Teach the parser to reject misplaced set-returning functions during parse
analysis using p_expr_kind, in much the same way as we do for aggregates
and window functions (cf commit eaccfded9). While this isn't complete
(it misses nesting-based restrictions), it's much better than the previous
error reporting for such cases, and it allows elimination of assorted
ad-hoc expression_returns_set() error checks. We could add nesting checks
later if it seems important to catch all cases at parse time.
There is one case the parser will now throw error for although previous
versions allowed it, which is SRFs in the tlist of an UPDATE. That never
behaved sensibly (since it's ill-defined which generated row should be
used to perform the update) and it's hard to see why it should not be
treated as an error. It's a release-note-worthy change though.
Also, add a new Query field hasTargetSRFs reporting whether there are
any SRFs in the targetlist (including GROUP BY/ORDER BY expressions).
The parser can now set that basically for free during parse analysis,
and we can use it in a number of places to avoid expression_returns_set
searches. (There will be more such checks soon.) In some places, this
allows decontorting the logic since it's no longer expensive to check for
SRFs in the tlist --- so I made the checks parallel to the handling of
hasAggs/hasWindowFuncs wherever it seemed appropriate.
catversion bump because adding a Query field changes stored rules.
Andres Freund and Tom Lane
Discussion: <24639.1473782855@sss.pgh.pa.us>
This error message was written with only ON SELECT rules in mind, but since
then we also made RETURNING-clause targetlists go through the same logic.
This means that you got a rather off-topic error message if you tried to
add a rule with RETURNING to a table having dropped columns. Ideally we'd
just support that, but some preliminary investigation says that it might be
a significant amount of work. Seeing that Nicklas Avén's complaint is the
first one we've gotten about this in the ten years or so that the code's
been like that, I'm unwilling to put much time into it. Instead, improve
the error report by issuing a different message for RETURNING cases, and
revise the associated comment based on this investigation.
Discussion: 1456176604.17219.9.camel@jordogskog.no
Commit 6f8cb1e234 tried to centralize rewriteTargetView's copying
of a target view's Query struct. However, it ignored the fact that the
jointree->quals field was used twice. This only accidentally failed to
fail immediately because the same ChangeVarNodes mutation is applied in
both cases, so that we end up with logically identical expression trees
for both uses (and, as the code stands, the second ChangeVarNodes call
actually does nothing). However, we end up linking *physically*
identical expression trees into both an RTE's securityQuals list and
the WithCheckOption list. That's pretty dangerous, mainly because
prepsecurity.c is utterly cavalier about further munging such structures
without copying them first.
There may be no live bug in HEAD as a consequence of the fact that we apply
preprocess_expression in between here and prepsecurity.c, and that will
make a copy of the tree anyway. Or it may just be that the regression
tests happen to not trip over it. (I noticed this only because things
fell over pretty badly when I tried to relocate the planner's call of
expand_security_quals to before expression preprocessing.) In any case
it's very fragile because if anyone tried to make the securityQuals and
WithCheckOption trees diverge before we reach preprocess_expression, it
would not work. The fact that the current code will preprocess
securityQuals and WithCheckOptions lists at completely different times in
different query levels does nothing to increase my trust that that can't
happen.
In view of the fact that 9.5.0 is almost upon us and the aforesaid commit
has seen exactly zero field testing, the prudent course is to make an extra
copy of the quals so that the behavior is not different from what has been
in the field during beta.
Rather than expect the Query returned by get_view_query() to be
read-only and then copy bits and pieces of it out, simply copy the
entire structure when we get it. This addresses an issue where
AcquireRewriteLocks, which is called by acquireLocksOnSubLinks(),
scribbles on the parsetree passed in, which was actually an entry
in relcache, leading to segfaults with certain view definitions.
This also future-proofs us a bit for anyone adding more code to this
path.
The acquireLocksOnSubLinks() was added in commit c3e0ddd40.
Back-patch to 9.3 as that commit was.
I originally modeled this data structure on SpecialJoinInfo, but after
commit acfcd45cac that looks like a pretty poor decision.
All we really need is relid sets identifying laterally-referenced rels;
and most of the time, what we want to know about includes indirect lateral
references, a case the LateralJoinInfo data was unsuited to compute with
any efficiency. The previous commit redefined RelOptInfo.lateral_relids
as the transitive closure of lateral references, so that it easily supports
checking indirect references. For the places where we really do want just
direct references, add a new RelOptInfo field direct_lateral_relids, which
is easily set up as a copy of lateral_relids before we perform the
transitive closure calculation. Then we can just drop lateral_info_list
and LateralJoinInfo and the supporting code. This makes the planner's
handling of lateral references noticeably more efficient, and shorter too.
Such a change can't be back-patched into stable branches for fear of
breaking extensions that might be looking at the planner's data structures;
but it seems not too late to push it into 9.5, so I've done so.
Similar to 7d8db3e, given that INSERT+RETURNING requires SELECT rights
on the table, apply the SELECT policies as WCOs to the tuples being
inserted. Apply the same logic to UPDATE+RETURNING.
Back-patch to 9.5 where RLS was added.
When considering which policies should be included, rather than look at
individual bits of the query (eg: if a RETURNING clause exists, or if a
WHERE clause exists which is referencing the table, or if it's a
FOR SHARE/UPDATE query), consider any case where we've determined
the user needs SELECT rights on the relation while doing an UPDATE or
DELETE to be a case where we apply SELECT policies, and any case where
we've deteremind that the user needs UPDATE rights on the relation while
doing a SELECT to be a case where we apply UPDATE policies.
This simplifies the logic and addresses concerns that a user could use
UPDATE or DELETE with a WHERE clauses to determine if rows exist, or
they could use SELECT .. FOR UPDATE to lock rows which they are not
actually allowed to modify through UPDATE policies.
Use list_append_unique() to avoid adding the same quals multiple times,
as, on balance, the cost of checking when adding the quals will almost
always be cheaper than keeping them and doing busywork for each tuple
during execution.
Back-patch to 9.5 where RLS was added.
For the UPDATE/DELETE RETURNING case, filter the records which are not
visible to the user through ALL or SELECT policies from those considered
for the UPDATE or DELETE. This is similar to how the GRANT system
works, which prevents RETURNING unless the caller has SELECT rights on
the relation.
Per discussion with Robert, Dean, Tom, and Kevin.
Back-patch to 9.5 where RLS was introduced.
This refactors rewrite/rowsecurity.c to simplify the handling of the
default deny case (reducing the number of places where we check for and
add the default deny policy from three to one) by splitting up the
retrival of the policies from the application of them.
This also allowed us to do away with the policy_id field. A policy_name
field was added for WithCheckOption policies and is used in error
reporting, when available.
Patch by Dean Rasheed, with various mostly cosmetic changes by me.
Back-patch to 9.5 where RLS was introduced to avoid unnecessary
differences, since we're still in alpha, per discussion with Robert.
Even views considered "simple" enough to be automatically updatable may
have mulitple relations involved (eg: in a where clause). We need to
make sure and lock those relations when rewriting the query.
Back-patch to 9.3 where updatable views were added.
Pointed out by Andres, patch thanks to Dean Rasheed.
During fireRIRrules(), get_row_security_policies can add to
securityQuals and withCheckOptions. Make sure to lock any relations
added at that point and before firing RIR rules on those expressions.
Back-patch to 9.5 where RLS was added.
Only remove the default deny policy when a permissive policy exists
(either from the hook or defined by the user). If only restrictive
policies exist then no rows will be visible, as restrictive policies
shouldn't make rows visible. To address this requirement, a single
"USING (true)" permissive policy can be created.
Update the test_rls_hooks regression tests to create the necessary
"USING (true)" permissive policy.
Back-patch to 9.5 where RLS was added.
Per discussion with Dean.
When retrieving policies, if not working on the root target relation,
we actually want the relation's SELECT policies, regardless of
the top level query command type. For example in UPDATE t1...FROM t2
we need to apply t1's UPDATE policies and t2's SELECT policies.
Previously top level query command type was applied to all relations,
which was wrong. Add some regression coverage to ensure we don't
violate this principle in the future.
Report and patch by Dean Rasheed. Cherry picked from larger refactoring
patch and tweaked by me. Back-patched to 9.5 where RLS was introduced.
When DefineQueryRewrite() is about to convert a table to a view, it checks
the table for features unavailable to views. For example, it rejects tables
having triggers. It omits to reject tables having relrowsecurity or a
pg_policy record. Fix that. To faciliate the repair, invent
relation_has_policies() which indicates the presence of policies on a
relation even when row security is disabled for that relation.
Reported by Noah Misch. Patch by me, review by Stephen Frost. Back-patch
to 9.5 where RLS was introduced.
The pg_stats view is supposed to be restricted to only show rows
about tables the user can read. However, it sometimes can leak
information which could not otherwise be seen when row level security
is enabled. Fix that by not showing pg_stats rows to users that would
be subject to RLS on the table the row is related to. This is done
by creating/using the newly introduced SQL visible function,
row_security_active().
Along the way, clean up three call sites of check_enable_rls(). The second
argument of that function should only be specified as other than
InvalidOid when we are checking as a different user than the current one,
as in when querying through a view. These sites were passing GetUserId()
instead of InvalidOid, which can cause the function to return incorrect
results if the current user has the BYPASSRLS privilege and row_security
has been set to OFF.
Additionally fix a bug causing RI Trigger error messages to unintentionally
leak information when RLS is enabled, and other minor cleanup and
improvements. Also add WITH (security_barrier) to the definition of pg_stats.
Bumped CATVERSION due to new SQL functions and pg_stats view definition.
Back-patch to 9.5 where RLS was introduced. Reported by Yaroslav.
Patch by Joe Conway and Dean Rasheed with review and input by
Michael Paquier and Stephen Frost.
The original implementation of TABLESAMPLE modeled the tablesample method
API on index access methods, which wasn't a good choice because, without
specialized DDL commands, there's no way to build an extension that can
implement a TSM. (Raw inserts into system catalogs are not an acceptable
thing to do, because we can't undo them during DROP EXTENSION, nor will
pg_upgrade behave sanely.) Instead adopt an API more like procedural
language handlers or foreign data wrappers, wherein the only SQL-level
support object needed is a single handler function identified by having
a special return type. This lets us get rid of the supporting catalog
altogether, so that no custom DDL support is needed for the feature.
Adjust the API so that it can support non-constant tablesample arguments
(the original coding assumed we could evaluate the argument expressions at
ExecInitSampleScan time, which is undesirable even if it weren't outright
unsafe), and discourage sampling methods from looking at invisible tuples.
Make sure that the BERNOULLI and SYSTEM methods are genuinely repeatable
within and across queries, as required by the SQL standard, and deal more
honestly with methods that can't support that requirement.
Make a full code-review pass over the tablesample additions, and fix
assorted bugs, omissions, infelicities, and cosmetic issues (such as
failure to put the added code stanzas in a consistent ordering).
Improve EXPLAIN's output of tablesample plans, too.
Back-patch to 9.5 so that we don't have to support the original API
in production.
Fix some places where pgindent did silly stuff, often because project
style wasn't followed to begin with. (I've not touched the atomics
headers, though.)
This SQL standard functionality allows to aggregate data by different
GROUP BY clauses at once. Each grouping set returns rows with columns
grouped by in other sets set to NULL.
This could previously be achieved by doing each grouping as a separate
query, conjoined by UNION ALLs. Besides being considerably more concise,
grouping sets will in many cases be faster, requiring only one scan over
the underlying data.
The current implementation of grouping sets only supports using sorting
for input. Individual sets that share a sort order are computed in one
pass. If there are sets that don't share a sort order, additional sort &
aggregation steps are performed. These additional passes are sourced by
the previous sort step; thus avoiding repeated scans of the source data.
The code is structured in a way that adding support for purely using
hash aggregation or a mix of hashing and sorting is possible. Sorting
was chosen to be supported first, as it is the most generic method of
implementation.
Instead of, as in an earlier versions of the patch, representing the
chain of sort and aggregation steps as full blown planner and executor
nodes, all but the first sort are performed inside the aggregation node
itself. This avoids the need to do some unusual gymnastics to handle
having to return aggregated and non-aggregated tuples from underlying
nodes, as well as having to shut down underlying nodes early to limit
memory usage. The optimizer still builds Sort/Agg node to describe each
phase, but they're not part of the plan tree, but instead additional
data for the aggregation node. They're a convenient and preexisting way
to describe aggregation and sorting. The first (and possibly only) sort
step is still performed as a separate execution step. That retains
similarity with existing group by plans, makes rescans fairly simple,
avoids very deep plans (leading to slow explains) and easily allows to
avoid the sorting step if the underlying data is sorted by other means.
A somewhat ugly side of this patch is having to deal with a grammar
ambiguity between the new CUBE keyword and the cube extension/functions
named cube (and rollup). To avoid breaking existing deployments of the
cube extension it has not been renamed, neither has cube been made a
reserved keyword. Instead precedence hacking is used to make GROUP BY
cube(..) refer to the CUBE grouping sets feature, and not the function
cube(). To actually group by a function cube(), unlikely as that might
be, the function name has to be quoted.
Needs a catversion bump because stored rules may change.
Author: Andrew Gierth and Atri Sharma, with contributions from Andres Freund
Reviewed-By: Andres Freund, Noah Misch, Tom Lane, Svenne Krap, Tomas
Vondra, Erik Rijkers, Marti Raudsepp, Pavel Stehule
Discussion: CAOeZVidmVRe2jU6aMk_5qkxnB7dfmPROzM7Ur8JPW5j8Y5X-Lw@mail.gmail.com
Add a TABLESAMPLE clause to SELECT statements that allows
user to specify random BERNOULLI sampling or block level
SYSTEM sampling. Implementation allows for extensible
sampling functions to be written, using a standard API.
Basic version follows SQLStandard exactly. Usable
concrete use cases for the sampling API follow in later
commits.
Petr Jelinek
Reviewed by Michael Paquier and Simon Riggs
Specifically the tlist and rti of the pseudo "excluded" relation weren't
properly treated by expression_tree_walker, which lead to errors when
excluded was referenced inside a rule because the varnos where not
properly adjusted. Similar omissions in OffsetVarNodes and
expression_tree_mutator had less impact, but should obviously be fixed
nonetheless.
A couple tests of for ON CONFLICT UPDATE into INSERT rule bearing
relations have been added.
In passing I updated a couple comments.
The newly added ON CONFLICT clause allows to specify an alternative to
raising a unique or exclusion constraint violation error when inserting.
ON CONFLICT refers to constraints that can either be specified using a
inference clause (by specifying the columns of a unique constraint) or
by naming a unique or exclusion constraint. DO NOTHING avoids the
constraint violation, without touching the pre-existing row. DO UPDATE
SET ... [WHERE ...] updates the pre-existing tuple, and has access to
both the tuple proposed for insertion and the existing tuple; the
optional WHERE clause can be used to prevent an update from being
executed. The UPDATE SET and WHERE clauses have access to the tuple
proposed for insertion using the "magic" EXCLUDED alias, and to the
pre-existing tuple using the table name or its alias.
This feature is often referred to as upsert.
This is implemented using a new infrastructure called "speculative
insertion". It is an optimistic variant of regular insertion that first
does a pre-check for existing tuples and then attempts an insert. If a
violating tuple was inserted concurrently, the speculatively inserted
tuple is deleted and a new attempt is made. If the pre-check finds a
matching tuple the alternative DO NOTHING or DO UPDATE action is taken.
If the insertion succeeds without detecting a conflict, the tuple is
deemed inserted.
To handle the possible ambiguity between the excluded alias and a table
named excluded, and for convenience with long relation names, INSERT
INTO now can alias its target table.
Bumps catversion as stored rules change.
Author: Peter Geoghegan, with significant contributions from Heikki
Linnakangas and Andres Freund. Testing infrastructure by Jeff Janes.
Reviewed-By: Heikki Linnakangas, Andres Freund, Robert Haas, Simon Riggs,
Dean Rasheed, Stephen Frost and many others.
Previously, relation range table entries used a single Bitmapset field
representing which columns required either UPDATE or INSERT privileges,
despite the fact that INSERT and UPDATE privileges are separately
cataloged, and may be independently held. As statements so far required
either insert or update privileges but never both, that was
sufficient. The required permission could be inferred from the top level
statement run.
The upcoming INSERT ... ON CONFLICT UPDATE feature needs to
independently check for both privileges in one statement though, so that
is not sufficient anymore.
Bumps catversion as stored rules change.
Author: Peter Geoghegan
Reviewed-By: Andres Freund
The RLS capability is built on top of the WITH CHECK OPTION
system which was added for auto-updatable views, however, unlike
WCOs on views (which are mandated by the SQL spec to not fire until
after all other constraints and checks are done), it makes much more
sense for RLS checks to happen earlier than constraint and uniqueness
checks.
This patch reworks the structure which holds the WCOs a bit to be
explicitly either VIEW or RLS checks and the RLS-related checks are
done prior to the constraint and uniqueness checks. This also allows
better error reporting as we are now reporting when a violation is due
to a WITH CHECK OPTION and when it's due to an RLS policy violation,
which was independently noted by Craig Ringer as being confusing.
The documentation is also updated to include a paragraph about when RLS
WITH CHECK handling is performed, as there have been a number of
questions regarding that and the documentation was previously silent on
the matter.
Author: Dean Rasheed, with some kabitzing and comment changes by me.
In get_row_security_policies(), we need to make a copy of the relation
name when building the WithCheckOptions structure, since
RelationGetRelationName just returns a pointer into the local Relation
structure. The relation name in the WCO structure is only used for
error reporting.
Pointed out by Robert and Christian Ullrich, who noted that the
buildfarm members with -DCLOBBER_CACHE_ALWAYS were failing.
In prepend_row_security_policies(), defaultDeny was always true, so if
there were any hook policies, the RLS policies on the table would just
get discarded. Fixed to start off with defaultDeny as false and then
properly set later if we detect that only the default deny policy exists
for the internal policies.
The infinite recursion detection in fireRIRrules() didn't properly
manage the activeRIRs list in the case of WCOs, so it would incorrectly
report infinite recusion if the same relation with RLS appeared more
than once in the rtable, for example "UPDATE t ... FROM t ...".
Further, the RLS expansion code in fireRIRrules() was handling RLS in
the main loop through the rtable, which lead to RTEs being visited twice
if they contained sublink subqueries, which
prepend_row_security_policies() attempted to handle by exiting early if
the RTE already had securityQuals. That doesn't work, however, since
if the query involved a security barrier view on top of a table with
RLS, the RTE would already have securityQuals (from the view) by the
time fireRIRrules() was invoked, and so the table's RLS policies would
be ignored. This is fixed in fireRIRrules() by handling RLS in a
separate loop at the end, after dealing with any other sublink
subqueries, thus ensuring that each RTE is only visited once for RLS
expansion.
The inheritance planner code didn't correctly handle non-target
relations with RLS, which would get turned into subqueries during
planning. Thus an update of the form "UPDATE t1 ... FROM t2 ..." where
t1 has inheritance and t2 has RLS quals would fail. Fix by making sure
to copy in and update the securityQuals when they exist for non-target
relations.
process_policies() was adding WCOs to non-target relations, which is
unnecessary, and could lead to a lot of wasted time in the rewriter and
the planner. Fix by only adding WCO policies when working on the result
relation. Also in process_policies, we should be copying the USING
policies to the WITH CHECK policies on a per-policy basis, fix by moving
the copying up into the per-policy loop.
Lastly, as noted by Dean, we were simply adding policies returned by the
hook provided to the list of quals being AND'd, meaning that they would
actually restrict records returned and there was no option to have
internal policies and hook-based policies work together permissively (as
all internal policies currently work). Instead, explicitly add support
for both permissive and restrictive policies by having a hook for each
and combining the results appropriately. To ensure this is all done
correctly, add a new test module (test_rls_hooks) to test the various
combinations of internal, permissive, and restrictive hook policies.
Largely from Dean Rasheed (thanks!):
CAEZATCVmFUfUOwwhnBTcgi6AquyjQ0-1fyKd0T3xBWJvn+xsFA@mail.gmail.com
Author: Dean Rasheed, though I added the new hooks and test module.
The changed routines are mostly those that can be directly called by
ProcessUtilitySlow; the intention is to make the affected object
information more precise, in support for future event trigger changes.
Originally it was envisioned that the OID of the affected object would
be enough, and in most cases that is correct, but upon actually
implementing the event trigger changes it turned out that ObjectAddress
is more widely useful.
Additionally, some command execution routines grew an output argument
that's an object address which provides further info about the executed
command. To wit:
* for ALTER DOMAIN / ADD CONSTRAINT, it corresponds to the address of
the new constraint
* for ALTER OBJECT / SET SCHEMA, it corresponds to the address of the
schema that originally contained the object.
* for ALTER EXTENSION {ADD, DROP} OBJECT, it corresponds to the address
of the object added to or dropped from the extension.
There's no user-visible change in this commit, and no functional change
either.
Discussion: 20150218213255.GC6717@tamriel.snowman.net
Reviewed-By: Stephen Frost, Andres Freund
We did not need a location tag on NullTest or BooleanTest before, because
no error messages referred directly to their locations. That's planned
to change though, so add these fields in a separate housekeeping commit.
Catversion bump because stored rules may change.
The four functions array_ref, array_set, array_get_slice, array_set_slice
have traditionally declared their array inputs and results as being of type
"ArrayType *". This is a lie, and has been since Berkeley days, because
they actually also support "fixed-length array" types such as "name" and
"point"; not to mention that the inputs could be toasted. These values
should be declared Datum instead to avoid confusion. The current coding
already risks possible misoptimization by compilers, and it'll get worse
when "expanded" array representations become a valid alternative.
However, there's a fair amount of code using array_ref and array_set with
arrays that *are* known to be ArrayType structures, and there might be more
such places in third-party code. Rather than cluttering those call sites
with PointerGetDatum/DatumGetArrayTypeP cruft, what I did was to rename the
existing functions to array_get_element/array_set_element, fix their
signatures, then reincarnate array_ref/array_set as backwards compatibility
wrappers.
array_get_slice/array_set_slice have no such constituency in the core code,
and probably not in third-party code either, so I just changed their APIs.
While building error messages to return to the user,
BuildIndexValueDescription, ExecBuildSlotValueDescription and
ri_ReportViolation would happily include the entire key or entire row in
the result returned to the user, even if the user didn't have access to
view all of the columns being included.
Instead, include only those columns which the user is providing or which
the user has select rights on. If the user does not have any rights
to view the table or any of the columns involved then no detail is
provided and a NULL value is returned from BuildIndexValueDescription
and ExecBuildSlotValueDescription. Note that, for key cases, the user
must have access to all of the columns for the key to be shown; a
partial key will not be returned.
Further, in master only, do not return any data for cases where row
security is enabled on the relation and row security should be applied
for the user. This required a bit of refactoring and moving of things
around related to RLS- note the addition of utils/misc/rls.c.
Back-patch all the way, as column-level privileges are now in all
supported versions.
This has been assigned CVE-2014-8161, but since the issue and the patch
have already been publicized on pgsql-hackers, there's no point in trying
to hide this commit.
Fix unsafe coding around PG_TRY in RelationBuildRowSecurity: can't change
a variable inside PG_TRY and then use it in PG_CATCH without marking it
"volatile". In this case though it seems saner to avoid that by doing
a single assignment before entering the TRY block.
I started out just intending to fix that, but the more I looked at the
row-security code the more distressed I got. This patch also fixes
incorrect construction of the RowSecurityPolicy cache entries (there was
not sufficient care taken to copy pass-by-ref data into the cache memory
context) and a whole bunch of sloppiness around the definition and use of
pg_policy.polcmd. You can't use nulls in that column because initdb will
mark it NOT NULL --- and I see no particular reason why a null entry would
be a good idea anyway, so changing initdb's behavior is not the right
answer. The internal value of '\0' wouldn't be suitable in a "char" column
either, so after a bit of thought I settled on using '*' to represent ALL.
Chasing those changes down also revealed that somebody wasn't paying
attention to what the underlying values of ACL_UPDATE_CHR etc really were,
and there was a great deal of lackadaiscalness in the catalogs.sgml
documentation for pg_policy and pg_policies too.
This doesn't pretend to be a complete code review for the row-security
stuff, it just fixes the things that were in my face while dealing with
the bugs in RelationBuildRowSecurity.
This reverts commit 1826987a46.
The overall design was deemed unacceptable, in discussion following the
previous commit message; we might find some parts of it still
salvageable, but I don't want to be on the hook for fixing it, so let's
wait until we have a new patch.
The previous representation using a boolean column for each attribute
would not scale as well as we want to add further attributes.
Extra auxilliary functions are added to go along with this change, to
make up for the lost convenience of access of the old representation.
Catalog version bumped due to change in catalogs and the new functions.
Author: Adam Brightwell, minor tweaks by Álvaro
Reviewed by: Stephen Frost, Andres Freund, Álvaro Herrera
This patch adds a way of iterating through the members of a bitmapset
nondestructively, unlike the old way with bms_first_member(). While
bms_next_member() is very slightly slower than bms_first_member()
(at least for typical-size bitmapsets), eliminating the need to palloc
and pfree a temporary copy of the target bitmapset is a significant win.
So this method should be preferred in all cases where a temporary copy
would be necessary.
Tom Lane, with suggestions from Dean Rasheed and David Rowley
As pointed out by Robert, we should really have named pg_rowsecurity
pg_policy, as the objects stored in that catalog are policies. This
patch fixes that and updates the column names to start with 'pol' to
match the new catalog name.
The security consideration for COPY with row level security, also
pointed out by Robert, has also been addressed by remembering and
re-checking the OID of the relation initially referenced during COPY
processing, to make sure it hasn't changed under us by the time we
finish planning out the query which has been built.
Robert and Alvaro also commented on missing OCLASS and OBJECT entries
for POLICY (formerly ROWSECURITY or POLICY, depending) in various
places. This patch fixes that too, which also happens to add the
ability to COMMENT on policies.
In passing, attempt to improve the consistency of messages, comments,
and documentation as well. This removes various incarnations of
'row-security', 'row-level security', 'Row-security', etc, in favor
of 'policy', 'row level security' or 'row_security' as appropriate.
Happy Thanksgiving!
The initial patch for RLS mistakenly included headers associated with
the executor and planner bits in rewrite/rowsecurity.h. Per policy and
general good sense, executor headers should not be included in planner
headers or vice versa.
The include of execnodes.h was a mistaken holdover from previous
versions, while the include of relation.h was used for Relation's
definition, which should have been coming from utils/relcache.h. This
patch cleans these issues up, adds comments to the RowSecurityPolicy
struct and the RowSecurityConfigType enum, and changes Relation->rsdesc
to Relation->rd_rsdesc to follow Relation field naming convention.
Additionally, utils/rel.h was including rewrite/rowsecurity.h, which
wasn't a great idea since that was pulling in things not really needed
in utils/rel.h (which gets included in quite a few places). Instead,
use 'struct RowSecurityDesc' for the rd_rsdesc field and add comments
explaining why.
Lastly, add an include into access/nbtree/nbtsort.c for
utils/sortsupport.h, which was evidently missed due to the above mess.
Pointed out by Tom in 16970.1415838651@sss.pgh.pa.us; note that the
concerns regarding a similar situation in the custom-path commit still
need to be addressed.
This clause changes the behavior of SELECT locking clauses in the
presence of locked rows: instead of causing a process to block waiting
for the locks held by other processes (or raise an error, with NOWAIT),
SKIP LOCKED makes the new reader skip over such rows. While this is not
appropriate behavior for general purposes, there are some cases in which
it is useful, such as queue-like tables.
Catalog version bumped because this patch changes the representation of
stored rules.
Reviewed by Craig Ringer (based on a previous attempt at an
implementation by Simon Riggs, who also provided input on the syntax
used in the current patch), David Rowley, and Álvaro Herrera.
Author: Thomas Munro
Buildfarm member tick identified an issue where the policies in the
relcache for a relation were were being replaced underneath a running
query, leading to segfaults while processing the policies to be added
to a query. Similar to how TupleDesc RuleLocks are handled, add in a
equalRSDesc() function to check if the policies have actually changed
and, if not, swap back the rsdesc field (using the original instead of
the temporairly built one; the whole structure is swapped and then
specific fields swapped back). This now passes a CLOBBER_CACHE_ALWAYS
for me and should resolve the buildfarm error.
In addition to addressing this, add a new chapter in Data Definition
under Privileges which explains row security and provides examples of
its usage, change \d to always list policies (even if row security is
disabled- but note that it is disabled, or enabled with no policies),
rework check_role_for_policy (it really didn't need the entire policy,
but it did need to be using has_privs_of_role()), and change the field
in pg_class to relrowsecurity from relhasrowsecurity, based on
Heikki's suggestion. Also from Heikki, only issue SET ROW_SECURITY in
pg_restore when talking to a 9.5+ server, list Bypass RLS in \du, and
document --enable-row-security options for pg_dump and pg_restore.
Lastly, fix a number of minor whitespace and typo issues from Heikki,
Dimitri, add a missing #include, per Peter E, fix a few minor
variable-assigned-but-not-used and resource leak issues from Coverity
and add tab completion for role attribute bypassrls as well.
Building on the updatable security-barrier views work, add the
ability to define policies on tables to limit the set of rows
which are returned from a query and which are allowed to be added
to a table. Expressions defined by the policy for filtering are
added to the security barrier quals of the query, while expressions
defined to check records being added to a table are added to the
with-check options of the query.
New top-level commands are CREATE/ALTER/DROP POLICY and are
controlled by the table owner. Row Security is able to be enabled
and disabled by the owner on a per-table basis using
ALTER TABLE .. ENABLE/DISABLE ROW SECURITY.
Per discussion, ROW SECURITY is disabled on tables by default and
must be enabled for policies on the table to be used. If no
policies exist on a table with ROW SECURITY enabled, a default-deny
policy is used and no records will be visible.
By default, row security is applied at all times except for the
table owner and the superuser. A new GUC, row_security, is added
which can be set to ON, OFF, or FORCE. When set to FORCE, row
security will be applied even for the table owner and superusers.
When set to OFF, row security will be disabled when allowed and an
error will be thrown if the user does not have rights to bypass row
security.
Per discussion, pg_dump sets row_security = OFF by default to ensure
that exports and backups will have all data in the table or will
error if there are insufficient privileges to bypass row security.
A new option has been added to pg_dump, --enable-row-security, to
ask pg_dump to export with row security enabled.
A new role capability, BYPASSRLS, which can only be set by the
superuser, is added to allow other users to be able to bypass row
security using row_security = OFF.
Many thanks to the various individuals who have helped with the
design, particularly Robert Haas for his feedback.
Authors include Craig Ringer, KaiGai Kohei, Adam Brightwell, Dean
Rasheed, with additional changes and rework by me.
Reviewers have included all of the above, Greg Smith,
Jeff McCormick, and Robert Haas.
This function wasn't originally thought to be really user-facing,
because converting a table to a view isn't something we expect people
to do manually. So not all that much effort was spent on the error
messages; in particular, while the code will complain that you got
the column types wrong it won't say exactly what they are. But since
we repurposed the code to also check compatibility of rule RETURNING
lists, it's definitely user-facing. It now seems worthwhile to add
errdetail messages showing exactly what the conflict is when there's
a mismatch of column names or types. This is prompted by bug #10836
from Matthias Raffelsieper, which might have been forestalled if the
error message had reported the wrong column type as being "record".
Back-patch to 9.4, but not into older branches where the set of
translatable error strings is supposed to be stable.
This SQL-standard feature allows a sub-SELECT yielding multiple columns
(but only one row) to be used to compute the new values of several columns
to be updated. While the same results can be had with an independent
sub-SELECT per column, such a workaround can require a great deal of
duplicated computation.
The standard actually says that the source for a multi-column assignment
could be any row-valued expression. The implementation used here is
tightly tied to our existing sub-SELECT support and can't handle other
cases; the Bison grammar would have some issues with them too. However,
I don't feel too bad about this since other cases can be converted into
sub-SELECTs. For instance, "SET (a,b,c) = row_valued_function(x)" could
be written "SET (a,b,c) = (SELECT * FROM row_valued_function(x))".
Views which are marked as security_barrier must have their quals
applied before any user-defined quals are called, to prevent
user-defined functions from being able to see rows which the
security barrier view is intended to prevent them from seeing.
Remove the restriction on security barrier views being automatically
updatable by adding a new securityQuals list to the RTE structure
which keeps track of the quals from security barrier views at each
level, independently of the user-supplied quals. When RTEs are
later discovered which have securityQuals populated, they are turned
into subquery RTEs which are marked as security_barrier to prevent
any user-supplied quals being pushed down (modulo LEAKPROOF quals).
Dean Rasheed, reviewed by Craig Ringer, Simon Riggs, KaiGai Kohei
Tom Lane
Robert Haas
Bruce Momjian
Stephen Frost
Andres Freund
Joe Conway
Simon Riggs
Alvaro Herrera
Peter Eisentraut