We should have done it this way all along, but we accidentally got
away with using the wrong BIO field up until OpenSSL 3.2. There,
the library's BIO routines that we rely on use the "data" field
for their own purposes, and our conflicting use causes assorted
weird behaviors up to and including core dumps when SSL connections
are attempted. Switch to using the approved field for the purpose,
i.e. app_data.
While at it, remove our configure probes for BIO_get_data as well
as the fallback implementation. BIO_{get,set}_app_data have been
there since long before any OpenSSL version that we still support,
even in the back branches.
Also, update src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl to allow for a minor
change in an error message spelling that evidently came in with 3.2.
Tristan Partin and Bo Andreson. Back-patch to all supported branches.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CAN55FZ1eDDYsYaL7mv+oSLUij2h_u6hvD4Qmv-7PK7jkji0uyQ@mail.gmail.com
Guard against the pointer being NULL before pfreeing upon an error
returned from OpenSSL. Also handle errors from X509_NAME_print_ex
which also can return -1 on memory allocation errors.
Backpatch down to v15 where the code was added.
Author: Sergey Shinderuk <s.shinderuk@postgrespro.ru>
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/8db5374d-32e0-6abb-d402-40762511eff2@postgrespro.ru
Backpatch-through: v15
OpenSSL 1.1.1 and newer versions have added support for RSA-PSS
certificates, which requires the use of a specific routine in OpenSSL to
determine which hash function to use when compiling it when using
channel binding in SCRAM-SHA-256. X509_get_signature_nid(), that is the
original routine the channel binding code has relied on, is not able to
determine which hash algorithm to use for such certificates. However,
X509_get_signature_info(), new to OpenSSL 1.1.1, is able to do it. This
commit switches the channel binding logic to rely on
X509_get_signature_info() over X509_get_signature_nid(), which would be
the choice when building with 1.1.1 or newer.
The error could have been triggered on the client or the server, hence
libpq and the backend need to have their related code paths patched.
Note that attempting to load an RSA-PSS certificate with OpenSSL 1.1.0
or older leads to a failure due to an unsupported algorithm.
The discovery of relying on X509_get_signature_info() comes from Jacob,
the tests have been written by Heikki (with few tweaks from me), while I
have bundled the whole together while adding the bits needed for MSVC
and meson.
This issue exists since channel binding exists, so backpatch all the way
down. Some tests are added in 15~, triggered if compiling with OpenSSL
1.1.1 or newer, where the certificate and key files can easily be
generated for RSA-PSS.
Reported-by: Gunnar "Nick" Bluth
Author: Jacob Champion, Heikki Linnakangas
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/17760-b6c61e752ec07060@postgresql.org
Backpatch-through: 11
After further investigation, it seems the cause of the problem
is our recent decision to start defining WIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN.
That causes <windows.h> to no longer include <wincrypt.h>, which
means that the OpenSSL headers are unable to prevent conflicts
with that header by #undef'ing the conflicting macros. Apparently,
some other system header that be-secure-openssl.c #includes after
the OpenSSL headers is pulling in <wincrypt.h>. It's obscure just
where that happens and why we're not seeing it on other Windows
buildfarm animals. However, it should work to move the OpenSSL
#includes to the end of the list. For the sake of future-proofing,
do likewise in fe-secure-openssl.c. In passing, remove useless
double inclusions of <openssl/ssl.h>.
Thanks to Thomas Munro for running down the relevant information.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/1051867.1635720347@sss.pgh.pa.us
Buildfarm member hamerkop has been failing for the last few days
with errors that look like OpenSSL's X509-related symbols have
not been imported into be-secure-openssl.c. It's unclear why
this should be, but let's try adding an explicit #include of
<openssl/x509v3.h>, as there has long been in fe-secure-openssl.c.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/1051867.1635720347@sss.pgh.pa.us
In OpenSSL there are two types of BIO's (I/O abstractions):
source/sink and filters. A source/sink BIO is a source and/or
sink of data, ie one acting on a socket or a file. A filter
BIO takes a stream of input from another BIO and transforms it.
In order for BIO_find_type() to be able to traverse the chain
of BIO's and correctly find all BIO's of a certain type they
shall have the type bit set accordingly, source/sink BIO's
(what PostgreSQL implements) use BIO_TYPE_SOURCE_SINK and
filter BIO's use BIO_TYPE_FILTER. In addition to these, file
descriptor based BIO's should have the descriptor bit set,
BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR.
The PostgreSQL implementation didn't set the type bits, which
went unnoticed for a long time as it's only really relevant
for code auditing the OpenSSL installation, or doing similar
tasks. It is required by the API though, so this fixes it.
Backpatch through 9.6 as this has been wrong for a long time.
Author: Itamar Gafni
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/SN6PR06MB39665EC10C34BB20956AE4578AF39@SN6PR06MB3966.namprd06.prod.outlook.com
Backpatch-through: 9.6
SSL renegotiation is already disabled as of 48d23c72, however this does
not prevent the server to comply with a client willing to use
renegotiation. In the last couple of years, renegotiation had its set
of security issues and flaws (like the recent CVE-2021-3449), and it
could be possible to crash the backend with a client attempting
renegotiation.
This commit takes one extra step by disabling renegotiation in the
backend in the same way as SSL compression (f9264d15) or tickets
(97d3a0b0). OpenSSL 1.1.0h has added an option named
SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION able to achieve that. In older versions
there is an option called SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS that
was undocumented, and could be set within the SSL object created when
the TLS connection opens, but I have decided not to use it, as it feels
trickier to rely on, and it is not official. Note that this option is
not usable in OpenSSL < 1.1.0h as the internal contents of the *SSL
object are hidden to applications.
SSL renegotiation concerns protocols up to TLSv1.2.
Per original report from Robert Haas, with a patch based on a suggestion
by Andres Freund.
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Daniel Gustafsson
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/YKZBXx7RhU74FlTE@paquier.xyz
Backpatch-through: 9.6
Also "make reformat-dat-files".
The only change worthy of note is that pgindent messed up the formatting
of launcher.c's struct LogicalRepWorkerId, which led me to notice that
that struct wasn't used at all anymore, so I just took it out.
Currently we only recognize the Common Name (CN) of a certificate's
subject to be matched against the user name. Thus certificates with
subjects '/OU=eng/CN=fred' and '/OU=sales/CN=fred' will have the same
connection rights. This patch provides an option to match the whole
Distinguished Name (DN) instead of just the CN. On any hba line using
client certificate identity, there is an option 'clientname' which can
have values of 'DN' or 'CN'. The default is 'CN', the current procedure.
The DN is matched against the RFC2253 formatted DN, which looks like
'CN=fred,OU=eng'.
This facility of probably best used in conjunction with an ident map.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/92e70110-9273-d93c-5913-0bccb6562740@dunslane.net
Reviewed-By: Michael Paquier, Daniel Gustafsson, Jacob Champion
While back-patching e0e569e1d, I noted that there were some other
places where we ought to be applying DH_free(); namely, where we
load some DH parameters from a file and then reject them as not
being sufficiently secure. While it seems really unlikely that
anybody would hit these code paths in production, let alone do
so repeatedly, let's fix it for consistency.
Back-patch to v10 where this code was introduced.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/16160-18367e56e9a28264@postgresql.org
After reading the root cert list from the ssl_ca_file, immediately
install it as client CA list of the new SSL context. That gives the
SSL context ownership of the list, so that SSL_CTX_free will free it.
This avoids a permanent memory leak if we fail further down in
be_tls_init(), which could happen if bogus CRL data is offered.
The leak could only amount to something if the CRL parameters get
broken after server start (else we'd just quit) and then the server
is SIGHUP'd many times without fixing the CRL data. That's rather
unlikely perhaps, but it seems worth fixing, if only because the
code is clearer this way.
While we're here, add some comments about the memory management
aspects of this logic.
Noted by Jelte Fennema and independently by Andres Freund.
Back-patch to v10; before commit de41869b6 it doesn't matter,
since we'd not re-execute this code during SIGHUP.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/16160-18367e56e9a28264@postgresql.org
PostgreSQL disabled compression as of e3bdb2d and the documentation
recommends against using it since. Additionally, SSL compression has
been disabled in OpenSSL since version 1.1.0, and was disabled in many
distributions long before that. The most recent TLS version, TLSv1.3,
disallows compression at the protocol level.
This commit removes the feature itself, removing support for the libpq
parameter sslcompression (parameter still listed for compatibility
reasons with existing connection strings, just ignored), and removes
the equivalent field in pg_stat_ssl and de facto PgBackendSSLStatus.
Note that, on top of removing the ability to activate compression by
configuration, compression is actively disabled in both frontend and
backend to avoid overrides from local configurations.
A TAP test is added for deprecated SSL parameters to check after
backwards compatibility.
Bump catalog version.
Author: Daniel Gustafsson
Reviewed-by: Peter Eisentraut, Magnus Hagander, Michael Paquier
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/7E384D48-11C5-441B-9EC3-F7DB1F8518F6@yesql.se
Add another method to specify CRLs, hashed directory method, for both
server and client side. This offers a means for server or libpq to
load only CRLs that are required to verify a certificate. The CRL
directory is specifed by separate GUC variables or connection options
ssl_crl_dir and sslcrldir, alongside the existing ssl_crl_file and
sslcrl, so both methods can be used at the same time.
Author: Kyotaro Horiguchi <horikyota.ntt@gmail.com>
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/flat/20200731.173911.904649928639357911.horikyota.ntt@gmail.com
The callback for retrieving state change information during connection
setup was only installed when the connection was mostly set up, and
thus didn't provide much information and missed all the details related
to the handshake.
This also extends the callback with SSL_state_string_long() to print
more information about the state change within the SSL object handled.
While there, fix some comments which were incorrectly referring to the
callback and its previous location in fe-secure.c.
Author: Daniel Gustafsson
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/232CF476-94E1-42F1-9408-719E2AEC5491@yesql.se
* Avoid pointlessly highlighting that an index vacuum was executed by a
parallel worker; user doesn't care.
* Don't give the impression that a non-concurrent reindex of an invalid
index on a TOAST table would work, because it wouldn't.
* Add a "translator:" comment for a mysterious message.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20201107034943.GA16596@alvherre.pgsql
Reviewed-by: Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
Commit d94c36a45a introduced error handling to sslinfo to handle
OpenSSL errors gracefully. This ports this errorhandling to the
backend TLS implementation.
Author: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
OpenSSL's native reports about problems related to protocol version
restrictions are pretty opaque and inconsistent. When we get an
SSL error that is plausibly due to this, emit a hint message that
includes the range of SSL protocol versions we (think we) are
allowing. This should at least get the user thinking in the right
direction to resolve the problem, even if the hint isn't totally
accurate, which it might not be for assorted reasons.
Back-patch to v13 where we increased the default minimum protocol
version, thereby increasing the risk of this class of failure.
Patch by me, reviewed by Daniel Gustafsson
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/a9408304-4381-a5af-d259-e55d349ae4ce@2ndquadrant.com
Thomas Munro fixed a longstanding annoyance in pg_bsd_indent, that
it would misformat lines containing IsA() macros on the assumption
that the IsA() call should be treated like a cast. This improves
some other cases involving field/variable names that match typedefs,
too. The only places that get worse are a couple of uses of the
OpenSSL macro STACK_OF(); we'll gladly take that trade-off.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20200114221814.GA19630@alvherre.pgsql
Includes some manual cleanup of places that pgindent messed up,
most of which weren't per project style anyway.
Notably, it seems some people didn't absorb the style rules of
commit c9d297751, because there were a bunch of new occurrences
of function calls with a newline just after the left paren, all
with faulty expectations about how the rest of the call would get
indented.
Commit 79dfa8a has introduced a check to catch when the minimum protocol
version was set higher than the maximum version, however an error was
getting generated when both bounds are set even if they are able to
work, causing a backend to not use a new SSL context but keep the old
one.
Author: Daniel Gustafsson
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/14BFD060-8C9D-43B4-897D-D5D9AA6FC92B@yesql.se
The default hook function sets the default password callback function.
In order to allow preloaded libraries to have an opportunity to override
the default, TLS initialization if now delayed slightly until after
shared preloaded libraries have been loaded.
A test module is provided which contains a trivial example that decodes
an obfuscated password for an SSL certificate.
Author: Andrew Dunstan
Reviewed By: Andreas Karlsson, Asaba Takanori
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/04116472-818b-5859-1d74-3d995aab2252@2ndQuadrant.com
Mixing incorrect bounds in the SSL context leads to confusing error
messages generated by OpenSSL which are hard to act on. New range
checks are added when both min/max parameters are loaded in the context
of a SSL reload to improve the error reporting. Note that this does not
make use of the GUC hook machinery contrary to 41aadee, as there is no
way to ensure a consistent range check (except if there is a way one day
to define range types for GUC parameters?). Hence, this patch applies
only to OpenSSL, and uses a logic similar to other parameters to trigger
an error when reloading the SSL context in a session.
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Daniel Gustafsson
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20200114035420.GE1515@paquier.xyz
These two new parameters, named sslminprotocolversion and
sslmaxprotocolversion, allow to respectively control the minimum and the
maximum version of the SSL protocol used for the SSL connection attempt.
The default setting is to allow any version for both the minimum and the
maximum bounds, causing libpq to rely on the bounds set by the backend
when negotiating the protocol to use for an SSL connection. The bounds
are checked when the values are set at the earliest stage possible as
this makes the checks independent of any SSL implementation.
Author: Daniel Gustafsson
Reviewed-by: Michael Paquier, Cary Huang
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/4F246AE3-A7AE-471E-BD3D-C799D3748E03@yesql.se
Two routines have been added in OpenSSL 1.1.0 to set the protocol bounds
allowed within a given SSL context:
- SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version
- SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version
As Postgres supports OpenSSL down to 1.0.1 (as of HEAD), equivalent
replacements exist in the tree, which are only available for the
backend. A follow-up patch is planned to add control of the SSL
protocol bounds for libpq, so move those routines to src/common/ so as
libpq can use them.
Author: Daniel Gustafsson
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/4F246AE3-A7AE-471E-BD3D-C799D3748E03@yesql.se
Support is out of scope from all the major vendors for these versions
(for example RHEL5 uses a version based on 0.9.8, and RHEL6 uses 1.0.1),
and it created some extra maintenance work. Upstream has stopped
support of 0.9.8 in December 2015 and of 1.0.0 in February 2016.
Since b1abfec, note that the default SSL protocol version set with
ssl_min_protocol_version is TLSv1.2, whose support was added in OpenSSL
1.0.1, so there is no point to enforce ssl_min_protocol_version to TLSv1
in the SSL tests.
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Daniel Gustafsson, Tom Lane
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20191205083252.GE5064@paquier.xyz
When loading DH parameters used for the generation of ephemeral DH keys
in the backend, the code has never bothered releasing the memory used
for the DH information loaded from a file or from libpq's default. This
commit makes sure that the information is properly free()'d.
Note that as SSL parameters can be reloaded, this can cause an accumulation
of memory leaked. As the leak is minor, no backpatch is done.
Reported-by: Dmitry Uspenskiy
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/16160-18367e56e9a28264@postgresql.org
Some older OpenSSL versions (0.9.8 branch) define TLS*_VERSION macros
but not the corresponding SSL_OP_NO_* macro, which causes the code for
handling ssl_min_protocol_version/ssl_max_protocol_version to fail to
compile. To fix, add more #ifdefs and error handling.
Reported-by: Victor Wagner <vitus@wagner.pp.ru>
Reviewed-by: Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/flat/20190924101859.09383b4f%40fafnir.local.vm
HEAD supports OpenSSL 0.9.8 and newer versions, and this code likely got
forgotten as its surrounding comments mention an incorrect version
number.
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Peter Eisentraut
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20190927032311.GB8485@paquier.xyz
This is still using the 2.0 version of pg_bsd_indent.
I thought it would be good to commit this separately,
so as to document the differences between 2.0 and 2.1 behavior.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/16296.1558103386@sss.pgh.pa.us
Be more consistent about use of XXXGetDatum macros in new jsonpath
code. This is mostly to avoid having code that looks randomly
different from everyplace else that's doing the exact same thing.
In pg_regress.c, avoid an unreferenced-function warning from
compilers that don't understand pg_attribute_unused(). Putting
the function inside the same #ifdef as its only caller is more
straightforward coding anyway.
In be-secure-openssl.c, avoid use of pg_attribute_unused() on a label.
That's pretty creative, but there's no good reason to suppose that
it's portable, and there's absolutely no need to use goto's here in the
first place. (This wasn't actually causing any buildfarm complaints,
but it's new code in v12 so it has no portability track record.)
In case of a reload, we just want to LOG errors instead of FATAL when
processing SSL configuration, but the more recent code for the
ssl_*_protocol_version settings didn't behave like that.
Author: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
Reviewed-by: Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz>
Commit cfdf4dc4 added an assertion that every WaitLatch() or similar
handles postmaster death. One place did not, but was missed in
review and testing due to the need for an SSL connection. Fix, by
asking for WL_EXIT_ON_PM_DEATH.
Reported-by: Christoph Berg
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20181124143845.GA15039%40msg.df7cb.de
Users of the WaitEventSet and WaitLatch() APIs can now choose between
asking for WL_POSTMASTER_DEATH and then handling it explicitly, or asking
for WL_EXIT_ON_PM_DEATH to trigger immediate exit on postmaster death.
This reduces code duplication, since almost all callers want the latter.
Repair all code that was previously ignoring postmaster death completely,
or requesting the event but ignoring it, or requesting the event but then
doing an unconditional PostmasterIsAlive() call every time through its
event loop (which is an expensive syscall on platforms for which we don't
have USE_POSTMASTER_DEATH_SIGNAL support).
Assert that callers of WaitLatchXXX() under the postmaster remember to
ask for either WL_POSTMASTER_DEATH or WL_EXIT_ON_PM_DEATH, to prevent
future bugs.
The only process that doesn't handle postmaster death is syslogger. It
waits until all backends holding the write end of the syslog pipe
(including the postmaster) have closed it by exiting, to be sure to
capture any parting messages. By using the WaitEventSet API directly
it avoids the new assertion, and as a by-product it may be slightly
more efficient on platforms that have epoll().
Author: Thomas Munro
Reviewed-by: Kyotaro Horiguchi, Heikki Linnakangas, Tom Lane
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CAEepm%3D1TCviRykkUb69ppWLr_V697rzd1j3eZsRMmbXvETfqbQ%40mail.gmail.com,
https://postgr.es/m/CAEepm=2LqHzizbe7muD7-2yHUbTOoF7Q+qkSD5Q41kuhttRTwA@mail.gmail.com
As already explained in configure.in, using the OpenSSL version number
to detect presence of functions doesn't work, because LibreSSL reports
incompatible version numbers. Fortunately, the functions we need here
are actually macros, so we can just test for them directly.
There are some problems with the tls-unique channel binding type. It's not
supported by all SSL libraries, and strictly speaking it's not defined for
TLS 1.3 at all, even though at least in OpenSSL, the functions used for it
still seem to work with TLS 1.3 connections. And since we had no
mechanism to negotiate what channel binding type to use, there would be
awkward interoperability issues if a server only supported some channel
binding types. tls-server-end-point seems feasible to support with any SSL
library, so let's just stick to that.
This removes the scram_channel_binding libpq option altogether, since there
is now only one supported channel binding type.
This also removes all the channel binding tests from the SSL test suite.
They were really just testing the scram_channel_binding option, which
is now gone. Channel binding is used if both client and server support it,
so it is used in the existing tests. It would be good to have some tests
specifically for channel binding, to make sure it really is used, and the
different combinations of a client and a server that support or doesn't
support it. The current set of settings we have make it hard to write such
tests, but I did test those things manually, by disabling
HAVE_BE_TLS_GET_CERTIFICATE_HASH and/or
HAVE_PGTLS_GET_PEER_CERTIFICATE_HASH.
I also removed the SCRAM_CHANNEL_BINDING_TLS_END_POINT constant. This is a
matter of taste, but IMO it's more readable to just use the
"tls-server-end-point" string.
Refactor the checks on whether the SSL library supports the functions
needed for tls-server-end-point channel binding. Now the server won't
advertise, and the client won't choose, the SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS variant, if
compiled with an OpenSSL version too old to support it.
In the passing, add some sanity checks to check that the chosen SASL
mechanism, SCRAM-SHA-256 or SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS, matches whether the SCRAM
exchange used channel binding or not. For example, if the client selects
the non-channel-binding variant SCRAM-SHA-256, but in the SCRAM message
uses channel binding anyway. It's harmless from a security point of view,
I believe, and I'm not sure if there are some other conditions that would
cause the connection to fail, but it seems better to be strict about these
things and check explicitly.
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/ec787074-2305-c6f4-86aa-6902f98485a4%40iki.fi