Roles with MAINTAIN on a relation may run VACUUM, ANALYZE, REINDEX,
REFRESH MATERIALIZE VIEW, CLUSTER, and LOCK TABLE on the relation.
Roles with privileges of pg_maintain may run those same commands on
all relations.
This was previously committed for v16, but it was reverted in
commit 151c22deee due to concerns about search_path tricks that
could be used to escalate privileges to the table owner. Commits
2af07e2f74, 59825d1639, and c7ea3f4229 resolved these concerns by
restricting search_path when running maintenance commands.
Bumps catversion.
Reviewed-by: Jeff Davis
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20240305161235.GA3478007%40nathanxps13
Documentation says it cannot signal "a backend owned by a superuser".
On the contrary, it could signal background workers, including the
logical replication launcher. It could signal autovacuum workers and
the autovacuum launcher. Block all that. Signaling autovacuum workers
and those two launchers doesn't stall progress beyond what one could
achieve other ways. If a cluster uses a non-core extension with a
background worker that does not auto-restart, this could create a denial
of service with respect to that background worker. A background worker
with bugs in its code for responding to terminations or cancellations
could experience those bugs at a time the pg_signal_backend member
chooses. Back-patch to v11 (all supported versions).
Reviewed by Jelte Fennema-Nio. Reported by Hemanth Sandrana and
Mahendrakar Srinivasarao.
Security: CVE-2023-5870
ff9618e82a introduced has_partition_ancestor_privs(), which is used
to check whether a user has MAINTAIN on any partition ancestors.
This involves syscache lookups, and presently this function does
not take any relation locks, so it is likely subject to the same
kind of cache lookup failures that were fixed by 19de0ab23c.
To fix this problem, this commit partially reverts ff9618e82a.
Specifically, it removes the partition-related changes, including
the has_partition_ancestor_privs() function mentioned above. This
means that MAINTAIN on a partitioned table is no longer sufficient
to perform maintenance commands on its partitions. This is more
like how privileges for maintenance commands work on supported
versions. Privileges are checked for each partition, so a command
that flows down to all partitions might refuse to process them
(e.g., if the current user doesn't have MAINTAIN on the partition).
In passing, adjust a few related comments and error messages, and
add a test for the privilege checks for CLUSTER on a partitioned
table.
Reviewed-by: Michael Paquier, Jeff Davis
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20230613211246.GA219055%40nathanxps13
While executing maintenance operations (ANALYZE, CLUSTER, REFRESH
MATERIALIZED VIEW, REINDEX, or VACUUM), set search_path to
'pg_catalog, pg_temp' to prevent inconsistent behavior.
Functions that are used for functional indexes, in index expressions,
or in materialized views and depend on a different search path must be
declared with CREATE FUNCTION ... SET search_path='...'.
This change addresses a security risk introduced in commit 60684dd834,
where a role with MAINTAIN privileges on a table may be able to
escalate privileges to the table owner. That commit is not yet part of
any release, so no need to backpatch.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/e44327179e5c9015c8dda67351c04da552066017.camel%40j-davis.com
Reviewed-by: Greg Stark
Reviewed-by: Nathan Bossart
Mainly move some detail from errmsg to errdetail, remove explicit
mention of superuser where appropriate, since that is implied in most
permission checks, and make messages more uniform.
Author: Nathan Bossart <nathandbossart@gmail.com>
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/20230316234701.GA903298@nathanxps13
pg_input_error_info() is now a SQL function able to return a row with
more than just the error message generated for incorrect data type
inputs when these are able to handle soft failures, returning more
contents of ErrorData, as of:
- The error message (same as before).
- The error detail, if set.
- The error hint, if set.
- SQL error code.
All the regression tests that relied on pg_input_error_message() are
updated to reflect the effects of the rename.
Per discussion with Tom Lane and Andrew Dunstan.
Author: Nathan Bossart
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/139a68e1-bd1f-a9a7-b5fe-0be9845c6311@dunslane.net
The prior behavior was confusing and hard to document. For instance,
if you had UPDATE privileges, you could lock a table in any lock mode
except ACCESS SHARE mode.
Now, if granted a privilege to lock at a given mode, one also has
privileges to lock at a less-conflicting mode. MAINTAIN, UPDATE,
DELETE, and TRUNCATE privileges allow any lock mode. INSERT privileges
allow ROW EXCLUSIVE (or below). SELECT privileges allow ACCESS SHARE.
Reviewed-by: Nathan Bossart
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/9550c76535404a83156252b25a11babb4792ea1e.camel%40j-davis.com
Convert assorted internal-ish datatypes, namely aclitemin,
int2vectorin, oidin, oidvectorin, pg_lsn_in, pg_snapshot_in,
and tidin to the new style.
(Some others you might expect to find in this group, such as
cidin and xidin, need no changes because they never throw
errors at all. That seems a little cheesy ... but it is not in
the charter of this patch series to add new error conditions.)
Amul Sul, minor mods by me
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CAAJ_b97KeDWUdpTKGOaFYPv0OicjOu6EW+QYWj-Ywrgj_aEy1g@mail.gmail.com
This provides two new predefined roles: pg_vacuum_all_tables and
pg_analyze_all_tables. Roles which have been granted these roles can
perform vacuum or analyse respectively on any or all tables as if they
were a superuser. This removes the need to grant superuser privilege to
roles just so they can perform vacuum and/or analyze.
Nathan Bossart
Reviewed by: Bharath Rupireddy, Kyotaro Horiguchi, Stephen Frost, Robert
Haas, Mark Dilger, Tom Lane, Corey Huinker, David G. Johnston, Michael
Paquier.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20220722203735.GB3996698@nathanxps13
Currently a table can only be vacuumed or analyzed by its owner or
a superuser. This can now be extended to any user by means of an
appropriate GRANT.
Nathan Bossart
Reviewed by: Bharath Rupireddy, Kyotaro Horiguchi, Stephen Frost, Robert
Haas, Mark Dilger, Tom Lane, Corey Huinker, David G. Johnston, Michael
Paquier.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20220722203735.GB3996698@nathanxps13
Commit 3d14e171e dropped regress_roleoption_donor twice and
regress_roleoption_protagonist not at all. Leaving roles behind
after "make installcheck" is unfriendly in its own right, plus
it causes repeated runs of "make installcheck" to fail.
Similar to how the INHERIT option controls whether or not the
permissions of the granted role are automatically available to the
grantee, the new SET permission controls whether or not the grantee
may use the SET ROLE command to assume the privileges of the granted
role.
In addition, the new SET permission controls whether or not it
is possible to transfer ownership of objects to the target role
or to create new objects owned by the target role using commands
such as CREATE DATABASE .. OWNER. We could alternatively have made
this controlled by the INHERIT option, or allow it when either
option is given. An advantage of this approach is that if you
are granted a predefined role with INHERIT TRUE, SET FALSE, you
can't go and create objects owned by that role.
The underlying theory here is that the ability to create objects
as a target role is not a privilege per se, and thus does not
depend on whether you inherit the target role's privileges. However,
it's surely something you could do anyway if you could SET ROLE
to the target role, and thus making it contingent on whether you
have that ability is reasonable.
Design review by Nathan Bossat, Wolfgang Walther, Jeff Davis,
Peter Eisentraut, and Stephen Frost.
Discussion: http://postgr.es/m/CA+Tgmob+zDSRS6JXYrgq0NWdzCXuTNzT5eK54Dn2hhgt17nm8A@mail.gmail.com
Commit e3ce2de09d rearranged this
function to be able to identify which inherited role had admin option
on the target role, but it got the order of operations wrong, causing
the function to return wrong answers in the presence of non-inherited
grants.
Fix that, and add a test case that verifies the correct behavior.
Patch by me, reviewed by Nathan Bossart
Discussion: http://postgr.es/m/CA+TgmoYamnu-xt-u7CqjYWnRiJ6BQaSpYOHXP=r4QGTfd1N_EA@mail.gmail.com
The GRANT statement can now specify WITH INHERIT TRUE or WITH
INHERIT FALSE to control whether the member inherits the granted
role's permissions. For symmetry, you can now likewise write
WITH ADMIN TRUE or WITH ADMIN FALSE to turn ADMIN OPTION on or off.
If a GRANT does not specify WITH INHERIT, the behavior based on
whether the member role is marked INHERIT or NOINHERIT. This means
that if all roles are marked INHERIT or NOINHERIT before any role
grants are performed, the behavior is identical to what we had before;
otherwise, it's different, because ALTER ROLE [NO]INHERIT now only
changes the default behavior of future grants, and has no effect on
existing ones.
Patch by me. Reviewed and testing by Nathan Bossart and Tushar Ahuja,
with design-level comments from various others.
Discussion: http://postgr.es/m/CA+Tgmoa5Sf4PiWrfxA=sGzDKg0Ojo3dADw=wAHOhR9dggV=RmQ@mail.gmail.com
Previously, membership of role A in role B could be recorded in the
catalog tables only once. This meant that a new grant of role A to
role B would overwrite the previous grant. For other object types, a
new grant of permission on an object - in this case role A - exists
along side the existing grant provided that the grantor is different.
Either grant can be revoked independently of the other, and
permissions remain so long as at least one grant remains. Make role
grants work similarly.
Previously, when granting membership in a role, the superuser could
specify any role whatsoever as the grantor, but for other object types,
the grantor of record must be either the owner of the object, or a
role that currently has privileges to perform a similar GRANT.
Implement the same scheme for role grants, treating the bootstrap
superuser as the role owner since roles do not have owners. This means
that attempting to revoke a grant, or admin option on a grant, can now
fail if there are dependent privileges, and that CASCADE can be used
to revoke these. It also means that you can't grant ADMIN OPTION on
a role back to a user who granted it directly or indirectly to you,
similar to how you can't give WITH GRANT OPTION on a privilege back
to a role which granted it directly or indirectly to you.
Previously, only the superuser could specify GRANTED BY with a user
other than the current user. Relax that rule to allow the grantor
to be any role whose privileges the current user posseses. This
doesn't improve compatibility with what we do for other object types,
where support for GRANTED BY is entirely vestigial, but it makes this
feature more usable and seems to make sense to change at the same time
we're changing related behaviors.
Along the way, fix "ALTER GROUP group_name ADD USER user_name" to
require the same privileges as "GRANT group_name TO user_name".
Previously, CREATEROLE privileges were sufficient for either, but
only the former form was permissible with ADMIN OPTION on the role.
Now, either CREATEROLE or ADMIN OPTION on the role suffices for
either spelling.
Patch by me, reviewed by Stephen Frost.
Discussion: http://postgr.es/m/CA+TgmoaFr-RZeQ+WoQ5nKPv97oT9+aDgK_a5+qWHSgbDsMp1Vg@mail.gmail.com
Previously, "GRANT foo TO bar" or "GRANT foo TO bar GRANTED BY baz"
would record the OID of the grantor in pg_auth_members.grantor, but
that role could later be dropped without modifying or removing the
pg_auth_members record. That's not great, because we typically try
to avoid dangling references in catalog data.
Now, a role grant depends on the grantor, and the grantor can't be
dropped without removing the grant or changing the grantor. "DROP
OWNED BY" will remove the grant, just as it does for other kinds of
privileges. "REASSIGN OWNED BY" will not, again just like what we do
in other cases involving privileges.
pg_auth_members now has an OID column, because that is needed in order
for dependencies to work. It also now has an index on the grantor
column, because otherwise dropping a role would require a sequential
scan of the entire table to see whether the role's OID is in use as
a grantor. That probably wouldn't be too large a problem in practice,
but it seems better to have an index just in case.
A follow-on patch is planned with the goal of more thoroughly
rationalizing the behavior of role grants. This patch is just trying
to do enough to make sure that the data we store in the catalogs is at
some basic level valid.
Patch by me, reviewed by Stephen Frost
Discussion: http://postgr.es/m/CA+TgmoaFr-RZeQ+WoQ5nKPv97oT9+aDgK_a5+qWHSgbDsMp1Vg@mail.gmail.com
Interpret its privileges argument as a comma-separated list of
privilege names, as in has_table_privilege and other functions.
This is actually net less code, since the support routine to
parse that already exists, and we can drop convert_priv_string()
which had no other use-case.
Robins Tharakan
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/e5a05dc54ba64408b3dd260171c1abaf@EX13D05UWC001.ant.amazon.com
It intended to, but did not, achieve this. Adopt the new standard of
setting user ID just after locking the relation. Back-patch to v10 (all
supported versions).
Reviewed by Simon Riggs. Reported by Alvaro Herrera.
Security: CVE-2022-1552
When a feature enumerates relations and runs functions associated with
all found relations, the feature's user shall not need to trust every
user having permission to create objects. BRIN-specific functionality
in autovacuum neglected to account for this, as did pg_amcheck and
CLUSTER. An attacker having permission to create non-temp objects in at
least one schema could execute arbitrary SQL functions under the
identity of the bootstrap superuser. CREATE INDEX (not a
relation-enumerating operation) and REINDEX protected themselves too
late. This change extends to the non-enumerating amcheck interface.
Back-patch to v10 (all supported versions).
Sergey Shinderuk, reviewed (in earlier versions) by Alexander Lakhin.
Reported by Alexander Lakhin.
Security: CVE-2022-1552
Commit f9fd176461 effectively gave
every role ADMIN OPTION on itself. However, this appears to be
something that happened accidentally as a result of refactoring
work rather than an intentional decision. Almost a decade later,
it was discovered that this was a security vulnerability. As a
result, commit fea164a72a restricted
this implicit ADMIN OPTION privilege to be exercisable only when
the role being administered is the same as the session user and
when no security-restricted operation is in progress. That
commit also documented the existence of this implicit privilege
for what seems to be the first time.
The effect of the privilege is to allow a login role to grant
the privileges of that role, and optionally ADMIN OPTION on it,
to some other role. That's an unusual thing to do, because generally
membership is granted in roles used as groups, rather than roles
used as users. Therefore, it does not seem likely that removing
the privilege will break things for many PostgreSQL users.
However, it will make it easier to reason about the permissions
system. This is the only case where a user who has not been given any
special permission (superuser, or ADMIN OPTION on some role) can
modify role membership, so removing it makes things more consistent.
For example, if a superuser sets up role A and B and grants A to B
but no other privileges to anyone, she can now be sure that no one
else will be able to revoke that grant. Without this change, that
would have been true only if A was a non-login role.
Patch by me. Reviewed by Tom Lane and Stephen Frost.
Discussion: http://postgr.es/m/CA+Tgmoawdt03kbA+dNyBcNWJpRxu0f4X=69Y3+DkXXZqmwMDLg@mail.gmail.com
MERGE performs actions that modify rows in the target table using a
source table or query. MERGE provides a single SQL statement that can
conditionally INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE rows -- a task that would otherwise
require multiple PL statements. For example,
MERGE INTO target AS t
USING source AS s
ON t.tid = s.sid
WHEN MATCHED AND t.balance > s.delta THEN
UPDATE SET balance = t.balance - s.delta
WHEN MATCHED THEN
DELETE
WHEN NOT MATCHED AND s.delta > 0 THEN
INSERT VALUES (s.sid, s.delta)
WHEN NOT MATCHED THEN
DO NOTHING;
MERGE works with regular tables, partitioned tables and inheritance
hierarchies, including column and row security enforcement, as well as
support for row and statement triggers and transition tables therein.
MERGE is optimized for OLTP and is parameterizable, though also useful
for large scale ETL/ELT. MERGE is not intended to be used in preference
to existing single SQL commands for INSERT, UPDATE or DELETE since there
is some overhead. MERGE can be used from PL/pgSQL.
MERGE does not support targetting updatable views or foreign tables, and
RETURNING clauses are not allowed either. These limitations are likely
fixable with sufficient effort. Rewrite rules are also not supported,
but it's not clear that we'd want to support them.
Author: Pavan Deolasee <pavan.deolasee@gmail.com>
Author: Álvaro Herrera <alvherre@alvh.no-ip.org>
Author: Amit Langote <amitlangote09@gmail.com>
Author: Simon Riggs <simon.riggs@enterprisedb.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Eisentraut <peter.eisentraut@enterprisedb.com>
Reviewed-by: Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de> (earlier versions)
Reviewed-by: Peter Geoghegan <pg@bowt.ie> (earlier versions)
Reviewed-by: Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com> (earlier versions)
Reviewed-by: Japin Li <japinli@hotmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Justin Pryzby <pryzby@telsasoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Vondra <tomas.vondra@enterprisedb.com>
Reviewed-by: Zhihong Yu <zyu@yugabyte.com>
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CANP8+jKitBSrB7oTgT9CY2i1ObfOt36z0XMraQc+Xrz8QB0nXA@mail.gmail.com
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CAH2-WzkJdBuxj9PO=2QaO9-3h3xGbQPZ34kJH=HukRekwM-GZg@mail.gmail.com
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20201231134736.GA25392@alvherre.pgsql
The reverted commit attempted to fix SQL specification compliance for
the cases which 6aaaa76bb left. This however broke existing behavior
which takes precedence over spec compliance so revert. The introduced
tests are left after the revert since the codepath isn't well covered.
Per bug report 17346. Backpatch down to 14 where it was introduced.
Reported-by: Andrew Bille <andrewbille@gmail.com>
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/17346-f72b28bd1a341060@postgresql.org
Commit 6aaaa76bb added support for the GRANTED BY clause in GRANT and
REVOKE statements, but missed adding support for checking the role in
the REVOKE ROLE case. Fix by checking that the parsed role matches the
CURRENT_ROLE/CURRENT_USER requirement, and also add some tests for it.
Backpatch to v14 where GRANTED BY support was introduced.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/B7F6699A-A984-4943-B9BF-CEB84C003527@yesql.se
Backpatch-through: 14
Grant privileges on views pg_backend_memory_contexts and
pg_shmem_allocations to the role pg_read_all_stats. Also grant on the
underlying functions that those views depend on.
Author: Bharath Rupireddy <bharath.rupireddyforpostgres@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Nathan Bossart <bossartn@amazon.com>
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CALj2ACWAZo3Ar_EVsn2Zf9irG+hYK3cmh1KWhZS_Od45nd01RA@mail.gmail.com
Several queries in the privileges regression test cause the planner
to apply the plpgsql function "leak()" to every element of the
histogram for atest12.b. Since commit 0c882e52a increased the size
of that histogram to 10000 entries, the test invokes that function
over 100000 times, which takes an absolutely unreasonable amount of
time in clobber-cache-always mode.
However, there's no real reason why that has to be a plpgsql
function: for the purposes of this test, all that matters is that
it not be marked leakproof. So we can replace the plpgsql
implementation with a direct call of int4lt, which has the same
behavior and is orders of magnitude faster. This is expected to
cut several hours off the buildfarm cycle time for CCA animals.
It has some positive impact in normal builds too, though that's
probably lost in the noise.
Back-patch to v13 where 0c882e52a came in.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/575884.1620626638@sss.pgh.pa.us
Arrange to do some things on-demand, rather than immediately during
executor startup, because there's a fair chance of never having to do
them at all:
* Don't open result relations' indexes until needed.
* Don't initialize partition tuple routing, nor the child-to-root
tuple conversion map, until needed.
This wins in UPDATEs on partitioned tables when only some of the
partitions will actually receive updates; with larger partition
counts the savings is quite noticeable. Also, we can remove some
sketchy heuristics in ExecInitModifyTable about whether to set up
tuple routing.
Also, remove execPartition.c's private hash table tracking which
partitions were already opened by the ModifyTable node. Instead
use the hash added to ModifyTable itself by commit 86dc90056.
To allow lazy computation of the conversion maps, we now set
ri_RootResultRelInfo in all child ResultRelInfos. We formerly set it
only in some, not terribly well-defined, cases. This has user-visible
side effects in that now more error messages refer to the root
relation instead of some partition (and provide error data in the
root's column order, too). It looks to me like this is a strict
improvement in consistency, so I don't have a problem with the
output changes visible in this commit.
Extracted from a larger patch, which seemed to me to be too messy
to push in one commit.
Amit Langote, reviewed at different times by Heikki Linnakangas and
myself
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CA+HiwqG7ZruBmmih3wPsBZ4s0H2EhywrnXEduckY5Hr3fWzPWA@mail.gmail.com
A commonly requested use-case is to have a role who can run an
unfettered pg_dump without having to explicitly GRANT that user access
to all tables, schemas, et al, without that role being a superuser.
This address that by adding a "pg_read_all_data" role which implicitly
gives any member of this role SELECT rights on all tables, views and
sequences, and USAGE rights on all schemas.
As there may be cases where it's also useful to have a role who has
write access to all objects, pg_write_all_data is also introduced and
gives users implicit INSERT, UPDATE and DELETE rights on all tables,
views and sequences.
These roles can not be logged into directly but instead should be
GRANT'd to a role which is able to log in. As noted in the
documentation, if RLS is being used then an administrator may (or may
not) wish to set BYPASSRLS on the login role which these predefined
roles are GRANT'd to.
Reviewed-by: Georgios Kokolatos
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20200828003023.GU29590@tamriel.snowman.net
According to the comments, when an invalid or dropped column oid is passed
to has_column_privilege(), the intention has always been to return NULL.
However, when the caller had table level privilege the invalid/missing
column was never discovered, because table permissions were checked first.
Fix that by introducing extended versions of pg_attribute_acl(check|mask)
and pg_class_acl(check|mask) which take a new argument, is_missing. When
is_missing is NULL, the old behavior is preserved. But when is_missing is
passed by the caller, no ERROR is thrown for dropped or missing
columns/relations, and is_missing is flipped to true. This in turn allows
has_column_privilege to check for column privileges first, providing the
desired semantics.
Not backpatched since it is a user visible behavioral change with no previous
complaints, and the fix is a bit on the invasive side.
Author: Joe Conway
Reviewed-By: Tom Lane
Reported by: Ian Barwick
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/flat/9b5f4311-157b-4164-7fe7-077b4fe8ed84%40joeconway.com
Membership consists, implicitly, of the current database owner. Expect
use in template databases. Once pg_database_owner has rights within a
template, each owner of a database instantiated from that template will
exercise those rights.
Reviewed by John Naylor.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20201228043148.GA1053024@rfd.leadboat.com
scanNSItemForColumn, expandNSItemAttrs, and ExpandSingleTable would
pass the wrong RTE to markVarForSelectPriv when dealing with a join
ParseNamespaceItem: they'd pass the join RTE, when what we need to
mark is the base table that the join column came from. The end
result was to not fill the base table's selectedCols bitmap correctly,
resulting in an understatement of the set of columns that are read
by the query. The executor would still insist on there being at
least one selectable column; but with a correctly crafted query,
a user having SELECT privilege on just one column of a table would
nonetheless be allowed to read all its columns.
To fix, make markRTEForSelectPriv fetch the correct RTE for itself,
ignoring the possibly-mismatched RTE passed by the caller. Later,
we'll get rid of some now-unused RTE arguments, but that risks
API breaks so we won't do it in released branches.
This problem was introduced by commit 9ce77d75c, so back-patch
to v13 where that came in. Thanks to Sven Klemm for reporting
the problem.
Security: CVE-2021-20229
If a cross-partition UPDATE violates a constraint on the target partition,
and the columns in the new partition are in different physical order than
in the parent, the error message can reveal columns that the user does not
have SELECT permission on. A similar bug was fixed earlier in commit
804b6b6db4.
The cause of the bug is that the callers of the
ExecBuildSlotValueDescription() function got confused when constructing
the list of modified columns. If the tuple was routed from a parent, we
converted the tuple to the parent's format, but the list of modified
columns was grabbed directly from the child's RTE entry.
ExecUpdateLockMode() had a similar issue. That lead to confusion on which
columns are key columns, leading to wrong tuple lock being taken on tables
referenced by foreign keys, when a row is updated with INSERT ON CONFLICT
UPDATE. A new isolation test is added for that corner case.
With this patch, the ri_RangeTableIndex field is no longer set for
partitions that don't have an entry in the range table. Previously, it was
set to the RTE entry of the parent relation, but that was confusing.
NOTE: This modifies the ResultRelInfo struct, replacing the
ri_PartitionRoot field with ri_RootResultRelInfo. That's a bit risky to
backpatch, because it breaks any extensions accessing the field. The
change that ri_RangeTableIndex is not set for partitions could potentially
break extensions, too. The ResultRelInfos are visible to FDWs at least,
and this patch required small changes to postgres_fdw. Nevertheless, this
seem like the least bad option. I don't think these fields widely used in
extensions; I don't think there are FDWs out there that uses the FDW
"direct update" API, other than postgres_fdw. If there is, you will get a
compilation error, so hopefully it is caught quickly.
Backpatch to 11, where support for both cross-partition UPDATEs, and unique
indexes on partitioned tables, were added.
Reviewed-by: Amit Langote
Security: CVE-2021-3393
The SQL standard allows a GRANTED BY clause on GRANT and
REVOKE (privilege) statements that can specify CURRENT_USER or
CURRENT_ROLE. In PostgreSQL, both of these are the default behavior.
Since we already have all the parsing support for this for the
GRANT (role) statement, we might as well add basic support for this
for the privilege variant as well. This allows us to check off SQL
feature T332. In the future, perhaps more interesting things could be
done with this, too.
Reviewed-by: Simon Riggs <simon@2ndquadrant.com>
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/flat/f2feac44-b4c5-f38f-3699-2851d6a76dc9@2ndquadrant.com
DROP OWNED BY has a specific code path to remove ACLs stored in
pg_default_acl when cleaning up shared dependencies that had no
coverage with the existing tests. This issue has been found while
digging into the bug fixed by 21378e1.
As ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES impacts the ACLs of all objects created
while the default permissions are visible, the test uses a transaction
rollback to isolate the test and avoid any impact with other sessions
running in parallel.
Reviewed-by: Álvaro Herrera
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/YAbQ1OD+3ip4lRv8@paquier.xyz
Specifying duplicated objects in this command would lead to unique
constraint violations in pg_default_acl or "tuple already updated by
self" errors. Similarly to GRANT/REVOKE, increment the command ID after
each subcommand processing to allow this case to work transparently.
A regression test is added by tweaking one of the existing queries of
privileges.sql to stress this case.
Reported-by: Andrus
Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Álvaro Herrera
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/ae2a7dc1-9d71-8cba-3bb9-e4cb7eb1f44e@hot.ee
Backpatch-through: 9.5
This makes existing sessions reflect "ALTER ROLE ... [NO]INHERIT" as
quickly as they have been reflecting "GRANT role_name". Back-patch to
9.5 (all supported versions).
Reviewed by Nathan Bossart.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20201221095028.GB3777719@rfd.leadboat.com
Specifically, this blocks DECLARE ... WITH HOLD and firing of deferred
triggers within index expressions and materialized view queries. An
attacker having permission to create non-temp objects in at least one
schema could execute arbitrary SQL functions under the identity of the
bootstrap superuser. One can work around the vulnerability by disabling
autovacuum and not manually running ANALYZE, CLUSTER, REINDEX, CREATE
INDEX, VACUUM FULL, or REFRESH MATERIALIZED VIEW. (Don't restore from
pg_dump, since it runs some of those commands.) Plain VACUUM (without
FULL) is safe, and all commands are fine when a trusted user owns the
target object. Performance may degrade quickly under this workaround,
however. Back-patch to 9.5 (all supported versions).
Reviewed by Robert Haas. Reported by Etienne Stalmans.
Security: CVE-2020-25695
Commit 0c882e52a tried to force table atest12 to have more-accurate-
than-default statistics; but transiently setting default_statistics_target
isn't enough for that, because autovacuum could come along and overwrite
the stats later. This evidently explains some intermittent buildfarm
failures we've seen since then. Repair by disabling autovac on this table.
Thanks to David Rowley for correctly diagnosing the cause.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CA+hUKG+OUkQSOUTg=qo=S=fWa_tbm99i7rB7mfbHz1SYm4v-jQ@mail.gmail.com
ineq_histogram_selectivity() can be invoked in situations where the
ordering we care about is not that of the column's histogram. We could
be considering some other collation, or even more drastically, the
query operator might not agree at all with what was used to construct
the histogram. (We'll get here for anything using scalarineqsel-based
estimators, so that's quite likely to happen for extension operators.)
Up to now we just ignored this issue and assumed we were dealing with
an operator/collation whose sort order exactly matches the histogram,
possibly resulting in junk estimates if the binary search gets confused.
It's past time to improve that, since the use of nondefault collations
is increasing. What we can do is verify that the given operator and
collation match what's recorded in pg_statistic, and use the existing
code only if so. When they don't match, instead execute the operator
against each histogram entry, and take the fraction of successes as our
selectivity estimate. This gives an estimate that is probably good to
about 1/histogram_size, with no assumptions about ordering. (The quality
of the estimate is likely to degrade near the ends of the value range,
since the two orderings probably don't agree on what is an extremal value;
but this is surely going to be more reliable than what we did before.)
At some point we might further improve matters by storing more than one
histogram calculated according to different orderings. But this code
would still be good fallback logic when no matches exist, so that is
not an argument for not doing this.
While here, also improve get_variable_range() to deal more honestly
with non-default collations.
This isn't back-patchable, because it requires adding another argument
to ineq_histogram_selectivity, and because it might have significant
impact on the estimation results for extension operators relying on
scalarineqsel --- mostly for the better, one hopes, but in any case
destabilizing plan choices in back branches is best avoided.
Per investigation of a report from James Lucas.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CAAFmbbOvfi=wMM=3qRsPunBSLb8BFREno2oOzSBS=mzfLPKABw@mail.gmail.com
Previously, LOCK TABLE command through a parent table checked
the permissions on not only the parent table but also the children
tables inherited from it. This was a bug and inherited queries should
perform access permission checks on the parent table only. This
commit fixes LOCK TABLE so that it does not check the permission
on children tables.
This patch is applied only in the master branch. We decided not to
back-patch because it's not hard to imagine that there are some
applications expecting the old behavior and the change breaks their
security.
Author: Amit Langote
Reviewed-by: Fujii Masao
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CAHGQGwE+GauyG7POtRfRwwthAGwTjPQYdFHR97+LzA4RHGnJxA@mail.gmail.com
Previously, TRUNCATE command through a parent table checked the
permissions on not only the parent table but also the children tables
inherited from it. This was a bug and inherited queries should perform
access permission checks on the parent table only. This commit fixes
that bug.
Back-patch to all supported branches.
Author: Amit Langote
Reviewed-by: Fujii Masao
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CAHGQGwFHdSvifhJE+-GSNqUHSfbiKxaeQQ7HGcYz6SC2n_oDcg@mail.gmail.com
This gives more information to the user about the error and it makes such
messages consistent with the other similar messages in the code.
Reported-by: Simon Riggs
Author: Mahendra Singh and Simon Riggs
Reviewed-by: Beena Emerson and Amit Kapila
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CANP8+j+7YUvQvGxTrCiw77R23enMJ7DFmyA3buR+fa2pKs4XhA@mail.gmail.com
In examine_variable() and examine_simple_variable(), when checking the
user's table and column privileges to determine whether to grant
access to the pg_statistic data, use checkAsUser for the privilege
checks, if it's set. This will be the case if we're accessing the
table via a view, to indicate that we should perform privilege checks
as the view owner rather than the current user.
This change makes this planner check consistent with the check in the
executor, so the planner will be able to make use of statistics if the
table is accessible via the view. This fixes a performance regression
introduced by commit e2d4ef8de8, which affects queries against
non-security barrier views in the case where the user doesn't have
privileges on the underlying table, but the view owner does.
Note that it continues to provide the same safeguards controlling
access to pg_statistic for direct table access (in which case
checkAsUser won't be set) and for security barrier views, because of
the nearby checks on rte->security_barrier and rte->securityQuals.
Back-patch to all supported branches because e2d4ef8de8 was.
Dean Rasheed, reviewed by Jonathan Katz and Stephen Frost.
Now that the ordering of DROP messages ought to be stable everywhere,
we should not need these kluges of hiding DETAIL output just to avoid
unstable ordering. Hiding it's not great for test coverage, so
let's undo that where possible.
In a small number of places, it's necessary to leave it in, for
example because the output might include a variable pg_temp_nnn
schema name. I also left things alone in places where the details
would depend on other regression test scripts, e.g. plpython_drop.sql.
Perhaps buildfarm experience will show this to be a bad idea,
but if so I'd like to know why.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/E1h6eep-0001Mw-Vd@gemulon.postgresql.org
Previously tables declared WITH OIDS, including a significant fraction
of the catalog tables, stored the oid column not as a normal column,
but as part of the tuple header.
This special column was not shown by default, which was somewhat odd,
as it's often (consider e.g. pg_class.oid) one of the more important
parts of a row. Neither pg_dump nor COPY included the contents of the
oid column by default.
The fact that the oid column was not an ordinary column necessitated a
significant amount of special case code to support oid columns. That
already was painful for the existing, but upcoming work aiming to make
table storage pluggable, would have required expanding and duplicating
that "specialness" significantly.
WITH OIDS has been deprecated since 2005 (commit ff02d0a05280e0).
Remove it.
Removing includes:
- CREATE TABLE and ALTER TABLE syntax for declaring the table to be
WITH OIDS has been removed (WITH (oids[ = true]) will error out)
- pg_dump does not support dumping tables declared WITH OIDS and will
issue a warning when dumping one (and ignore the oid column).
- restoring an pg_dump archive with pg_restore will warn when
restoring a table with oid contents (and ignore the oid column)
- COPY will refuse to load binary dump that includes oids.
- pg_upgrade will error out when encountering tables declared WITH
OIDS, they have to be altered to remove the oid column first.
- Functionality to access the oid of the last inserted row (like
plpgsql's RESULT_OID, spi's SPI_lastoid, ...) has been removed.
The syntax for declaring a table WITHOUT OIDS (or WITH (oids = false)
for CREATE TABLE) is still supported. While that requires a bit of
support code, it seems unnecessary to break applications / dumps that
do not use oids, and are explicit about not using them.
The biggest user of WITH OID columns was postgres' catalog. This
commit changes all 'magic' oid columns to be columns that are normally
declared and stored. To reduce unnecessary query breakage all the
newly added columns are still named 'oid', even if a table's column
naming scheme would indicate 'reloid' or such. This obviously
requires adapting a lot code, mostly replacing oid access via
HeapTupleGetOid() with access to the underlying Form_pg_*->oid column.
The bootstrap process now assigns oids for all oid columns in
genbki.pl that do not have an explicit value (starting at the largest
oid previously used), only oids assigned later by oids will be above
FirstBootstrapObjectId. As the oid column now is a normal column the
special bootstrap syntax for oids has been removed.
Oids are not automatically assigned during insertion anymore, all
backend code explicitly assigns oids with GetNewOidWithIndex(). For
the rare case that insertions into the catalog via SQL are called for
the new pg_nextoid() function can be used (which only works on catalog
tables).
The fact that oid columns on system tables are now normal columns
means that they will be included in the set of columns expanded
by * (i.e. SELECT * FROM pg_class will now include the table's oid,
previously it did not). It'd not technically be hard to hide oid
column by default, but that'd mean confusing behavior would either
have to be carried forward forever, or it'd cause breakage down the
line.
While it's not unlikely that further adjustments are needed, the
scope/invasiveness of the patch makes it worthwhile to get merge this
now. It's painful to maintain externally, too complicated to commit
after the code code freeze, and a dependency of a number of other
patches.
Catversion bump, for obvious reasons.
Author: Andres Freund, with contributions by John Naylor
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20180930034810.ywp2c7awz7opzcfr@alap3.anarazel.de
This patch fixes several related cases in which pg_shdepend entries were
never made, or were lost, for references to roles appearing in the ACLs of
schemas and/or types. While that did no immediate harm, if a referenced
role were later dropped, the drop would be allowed and would leave a
dangling reference in the object's ACL. That still wasn't a big problem
for normal database usage, but it would cause obscure failures in
subsequent dump/reload or pg_upgrade attempts, taking the form of
attempts to grant privileges to all-numeric role names. (I think I've
seen field reports matching that symptom, but can't find any right now.)
Several cases are fixed here:
1. ALTER DOMAIN SET/DROP DEFAULT would lose the dependencies for any
existing ACL entries for the domain. This case is ancient, dating
back as far as we've had pg_shdepend tracking at all.
2. If a default type privilege applies, CREATE TYPE recorded the
ACL properly but forgot to install dependency entries for it.
This dates to the addition of default privileges for types in 9.2.
3. If a default schema privilege applies, CREATE SCHEMA recorded the
ACL properly but forgot to install dependency entries for it.
This dates to the addition of default privileges for schemas in v10
(commit ab89e465c).
Another somewhat-related problem is that when creating a relation
rowtype or implicit array type, TypeCreate would apply any available
default type privileges to that type, which we don't really want
since such an object isn't supposed to have privileges of its own.
(You can't, for example, drop such privileges once they've been added
to an array type.)
ab89e465c is also to blame for a race condition in the regression tests:
privileges.sql transiently installed globally-applicable default
privileges on schemas, which sometimes got absorbed into the ACLs of
schemas created by concurrent test scripts. This should have resulted
in failures when privileges.sql tried to drop the role holding such
privileges; but thanks to the bug fixed here, it instead led to dangling
ACLs in the final state of the regression database. We'd managed not to
notice that, but it became obvious in the wake of commit da906766c, which
allowed the race condition to occur in pg_upgrade tests.
To fix, add a function recordDependencyOnNewAcl to encapsulate what
callers of get_user_default_acl need to do; while the original call
sites got that right via ad-hoc code, none of the later-added ones
have. Also change GenerateTypeDependencies to generate these
dependencies, which requires adding the typacl to its parameter list.
(That might be annoying if there are any extensions calling that
function directly; but if there are, they're most likely buggy in the
same way as the core callers were, so they need work anyway.) While
I was at it, I changed GenerateTypeDependencies to accept most of its
parameters in the form of a Form_pg_type pointer, making its parameter
list a bit less unwieldy and mistake-prone.
The test race condition is fixed just by wrapping the addition and
removal of default privileges into a single transaction, so that that
state is never visible externally. We might eventually prefer to
separate out tests of default privileges into a script that runs by
itself, but that would be a bigger change and would make the tests
run slower overall.
Back-patch relevant parts to all supported branches.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/15719.1541725287@sss.pgh.pa.us
Nathan Bossart
Jeff Davis
Noah Misch
Peter Eisentraut
Michael Paquier
Tom Lane
Andrew Dunstan
Robert Haas
Alvaro Herrera
Daniel Gustafsson
Stephen Frost
Joe Conway
Heikki Linnakangas
Fujii Masao
Amit Kapila
Dean Rasheed
Andres Freund