Change pg_bsd_indent to follow upstream rules for placement of comments
to the right of code, and remove pgindent hack that caused comments
following #endif to not obey the general rule.
Commit e3860ffa4d wasn't actually using
the published version of pg_bsd_indent, but a hacked-up version that
tried to minimize the amount of movement of comments to the right of
code. The situation of interest is where such a comment has to be
moved to the right of its default placement at column 33 because there's
code there. BSD indent has always moved right in units of tab stops
in such cases --- but in the previous incarnation, indent was working
in 8-space tab stops, while now it knows we use 4-space tabs. So the
net result is that in about half the cases, such comments are placed
one tab stop left of before. This is better all around: it leaves
more room on the line for comment text, and it means that in such
cases the comment uniformly starts at the next 4-space tab stop after
the code, rather than sometimes one and sometimes two tabs after.
Also, ensure that comments following #endif are indented the same
as comments following other preprocessor commands such as #else.
That inconsistency turns out to have been self-inflicted damage
from a poorly-thought-through post-indent "fixup" in pgindent.
This patch is much less interesting than the first round of indent
changes, but also bulkier, so I thought it best to separate the effects.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/E1dAmxK-0006EE-1r@gemulon.postgresql.org
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/30527.1495162840@sss.pgh.pa.us
DROP OWNED BY handled GRANT-based ACLs but was not removing roles from
policies. Fix that by having DROP OWNED BY remove the role specified
from the list of roles the policy (or policies) apply to, or the entire
policy (or policies) if it only applied to the role specified.
As with ACLs, the DROP OWNED BY caller must have permission to modify
the policy or a WARNING is thrown and no change is made to the policy.
When DefineQueryRewrite() is about to convert a table to a view, it checks
the table for features unavailable to views. For example, it rejects tables
having triggers. It omits to reject tables having relrowsecurity or a
pg_policy record. Fix that. To faciliate the repair, invent
relation_has_policies() which indicates the presence of policies on a
relation even when row security is disabled for that relation.
Reported by Noah Misch. Patch by me, review by Stephen Frost. Back-patch
to 9.5 where RLS was introduced.
The changed routines are mostly those that can be directly called by
ProcessUtilitySlow; the intention is to make the affected object
information more precise, in support for future event trigger changes.
Originally it was envisioned that the OID of the affected object would
be enough, and in most cases that is correct, but upon actually
implementing the event trigger changes it turned out that ObjectAddress
is more widely useful.
Additionally, some command execution routines grew an output argument
that's an object address which provides further info about the executed
command. To wit:
* for ALTER DOMAIN / ADD CONSTRAINT, it corresponds to the address of
the new constraint
* for ALTER OBJECT / SET SCHEMA, it corresponds to the address of the
schema that originally contained the object.
* for ALTER EXTENSION {ADD, DROP} OBJECT, it corresponds to the address
of the object added to or dropped from the extension.
There's no user-visible change in this commit, and no functional change
either.
Discussion: 20150218213255.GC6717@tamriel.snowman.net
Reviewed-By: Stephen Frost, Andres Freund
Buildfarm member tick identified an issue where the policies in the
relcache for a relation were were being replaced underneath a running
query, leading to segfaults while processing the policies to be added
to a query. Similar to how TupleDesc RuleLocks are handled, add in a
equalRSDesc() function to check if the policies have actually changed
and, if not, swap back the rsdesc field (using the original instead of
the temporairly built one; the whole structure is swapped and then
specific fields swapped back). This now passes a CLOBBER_CACHE_ALWAYS
for me and should resolve the buildfarm error.
In addition to addressing this, add a new chapter in Data Definition
under Privileges which explains row security and provides examples of
its usage, change \d to always list policies (even if row security is
disabled- but note that it is disabled, or enabled with no policies),
rework check_role_for_policy (it really didn't need the entire policy,
but it did need to be using has_privs_of_role()), and change the field
in pg_class to relrowsecurity from relhasrowsecurity, based on
Heikki's suggestion. Also from Heikki, only issue SET ROW_SECURITY in
pg_restore when talking to a 9.5+ server, list Bypass RLS in \du, and
document --enable-row-security options for pg_dump and pg_restore.
Lastly, fix a number of minor whitespace and typo issues from Heikki,
Dimitri, add a missing #include, per Peter E, fix a few minor
variable-assigned-but-not-used and resource leak issues from Coverity
and add tab completion for role attribute bypassrls as well.
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
Bruce Momjian
Tom Lane
Stephen Frost
Joe Conway
Alvaro Herrera