. Back-patch to all supported branches.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/18210-4c6d0b14627f2eb8@postgresql.org
Commit 6df7a9698b accidentally included two identical prototypes for
default_multirange_selectivi() and commit 086cf1458c added a break;
statement where one was already present, thus duplicating it. While
there is no bug caused by this, fix by removing the duplicated lines
as they provide no value.
Backpatch the fix for duplicate prototypes to v14 and the duplicate
break statement fix to all supported branches to avoid backpatching
hazards due to the removal.
Reported-by: Anton Voloshin <a.voloshin@postgrespro.ru>
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/0e69cb60-0176-f6d0-7e15-6478b7d85724@postgrespro.ru
When compiled with -C ORACLE, ecpg_get_data() had a one-off issue where
it would incorrectly store the null terminator byte to str[-1] when
varcharsize is 0, which is something that can happen when using SQLDA.
This would eat 1 byte from the previous field stored, corrupting the
results generated.
All the callers of ecpg_get_data() estimate and allocate enough storage
for the data received, and the fix of this commit relies on this
assumption. Note that this maps to the case where no padding or
truncation is required.
This issue has been introduced by 3b7ab43 with the Oracle compatibility
option, so backpatch down to v11.
Author: Kyotaro Horiguchi
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20230410.173500.440060475837236886.horikyota.ntt@gmail.com
Backpatch-through: 11
The error cases for TLS and GSS encryption were inconsistent. After TLS
fails, the connection is marked as dead and follow-up calls of
PQconnectPoll() would return immediately, but GSS encryption was not
doing that, so the connection would still have been allowed to enter the
GSS handling code. This was handled incorrectly when gssencmode was set
to "require". "prefer" was working correctly, and this could not happen
under "disable" as GSS encryption would not be attempted.
This commit makes the error handling of GSS encryption on par with TLS
portion, fixing the case of gssencmode=require.
Reported-by: Jacob Champion
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Jacob Champion, Stephen Frost
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/23787477-5fe1-a161-6d2a-e459f74c4713@timescale.com
Backpatch-through: 12
OpenSSL 1.1.1 and newer versions have added support for RSA-PSS
certificates, which requires the use of a specific routine in OpenSSL to
determine which hash function to use when compiling it when using
channel binding in SCRAM-SHA-256. X509_get_signature_nid(), that is the
original routine the channel binding code has relied on, is not able to
determine which hash algorithm to use for such certificates. However,
X509_get_signature_info(), new to OpenSSL 1.1.1, is able to do it. This
commit switches the channel binding logic to rely on
X509_get_signature_info() over X509_get_signature_nid(), which would be
the choice when building with 1.1.1 or newer.
The error could have been triggered on the client or the server, hence
libpq and the backend need to have their related code paths patched.
Note that attempting to load an RSA-PSS certificate with OpenSSL 1.1.0
or older leads to a failure due to an unsupported algorithm.
The discovery of relying on X509_get_signature_info() comes from Jacob,
the tests have been written by Heikki (with few tweaks from me), while I
have bundled the whole together while adding the bits needed for MSVC
and meson.
This issue exists since channel binding exists, so backpatch all the way
down. Some tests are added in 15~, triggered if compiling with OpenSSL
1.1.1 or newer, where the certificate and key files can easily be
generated for RSA-PSS.
Reported-by: Gunnar "Nick" Bluth
Author: Jacob Champion, Heikki Linnakangas
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/17760-b6c61e752ec07060@postgresql.org
Backpatch-through: 11
pqsecure_open_gss() includes a code path handling error messages with
v2-style protocol messages coming from the server. The client-side
buffer holding the error message does not force a NULL-termination, with
the data of the server getting copied to the errorMessage of the
connection. Hence, it would be possible for a server to send an
unterminated string and copy arbitrary bytes in the buffer receiving the
error message in the client, opening the door to a crash or even data
exposure.
As at this stage of the authentication process the exchange has not been
completed yet, this could be abused by an attacker without Kerberos
credentials. Clients that have a valid kerberos cache are vulnerable as
libpq opportunistically requests for it except if gssencmode is
disabled.
Author: Jacob Champion
Backpatch-through: 12
Security: CVE-2022-41862
The frontend-side routine in charge of building a SCRAM verifier
mentioned that the restrictions applying to SASLprep on the password
with the encoding are described at the top of fe-auth-scram.c, but this
information is in auth-scram.c.
This is wrong since 8f8b9be, so backpatch all the way down as this is an
important documentation bit.
Spotted while reviewing a different patch.
Backpatch-through: 11
The ECPG preprocessor converted code such as
static varchar str1[10], str2[20], str3[30];
into
static struct varchar_1 { int len; char arr[ 10 ]; } str1 ;
struct varchar_2 { int len; char arr[ 20 ]; } str2 ;
struct varchar_3 { int len; char arr[ 30 ]; } str3 ;
thus losing the storage attribute for the later variables.
Repeat the declaration for each such variable.
(Note that this occurred only for variables declared "varchar"
or "bytea", which may help explain how it escaped detection
for so long.)
Andrey Sokolov
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/942241662288242@mail.yandex.ru
There's a convention that externally-visible libpq functions should
check for a NULL PGconn pointer, and fail gracefully instead of
crashing. PQflush() and PQisnonblocking() didn't get that memo
though. Also add a similar check to PQdefaultSSLKeyPassHook_OpenSSL;
while it's not clear that ordinary usage could reach that with a
null conn pointer, it's cheap enough to check, so let's be consistent.
Daniele Varrazzo and Tom Lane
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CA+mi_8Zm_mVVyW1iNFgyMd9Oh0Nv8-F+7Y3-BqwMgTMHuo_h2Q@mail.gmail.com
Per buildfarm member prairiedog, this platform rejects uninitialized
global variables in shared libraries. Back-patch to v10, like the
addition of the variable.
Reviewed by Tom Lane.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20220703030619.GB2378460@rfd.leadboat.com
ecpglib has been calling it once per SQL query and once per EXEC SQL GET
DESCRIPTOR. Instead, if newlocale() has not succeeded before, call it
while establishing a connection. This mitigates three problems:
- If newlocale() failed in EXEC SQL GET DESCRIPTOR, the command silently
proceeded without the intended locale change.
- On AIX, each newlocale()+freelocale() cycle leaked memory.
- newlocale() CPU usage may have been nontrivial.
Fail the connection attempt if newlocale() fails. Rearrange
ecpg_do_prologue() to validate the connection before its uselocale().
The sort of program that may regress is one running in an environment
where newlocale() fails. If that program establishes connections
without running SQL statements, it will stop working in response to this
change. I'm betting against the importance of such an ECPG use case.
Most SQL execution (any using ECPGdo()) has long required newlocale()
success, so there's little a connection could do without newlocale().
Back-patch to v10 (all supported versions).
Reviewed by Tom Lane. Reported by Guillaume Lelarge.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20220101074055.GA54621@rfd.leadboat.com
If an application executed operations like EXEC SQL PREPARE
without having first established a database connection, it could
get a core dump instead of the expected clean failure. This
occurred because we did "pthread_getspecific(actual_connection_key)"
without ever having initialized the TSD key actual_connection_key.
The results of that are probably platform-specific, but at least
on Linux it often leads to a crash.
To fix, add calls to ecpg_pthreads_init() in the code paths that
might use actual_connection_key uninitialized. It's harmless
(and hopefully inexpensive) to do that more than once.
Per bug #17514 from Okano Naoki. The problem's ancient, so
back-patch to all supported branches.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/17514-edd4fad547c5692c@postgresql.org
An error PGresult generated by libpq itself, such as a report of
connection loss, won't have broken-down error fields.
ecpg_raise_backend() blithely assumed that PG_DIAG_MESSAGE_PRIMARY
would always be present, and would end up passing a NULL string
pointer to snprintf when it isn't. That would typically crash
before 3779ac62d, and it would fail to provide a useful error report
in any case. Best practice is to substitute PQerrorMessage(conn)
in such cases, so do that.
Per bug #17421 from Masayuki Hirose. Back-patch to all supported
branches.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/17421-790ff887e3188874@postgresql.org
Commits a59c79564 et al. tried to sync libpq's SSL key file
permissions checks with what we've used for years in the backend.
We did not intend to create any new failure cases, but it turns out
we did: restricting the key file's ownership breaks cases where the
client is allowed to read a key file despite not having the identical
UID. In particular a client running as root used to be able to read
someone else's key file; and having seen that I suspect that there are
other, less-dubious use cases that this restriction breaks on some
platforms.
We don't really need an ownership check, since if we can read the key
file despite its having restricted permissions, it must have the right
ownership --- under normal conditions anyway, and the point of this
patch is that any additional corner cases where that works should be
deemed allowable, as they have been historically. Hence, just drop
the ownership check, and rearrange the permissions check to get rid
of its faulty assumption that geteuid() can't be zero. (Note that the
comparable backend-side code doesn't have to cater for geteuid() == 0,
since the server rejects that very early on.)
This does have the end result that the permissions safety check used
for a root user's private key file is weaker than that used for
anyone else's. While odd, root really ought to know what she's doing
with file permissions, so I think this is acceptable.
Per report from Yogendra Suralkar. Like the previous patch,
back-patch to all supported branches.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/MW3PR15MB3931DF96896DC36D21AFD47CA3D39@MW3PR15MB3931.namprd15.prod.outlook.com
The target failed, tested $PATH binaries, or tested a stale temporary
installation. Commit c66b438db6 missed
this. Back-patch to v10 (all supported versions).
This change makes libpq apply the same private-key-file ownership
and permissions checks that we have used in the backend since commit
9a83564c5. Namely, that the private key can be owned by either the
current user or root (with different file permissions allowed in the
two cases). This allows system-wide management of key files, which
is just as sensible on the client side as the server, particularly
when the client is itself some application daemon.
Sync the comments about this between libpq and the backend, too.
Back-patch of a59c79564 and 50f03473e into all supported branches.
David Steele
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/f4b7bc55-97ac-9e69-7398-335e212f7743@pgmasters.net
In commit 1f39a1c06 I made PQisBusy consider conn->write_failed, but
that is now looking like complete brain fade. In the first place, the
logic is quite wrong: it ought to be like "and not" rather than "or".
This meant that once we'd gotten into a write_failed state, PQisBusy
would always return true, probably causing the calling application to
iterate its loop until PQconsumeInput returns a hard failure thanks
to connection loss. That's not what we want: the intended behavior
is to return an error PGresult, which the application probably has
much cleaner support for.
But in the second place, checking write_failed here seems like the
wrong thing anyway. The idea of the write_failed mechanism is to
postpone handling of a write failure until we've read all we can from
the server; so that flag should not interfere with input-processing
behavior. (Compare 7247e243a.) What we *should* check for is
status = CONNECTION_BAD, ie, socket already closed. (Most places that
close the socket don't touch asyncStatus, but they do reset status.)
This primarily ensures that if PQisBusy() returns true then there is
an open socket, which is assumed by several call sites in our own
code, and probably other applications too.
While at it, fix a nearby thinko in libpq's my_sock_write: we should
only consult errno for res < 0, not res == 0. This is harmless since
pqsecure_raw_write would force errno to zero in such a case, but it
still could confuse readers.
Noted by Andres Freund. Backpatch to v12 where 1f39a1c06 came in.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20220211011025.ek7exh6owpzjyudn@alap3.anarazel.de
In libpq and ecpglib, multiple threads can concurrently enter the
initialization logic for message localization. Since we set the
its-done flag before actually doing the work, it'd be possible
for some threads to reach gettext() before anyone has called
bindtextdomain(). Barring bugs in libintl itself, this would not
result in anything worse than failure to localize some early
messages. Nonetheless, it's a bug, and an easy one to fix.
Noted while investigating bug #17299 from Clemens Zeidler
(much thanks to Liam Bowen for followup investigation on that).
It currently appears that that actually *is* a bug in libintl itself,
but that doesn't let us off the hook for this bit.
Back-patch to all supported versions.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/17299-7270741958c0b1ab@postgresql.org
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CAE7q7Eit4Eq2=bxce=Fm8HAStECjaXUE=WBQc-sDDcgJQ7s7eg@mail.gmail.com
PQcancel() is supposed to be safe to call from a signal handler,
and indeed psql uses it that way. All of the library functions
it uses are specified to be async-signal-safe by POSIX ...
except for strerror. Neither plain strerror nor strerror_r
are considered safe. When this code was written, back in the
dark ages, we probably figured "oh, strerror will just index
into a constant array of strings" ... but in any locale except C,
that's unlikely to be true. Probably the reason we've not heard
complaints is that (a) this error-handling code is unlikely to be
reached in normal use, and (b) in many scenarios, localized error
strings would already have been loaded, after which maybe it's
safe to call strerror here. Still, this is clearly unacceptable.
The best we can do without relying on strerror is to print the
decimal value of errno, so make it do that instead. (This is
probably not much loss of user-friendliness, given that it is
hard to get a failure here.)
Back-patch to all supported branches.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/2937814.1641960929@sss.pgh.pa.us
We started to backpatch test infrastructure improvements more aggressively to
make it easier to backpatch test. A proposed isolationtester improvement has a
dependency on b1907d688, backpatch b1907d688 to make it easier to subsequently
backpatch the new proposed isolationtester change.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/861977.1639421872@sss.pgh.pa.us
Backpatch: 10-12, the commit already is in 13-HEAD
libpq collects up to a bufferload of data whenever it reads data from
the socket. When SSL or GSS encryption is requested during startup,
any additional data received with the server's yes-or-no reply
remained in the buffer, and would be treated as already-decrypted data
once the encryption handshake completed. Thus, a man-in-the-middle
with the ability to inject data into the TCP connection could stuff
some cleartext data into the start of a supposedly encryption-protected
database session.
This could probably be abused to inject faked responses to the
client's first few queries, although other details of libpq's behavior
make that harder than it sounds. A different line of attack is to
exfiltrate the client's password, or other sensitive data that might
be sent early in the session. That has been shown to be possible with
a server vulnerable to CVE-2021-23214.
To fix, throw a protocol-violation error if the internal buffer
is not empty after the encryption handshake.
Our thanks to Jacob Champion for reporting this problem.
Security: CVE-2021-23222
Tom Lane
Michael Paquier
Peter Eisentraut
Daniel Gustafsson
Alvaro Herrera
Noah Misch
Andres Freund