The annotation for "ERROR: language "foo" is not trusted" used to say
"HINT: Only superusers can use untrusted languages", which was fairly
poorly thought out. For one thing, it's not a hint about what to do,
but a statement of fact, which makes it errdetail. But also, this
fails to clarify things much, because there's a missing step in the
chain of reasoning. I think it's more useful to say "GRANT and REVOKE
are not allowed on untrusted languages, because only superusers can use
untrusted languages".
It's been like this for a long time, but given the lack of previous
complaints, I don't think this is worth back-patching.
Discussion: <1417.1466289901@sss.pgh.pa.us>
Remove the code in plpgsql that suppressed the innermost line of CONTEXT
for messages emitted by RAISE commands. That was never more than a quick
backwards-compatibility hack, and it's pretty silly in cases where the
RAISE is nested in several levels of function. What's more, it violated
our design theory that verbosity of error reports should be controlled
on the client side not the server side.
To alleviate the resulting noise increase, introduce a feature in libpq
and psql whereby the CONTEXT field of messages can be suppressed, either
always or only for non-error messages. Printing CONTEXT for errors only
is now their default behavior.
The actual code changes here are pretty small, but the effects on the
regression test outputs are widespread. I had to edit some of the
alternative expected outputs by hand; hopefully the buildfarm will soon
find anything I fat-fingered.
In passing, fix up (again) the output line counts in psql's various
help displays. Add some commentary about how to verify them.
Pavel Stehule, reviewed by Petr Jelínek, Jeevan Chalke, and others
Test the interactions with permissions and LOCK TABLE. Specifically
ROW EXCLUSIVE, ACCESS SHARE, and ACCESS EXCLUSIVE modes against
SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE, and TRUNCATE permissions. Discussed
by Stephen Frost and Michael Paquier, patch by the latter. Backpatch
to 9.5 where matching behavior was first committed.
The newly added ON CONFLICT clause allows to specify an alternative to
raising a unique or exclusion constraint violation error when inserting.
ON CONFLICT refers to constraints that can either be specified using a
inference clause (by specifying the columns of a unique constraint) or
by naming a unique or exclusion constraint. DO NOTHING avoids the
constraint violation, without touching the pre-existing row. DO UPDATE
SET ... [WHERE ...] updates the pre-existing tuple, and has access to
both the tuple proposed for insertion and the existing tuple; the
optional WHERE clause can be used to prevent an update from being
executed. The UPDATE SET and WHERE clauses have access to the tuple
proposed for insertion using the "magic" EXCLUDED alias, and to the
pre-existing tuple using the table name or its alias.
This feature is often referred to as upsert.
This is implemented using a new infrastructure called "speculative
insertion". It is an optimistic variant of regular insertion that first
does a pre-check for existing tuples and then attempts an insert. If a
violating tuple was inserted concurrently, the speculatively inserted
tuple is deleted and a new attempt is made. If the pre-check finds a
matching tuple the alternative DO NOTHING or DO UPDATE action is taken.
If the insertion succeeds without detecting a conflict, the tuple is
deemed inserted.
To handle the possible ambiguity between the excluded alias and a table
named excluded, and for convenience with long relation names, INSERT
INTO now can alias its target table.
Bumps catversion as stored rules change.
Author: Peter Geoghegan, with significant contributions from Heikki
Linnakangas and Andres Freund. Testing infrastructure by Jeff Janes.
Reviewed-By: Heikki Linnakangas, Andres Freund, Robert Haas, Simon Riggs,
Dean Rasheed, Stephen Frost and many others.
This role attribute is an ancient PostgreSQL feature, but could only be
set by directly updating the system catalogs, and it doesn't have any
clearly defined use.
Author: Adam Brightwell <adam.brightwell@crunchydatasolutions.com>
While building error messages to return to the user,
BuildIndexValueDescription, ExecBuildSlotValueDescription and
ri_ReportViolation would happily include the entire key or entire row in
the result returned to the user, even if the user didn't have access to
view all of the columns being included.
Instead, include only those columns which the user is providing or which
the user has select rights on. If the user does not have any rights
to view the table or any of the columns involved then no detail is
provided and a NULL value is returned from BuildIndexValueDescription
and ExecBuildSlotValueDescription. Note that, for key cases, the user
must have access to all of the columns for the key to be shown; a
partial key will not be returned.
Further, in master only, do not return any data for cases where row
security is enabled on the relation and row security should be applied
for the user. This required a bit of refactoring and moving of things
around related to RLS- note the addition of utils/misc/rls.c.
Back-patch all the way, as column-level privileges are now in all
supported versions.
This has been assigned CVE-2014-8161, but since the issue and the patch
have already been publicized on pgsql-hackers, there's no point in trying
to hide this commit.
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
Granting a role without ADMIN OPTION is supposed to prevent the grantee
from adding or removing members from the granted role. Issuing SET ROLE
before the GRANT bypassed that, because the role itself had an implicit
right to add or remove members. Plug that hole by recognizing that
implicit right only when the session user matches the current role.
Additionally, do not recognize it during a security-restricted operation
or during execution of a SECURITY DEFINER function. The restriction on
SECURITY DEFINER is not security-critical. However, it seems best for a
user testing his own SECURITY DEFINER function to see the same behavior
others will see. Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions).
The SQL standards do not conflate roles and users as PostgreSQL does;
only SQL roles have members, and only SQL users initiate sessions. An
application using PostgreSQL users and roles as SQL users and roles will
never attempt to grant membership in the role that is the session user,
so the implicit right to add or remove members will never arise.
The security impact was mostly that a role member could revoke access
from others, contrary to the wishes of his own grantor. Unapproved role
member additions are less notable, because the member can still largely
achieve that by creating a view or a SECURITY DEFINER function.
Reviewed by Andres Freund and Tom Lane. Reported, independently, by
Jonas Sundman and Noah Misch.
Security: CVE-2014-0060
This reverts the code changes in 50c137487c,
which turned out to induce crashes and not completely fix the problem
anyway. That commit only considered single subqueries that were excluded
by constraint-exclusion logic, but actually the problem also exists for
subqueries that are appendrel members (ie part of a UNION ALL list). In
such cases we can't add a dummy subpath to the appendrel's AppendPath list
without defeating the logic that recognizes when an appendrel is completely
excluded. Instead, fix the problem by having setrefs.c scan the rangetable
an extra time looking for subqueries that didn't get into the plan tree.
(This approach depends on the 9.2 change that made set_subquery_pathlist
generate dummy paths for excluded single subqueries, so that the exclusion
behavior is the same for single subqueries and appendrel members.)
Note: it turns out that the appendrel form of the missed-permissions-checks
bug exists as far back as 8.4. However, since the practical effect of that
bug seems pretty minimal, consensus is to not attempt to fix it in the back
branches, at least not yet. Possibly we could back-port this patch once
it's gotten a reasonable amount of testing in HEAD. For the moment I'm
just going to revert the previous patch in 9.2.
A view defined as "select <something> where false" had the curious property
that the system wouldn't check whether users had the privileges necessary
to select from it. More generally, permissions checks could be skipped
for tables referenced in sub-selects or views that were proven empty by
constraint exclusion (although some quick testing suggests this seldom
happens in cases of practical interest). This happened because the planner
failed to include rangetable entries for such tables in the finished plan.
This was noticed in connection with erroneous handling of materialized
views, but actually the issue is quite unrelated to matviews. Therefore,
revert commit 200ba1667b in favor of a more
direct test for the real problem.
Back-patch to 9.2 where the bug was introduced (by commit
7741dd6590).
If we revoke a grant option from some role X, but X still holds the option
via another grant, we should not recursively revoke the privilege from
role(s) Y that X had granted it to. This was supposedly fixed as one
aspect of commit 4b2dafcc0b, but I must not
have tested it, because in fact that code never worked: it forgot to shift
the grant-option bits back over when masking the bits being revoked.
Per bug #6728 from Daniel German. Back-patch to all active branches,
since this has been wrong since 8.0.
Because permissions are assigned to element types, not array types,
complaining about permission denied on an array type would be
misleading to users. So adjust the reporting to refer to the element
type instead.
In order not to duplicate the required logic in two dozen places,
refactor the permission denied reporting for types a bit.
pointed out by Yeb Havinga during the review of the type privilege
feature
Prohibiting this outright would break dumps taken from older versions
that contain such casts, which would create far more pain than is
justified here.
Per report by Jaime Casanova and subsequent discussion.
This adds support for the more or less SQL-conforming USAGE privilege
on types and domains. The intent is to be able restrict which users
can create dependencies on types, which restricts the way in which
owners can alter types.
reviewed by Yeb Havinga
the privileges that will be applied to subsequently-created objects.
Such adjustments are always per owning role, and can be restricted to objects
created in particular schemas too. A notable benefit is that users can
override the traditional default privilege settings, eg, the PUBLIC EXECUTE
privilege traditionally granted by default for functions.
Petr Jelinek
Add family of functions that did not exist earlier,
mainly due to historical omission. Original patch by
Abhijit Menon-Sen, with review and modifications by
Joe Conway. catversion.h bumped.
attribute numbering. Also, a parent whole-row reference should not require
select privilege on child columns that aren't inherited from the parent.
Problem diagnosed by KaiGai Kohei, though this isn't exactly his patch.
has_column_privilege and has_any_column_privilege SQL functions; fix the
information_schema views that are supposed to pay attention to column
privileges; adjust pg_stats to show stats for any column you have select
privilege on; and fix COPY to allow copying a subset of columns if the user
has suitable per-column privileges for all the columns.
To improve efficiency of some of the information_schema views, extend the
has_xxx_privilege functions to allow inquiring about the OR of a set of
privileges in just one call. This is just exposing capability that already
existed in the underlying aclcheck routines.
In passing, make the information_schema views report the owner's own
privileges as being grantable, since Postgres assumes this even when the grant
option bit is not set in the ACL. This is a longstanding oversight.
Also, make the new has_xxx_privilege functions for foreign data objects follow
the same coding conventions used by the older ones.
Stephen Frost and Tom Lane
to return NULL, instead of erroring out, if the target object is specified by
OID and we can't find that OID in the catalogs. Since these functions operate
internally on SnapshotNow rules, there is a race condition when using them
in user queries: the query's MVCC snapshot might "see" a catalog row that's
already committed dead, leading to a failure when the inquiry function is
applied. Returning NULL should generally provide more convenient behavior.
This issue has been complained of before, and in particular we are now seeing
it in the regression tests due to another recent patch.
algorithm, replacing the original intention of a one-pass search, which
had been hacked up over time to be partially two-pass in hopes of handling
various corner cases better. It still wasn't quite there, especially as
regards emitting unwanted NOTICE messages. More importantly, this approach
lets us fix a number of open bugs concerning concurrent DROP scenarios,
because we can take locks during the first pass and avoid traversing to
dependent objects that were just deleted by someone else.
There is more that can be done here, but I'll go ahead and commit the
base patch before working on the options.
Standard English uses "may", "can", and "might" in different ways:
may - permission, "You may borrow my rake."
can - ability, "I can lift that log."
might - possibility, "It might rain today."
Unfortunately, in conversational English, their use is often mixed, as
in, "You may use this variable to do X", when in fact, "can" is a better
choice. Similarly, "It may crash" is better stated, "It might crash".
can create or modify rules for the table. Do setRuleCheckAsUser() while
loading rules into the relcache, rather than when defining a rule. This
ensures that permission checks for tables referenced in a rule are done with
respect to the current owner of the rule's table, whereas formerly ALTER TABLE
OWNER would fail to update the permission checking for associated rules.
Removal of separate RULE privilege is needed to prevent various scenarios
in which a grantee of RULE privilege could effectively have any privilege
of the table owner. For backwards compatibility, GRANT/REVOKE RULE is still
accepted, but it doesn't do anything. Per discussion here:
http://archives.postgresql.org/pgsql-hackers/2006-04/msg01138.php
code to forcibly drop regressuser[1-4] and regressgroup[1-2]. Instead,
let the privileges.sql test do that for itself (this is made easy by
the recent addition of DROP ROLE IF EXISTS). Per a recent patch proposed
by Joachim Wieland --- the rest of his patch is superseded by the
rewrite into C, but this is a good idea we should adopt.
Continue to support GRANT ON [TABLE] for sequences for backward
compatibility; issue warning for invalid sequence permissions.
[Backward compatibility warning message.]
Add USAGE permission for sequences that allows only currval() and
nextval(), not setval().
Mention object name in grant/revoke warnings because of possible
multi-object operations.
have adequate mechanisms for tracking the contents of databases and
tablespaces). This solves the longstanding problem that you can drop a
user who still owns objects and/or has access permissions.
Alvaro Herrera, with some kibitzing from Tom Lane.
and pg_auth_members. There are still many loose ends to finish in this
patch (no documentation, no regression tests, no pg_dump support for
instance). But I'm going to commit it now anyway so that Alvaro can
make some progress on shared dependencies. The catalog changes should
be pretty much done.
in UPDATE. We also now issue a NOTICE if a query has _any_ implicit
range table entries -- in the past, we would only warn about implicit
RTEs in SELECTs with at least one explicit RTE.
As a result of the warning change, 25 of the regression tests had to
be updated. I also took the opportunity to remove some bogus whitespace
differences between some of the float4 and float8 variants. I believe
I have correctly updated all the platform-specific variants, but let
me know if that's not the case.
Original patch for DELETE ... USING from Euler Taveira de Oliveira,
reworked by Neil Conway.
of bug report #1150. Also, arrange that the object owner's irrevocable
grant-option permissions are handled implicitly by the system rather than
being listed in the ACL as self-granted rights (which was wrong anyway).
I did not take the further step of showing these permissions in an
explicit 'granted by _SYSTEM' ACL entry, as that seemed more likely to
bollix up existing clients than to do anything really useful. It's still
a possible future direction, though.
> Please find a attached a small patch that adds accessor functions
> for "aclitem" so that it is not an opaque datatype.
>
> I needed these functions to browse aclitems from user land. I can load
> them when necessary, but it seems to me that these accessors for a
> backend type belong to the backend, so I submit them.
>
> Fabien Coelho
for "aclitem" so that it is not an opaque datatype.
I needed these functions to browse aclitems from user land. I can load
them when necessary, but it seems to me that these accessors for a
backend type belong to the backend, so I submit them.
Fabien Coelho
Tom Lane
Joe Conway
Andres Freund
Peter Eisentraut
Stephen Frost
Noah Misch
Simon Riggs
Robert Haas
Itagaki Takahiro
Bruce Momjian
Neil Conway