Refactor code into something reasonably understandable, cause
use of the feature to not fail in standalone backends or in
EXEC_BACKEND case, fix sloppy guc.c table entries, make the
documentation minimally usable.
* Links with -leay32 and -lssleay32 instead of crypto and ssl. On win32,
"crypto and ssl" is only used for static linking.
* Initializes SSL in the backend and not just in the postmaster. We
cannot pass the SSL context from the postmaster through the parameter
file, because it contains function pointers.
* Split one error check in be-secure.c. Previously we could not tell
which of three calls actually failed. The previous code also returned
incorrect error messages if SSL_accept() failed - that function needs to
use SSL_get_error() on the return value, can't just use the error queue.
* Since the win32 implementation uses non-blocking sockets "behind the
scenes" in order to deliver signals correctly, implements a version of
SSL_accept() that can handle this. Also, add a wait function in case
SSL_read or SSL_write() needs more data.
Magnus Hagander
as per recent discussions. Invent SubTransactionIds that are managed like
CommandIds (ie, counter is reset at start of each top transaction), and
use these instead of TransactionIds to keep track of subtransaction status
in those modules that need it. This means that a subtransaction does not
need an XID unless it actually inserts/modifies rows in the database.
Accordingly, don't assign it an XID nor take a lock on the XID until it
tries to do that. This saves a lot of overhead for subtransactions that
are only used for error recovery (eg plpgsql exceptions). Also, arrange
to release a subtransaction's XID lock as soon as the subtransaction
exits, in both the commit and abort cases. This avoids holding many
unique locks after a long series of subtransactions. The price is some
additional overhead in XactLockTableWait, but that seems acceptable.
Finally, restructure the state machine in xact.c to have a more orthogonal
set of states for subtransactions.
>>'127.0.0.1/32' instead of '127.0.0.1 255.255.255.255'.
>>
>>
>
>Yeah, that's probably the path of least resistance. Note that the
>comments and possibly the SGML docs need to be adjusted to match,
>however, so it's not quite a one-liner.
Andrew Dunstan
>takes a string to specify the local authentication method:
>
> initdb --auth 'ident'
>
>or whatever the user wants. I think this is more flexible and more
>compact. It would default to 'trust', and the packagers could
>set it to
>whatever they want. If their OS supports local ident, they can use
>that.
>
>Also keep in mind you might want some ident map file:
>
> initdb --auth 'ident mymap'
>
>so you would need to allow multiple words in the string.
Magnus Hagander
password/group files. Also allow read-only subtransactions of a read-write
parent, but not vice versa. These are the reasonably noncontroversial
parts of Alvaro's recent mop-up patch, plus further work on large objects
to minimize use of the TopTransactionResourceOwner.
than being random pieces of other files. Give bgwriter responsibility
for all checkpoint activity (other than a post-recovery checkpoint);
so this child process absorbs the functionality of the former transient
checkpoint and shutdown subprocesses. While at it, create an actual
include file for postmaster.c, which for some reason never had its own
file before.
the four functions.
> Also, please justify the temp-related changes. I was not aware that we
> had any breakage there.
patch-tmp-schema.txt contains the following bits:
*) Changes pg_namespace_aclmask() so that the superuser is always able
to create objects in the temp namespace.
*) Changes pg_namespace_aclmask() so that if this is a temp namespace,
objects are only allowed to be created in the temp namespace if the
user has TEMP privs on the database. This encompasses all object
creation, not just TEMP tables.
*) InitTempTableNamespace() checks to see if the current user, not the
session user, has access to create a temp namespace.
The first two changes are necessary to support the third change. Now
it's possible to revoke all temp table privs from non-super users and
limiting all creation of temp tables/schemas via a function that's
executed with elevated privs (security definer). Before this change,
it was not possible to have a setuid function to create a temp
table/schema if the session user had no TEMP privs.
patch-area-path.txt contains:
*) Can now determine the area of a closed path.
patch-dfmgr.txt contains:
*) Small tweak to add the library path that's being expanded.
I was using $lib/foo.so and couldn't easily figure out what the error
message, "invalid macro name in dynamic library path" meant without
looking through the source code. With the path in there, at least I
know where to start looking in my config file.
Sean Chittenden
In the past, we used a 'Lispy' linked list implementation: a "list" was
merely a pointer to the head node of the list. The problem with that
design is that it makes lappend() and length() linear time. This patch
fixes that problem (and others) by maintaining a count of the list
length and a pointer to the tail node along with each head node pointer.
A "list" is now a pointer to a structure containing some meta-data
about the list; the head and tail pointers in that structure refer
to ListCell structures that maintain the actual linked list of nodes.
The function names of the list API have also been changed to, I hope,
be more logically consistent. By default, the old function names are
still available; they will be disabled-by-default once the rest of
the tree has been updated to use the new API names.
* removed a few redundant defines
* get_user_name safe under win32
* rationalized pipe read EOF for win32 (UPDATED PATCH USED)
* changed all backend instances of sleep() to pg_usleep
- except for the SLEEP_ON_ASSERT in assert.c, as it would exceed a
32-bit long [Note to patcher: If a SLEEP_ON_ASSERT of 2000 seconds is
acceptable, please replace with pg_usleep(2000000000L)]
I added a comment to that part of the code:
/*
* It would be nice to use pg_usleep() here, but only does 2000 sec
* or 33 minutes, which seems too short.
*/
sleep(1000000);
Claudio Natoli
It works on the principle of turning sockets into non-blocking, and then
emulate blocking behaviour on top of that, while allowing signals to
run. Signals are now implemented using an event instead of APCs, thus
getting rid of the issue of APCs not being compatible with "old style"
sockets functions.
It also moves the win32 specific code away from pqsignal.h/c into
port/win32, and also removes the "thread style workaround" of the APC
issue previously in place.
In order to make things work, a few things are also changed in pgstat.c:
1) There is now a separate pipe to the collector and the bufferer. This
is required because the pipe will otherwise only be signalled in one of
the processes when the postmaster goes down. The MS winsock code for
select() must have some kind of workaround for this behaviour, but I
have found no stable way of doing that. You really are not supposed to
use the same socket from more than one process (unless you use
WSADuplicateSocket(), in which case the docs specifically say that only
one will be flagged).
2) The check for "postmaster death" is moved into a separate select()
call after the main loop. The previous behaviour select():ed on the
postmaster pipe, while later explicitly saying "we do NOT check for
postmaster exit inside the loop".
The issue was that the code relies on the same select() call seeing both
the postmaster pipe *and* the pgstat pipe go away. This does not always
happen, and it appears that useing WSAEventSelect() makes it even more
common that it does not.
Since it's only called when the process exits, I don't think using a
separate select() call will have any significant impact on how the stats
collector works.
Magnus Hagander
applied, deadlock detection and statement_timeout now works.
The file timer.c goes into src/backend/port/win32/.
The patch also removes two lines of "printf debugging" accidentally left
in pqsignal.h, in the console control handler.
Magnus Hagander
the relcache, and so the notion of 'blind write' is gone. This should
improve efficiency in bgwriter and background checkpoint processes.
Internal restructuring in md.c to remove the not-very-useful array of
MdfdVec objects --- might as well just use pointers.
Also remove the long-dead 'persistent main memory' storage manager (mm.c),
since it seems quite unlikely to ever get resurrected.
Natoli and Bruce Momjian (and some cosmetic fixes from Neil Conway).
Changes:
- remove duplicate signal definitions from pqsignal.h
- replace pqkill() with kill() and redefine kill() in Win32
- use ereport() in place of fprintf() in some error handling in
pqsignal.c
- export pg_queue_signal() and make use of it where necessary
- add a console control handler for Ctrl-C and similar handling
on Win32
- do WaitForSingleObjectEx() in CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS() on Win32;
query cancelling should now work on Win32
- various other fixes and cleanups
valgrind: a buffer passed to strncmp() had to be NUL-terminated. Original
report and patch from Dennis Bjorkland, some cleanup by Andrew Dunstan,
and finally some editorializing from Neil Conway.
against the latest shapshot. It also includes the replacement of kill()
with pqkill() and sigsetmask() with pqsigsetmask().
Passes all tests fine on my linux machine once applied. Still doesn't
link completely on Win32 - there are a few things still required. But
much closer than before.
At Bruce's request, I'm goint to write up a README file about the method
of signals delivery chosen and why the others were rejected (basically a
summary of the mailinglist discussions). I'll finish that up once/if the
patch is accepted.
Magnus Hagander
special meaning of these terms in pg_hba.conf.
Also changes ugly pg_hba.conf IPv6 netmask of
ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff to ::1/128.
Andrew Dunstan
comments/examples in pg_hba.conf. This patch remedies that, adds a brief
explanation of the connection types, and adds a missing period in the
docs.
Jon Jensen
ps status as '[local]', not as 'localhost' as the code has been doing
recently. That's too easily confused with TCP loopback connections,
and there is no good reason to change the behavior anyway.
and send() very well at all; and in any case we can't use retval==0
for EOF due to race conditions. Make the same fixes in the backend as
are required in libpq.
modes (and replace the requiressl boolean). The four options were first
spelled out by Magnus Hagander <mha@sollentuna.net> on 2000-08-23 in email
to pgsql-hackers, archived here:
http://archives.postgresql.org/pgsql-hackers/2000-08/msg00639.php
My original less-flexible patch and the ensuing thread are archived at:
http://dbforums.com/t623845.html
Attached is a new patch, including documentation.
To sum up, there's a new client parameter "sslmode" and environment
variable "PGSSLMODE", with these options:
sslmode description
------- -----------
disable Unencrypted non-SSL only
allow Negotiate, prefer non-SSL
prefer Negotiate, prefer SSL (default)
require Require SSL
The only change to the server is a new pg_hba.conf line type,
"hostnossl", for specifying connections that are not allowed to use SSL
(for example, to prevent servers on a local network from accidentally
using SSL and wasting cycles). Thus the 3 pg_hba.conf line types are:
pg_hba.conf line types
----------------------
host applies to either SSL or regular connections
hostssl applies only to SSL connections
hostnossl applies only to regular connections
These client and server options, the postgresql.conf ssl = false option,
and finally the possibility of compiling with no SSL support at all,
make quite a range of combinations to test. I threw together a test
script to try many of them out. It's in a separate tarball with its
config files, a patch to psql so it'll announce SSL connections even in
absence of a tty, and the test output. The test is especially informative
when run on the same tty the postmaster was started on, so the FATAL:
errors during negotiation are interleaved with the psql client output.
I saw Tom write that new submissions for 7.4 have to be in before midnight
local time, and since I'm on the east coast in the US, this just makes it
in before the bell. :)
Jon Jensen
was modified for IPv6. Use a robust definition of struct sockaddr_storage,
do a proper configure test to see if ss_len exists, don't assume that
getnameinfo() will handle AF_UNIX sockets, don't trust getaddrinfo to
return the protocol we ask for, etc. This incorporates several outstanding
patches from Kurt Roeckx, but I'm to blame for anything that doesn't
work ...
> http://developer.postgresql.org/cvsweb.cgi/pgsql-server/src/include/libpq/pqcomm.h.diff?r1=1.85&r2=1.86
>
> modified SockAddr, but no corresponding change was made here
> (fe-auth.c:612):
>
> case AUTH_REQ_KRB5:
> #ifdef KRB5
> if (pg_krb5_sendauth(PQerrormsg, conn->sock, &conn->laddr.in,
> &conn->raddr.in,
> hostname) != STATUS_OK)
>
> It's not obvious to me what the change ought to be though.
This patch should hopefully fix both kerberos 4 and 5.
Kurt Roeckx
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
here is a patch that allows CIDR netmasks in pg_hba.conf. It allows two
address/mask forms:
. address/maskbits, or
. address netmask (as now)
If the patch is accepted I will submit a documentation patch to cover
it.
This is submitted by agreement with Kurt Roeckx, who has worked on a
patch that covers this and other IPv6 issues.
address/mask forms:
. address/maskbits, or
. address netmask (as now)
If the patch is accepted I will submit a documentation patch to cover
it.
This is submitted by agreement with Kurt Roeckx, who has worked on a
patch that covers this and other IPv6 issues.
Andrew Dunstan
some reading on the subject.
1) PostgreSQL uses ephemeral keying, for its connections (good thing)
2) PostgreSQL doesn't set the cipher list that it allows (bad thing,
fixed)
3) PostgreSQL's renegotiation code wasn't text book correct (could be
bad, fixed)
4) The rate of renegotiating was insanely low (as Tom pointed out, set
to a more reasonable level)
I haven't checked around much to see if there are any other SSL bits
that need some review, but I'm doing some OpenSSL work right now
and'll send patches for improvements along the way (if I find them).
At the very least, the changes in this patch will make security folks
happier for sure. The constant renegotiation of sessions was likely a
boon to systems that had bad entropy gathering means (read: Slowaris
/dev/rand|/dev/urand != ANDIrand). The new limit for renegotiations
is 512MB which should be much more reasonable.
Sean Chittenden
protocol 3, then falls back to 2 if postmaster rejects the startup packet
with an old-format error message. A side benefit of the rewrite is that
SSL-encrypted connections can now be made without blocking. (I think,
anyway, but do not have a good way to test.)
leave it for the kernel to do after the process dies. This allows clients
to wait for the backend to exit if they wish (after sending X message,
wait till EOF is detected on the socket).
Win32 port is now called 'win32' rather than 'win'
add -lwsock32 on Win32
make gethostname() be only used when kerberos4 is enabled
use /port/getopt.c
new /port/opendir.c routines
disable GUC unix_socket_group on Win32
convert some keywords.c symbols to KEYWORD_P to prevent conflict
create new FCNTL_NONBLOCK macro to turn off socket blocking
create new /include/port.h file that has /port prototypes, move
out of c.h
new /include/port/win32_include dir to hold missing include files
work around ERROR being defined in Win32 includes
handle multiple 'formats' for data I/O. Restructure CommandDest and
DestReceiver stuff one more time (it's finally starting to look a bit
clean though). Code now matches latest 3.0 protocol document as far
as message formats go --- but there is no support for binary I/O yet.
have length words. COPY OUT reimplemented per new protocol: it doesn't
need \. anymore, thank goodness. COPY BINARY to/from frontend works,
at least as far as the backend is concerned --- libpq's PQgetline API
is not up to snuff, and will have to be replaced with something that is
null-safe. libpq uses message length words for performance improvement
(no cycles wasted rescanning long messages), but not yet for error
recovery.
with variable-width fields. No more truncation of long user names.
Also, libpq can now send its environment-variable-driven SET commands
as part of the startup packet, saving round trips to server.
typing error in src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c ???
Long Description
In src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c: secure_write
on SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE call secure_read instead
secure_write again. May be is this a typing error?
Sergey N. Yatskevich (syatskevich@n21lab.gosniias.msk.ru)
of the socket file and socket lock file; this should prevent both of them
from being removed by even the stupidest varieties of /tmp-cleaning
script. Per suggestion from Giles Lean.
believe I didn't notice this before -- once 64k was sent to/from the
server the client would crash. Basicly, in 7.3 the server SSL code set
the initial state to "about to renegotiate" without actually starting
the renegotiation. In addition, the server and client didn't properly
handle the SSL_ERROR_WANT_(READ|WRITE) error. This is fixed in the
second patch.
Nathan Mueller
first, that I missed when checking over 7.3.1, was that the client
method was switched to SSLv23 along with the server. The SSLv23 client
method does SSLv2 by default, but can also understand SSLv3. In our
situation the SSLv2 backwords compatibility is really only needed on the
server. This is the first patch.
The last thing is that I found a way for the server to understand SSLv2
HELLO messages (sent by pre-7.3 clients) but then get them to talk
SSLv3. This is the last one.
Nathan Mueller
"SSLv23_method(void), SSLv23_server_method(void), SSLv23_client_method(void)
A TLS/SSL connection established with these methods will understand the SSLv2,
SSLv3, and TLSv1 protocol. A client will send out SSLv2 client hello messages
and will indicate that it also understands SSLv3 and TLSv1. A server will
understand SSLv2, SSLv3, and TLSv1 client hello messages. This is the best
choice when compatibility is a concern."
This will maintain backwards compatibility for those us that don't use
TLS connections ...
failing to find pg_hba.conf should be a fatal error anyway, so I
increased the priority of the elog() from LOG to FATAL and refactored
the code a little bit.
Neil Conway
postgresql version 7.3, but yea... this patch adds full IPv6
support to postgres. I've tested it out on 7.2.3 and has
been running perfectly stable.
CREDITS:
The KAME Project (Initial patch)
Nigel Kukard <nkukard@lbsd.net>
Johan Jordaan <johanj@lando.co.za>
client
utilities (libpq.dll and psql.exe) for win32 (missing defines,
adjustments to
includes, pedantic casting, non-existent functions) per:
http://developer.postgresql.org/docs/postgres/install-win32.html.
It compiles cleanly under Windows 2000 using Visual Studio .net. Also
compiles clean and passes all regression tests (regular and contrib)
under Linux.
In addition to a review by the usual suspects, it would be very
desirable for someone well versed in the peculiarities of win32 to take
a look.
Joe Conway
width types and varlena types, since with the introduction of CSTRING as
a more-or-less-real type, these concepts aren't identical. I've tried to
use varlena consistently to denote datatypes with typlen = -1, ie, they
have a length word and are potentially TOASTable; while the term variable
width covers both varlena and cstring (and, perhaps, someday other types
with other rules for computing the actual width). No code changes in this
commit except for renaming a couple macros.
on the server, if DebugLvl >= 2.
The patch also includes a late addition to the last patch
(X509_check_private_key()). I'm not sure why it the currect
revision wasn't tagged.
Bear Giles
If the user has certificates in $HOME/.postgresql/postgresql.crt
and $HOME/.postgresql/postgresql.key exist, they are provided
to the server. The certificate used to sign this cert must be
known to the server, in $DataDir/root.crt. If successful, the
cert's "common name" is logged.
Client certs are not used for authentication, but they could be
via the port->peer (X509 *), port->peer_dn (char *) or
port->peer_cn (char *) fields. Or any other function could be
used, e.g., many sites like the issuer + serial number hash.
Bear Giles
In order to reduce the risk of cryptanalysis during extended
sessions (or brief ones involving a substantial amount of data),
this patch renegotiates the session key after 64kib has been
transferred.
Bear Giles
As the comment headers in be-secure.c discusses, EPH preserves
confidentiality even if the static private key (which is usually
kept unencrypted) is compromised.
Because of the value of this, common default values are hard-coded
to protect the confidentiality of the data even if an attacker
successfully deletes or modifies the external file.
Bear Giles
Attached are a revised set of SSL patches. Many of these patches
are motivated by security concerns, it's not just bug fixes. The key
differences (from stock 7.2.1) are:
*) almost all code that directly uses the OpenSSL library is in two
new files,
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-ssl.c
src/backend/postmaster/be-ssl.c
in the long run, it would be nice to merge these two files.
*) the legacy code to read and write network data have been
encapsulated into read_SSL() and write_SSL(). These functions
should probably be renamed - they handle both SSL and non-SSL
cases.
the remaining code should eliminate the problems identified
earlier, albeit not very cleanly.
*) both front- and back-ends will send a SSL shutdown via the
new close_SSL() function. This is necessary for sessions to
work properly.
(Sessions are not yet fully supported, but by cleanly closing
the SSL connection instead of just sending a TCP FIN packet
other SSL tools will be much happier.)
*) The client certificate and key are now expected in a subdirectory
of the user's home directory. Specifically,
- the directory .postgresql must be owned by the user, and
allow no access by 'group' or 'other.'
- the file .postgresql/postgresql.crt must be a regular file
owned by the user.
- the file .postgresql/postgresql.key must be a regular file
owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other'.
At the current time encrypted private keys are not supported.
There should also be a way to support multiple client certs/keys.
*) the front-end performs minimal validation of the back-end cert.
Self-signed certs are permitted, but the common name *must*
match the hostname used by the front-end. (The cert itself
should always use a fully qualified domain name (FDQN) in its
common name field.)
This means that
psql -h eris db
will fail, but
psql -h eris.example.com db
will succeed. At the current time this must be an exact match;
future patches may support any FQDN that resolves to the address
returned by getpeername(2).
Another common "problem" is expiring certs. For now, it may be
a good idea to use a very-long-lived self-signed cert.
As a compile-time option, the front-end can specify a file
containing valid root certificates, but it is not yet required.
*) the back-end performs minimal validation of the client cert.
It allows self-signed certs. It checks for expiration. It
supports a compile-time option specifying a file containing
valid root certificates.
*) both front- and back-ends default to TLSv1, not SSLv3/SSLv2.
*) both front- and back-ends support DSA keys. DSA keys are
moderately more expensive on startup, but many people consider
them preferable than RSA keys. (E.g., SSH2 prefers DSA keys.)
*) if /dev/urandom exists, both client and server will read 16k
of randomization data from it.
*) the server can read empheral DH parameters from the files
$DataDir/dh512.pem
$DataDir/dh1024.pem
$DataDir/dh2048.pem
$DataDir/dh4096.pem
if none are provided, the server will default to hardcoded
parameter files provided by the OpenSSL project.
Remaining tasks:
*) the select() clauses need to be revisited - the SSL abstraction
layer may need to absorb more of the current code to avoid rare
deadlock conditions. This also touches on a true solution to
the pg_eof() problem.
*) the SIGPIPE signal handler may need to be revisited.
*) support encrypted private keys.
*) sessions are not yet fully supported. (SSL sessions can span
multiple "connections," and allow the client and server to avoid
costly renegotiations.)
*) makecert - a script that creates back-end certs.
*) pgkeygen - a tool that creates front-end certs.
*) the whole protocol issue, SASL, etc.
*) certs are fully validated - valid root certs must be available.
This is a hassle, but it means that you *can* trust the identity
of the server.
*) the client library can handle hardcoded root certificates, to
avoid the need to copy these files.
*) host name of server cert must resolve to IP address, or be a
recognized alias. This is more liberal than the previous
iteration.
*) the number of bytes transferred is tracked, and the session
key is periodically renegotiated.
*) basic cert generation scripts (mkcert.sh, pgkeygen.sh). The
configuration files have reasonable defaults for each type
of use.
Bear Giles
are motivated by security concerns, it's not just bug fixes. The key
differences (from stock 7.2.1) are:
*) almost all code that directly uses the OpenSSL library is in two
new files,
src/interfaces/libpq/fe-ssl.c
src/backend/postmaster/be-ssl.c
in the long run, it would be nice to merge these two files.
*) the legacy code to read and write network data have been
encapsulated into read_SSL() and write_SSL(). These functions
should probably be renamed - they handle both SSL and non-SSL
cases.
the remaining code should eliminate the problems identified
earlier, albeit not very cleanly.
*) both front- and back-ends will send a SSL shutdown via the
new close_SSL() function. This is necessary for sessions to
work properly.
(Sessions are not yet fully supported, but by cleanly closing
the SSL connection instead of just sending a TCP FIN packet
other SSL tools will be much happier.)
*) The client certificate and key are now expected in a subdirectory
of the user's home directory. Specifically,
- the directory .postgresql must be owned by the user, and
allow no access by 'group' or 'other.'
- the file .postgresql/postgresql.crt must be a regular file
owned by the user.
- the file .postgresql/postgresql.key must be a regular file
owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other'.
At the current time encrypted private keys are not supported.
There should also be a way to support multiple client certs/keys.
*) the front-end performs minimal validation of the back-end cert.
Self-signed certs are permitted, but the common name *must*
match the hostname used by the front-end. (The cert itself
should always use a fully qualified domain name (FDQN) in its
common name field.)
This means that
psql -h eris db
will fail, but
psql -h eris.example.com db
will succeed. At the current time this must be an exact match;
future patches may support any FQDN that resolves to the address
returned by getpeername(2).
Another common "problem" is expiring certs. For now, it may be
a good idea to use a very-long-lived self-signed cert.
As a compile-time option, the front-end can specify a file
containing valid root certificates, but it is not yet required.
*) the back-end performs minimal validation of the client cert.
It allows self-signed certs. It checks for expiration. It
supports a compile-time option specifying a file containing
valid root certificates.
*) both front- and back-ends default to TLSv1, not SSLv3/SSLv2.
*) both front- and back-ends support DSA keys. DSA keys are
moderately more expensive on startup, but many people consider
them preferable than RSA keys. (E.g., SSH2 prefers DSA keys.)
*) if /dev/urandom exists, both client and server will read 16k
of randomization data from it.
*) the server can read empheral DH parameters from the files
$DataDir/dh512.pem
$DataDir/dh1024.pem
$DataDir/dh2048.pem
$DataDir/dh4096.pem
if none are provided, the server will default to hardcoded
parameter files provided by the OpenSSL project.
Remaining tasks:
*) the select() clauses need to be revisited - the SSL abstraction
layer may need to absorb more of the current code to avoid rare
deadlock conditions. This also touches on a true solution to
the pg_eof() problem.
*) the SIGPIPE signal handler may need to be revisited.
*) support encrypted private keys.
*) sessions are not yet fully supported. (SSL sessions can span
multiple "connections," and allow the client and server to avoid
costly renegotiations.)
*) makecert - a script that creates back-end certs.
*) pgkeygen - a tool that creates front-end certs.
*) the whole protocol issue, SASL, etc.
*) certs are fully validated - valid root certs must be available.
This is a hassle, but it means that you *can* trust the identity
of the server.
*) the client library can handle hardcoded root certificates, to
avoid the need to copy these files.
*) host name of server cert must resolve to IP address, or be a
recognized alias. This is more liberal than the previous
iteration.
*) the number of bytes transferred is tracked, and the session
key is periodically renegotiated.
*) basic cert generation scripts (mkcert.sh, pgkeygen.sh). The
configuration files have reasonable defaults for each type
of use.
Bear Giles
As proof of concept, provide an alternate implementation based on POSIX
semaphores. Also push the SysV shared-memory implementation into a
separate file so that it can be replaced conveniently.
A new pg_hba.conf column, USER
Allow specifiction of lists of users separated by commas
Allow group names specified by +
Allow include files containing lists of users specified by @
Allow lists of databases, and database files
Allow samegroup in database column to match group name matching dbname
Removal of secondary password files
Remove pg_passwd utility
Lots of code cleanup in user.c and hba.c
New data/global/pg_pwd format
New data/global/pg_group file
o Change all current CVS messages of NOTICE to WARNING. We were going
to do this just before 7.3 beta but it has to be done now, as you will
see below.
o Change current INFO messages that should be controlled by
client_min_messages to NOTICE.
o Force remaining INFO messages, like from EXPLAIN, VACUUM VERBOSE, etc.
to always go to the client.
o Remove INFO from the client_min_messages options and add NOTICE.
Seems we do need three non-ERROR elog levels to handle the various
behaviors we need for these messages.
Regression passed.
when to send what to which, prevent recursion by introducing new COMMERROR
elog level for client-communication problems, get rid of direct writes
to stderr in backend/libpq files, prevent non-error elogs from going to
client during the authentication cycle.
now just below FATAL in server_min_messages. Added more text to
highlight ordering difference between it and client_min_messages.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
REALLYFATAL => PANIC
STOP => PANIC
New INFO level the prints to client by default
New LOG level the prints to server log by default
Cause VACUUM information to print only to the client
NOTICE => INFO where purely information messages are sent
DEBUG => LOG for purely server status messages
DEBUG removed, kept as backward compatible
DEBUG5, DEBUG4, DEBUG3, DEBUG2, DEBUG1 added
DebugLvl removed in favor of new DEBUG[1-5] symbols
New server_min_messages GUC parameter with values:
DEBUG[5-1], INFO, NOTICE, ERROR, LOG, FATAL, PANIC
New client_min_messages GUC parameter with values:
DEBUG[5-1], LOG, INFO, NOTICE, ERROR, FATAL, PANIC
Server startup now logged with LOG instead of DEBUG
Remove debug_level GUC parameter
elog() numbers now start at 10
Add test to print error message if older elog() values are passed to elog()
Bootstrap mode now has a -d that requires an argument, like postmaster
> and that the right fix is to make each of the subsequent calls be in
> this same pattern, not to try to emulate their nonsensical style.
Dominic J. Eidson
to use and significantly faster. This tweak saves 25% (!) of the runtime
of COPY IN in a test with 8000-character lines. I wouldn't normally
commit a performance improvement this late in the cycle, but 25% got
my attention...
