The annotation for "ERROR: language "foo" is not trusted" used to say
"HINT: Only superusers can use untrusted languages", which was fairly
poorly thought out. For one thing, it's not a hint about what to do,
but a statement of fact, which makes it errdetail. But also, this
fails to clarify things much, because there's a missing step in the
chain of reasoning. I think it's more useful to say "GRANT and REVOKE
are not allowed on untrusted languages, because only superusers can use
untrusted languages".
It's been like this for a long time, but given the lack of previous
complaints, I don't think this is worth back-patching.
Discussion: <1417.1466289901@sss.pgh.pa.us>
pg_type_aclmask reported the wrong type's OID when complaining that
it could not find a type's typelem. It also failed to provide a
suitable errcode when the initially given OID doesn't exist (which
is a user-facing error, since that OID can be user-specified).
pg_foreign_data_wrapper_aclmask and pg_foreign_server_aclmask likewise
lacked errcode specifications. Trivial cosmetic adjustments too.
The wrong-type-OID problem was reported by Petru-Florin Mihancea in
bug #14186; the other issues noted by me while reading the code.
These errors all seem to be aboriginal in the respective routines, so
back-patch as necessary.
Report: <20160613163159.5798.52928@wrigleys.postgresql.org>
Default roles really should be like regular roles, for the most part.
This removes a number of checks that were trying to make default roles
extra special by not allowing them to be used as regular roles.
We still prevent users from creating roles in the "pg_" namespace or
from altering roles which exist in that namespace via ALTER ROLE, as
we can't preserve such changes, but otherwise the roles are very much
like regular roles.
Based on discussion with Robert and Tom.
For reasons of sheer brain fade, we (I) was calling systable_endscan()
immediately after systable_getnext() and expecting the tuple returned
by systable_getnext() to still be valid.
That's clearly wrong. Move the systable_endscan() down below the tuple
usage.
Discovered initially by Pavel Stehule and then also by Alvaro.
Add a regression test based on Alvaro's testing.
This will prevent users from creating roles which begin with "pg_" and
will check for those roles before allowing an upgrade using pg_upgrade.
This will allow for default roles to be provided at initdb time.
Reviews by José Luis Tallón and Robert Haas
Now that all of the infrastructure exists, add in the ability to
dump out the ACLs of the objects inside of pg_catalog or the ACLs
for objects which are members of extensions, but only if they have
been changed from their original values.
The original values are tracked in pg_init_privs. When pg_dump'ing
9.6-and-above databases, we will dump out the ACLs for all objects
in pg_catalog and the ACLs for all extension members, where the ACL
has been changed from the original value which was set during either
initdb or CREATE EXTENSION.
This should not change dumps against pre-9.6 databases.
Reviews by Alexander Korotkov, Jose Luis Tallon
This new catalog holds the privileges which the system was
initialized with at initdb time, along with any permissions set
by extensions at CREATE EXTENSION time. This allows pg_dump
(and any other similar use-cases) to detect when the privileges
set on initdb-created or extension-created objects have been
changed from what they were set to at initdb/extension-creation
time and handle those changes appropriately.
Reviews by Alexander Korotkov, Jose Luis Tallon
This feature lets user code inspect and take action on DDL events.
Whenever a ddl_command_end event trigger is installed, DDL actions
executed are saved to a list which can be inspected during execution of
a function attached to ddl_command_end.
The set-returning function pg_event_trigger_ddl_commands can be used to
list actions so captured; it returns data about the type of command
executed, as well as the affected object. This is sufficient for many
uses of this feature. For the cases where it is not, we also provide a
"command" column of a new pseudo-type pg_ddl_command, which is a
pointer to a C structure that can be accessed by C code. The struct
contains all the info necessary to completely inspect and even
reconstruct the executed command.
There is no actual deparse code here; that's expected to come later.
What we have is enough infrastructure that the deparsing can be done in
an external extension. The intention is that we will add some deparsing
code in a later release, as an in-core extension.
A new test module is included. It's probably insufficient as is, but it
should be sufficient as a starting point for a more complete and
future-proof approach.
Authors: Álvaro Herrera, with some help from Andres Freund, Ian Barwick,
Abhijit Menon-Sen.
Reviews by Andres Freund, Robert Haas, Amit Kapila, Michael Paquier,
Craig Ringer, David Steele.
Additional input from Chris Browne, Dimitri Fontaine, Stephen Frost,
Petr Jelínek, Tom Lane, Jim Nasby, Steven Singer, Pavel Stěhule.
Based on original work by Dimitri Fontaine, though I didn't use his
code.
Discussion:
https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/m2txrsdzxa.fsf@2ndQuadrant.frhttps://www.postgresql.org/message-id/20131108153322.GU5809@eldon.alvh.no-ip.orghttps://www.postgresql.org/message-id/20150215044814.GL3391@alvh.no-ip.org
ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES was trying to decode the list of roles in the
FOR clause as a list of names rather than of RoleSpecs; and the IN
clause in CREATE ROLE was doing the same thing. This was evidenced by
crashes on some buildfarm machines, though on my platform this doesn't
cause a failure by mere chance; I can reproduce the failures only by
adding some padding in struct RoleSpecs.
Fix by dereferencing those lists as being of RoleSpecs, not string
Values.
Commands such as ALTER USER, ALTER GROUP, ALTER ROLE, GRANT, and the
various ALTER OBJECT / OWNER TO, as well as ad-hoc clauses related to
roles such as the AUTHORIZATION clause of CREATE SCHEMA, the FOR clause
of CREATE USER MAPPING, and the FOR ROLE clause of ALTER DEFAULT
PRIVILEGES can now take the keywords CURRENT_USER and SESSION_USER as
user specifiers in place of an explicit user name.
This commit also fixes some quite ugly handling of special standards-
mandated syntax in CREATE USER MAPPING, which in particular would fail
to work in presence of a role named "current_user".
The special role specifiers PUBLIC and NONE also have more consistent
handling now.
Also take the opportunity to add location tracking to user specifiers.
Authors: Kyotaro Horiguchi. Heavily reworked by Álvaro Herrera.
Reviewed by: Rushabh Lathia, Adam Brightwell, Marti Raudsepp.
This role attribute is an ancient PostgreSQL feature, but could only be
set by directly updating the system catalogs, and it doesn't have any
clearly defined use.
Author: Adam Brightwell <adam.brightwell@crunchydatasolutions.com>
This reverts commit 1826987a46.
The overall design was deemed unacceptable, in discussion following the
previous commit message; we might find some parts of it still
salvageable, but I don't want to be on the hook for fixing it, so let's
wait until we have a new patch.
The previous representation using a boolean column for each attribute
would not scale as well as we want to add further attributes.
Extra auxilliary functions are added to go along with this change, to
make up for the lost convenience of access of the old representation.
Catalog version bumped due to change in catalogs and the new functions.
Author: Adam Brightwell, minor tweaks by Álvaro
Reviewed by: Stephen Frost, Andres Freund, Álvaro Herrera
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
Although user-defined relations can't be directly created in
pg_catalog, it's possible for them to end up there, because you can
create them in some other schema and then use ALTER TABLE .. SET SCHEMA
to move them there. Previously, such relations couldn't afterwards
be manipulated, because IsSystemRelation()/IsSystemClass() rejected
all attempts to modify objects in the pg_catalog schema, regardless
of their origin. With this patch, they now reject only those
objects in pg_catalog which were created at initdb-time, allowing
most operations on user-created tables in pg_catalog to proceed
normally.
This patch also adds new functions IsCatalogRelation() and
IsCatalogClass(), which is similar to IsSystemRelation() and
IsSystemClass() but with a slightly narrower definition: only TOAST
tables of system catalogs are included, rather than *all* TOAST tables.
This is currently used only for making decisions about when
invalidation messages need to be sent, but upcoming logical decoding
patches will find other uses for this information.
Andres Freund, with some modifications by me.
SnapshotNow scans have the undesirable property that, in the face of
concurrent updates, the scan can fail to see either the old or the new
versions of the row. In many cases, we work around this by requiring
DDL operations to hold AccessExclusiveLock on the object being
modified; in some cases, the existing locking is inadequate and random
failures occur as a result. This commit doesn't change anything
related to locking, but will hopefully pave the way to allowing lock
strength reductions in the future.
The major issue has held us back from making this change in the past
is that taking an MVCC snapshot is significantly more expensive than
using a static special snapshot such as SnapshotNow. However, testing
of various worst-case scenarios reveals that this problem is not
severe except under fairly extreme workloads. To mitigate those
problems, we avoid retaking the MVCC snapshot for each new scan;
instead, we take a new snapshot only when invalidation messages have
been processed. The catcache machinery already requires that
invalidation messages be sent before releasing the related heavyweight
lock; else other backends might rely on locally-cached data rather
than scanning the catalog at all. Thus, making snapshot reuse
dependent on the same guarantees shouldn't break anything that wasn't
already subtly broken.
Patch by me. Review by Michael Paquier and Andres Freund.
Per discussion, this restriction isn't needed for any real security reason,
and it seems to confuse people more often than it helps them. It could
also result in some database states being unrestorable. So just drop it.
Back-patch to 9.0, where ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES was introduced.
A materialized view has a rule just like a view and a heap and
other physical properties like a table. The rule is only used to
populate the table, references in queries refer to the
materialized data.
This is a minimal implementation, but should still be useful in
many cases. Currently data is only populated "on demand" by the
CREATE MATERIALIZED VIEW and REFRESH MATERIALIZED VIEW statements.
It is expected that future releases will add incremental updates
with various timings, and that a more refined concept of defining
what is "fresh" data will be developed. At some point it may even
be possible to have queries use a materialized in place of
references to underlying tables, but that requires the other
above-mentioned features to be working first.
Much of the documentation work by Robert Haas.
Review by Noah Misch, Thom Brown, Robert Haas, Marko Tiikkaja
Security review by KaiGai Kohei, with a decision on how best to
implement sepgsql still pending.
Previously, CREATE TABLE IF EXIST threw an error if the schema was
nonexistent. This was done by passing 'missing_ok' to the function that
looks up the schema oid.
Commit 729205571e added privileges on data
types, but there were a number of oversights. The implementation of
default privileges for types missed a few places, and pg_dump was
utterly innocent of the whole concept. Per bug #7741 from Nathan Alden,
and subsequent wider investigation.
This reduces unnecessary exposure of other headers through htup.h, which
is very widely included by many files.
I have chosen to move the function prototypes to the new file as well,
because that means htup.h no longer needs to include tupdesc.h. In
itself this doesn't have much effect in indirect inclusion of tupdesc.h
throughout the tree, because it's also required by execnodes.h; but it's
something to explore in the future, and it seemed best to do the htup.h
change now while I'm busy with it.
They don't actually do anything yet; that will get fixed in a
follow-on commit. But this gets the basic infrastructure in place,
including CREATE/ALTER/DROP EVENT TRIGGER; support for COMMENT,
SECURITY LABEL, and ALTER EXTENSION .. ADD/DROP EVENT TRIGGER;
pg_dump and psql support; and documentation for the anticipated
initial feature set.
Dimitri Fontaine, with review and a bunch of additional hacking by me.
Thom Brown extensively reviewed earlier versions of this patch set,
but there's not a whole lot of that code left in this commit, as it
turns out.
Because permissions are assigned to element types, not array types,
complaining about permission denied on an array type would be
misleading to users. So adjust the reporting to refer to the element
type instead.
In order not to duplicate the required logic in two dozen places,
refactor the permission denied reporting for types a bit.
pointed out by Yeb Havinga during the review of the type privilege
feature
This doesn't do anything useful just yet, but is intended as supporting
infrastructure for allowing sepgsql to sensibly check DROP permissions.
KaiGai Kohei and Robert Haas
This adds support for the more or less SQL-conforming USAGE privilege
on types and domains. The intent is to be able restrict which users
can create dependencies on types, which restricts the way in which
owners can alter types.
reviewed by Yeb Havinga
In the previous coding, callers were faced with an awkward choice:
look up the name, do permissions checks, and then lock the table; or
look up the name, lock the table, and then do permissions checks.
The first choice was wrong because the results of the name lookup
and permissions checks might be out-of-date by the time the table
lock was acquired, while the second allowed a user with no privileges
to interfere with access to a table by users who do have privileges
(e.g. if a malicious backend queues up for an AccessExclusiveLock on
a table on which AccessShareLock is already held, further attempts
to access the table will be blocked until the AccessExclusiveLock
is obtained and the malicious backend's transaction rolls back).
To fix, allow callers of RangeVarGetRelid() to pass a callback which
gets executed after performing the name lookup but before acquiring
the relation lock. If the name lookup is retried (because
invalidation messages are received), the callback will be re-executed
as well, so we get the best of both worlds. RangeVarGetRelid() is
renamed to RangeVarGetRelidExtended(); callers not wishing to supply
a callback can continue to invoke it as RangeVarGetRelid(), which is
now a macro. Since the only one caller that uses nowait = true now
passes a callback anyway, the RangeVarGetRelid() macro defaults nowait
as well. The callback can also be used for supplemental locking - for
example, REINDEX INDEX needs to acquire the table lock before the index
lock to reduce deadlock possibilities.
There's a lot more work to be done here to fix all the cases where this
can be a problem, but this commit provides the general infrastructure
and fixes the following specific cases: REINDEX INDEX, REINDEX TABLE,
LOCK TABLE, and and DROP TABLE/INDEX/SEQUENCE/VIEW/FOREIGN TABLE.
Per discussion with Noah Misch and Alvaro Herrera.
In the previous coding, we would look up a relation in RangeVarGetRelid,
lock the resulting OID, and then AcceptInvalidationMessages(). While
this was sufficient to ensure that we noticed any changes to the
relation definition before building the relcache entry, it didn't
handle the possibility that the name we looked up no longer referenced
the same OID. This was particularly problematic in the case where a
table had been dropped and recreated: we'd latch on to the entry for
the old relation and fail later on. Now, we acquire the relation lock
inside RangeVarGetRelid, and retry the name lookup if we notice that
invalidation messages have been processed meanwhile. Many operations
that would previously have failed with an error in the presence of
concurrent DDL will now succeed.
There is a good deal of work remaining to be done here: many callers
of RangeVarGetRelid still pass NoLock for one reason or another. In
addition, nothing in this patch guards against the possibility that
the meaning of an unqualified name might change due to the creation
of a relation in a schema earlier in the user's search path than the
one where it was previously found. Furthermore, there's nothing at
all here to guard against similar race conditions for non-relations.
For all that, it's a start.
Noah Misch and Robert Haas
Instead, foreign tables are treated just like views: permissions can
be granted using GRANT privilege ON [TABLE] foreign_table_name TO role,
and revoked similarly. GRANT/REVOKE .. FOREIGN TABLE is no longer
supported, just as we don't support GRANT/REVOKE .. VIEW. The set of
accepted permissions for foreign tables is now identical to the set for
regular tables, and views.
Per report from Thom Brown, and subsequent discussion.
This mostly involves making it work with the objectaddress.c framework,
which does most of the heavy lifting. In that vein, change
GetForeignDataWrapperOidByName to get_foreign_data_wrapper_oid and
GetForeignServerOidByName to get_foreign_server_oid, to match the
pattern we use for other object types.
Robert Haas and Shigeru Hanada
Formerly, any member of a role could change the role's comment, as of
course could superusers; but holders of CREATEROLE privilege could not,
unless they were also members. This led to the odd situation that a
CREATEROLE holder could create a role but then could not comment on it.
It also seems a bit dubious to let an unprivileged user change his own
comment, let alone those of group roles he belongs to. So, change the
rule to be "you must be superuser to comment on a superuser role, or
hold CREATEROLE to comment on non-superuser roles". This is the same
as the privilege check for creating/dropping roles, and thus fits much
better with the rule for other object types, namely that only the owner
of an object can comment on it.
In passing, clean up the documentation for COMMENT a little bit.
Per complaint from Owen Jacobson and subsequent discussion.
Remove the unconditional superuser permissions check in CREATE EXTENSION,
and instead define a "superuser" extension property, which when false
(not the default) skips the superuser permissions check. In this case
the calling user only needs enough permissions to execute the commands
in the extension's installation script. The superuser property is also
enforced in the same way for ALTER EXTENSION UPDATE cases.
In other ALTER EXTENSION cases and DROP EXTENSION, test ownership of
the extension rather than superuserness. ALTER EXTENSION ADD/DROP needs
to insist on ownership of the target object as well; to do that without
duplicating code, refactor comment.c's big switch for permissions checks
into a separate function in objectaddress.c.
I also removed the superuserness checks in pg_available_extensions and
related functions; there's no strong reason why everybody shouldn't
be able to see that info.
Also invent an IF NOT EXISTS variant of CREATE EXTENSION, and use that
in pg_dump, so that dumps won't fail for installed-by-default extensions.
We don't have any of those yet, but we will soon.
This is all per discussion of wrapping the standard procedural languages
into extensions. I'll make those changes in a separate commit; this is
just putting the core infrastructure in place.
- collowner field
- CREATE COLLATION
- ALTER COLLATION
- DROP COLLATION
- COMMENT ON COLLATION
- integration with extensions
- pg_dump support for the above
- dependency management
- psql tab completion
- psql \dO command
Foreign tables are a core component of SQL/MED. This commit does
not provide a working SQL/MED infrastructure, because foreign tables
cannot yet be queried. Support for foreign table scans will need to
be added in a future patch. However, this patch creates the necessary
system catalog structure, syntax support, and support for ancillary
operations such as COMMENT and SECURITY LABEL.
Shigeru Hanada, heavily revised by Robert Haas
belonging to a user at DROP OWNED BY. Foreign data wrappers and servers
don't do anything useful yet, which is why no-one has noticed, but since we
have them, seems prudent to fix this. Per report from Chetan Suttraway.
Backpatch to 9.0, 8.4 has the same problem but this patch didn't apply
there so I'm not going to bother.
Tom Lane
Stephen Frost
Bruce Momjian
Alvaro Herrera
Peter Eisentraut
Robert Haas
Noah Misch
Kevin Grittner
Heikki Linnakangas
Magnus Hagander