Some time back we agreed that row_security=off should not be a way to
bypass RLS entirely, but only a way to get an error if it was being
applied. However, the code failed to act that way for table owners.
Per discussion, this is a must-fix bug for 9.5.0.
Adjust the logic in rls.c to behave as expected; also, modify the
error message to be more consistent with the new interpretation.
The regression tests need minor corrections as well. Also update
the comments about row_security in ddl.sgml to be correct. (The
official description of the GUC in config.sgml is already correct.)
I failed to resist the temptation to do some other very minor
cleanup as well, such as getting rid of a duplicate extern declaration.
To allow users to force RLS to always be applied, even for table owners,
add ALTER TABLE .. FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY.
row_security=off overrides FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY, to ensure pg_dump
output is complete (by default).
Also add SECURITY_NOFORCE_RLS context to avoid data corruption when
ALTER TABLE .. FORCE ROW SECURITY is being used. The
SECURITY_NOFORCE_RLS security context is used only during referential
integrity checks and is only considered in check_enable_rls() after we
have already checked that the current user is the owner of the relation
(which should always be the case during referential integrity checks).
Back-patch to 9.5 where RLS was added.
Specifically, make its effect independent from the row_security GUC, and
make it affect permission checks pertinent to views the BYPASSRLS role
owns. The row_security GUC thereby ceases to change successful-query
behavior; it can only make a query fail with an error. Back-patch to
9.5, where BYPASSRLS was introduced.
This commit's parent made superfluous the bit's sole usage. Referential
integrity checks have long run as the subject table's owner, and that
now implies RLS bypass. Safe use of the bit was tricky, requiring
strict control over the SQL expressions evaluating therein. Back-patch
to 9.5, where the bit was introduced.
Based on a patch by Stephen Frost.
Every query of a single ENABLE ROW SECURITY table has two meanings, with
the row_security GUC selecting between them. With row_security=force
available, every function author would have been advised to either set
the GUC locally or test both meanings. Non-compliance would have
threatened reliability and, for SECURITY DEFINER functions, security.
Authors already face an obligation to account for search_path, and we
should not mimic that example. With this change, only BYPASSRLS roles
need exercise the aforementioned care. Back-patch to 9.5, where the
row_security GUC was introduced.
Since this narrows the domain of pg_db_role_setting.setconfig and
pg_proc.proconfig, one might bump catversion. A row_security=force
setting in one of those columns will elicit a clear message, so don't.
The pg_stats view is supposed to be restricted to only show rows
about tables the user can read. However, it sometimes can leak
information which could not otherwise be seen when row level security
is enabled. Fix that by not showing pg_stats rows to users that would
be subject to RLS on the table the row is related to. This is done
by creating/using the newly introduced SQL visible function,
row_security_active().
Along the way, clean up three call sites of check_enable_rls(). The second
argument of that function should only be specified as other than
InvalidOid when we are checking as a different user than the current one,
as in when querying through a view. These sites were passing GetUserId()
instead of InvalidOid, which can cause the function to return incorrect
results if the current user has the BYPASSRLS privilege and row_security
has been set to OFF.
Additionally fix a bug causing RI Trigger error messages to unintentionally
leak information when RLS is enabled, and other minor cleanup and
improvements. Also add WITH (security_barrier) to the definition of pg_stats.
Bumped CATVERSION due to new SQL functions and pg_stats view definition.
Back-patch to 9.5 where RLS was introduced. Reported by Yaroslav.
Patch by Joe Conway and Dean Rasheed with review and input by
Michael Paquier and Stephen Frost.
While building error messages to return to the user,
BuildIndexValueDescription, ExecBuildSlotValueDescription and
ri_ReportViolation would happily include the entire key or entire row in
the result returned to the user, even if the user didn't have access to
view all of the columns being included.
Instead, include only those columns which the user is providing or which
the user has select rights on. If the user does not have any rights
to view the table or any of the columns involved then no detail is
provided and a NULL value is returned from BuildIndexValueDescription
and ExecBuildSlotValueDescription. Note that, for key cases, the user
must have access to all of the columns for the key to be shown; a
partial key will not be returned.
Further, in master only, do not return any data for cases where row
security is enabled on the relation and row security should be applied
for the user. This required a bit of refactoring and moving of things
around related to RLS- note the addition of utils/misc/rls.c.
Back-patch all the way, as column-level privileges are now in all
supported versions.
This has been assigned CVE-2014-8161, but since the issue and the patch
have already been publicized on pgsql-hackers, there's no point in trying
to hide this commit.
Tom Lane
Bruce Momjian
Peter Eisentraut
Stephen Frost
Noah Misch
Joe Conway