Most of the improvements were in the new SCRAM code:
* In SCRAM protocol violation messages, use errdetail to provide the
details.
* If pg_backend_random() fails, throw an ERROR rather than just LOG. We
shouldn't continue authentication if we can't generate a random nonce.
* Use ereport() rather than elog() for the "invalid SCRAM verifier"
messages. They shouldn't happen, if everything works, but it's not
inconceivable that someone would have invalid scram verifiers in
pg_authid, e.g. if a broken client application was used to generate the
verifier.
But this change applied to old code:
* Use ERROR rather than COMMERROR for protocol violation errors. There's
no reason to not tell the client what they did wrong. The client might be
confused already, so that it cannot read and display the error correctly,
but let's at least try. In the "invalid password packet size" case, we
used to actually continue with authentication anyway, but that is now a
hard error.
Patch by Michael Paquier and me. Thanks to Daniel Varrazzo for spotting
the typo in one of the messages that spurred the discussion and these
larger changes.
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CA%2Bmi_8aZYLhuyQi1Jo0hO19opNZ2OEATEOM5fKApH7P6zTOZGg%40mail.gmail.com
Storing passwords in plaintext hasn't been a good idea for a very long
time, if ever. Now seems like a good time to finally forbid it, since we're
messing with this in PostgreSQL 10 anyway.
Remove the CREATE/ALTER USER UNENCRYPTED PASSSWORD 'foo' syntax, since
storing passwords unencrypted is no longer supported. ENCRYPTED PASSWORD
'foo' is still accepted, but ENCRYPTED is now just a noise-word, it does
the same as just PASSWORD 'foo'.
Likewise, remove the --unencrypted option from createuser, but accept
--encrypted as a no-op for backward compatibility. AFAICS, --encrypted was
a no-op even before this patch, because createuser encrypted the password
before sending it to the server even if --encrypted was not specified. It
added the ENCRYPTED keyword to the SQL command, but since the password was
already in encrypted form, it didn't make any difference. The documentation
was not clear on whether that was intended or not, but it's moot now.
Also, while password_encryption='on' is still accepted as an alias for
'md5', it is now marked as hidden, so that it is not listed as an accepted
value in error hints, for example. That's not directly related to removing
'plain', but it seems better this way.
Reviewed by Michael Paquier
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/16e9b768-fd78-0b12-cfc1-7b6b7f238fde@iki.fi
Per discussion, plain "scram" is confusing because we actually implement
SCRAM-SHA-256 rather than the original SCRAM that uses SHA-1 as the hash
algorithm. If we add support for SCRAM-SHA-512 or some other mechanism in
the SCRAM family in the future, that would become even more confusing.
Most of the internal files and functions still use just "scram" as a
shorthand for SCRMA-SHA-256, but I did change PASSWORD_TYPE_SCRAM to
PASSWORD_TYPE_SCRAM_SHA_256, as that could potentially be used by 3rd
party extensions that hook into the password-check hook.
Michael Paquier did this in an earlier version of the SCRAM patch set
already, but I didn't include that in the version that was committed.
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/fde71ff1-5858-90c8-99a9-1c2427e7bafb@iki.fi
This contains some protocol changes to SASL authentiation (which is new
in v10):
* For future-proofing, in the AuthenticationSASL message that begins SASL
authentication, provide a list of SASL mechanisms that the server
supports, for the client to choose from. Currently, it's always just
SCRAM-SHA-256.
* Add a separate authentication message type for the final server->client
SASL message, which the client doesn't need to respond to. This makes
it unambiguous whether the client is supposed to send a response or not.
The SASL mechanism should know that anyway, but better to be explicit.
Also, in the server, support clients that don't send an Initial Client
response in the first SASLInitialResponse message. The server is supposed
to first send an empty request in that case, to which the client will
respond with the data that usually comes in the Initial Client Response.
libpq uses the Initial Client Response field and doesn't need this, and I
would assume any other sensible implementation to use Initial Client
Response, too, but let's follow the SASL spec.
Improve the documentation on SASL authentication in protocol. Add a
section describing the SASL message flow, and some details on our
SCRAM-SHA-256 implementation.
Document the different kinds of PasswordMessages that the frontend sends
in different phases of SASL authentication, as well as GSS/SSPI
authentication as separate message formats. Even though they're all 'p'
messages, and the exact format depends on the context, describing them as
separate message formats makes the documentation more clear.
Reviewed by Michael Paquier and Álvaro Hernández Tortosa.
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqS-aFg0iM3AQOJwKDv_0WkAedRjs1W2X8EixSz+sKBXCQ@mail.gmail.com
Free each SASL message after sending it. It's not a lot of wasted memory,
and it's short-lived, but the authentication code in general tries to
pfree() stuff, so let's follow the example.
Adding the pfree() revealed a little bug in build_server_first_message().
It attempts to keeps a copy of the sent message, but it was missing a
pstrdup(), so the pointer started to dangle, after adding the pfree()
into CheckSCRAMAuth().
Reword comments and debug messages slightly, while we're at it.
Reviewed by Michael Paquier.
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/6490b975-5ee1-6280-ac1d-af975b19fb9a@iki.fi
This used to mean "Visual C++ except in those parts where Borland C++
was supported where it meant one of those". Now that we don't support
Borland C++ anymore, simplify by using _MSC_VER which is the normal way
to detect Visual C++.
The compiler is entitled to store a char[] local variable with no
particular alignment requirement. Our RADIUS code cavalierly took such
a local variable and cast its address to a struct type that does have
alignment requirements. On an alignment-picky machine this would lead
to bus errors. To fix, declare the local variable honestly, and then
cast its address to char * for use in the I/O calls.
Given the lack of field complaints, there must be very few if any
people affected; but nonetheless this is a clear portability issue,
so back-patch to all supported branches.
Noted while looking at a Coverity complaint in the same code.
Failure to free serveraddrs pointed out by Coverity, failure to close
socket noted by code-reading. These bugs seem to be quite old, but
given the low probability of taking these error-exit paths and the
minimal consequences of the leaks (since the process would presumably
exit shortly anyway), it doesn't seem worth back-patching.
Michael Paquier and Tom Lane
If a user has a SCRAM verifier in pg_authid.rolpassword, there's no reason
we cannot attempt to perform SCRAM authentication instead of MD5. The worst
that can happen is that the client doesn't support SCRAM, and the
authentication will fail. But previously, it would fail for sure, because
we would not even try. SCRAM is strictly more secure than MD5, so there's
no harm in trying it. This allows for a more graceful transition from MD5
passwords to SCRAM, as user passwords can be changed to SCRAM verifiers
incrementally, without changing pg_hba.conf.
Refactor the code in auth.c to support that better. Notably, we now have to
look up the user's pg_authid entry before sending the password challenge,
also when performing MD5 authentication. Also simplify the concept of a
"doomed" authentication. Previously, if a user had a password, but it had
expired, we still performed SCRAM authentication (but always returned error
at the end) using the salt and iteration count from the expired password.
Now we construct a fake salt, like we do when the user doesn't have a
password or doesn't exist at all. That simplifies get_role_password(), and
we can don't need to distinguish the "user has expired password", and
"user does not exist" cases in auth.c.
On second thoughts, also rename uaSASL to uaSCRAM. It refers to the
mechanism specified in pg_hba.conf, and while we use SASL for SCRAM
authentication at the protocol level, the mechanism should be called SCRAM,
not SASL. As a comparison, we have uaLDAP, even though it looks like the
plain 'password' authentication at the protocol level.
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/6425.1489506016@sss.pgh.pa.us
Reviewed-by: Michael Paquier
This changes all the RADIUS related parameters (radiusserver,
radiussecret, radiusport, radiusidentifier) to be plural and to accept a
comma separated list of servers, which will be tried in order.
Reviewed by Adam Brightwell
This introduces a new generic SASL authentication method, similar to the
GSS and SSPI methods. The server first tells the client which SASL
authentication mechanism to use, and then the mechanism-specific SASL
messages are exchanged in AuthenticationSASLcontinue and PasswordMessage
messages. Only SCRAM-SHA-256 is supported at the moment, but this allows
adding more SASL mechanisms in the future, without changing the overall
protocol.
Support for channel binding, aka SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS is left for later.
The SASLPrep algorithm, for pre-processing the password, is not yet
implemented. That could cause trouble, if you use a password with
non-ASCII characters, and a client library that does implement SASLprep.
That will hopefully be added later.
Authorization identities, as specified in the SCRAM-SHA-256 specification,
are ignored. SET SESSION AUTHORIZATION provides more or less the same
functionality, anyway.
If a user doesn't exist, perform a "mock" authentication, by constructing
an authentic-looking challenge on the fly. The challenge is derived from
a new system-wide random value, "mock authentication nonce", which is
created at initdb, and stored in the control file. We go through these
motions, in order to not give away the information on whether the user
exists, to unauthenticated users.
Bumps PG_CONTROL_VERSION, because of the new field in control file.
Patch by Michael Paquier and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed at different
stages by Robert Haas, Stephen Frost, David Steele, Aleksander Alekseev,
and many others.
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqRbR3GmFYdedCAhzukfKrgBLTLtMvENOmPrVWREsZkF8g%40mail.gmail.com
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqSMXU35g%3DW9X74HVeQp0uvgJxvYOuA4A-A3M%2B0wfEBv-w%40mail.gmail.com
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/55192AFE.6080106@iki.fi
It is no longer necessary to restart the server to enable, disable,
or reconfigure SSL. Instead, we just create a new SSL_CTX struct
(by re-reading all relevant files) whenever we get SIGHUP. Testing
shows that this is fast enough that it shouldn't be a problem.
In conjunction with that, downgrade the logic that complains about
pg_hba.conf "hostssl" lines when SSL isn't active: now that's just
a warning condition not an error.
An issue that still needs to be addressed is what shall we do with
passphrase-protected server keys? As this stands, the server would
demand the passphrase again on every SIGHUP, which is certainly
impractical. But the case was only barely supported before, so that
does not seem a sufficient reason to hold up committing this patch.
Andreas Karlsson, reviewed by Michael Banck and Michael Paquier
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/556A6E8A.9030400@proxel.se
Split md5_crypt_verify() into three functions:
* get_role_password() to fetch user's password from pg_authid, and check
its expiration.
* md5_crypt_verify() to check an MD5 authentication challenge
* plain_crypt_verify() to check a plaintext password.
get_role_password() will be needed as a separate function by the upcoming
SCRAM authentication patch set. Most of the remaining functionality in
md5_crypt_verify() was different for MD5 and plaintext authentication, so
split that for readability.
While we're at it, simplify the *_crypt_verify functions by using
stack-allocated buffers to hold the temporary MD5 hashes, instead of
pallocing.
Reviewed by Michael Paquier.
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/3029e460-d47c-710e-507e-d8ba759d7cbb@iki.fi
Also use the new facility for generating RADIUS authenticator requests,
and salt in chkpass extension.
Reword the error messages to be nicer. Fix bogus error code used in the
message in BackendStartup.
pg_backend_random() is used for MD5 salt generation, but it can fail, and
no checks were done on its status code.
Fix memory leak, if generating a random number for a cancel key failed.
Both issues were spotted by Coverity. Fix by Michael Paquier.
Commit fe0a0b59, which moved code to do MD5 authentication to a separate
CheckMD5Auth() function, left behind a comment that really belongs inside
the function, too. Also move the check for db_user_namespace inside the
function, seems clearer that way.
Now that the md5 salt is passed as argument to md5_crypt_verify, it's a bit
silly that it peeks into the Port struct to see if MD5 authentication was
used. Seems more straightforward to treat it as an MD5 authentication, if
the md5 salt argument is given. And after that, md5_crypt_verify only used
the Port argument to look at port->user_name, but that is redundant,
because it is also passed as a separate 'role' argument. So remove the Port
argument altogether.
This adds a new routine, pg_strong_random() for generating random bytes,
for use in both frontend and backend. At the moment, it's only used in
the backend, but the upcoming SCRAM authentication patches need strong
random numbers in libpq as well.
pg_strong_random() is based on, and replaces, the existing implementation
in pgcrypto. It can acquire strong random numbers from a number of sources,
depending on what's available:
- OpenSSL RAND_bytes(), if built with OpenSSL
- On Windows, the native cryptographic functions are used
- /dev/urandom
Unlike the current pgcrypto function, the source is chosen by configure.
That makes it easier to test different implementations, and ensures that
we don't accidentally fall back to a less secure implementation, if the
primary source fails. All of those methods are quite reliable, it would be
pretty surprising for them to fail, so we'd rather find out by failing
hard.
If no strong random source is available, we fall back to using erand48(),
seeded from current timestamp, like PostmasterRandom() was. That isn't
cryptographically secure, but allows us to still work on platforms that
don't have any of the above stronger sources. Because it's not very secure,
the built-in implementation is only used if explicitly requested with
--disable-strong-random.
This replaces the more complicated Fortuna algorithm we used to have in
pgcrypto, which is unfortunate, but all modern platforms have /dev/urandom,
so it doesn't seem worth the maintenance effort to keep that. pgcrypto
functions that require strong random numbers will be disabled with
--disable-strong-random.
Original patch by Magnus Hagander, tons of further work by Michael Paquier
and me.
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqRy3krN8quR9XujMVVHYtXJ0_60nqgVc6oUk8ygyVkZsA@mail.gmail.com
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqRWkNYRRPJA7-cF+LfroYV10pvjdz6GNvxk-Eee9FypKA@mail.gmail.com
This reverts commit 9e083fd468. That was a
few bricks shy of a load:
* Query cancel stopped working
* Buildfarm member pademelon stopped working, because the box doesn't have
/dev/urandom nor /dev/random.
This clearly needs some more discussion, and a quite different patch, so
revert for now.
This adds a new routine, pg_strong_random() for generating random bytes,
for use in both frontend and backend. At the moment, it's only used in
the backend, but the upcoming SCRAM authentication patches need strong
random numbers in libpq as well.
pg_strong_random() is based on, and replaces, the existing implementation
in pgcrypto. It can acquire strong random numbers from a number of sources,
depending on what's available:
- OpenSSL RAND_bytes(), if built with OpenSSL
- On Windows, the native cryptographic functions are used
- /dev/urandom
- /dev/random
Original patch by Magnus Hagander, with further work by Michael Paquier
and me.
Discussion: <CAB7nPqRy3krN8quR9XujMVVHYtXJ0_60nqgVc6oUk8ygyVkZsA@mail.gmail.com>
<sys/select.h> is required by POSIX.1-2001 to get the prototype of
select(2), but nearly no systems enforce that because older standards
let you get away with including some other headers. Recent OpenBSD
hacking has removed that frail touch of friendliness, however, which
broke some compiles; fix all the way back to 9.1 by adding the required
standard. Only vacuumdb.c was reported to fail, but it seems easier to
fix the whole lot in a fell swoop.
Per bug #14334 by Sean Farrell.
When building libpq, ip.c and md5.c were symlinked or copied from
src/backend/libpq into src/interfaces/libpq, but now that we have a
directory specifically for routines that are shared between the server and
client binaries, src/common/, move them there.
Some routines in ip.c were only used in the backend. Keep those in
src/backend/libpq, but rename to ifaddr.c to avoid confusion with the file
that's now in common.
Fix the comment in src/common/Makefile to reflect how libpq actually links
those files.
There are two more files that libpq symlinks directly from src/backend:
encnames.c and wchar.c. I don't feel compelled to move those right now,
though.
Patch by Michael Paquier, with some changes by me.
Discussion: <69938195-9c76-8523-0af8-eb718ea5b36e@iki.fi>
This way sendAuthRequest doesn't need to know the details of all the
different authentication methods. This is in preparation for adding SCRAM
authentication, which will add yet another authentication request message
type, with different payload.
Reviewed-By: Michael Paquier
Discussion: <CAB7nPqQvO4sxLFeS9D+NM3wpy08ieZdAj_6e117MQHZAfxBFsg@mail.gmail.com>
These parameters are available for SSPI authentication only, to make
it possible to make it behave more like "normal gssapi", while
making it possible to maintain compatibility.
compat_realm is on by default, but can be turned off to make the
authentication use the full Kerberos realm instead of the NetBIOS name.
upn_username is off by default, and can be turned on to return the users
Kerberos UPN rather than the SAM-compatible name (a user in Active
Directory can have both a legacy SAM-compatible username and a new
Kerberos one. Normally they are the same, but not always)
Author: Christian Ullrich
Reviewed by: Robbie Harwood, Alvaro Herrera, me
Create a "bsd" auth method that works the same as "password" so far as
clients are concerned, but calls the BSD Authentication service to
check the password. This is currently only available on OpenBSD.
Marisa Emerson, reviewed by Thomas Munro
The PAM_RHOST item is set to the remote IP address or host name and can
be used by PAM modules. A pg_hba.conf option is provided to choose
between IP address and resolved host name.
From: Grzegorz Sampolski <grzsmp@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Haribabu Kommi <kommi.haribabu@gmail.com>
Commit c22650cd64 sparked a discussion
about diverse interpretations of "token user" in error messages. Expel
old and new specimens of that phrase by making all GetTokenInformation()
callers report errors the way GetTokenUser() has been reporting them.
These error conditions almost can't happen, so users are unlikely to
observe this change.
Reviewed by Tom Lane and Stephen Frost.
Whenever this function is used with the FORMAT_MESSAGE_FROM_SYSTEM flag,
it's good practice to include FORMAT_MESSAGE_IGNORE_INSERTS as well.
Otherwise, if the message contains any %n insertion markers, the function
will try to fetch argument strings to substitute --- which we are not
passing, possibly leading to a crash. This is exactly analogous to the
rule about not giving printf() a format string you're not in control of.
Noted and patched by Christian Ullrich.
Back-patch to all supported branches.
We can never leak more than one token, but we shouldn't do that. We
don't bother closing it in the error paths since the process will
exit shortly anyway.
Christian Ullrich
PostgreSQL already checked the vast majority of these, missing this
handful that nearly cannot fail. If putenv() failed with ENOMEM in
pg_GSS_recvauth(), authentication would proceed with the wrong keytab
file. If strftime() returned zero in cache_locale_time(), using the
unspecified buffer contents could lead to information exposure or a
crash. Back-patch to 9.0 (all supported versions).
Other unchecked calls to these functions, especially those in frontend
code, pose negligible security concern. This patch does not address
them. Nonetheless, it is always better to check return values whose
specification provides for indicating an error.
In passing, fix an off-by-one error in strftime_win32()'s invocation of
WideCharToMultiByte(). Upon retrieving a value of exactly MAX_L10N_DATA
bytes, strftime_win32() would overrun the caller's buffer by one byte.
MAX_L10N_DATA is chosen to exceed the length of every possible value, so
the vulnerable scenario probably does not arise.
Security: CVE-2015-3166
We'd leak the ident_serv data structure if the second pg_getaddrinfo_all
(the one for the local address) failed. This is not of great consequence
because a failure return here just leads directly to backend exit(), but
if this function is going to try to clean up after itself at all, it should
not have such holes in the logic. Try to fix it in a future-proof way by
having all the failure exits go through the same cleanup path, rather than
"optimizing" some of them.
Per Coverity. Back-patch to 9.2, which is as far back as this patch
applies cleanly.
We used to handle authentication_timeout by setting
ImmediateInterruptOK to true during large parts of the authentication
phase of a new connection. While that happens to work acceptably in
practice, it's not particularly nice and has ugly corner cases.
Previous commits converted the FE/BE communication to use latches and
implemented support for interrupt handling during both
send/recv. Building on top of that work we can get rid of
ImmediateInterruptOK during authentication, by immediately treating
timeouts during authentication as a reason to die. As die interrupts
are handled immediately during client communication that provides a
sensibly quick reaction time to authentication timeout.
Additionally add a few CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS() to some more complex
authentication methods. More could be added, but this already should
provides a reasonable coverage.
While it this overall increases the maximum time till a timeout is
reacted to, it greatly reduces complexity and increases
reliability. That seems like a overall win. If the increase proves to
be noticeable we can deal with those cases by moving to nonblocking
network code and add interrupt checking there.
Reviewed-By: Heikki Linnakangas
If any error occurred while we were in the middle of reading a protocol
message from the client, we could lose sync, and incorrectly try to
interpret a part of another message as a new protocol message. That will
usually lead to an "invalid frontend message" error that terminates the
connection. However, this is a security issue because an attacker might
be able to deliberately cause an error, inject a Query message in what's
supposed to be just user data, and have the server execute it.
We were quite careful to not have CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS() calls or other
operations that could ereport(ERROR) in the middle of processing a message,
but a query cancel interrupt or statement timeout could nevertheless cause
it to happen. Also, the V2 fastpath and COPY handling were not so careful.
It's very difficult to recover in the V2 COPY protocol, so we will just
terminate the connection on error. In practice, that's what happened
previously anyway, as we lost protocol sync.
To fix, add a new variable in pqcomm.c, PqCommReadingMsg, that is set
whenever we're in the middle of reading a message. When it's set, we cannot
safely ERROR out and continue running, because we might've read only part
of a message. PqCommReadingMsg acts somewhat similarly to critical sections
in that if an error occurs while it's set, the error handler will force the
connection to be terminated, as if the error was FATAL. It's not
implemented by promoting ERROR to FATAL in elog.c, like ERROR is promoted
to PANIC in critical sections, because we want to be able to use
PG_TRY/CATCH to recover and regain protocol sync. pq_getmessage() takes
advantage of that to prevent an OOM error from terminating the connection.
To prevent unnecessary connection terminations, add a holdoff mechanism
similar to HOLD/RESUME_INTERRUPTS() that can be used hold off query cancel
interrupts, but still allow die interrupts. The rules on which interrupts
are processed when are now a bit more complicated, so refactor
ProcessInterrupts() and the calls to it in signal handlers so that the
signal handlers always call it if ImmediateInterruptOK is set, and
ProcessInterrupts() can decide to not do anything if the other conditions
are not met.
Reported by Emil Lenngren. Patch reviewed by Noah Misch and Andres Freund.
Backpatch to all supported versions.
Security: CVE-2015-0244
This refactoring is in preparation for adding support for other SSL
implementations, with no user-visible effects. There are now two #defines,
USE_OPENSSL which is defined when building with OpenSSL, and USE_SSL which
is defined when building with any SSL implementation. Currently, OpenSSL is
the only implementation so the two #defines go together, but USE_SSL is
supposed to be used for implementation-independent code.
The libpq SSL code is changed to use a custom BIO, which does all the raw
I/O, like we've been doing in the backend for a long time. That makes it
possible to use MSG_NOSIGNAL to block SIGPIPE when using SSL, which avoids
a couple of syscall for each send(). Probably doesn't make much performance
difference in practice - the SSL encryption is expensive enough to mask the
effect - but it was a natural result of this refactoring.
Based on a patch by Martijn van Oosterhout from 2006. Briefly reviewed by
Alvaro Herrera, Andreas Karlsson, Jeff Janes.
Heikki Linnakangas
Bruce Momjian
Magnus Hagander
Tom Lane
Alvaro Herrera
Robert Haas
Peter Eisentraut
Noah Misch
Andres Freund