which is perhaps not a terribly good spot for it but there doesn't seem to be
a better place. Also add a source-code comment pointing out a couple reasons
for having a separate lock file. Per suggestion from Greg Smith.
unqualified names.
- Add a missing_ok parameter to get_tablespace_oid.
- Avoid duplicating get_tablespace_od guts in objectNamesToOids.
- Add a missing_ok parameter to get_database_oid.
- Replace get_roleid and get_role_checked with get_role_oid.
- Add get_namespace_oid, get_language_oid, get_am_oid.
- Refactor existing code to use new interfaces.
Thanks to KaiGai Kohei for the review.
requests for client certs. This lets a client with a keystore select the
appropriate client certificate to send. In particular, this is necessary
to get Java clients to work in all but the most trivial configurations.
Per discussion of bug #5468.
Craig Ringer
with database = replication. The previous coding would allow them to match
ordinary records too, but that seems like a recipe for security breaches.
Improve the messages associated with no-such-pg_hba.conf entry to report
replication connections as such, since that's now a critical aspect of
whether the connection matches. Make some cursory improvements in the related
documentation, too.
unless (1) the @ isn't quoted and (2) the filename isn't empty. This guards
against unexpectedly treating usernames or other strings in "flat files"
as inclusion requests, as seen in a recent trouble report from Ed L.
The empty-filename case would be guaranteed to misbehave anyway, because our
subsequent path-munging behavior results in trying to read the directory
containing the current input file.
I think this might finally explain the report at
http://archives.postgresql.org/pgsql-bugs/2004-05/msg00132.php
of a crash after printing "authentication file token too long, skipping",
since I was able to duplicate that message (though not a crash) on a
platform where stdio doesn't refuse to read directories. We never got
far in investigating that problem, but now I'm suspicious that the trigger
condition was an @ in the flat password file.
Back-patch to all active branches since the problem can be demonstrated in all
branches except HEAD. The test case, creating a user named "@", doesn't cause
a problem in HEAD since we got rid of the flat password file. Nonetheless it
seems like a good idea to not consider quoted @ as a file inclusion spec,
so I changed HEAD too.
set ferror() but never set feof(). This is known to be the case for recent
glibc when trying to read a directory as a file, and might be true for other
platforms/cases too. Per report from Ed L. (There is more that we ought to
do about his report, but this is one easily identifiable issue.)
how often we do SSL session key renegotiation. Can be set to
0 to disable renegotiation completely, which is required if
a broken SSL library is used (broken patches to CVE-2009-3555
a known cause) or when using a client library that can't do
renegotiation.
and use this in pq_getbyte_if_available.
It's only a limited implementation which swithes the whole emulation layer
no non-blocking mode, but that's enough as long as non-blocking is only
used during a short period of time, and only one socket is accessed during
this time.
The purpose of this change is to eliminate the need for every caller
of SearchSysCache, SearchSysCacheCopy, SearchSysCacheExists,
GetSysCacheOid, and SearchSysCacheList to know the maximum number
of allowable keys for a syscache entry (currently 4). This will
make it far easier to increase the maximum number of keys in a
future release should we choose to do so, and it makes the code
shorter, too.
Design and review by Tom Lane.
These files have apparently been edited over the years by a dozen people
with as many different editor settings, which made the alignment of the
paragraphs quite inconsistent and ugly. I made a pass of M-q with Emacs
to straighten it out.
This includes two new kinds of postmaster processes, walsenders and
walreceiver. Walreceiver is responsible for connecting to the primary server
and streaming WAL to disk, while walsender runs in the primary server and
streams WAL from disk to the client.
Documentation still needs work, but the basics are there. We will probably
pull the replication section to a new chapter later on, as well as the
sections describing file-based replication. But let's do that as a separate
patch, so that it's easier to see what has been added/changed. This patch
also adds a new section to the chapter about FE/BE protocol, documenting the
protocol used by walsender/walreceivxer.
Bump catalog version because of two new functions,
pg_last_xlog_receive_location() and pg_last_xlog_replay_location(), for
monitoring the progress of replication.
Fujii Masao, with additional hacking by me
This silences some warnings on Win64. Not using the proper SOCKET datatype
was actually wrong on Win32 as well, but didn't cause any warnings there.
Also create define PGINVALID_SOCKET to indicate an invalid/non-existing
socket, instead of using a hardcoded -1 value.
we're not going to support that anymore.
I did keep the 64-bit-CRC-with-32-bit-arithmetic code, since it has a
performance excuse to live. It's a bit moot since that's all ifdef'd
out, of course.
at least in some Windows versions, these functions are capable of returning
a failure indication without setting errno. That puts us into an infinite
loop if the previous value happened to be EINTR. Per report from Brendan
Hill.
Back-patch to 8.2. We could take it further back, but since this is only
known to be an issue on Windows and we don't support Windows before 8.2,
it does not seem worth the trouble.
does a search for the user in the directory first, and then binds with
the DN found for this user.
This allows for LDAP logins in scenarios where the DN of the user cannot
be determined simply by prefix and suffix, such as the case where different
users are located in different containers.
The old way of authentication can be significantly faster, so it's kept
as an option.
Robert Fleming and Magnus Hagander
attacks where an attacker would put <attack>\0<propername> in the field and
trick the validation code that the certificate was for <attack>.
This is a very low risk attack since it reuqires the attacker to trick the
CA into issuing a certificate with an incorrect field, and the common
PostgreSQL deployments are with private CAs, and not external ones. Also,
default mode in 8.4 does not do any name validation, and is thus also not
vulnerable - but the higher security modes are.
Backpatch all the way. Even though versions 8.3.x and before didn't have
certificate name validation support, they still exposed this field for
the user to perform the validation in the application code, and there
is no way to detect this problem through that API.
Security: CVE-2009-4034
pam_message array contains exactly one PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF message.
Instead, deal with however many messages there are, and don't throw error
for PAM_ERROR_MSG and PAM_TEXT_INFO messages. This logic is borrowed from
openssh 5.2p1, which hopefully has seen more real-world PAM usage than we
have. Per bug #5121 from Ryan Douglas, which turned out to be caused by
the conv_proc being called with zero messages. Apparently that is normal
behavior given the combination of Linux pam_krb5 with MS Active Directory
as the domain controller.
Patch all the way back, since this code has been essentially untouched
since 7.4. (Surprising we've not heard complaints before.)
and SSPI athentication methods. While the old 2000 byte limit was more than
enough for Unix Kerberos implementations, tickets issued by Windows Domain
Controllers can be much larger.
Ian Turner
large number of SIGHUP cycles, these would have run the postmaster out
of memory. Noted while testing memory-leak scenario in postgresql.conf
configuration-change-printing patch.
Magnus Hagander
Tom Lane
Robert Haas
Bruce Momjian
Peter Eisentraut
Simon Riggs
Heikki Linnakangas
Itagaki Takahiro