Commit Graph

5 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Heikki Linnakangas d981074c24 Misc SCRAM code cleanups.
* Move computation of SaltedPassword to a separate function from
  scram_ClientOrServerKey(). This saves a lot of cycles in libpq, by
  computing SaltedPassword only once per authentication. (Computing
  SaltedPassword is expensive by design.)

* Split scram_ClientOrServerKey() into two functions. Improves
  readability, by making the calling code less verbose.

* Rename "server proof" to "server signature", to better match the
  nomenclature used in RFC 5802.

* Rename SCRAM_SALT_LEN to SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN, to make it more clear
  that the salt can be of any length, and the constant only specifies how
  long a salt we use when we generate a new verifier. Also rename
  SCRAM_ITERATIONS_DEFAULT to SCRAM_DEFAULT_ITERATIONS, for consistency.

These things caught my eye while working on other upcoming changes.
2017-04-28 15:22:38 +03:00
Heikki Linnakangas 60f11b87a2 Use SASLprep to normalize passwords for SCRAM authentication.
An important step of SASLprep normalization, is to convert the string to
Unicode normalization form NFKC. Unicode normalization requires a fairly
large table of character decompositions, which is generated from data
published by the Unicode consortium. The script to generate the table is
put in src/common/unicode, as well test code for the normalization.
A pre-generated version of the tables is included in src/include/common,
so you don't need the code in src/common/unicode to build PostgreSQL, only
if you wish to modify the normalization tables.

The SASLprep implementation depends on the UTF-8 functions from
src/backend/utils/mb/wchar.c. So to use it, you must also compile and link
that. That doesn't change anything for the current users of these
functions, the backend and libpq, as they both already link with wchar.o.
It would be good to move those functions into a separate file in
src/commmon, but I'll leave that for another day.

No documentation changes included, because there is no details on the
SCRAM mechanism in the docs anyway. An overview on that in the protocol
specification would probably be good, even though SCRAM is documented in
detail in RFC5802. I'll write that as a separate patch. An important thing
to mention there is that we apply SASLprep even on invalid UTF-8 strings,
to support other encodings.

Patch by Michael Paquier and me.

Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqSByyEmAVLtEf1KxTRh=PWNKiWKEKQR=e1yGehz=wbymQ@mail.gmail.com
2017-04-07 14:56:05 +03:00
Heikki Linnakangas 95c1dbcdff A collection of small fixes for the SCRAM patch.
* Add required #includes for htonl. Per buildfarm members pademelon/gaur.

* Remove unnecessary "#include <utils/memutils>".

* Fix checking for empty string in pg_SASL_init. (Reported by Peter
  Eisentraut and his compiler)

* Move code in pg_SASL_init to match the recent changes (commit ba005f193d)
  to pg_fe_sendauth() function, where it's copied from.

* Return value of malloc() was not checked for NULL in
  scram_SaltedPassword(). Fix by avoiding the malloc().
2017-03-07 19:00:22 +02:00
Heikki Linnakangas 55acfcbffd Fix comments in SCRAM-SHA-256 patch.
Amit Kapila.
2017-03-07 15:24:27 +02:00
Heikki Linnakangas 818fd4a67d Support SCRAM-SHA-256 authentication (RFC 5802 and 7677).
This introduces a new generic SASL authentication method, similar to the
GSS and SSPI methods. The server first tells the client which SASL
authentication mechanism to use, and then the mechanism-specific SASL
messages are exchanged in AuthenticationSASLcontinue and PasswordMessage
messages. Only SCRAM-SHA-256 is supported at the moment, but this allows
adding more SASL mechanisms in the future, without changing the overall
protocol.

Support for channel binding, aka SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS is left for later.

The SASLPrep algorithm, for pre-processing the password, is not yet
implemented. That could cause trouble, if you use a password with
non-ASCII characters, and a client library that does implement SASLprep.
That will hopefully be added later.

Authorization identities, as specified in the SCRAM-SHA-256 specification,
are ignored. SET SESSION AUTHORIZATION provides more or less the same
functionality, anyway.

If a user doesn't exist, perform a "mock" authentication, by constructing
an authentic-looking challenge on the fly. The challenge is derived from
a new system-wide random value, "mock authentication nonce", which is
created at initdb, and stored in the control file. We go through these
motions, in order to not give away the information on whether the user
exists, to unauthenticated users.

Bumps PG_CONTROL_VERSION, because of the new field in control file.

Patch by Michael Paquier and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed at different
stages by Robert Haas, Stephen Frost, David Steele, Aleksander Alekseev,
and many others.

Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqRbR3GmFYdedCAhzukfKrgBLTLtMvENOmPrVWREsZkF8g%40mail.gmail.com
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqSMXU35g%3DW9X74HVeQp0uvgJxvYOuA4A-A3M%2B0wfEBv-w%40mail.gmail.com
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/55192AFE.6080106@iki.fi
2017-03-07 14:25:40 +02:00