This function created new Vars with varno different from varnoold, which
is a condition that should never prevail before setrefs.c does the final
variable-renumbering pass. The created Vars could not be seen as equal()
to normal Vars, which among other things broke equivalence-class processing
for them. The consequences of this were indeed visible in the regression
tests, in the form of failure to propagate constants as one would expect.
I stumbled across it while poking at bug #11457 --- after intentionally
disabling join equivalence processing, the security-barrier regression
tests started falling over with fun errors like "could not find pathkey
item to sort", because of failure to match the corrupted Vars to normal
ones.
While withCheckOption exprs had been handled in many cases by
happenstance, they need to be handled during set_plan_references and
more specifically down in set_plan_refs for ModifyTable plan nodes.
This is to ensure that the opfuncid's are set for operators referenced
in the withCheckOption exprs.
Identified as an issue by Thom Brown
Patch by Dean Rasheed
Back-patch to 9.4, where withCheckOption was introduced.
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
Looks like we can end up with different plans happening on the
buildfarm, which breaks the regression tests when we include
EXPLAIN output (which is done in the regression tests for
updatable security views, to ensure that the user-defined
function isn't pushed down to a level where it could view the
rows before the security quals are applied).
This adds in ANALYZE to hopefully make the plans consistent.
The ANALYZE ends up changing the original plan too, so the
update looks bigger than it really is. The new plan looks
perfectly valid, of course.
Views which are marked as security_barrier must have their quals
applied before any user-defined quals are called, to prevent
user-defined functions from being able to see rows which the
security barrier view is intended to prevent them from seeing.
Remove the restriction on security barrier views being automatically
updatable by adding a new securityQuals list to the RTE structure
which keeps track of the quals from security barrier views at each
level, independently of the user-supplied quals. When RTEs are
later discovered which have securityQuals populated, they are turned
into subquery RTEs which are marked as security_barrier to prevent
any user-supplied quals being pushed down (modulo LEAKPROOF quals).
Dean Rasheed, reviewed by Craig Ringer, Simon Riggs, KaiGai Kohei
The pretty-printing logic in ruleutils.c operates by inserting a newline
and some indentation whitespace into strings that are already valid SQL.
This naturally results in leaving some trailing whitespace before the
newline in many cases; which can be annoying when processing the output
with other tools, as complained of by Joe Abbate. We can fix that in
a pretty localized fashion by deleting any trailing whitespace before
we append a pretty-printing newline. In addition, we have to modify the
code inserted by commit 2f582f76b1 so that
we also delete trailing whitespace when transposing items from temporary
buffers into the main result string, when a temporary item starts with a
newline.
This results in rather voluminous changes to the regression test results,
but it's easily verified that they are only removal of trailing whitespace.
Back-patch to 9.3, because the aforementioned commit resulted in many
more cases of trailing whitespace than had occurred in earlier branches.
Previously, unless all columns were auto-updateable, we wouldn't
inserts, updates, or deletes, or at least not without a rule or trigger;
now, we'll allow inserts and updates that target only the auto-updateable
columns, and deletes even if there are no auto-updateable columns at
all provided the view definition is otherwise suitable.
Dean Rasheed, reviewed by Marko Tiikkaja
For simple views which are automatically updatable, this patch allows
the user to specify what level of checking should be done on records
being inserted or updated. For 'LOCAL CHECK', new tuples are validated
against the conditionals of the view they are being inserted into, while
for 'CASCADED CHECK' the new tuples are validated against the
conditionals for all views involved (from the top down).
This option is part of the SQL specification.
Dean Rasheed, reviewed by Pavel Stehule
An INSERT into such a view should work just like an INSERT into its base
table, ie the insertion should go directly into that table ... not be
duplicated into each child table, as was happening before, per bug #8275
from Rushabh Lathia. On the other hand, the current behavior for
UPDATE/DELETE seems reasonable: the update/delete traverses the child
tables, or not, depending on whether the view specifies ONLY or not.
Add some regression tests covering this area.
Dean Rasheed
This patch makes "simple" views automatically updatable, without the need
to create either INSTEAD OF triggers or INSTEAD rules. "Simple" views
are those classified as updatable according to SQL-92 rules. The rewriter
transforms INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE commands on such views directly into an
equivalent command on the underlying table, which will generally have
noticeably better performance than is possible with either triggers or
user-written rules. A view that has INSTEAD OF triggers or INSTEAD rules
continues to operate the same as before.
For the moment, security_barrier views are not considered simple.
Also, we do not support WITH CHECK OPTION. These features may be
added in future.
Dean Rasheed, reviewed by Amit Kapila
Tom Lane
Stephen Frost
Peter Eisentraut
Robert Haas