Buildfarm evidence shows that TCP_KEEPALIVE_THRESHOLD doesn't exist
after all on Solaris < 11. This means we need to take positive action to
prevent the TCP_KEEPALIVE code path from being taken on that platform.
I've chosen to limit it with "&& defined(__darwin__)", since it's unclear
that anyone else would follow Apple's precedent of spelling the symbol
that way.
Also, follow a suggestion from Michael Paquier of eliminating code
duplication by defining a couple of intermediate symbols for the
socket option.
In passing, make some effort to reduce the number of translatable messages
by replacing "setsockopt(foo) failed" with "setsockopt(%s) failed", etc,
throughout the affected files. And update relevant documentation so
that it doesn't claim to provide an exhaustive list of the possible
socket option names.
Like the previous commit (f0256c774), back-patch to all supported branches.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20170627163757.25161.528@wrigleys.postgresql.org
Turns out that the socket option for this is named TCP_KEEPALIVE_THRESHOLD,
at least according to the tcp(7P) man page for Solaris 11. (But since that
text refers to "SunOS", it's likely pretty ancient.) It appears that the
symbol TCP_KEEPALIVE does get defined on that platform, but it doesn't
seem to represent a valid protocol-level socket option. This leads to
bleats in the postmaster log, and no tcp_keepalives_idle functionality.
Per bug #14720 from Andrey Lizenko, as well as an earlier report from
Dhiraj Chawla that nobody had followed up on. The issue's been there
since we added the TCP_KEEPALIVE code path in commit 5acd417c8, so
back-patch to all supported branches.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20170627163757.25161.528@wrigleys.postgresql.org
Don't move parenthesized lines to the left, even if that means they
flow past the right margin.
By default, BSD indent lines up statement continuation lines that are
within parentheses so that they start just to the right of the preceding
left parenthesis. However, traditionally, if that resulted in the
continuation line extending to the right of the desired right margin,
then indent would push it left just far enough to not overrun the margin,
if it could do so without making the continuation line start to the left of
the current statement indent. That makes for a weird mix of indentations
unless one has been completely rigid about never violating the 80-column
limit.
This behavior has been pretty universally panned by Postgres developers.
Hence, disable it with indent's new -lpl switch, so that parenthesized
lines are always lined up with the preceding left paren.
This patch is much less interesting than the first round of indent
changes, but also bulkier, so I thought it best to separate the effects.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/E1dAmxK-0006EE-1r@gemulon.postgresql.org
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/30527.1495162840@sss.pgh.pa.us
Change pg_bsd_indent to follow upstream rules for placement of comments
to the right of code, and remove pgindent hack that caused comments
following #endif to not obey the general rule.
Commit e3860ffa4d wasn't actually using
the published version of pg_bsd_indent, but a hacked-up version that
tried to minimize the amount of movement of comments to the right of
code. The situation of interest is where such a comment has to be
moved to the right of its default placement at column 33 because there's
code there. BSD indent has always moved right in units of tab stops
in such cases --- but in the previous incarnation, indent was working
in 8-space tab stops, while now it knows we use 4-space tabs. So the
net result is that in about half the cases, such comments are placed
one tab stop left of before. This is better all around: it leaves
more room on the line for comment text, and it means that in such
cases the comment uniformly starts at the next 4-space tab stop after
the code, rather than sometimes one and sometimes two tabs after.
Also, ensure that comments following #endif are indented the same
as comments following other preprocessor commands such as #else.
That inconsistency turns out to have been self-inflicted damage
from a poorly-thought-through post-indent "fixup" in pgindent.
This patch is much less interesting than the first round of indent
changes, but also bulkier, so I thought it best to separate the effects.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/E1dAmxK-0006EE-1r@gemulon.postgresql.org
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/30527.1495162840@sss.pgh.pa.us
The new indent version includes numerous fixes thanks to Piotr Stefaniak.
The main changes visible in this commit are:
* Nicer formatting of function-pointer declarations.
* No longer unexpectedly removes spaces in expressions using casts,
sizeof, or offsetof.
* No longer wants to add a space in "struct structname *varname", as
well as some similar cases for const- or volatile-qualified pointers.
* Declarations using PG_USED_FOR_ASSERTS_ONLY are formatted more nicely.
* Fixes bug where comments following declarations were sometimes placed
with no space separating them from the code.
* Fixes some odd decisions for comments following case labels.
* Fixes some cases where comments following code were indented to less
than the expected column 33.
On the less good side, it now tends to put more whitespace around typedef
names that are not listed in typedefs.list. This might encourage us to
put more effort into typedef name collection; it's not really a bug in
indent itself.
There are more changes coming after this round, having to do with comment
indentation and alignment of lines appearing within parentheses. I wanted
to limit the size of the diffs to something that could be reviewed without
one's eyes completely glazing over, so it seemed better to split up the
changes as much as practical.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/E1dAmxK-0006EE-1r@gemulon.postgresql.org
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/30527.1495162840@sss.pgh.pa.us
Most of the improvements were in the new SCRAM code:
* In SCRAM protocol violation messages, use errdetail to provide the
details.
* If pg_backend_random() fails, throw an ERROR rather than just LOG. We
shouldn't continue authentication if we can't generate a random nonce.
* Use ereport() rather than elog() for the "invalid SCRAM verifier"
messages. They shouldn't happen, if everything works, but it's not
inconceivable that someone would have invalid scram verifiers in
pg_authid, e.g. if a broken client application was used to generate the
verifier.
But this change applied to old code:
* Use ERROR rather than COMMERROR for protocol violation errors. There's
no reason to not tell the client what they did wrong. The client might be
confused already, so that it cannot read and display the error correctly,
but let's at least try. In the "invalid password packet size" case, we
used to actually continue with authentication anyway, but that is now a
hard error.
Patch by Michael Paquier and me. Thanks to Daniel Varrazzo for spotting
the typo in one of the messages that spurred the discussion and these
larger changes.
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CA%2Bmi_8aZYLhuyQi1Jo0hO19opNZ2OEATEOM5fKApH7P6zTOZGg%40mail.gmail.com
The larger part of this patch replaces usages of MyProc->procLatch
with MyLatch. The latter works even early during backend startup,
where MyProc->procLatch doesn't yet. While the affected code
shouldn't run in cases where it's not initialized, it might get copied
into places where it might. Using MyLatch is simpler and a bit faster
to boot, so there's little point to stick with the previous coding.
While doing so I noticed some weaknesses around newly introduced uses
of latches that could lead to missed events, and an omitted
CHECK_FOR_INTERRUPTS() call in worker_spi.
As all the actual bugs are in v10 code, there doesn't seem to be
sufficient reason to backpatch this.
Author: Andres Freund
Discussion:
https://postgr.es/m/20170606195321.sjmenrfgl2nu6j63@alap3.anarazel.dehttps://postgr.es/m/20170606210405.sim3yl6vpudhmufo@alap3.anarazel.de
Backpatch: -
Storing passwords in plaintext hasn't been a good idea for a very long
time, if ever. Now seems like a good time to finally forbid it, since we're
messing with this in PostgreSQL 10 anyway.
Remove the CREATE/ALTER USER UNENCRYPTED PASSSWORD 'foo' syntax, since
storing passwords unencrypted is no longer supported. ENCRYPTED PASSWORD
'foo' is still accepted, but ENCRYPTED is now just a noise-word, it does
the same as just PASSWORD 'foo'.
Likewise, remove the --unencrypted option from createuser, but accept
--encrypted as a no-op for backward compatibility. AFAICS, --encrypted was
a no-op even before this patch, because createuser encrypted the password
before sending it to the server even if --encrypted was not specified. It
added the ENCRYPTED keyword to the SQL command, but since the password was
already in encrypted form, it didn't make any difference. The documentation
was not clear on whether that was intended or not, but it's moot now.
Also, while password_encryption='on' is still accepted as an alias for
'md5', it is now marked as hidden, so that it is not listed as an accepted
value in error hints, for example. That's not directly related to removing
'plain', but it seems better this way.
Reviewed by Michael Paquier
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/16e9b768-fd78-0b12-cfc1-7b6b7f238fde@iki.fi
In the backend, this is just to silence coverity warnings, but in the
frontend, it's a genuine leak, even if extremely rare.
Spotted by Coverity, patch by Michael Paquier.
* Remove is_scram_verifier() function. It was unused.
* Fix sanitize_char() function, used in error messages on protocol
violations, to print bytes >= 0x7F correctly.
* Change spelling of scram_MockSalt() function to be more consistent with
the surroundings.
* Change a few more references to "server proof" to "server signature" that
I missed in commit d981074c24.
Instead, send the same FATAL message as with other password-based
authentication mechanisms. This gives a more user-friendly message:
psql: FATAL: password authentication failed for user "test"
instead of:
psql: error received from server in SASL exchange: invalid-proof
Even before this patch, the server sent that FATAL message, after the
SCRAM-specific "e=invalid-proof" message. But libpq would stop at the
SCRAM error message, and not process the ErrorResponse that would come
after that. We could've taught libpq to check for an ErrorResponse after
failed authentication, but it's simpler to modify the server to send only
the ErrorResponse. The SCRAM specification allows for aborting the
authentication at any point, using an application-defined error mechanism,
like PostgreSQL's ErrorResponse. Using the e=invalid-proof message is
optional.
Reported by Jeff Janes.
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAMkU%3D1w3jQ53M1OeNfN8Cxd9O%2BA_9VONJivTbYoYRRdRsLT6vA@mail.gmail.com
* Move computation of SaltedPassword to a separate function from
scram_ClientOrServerKey(). This saves a lot of cycles in libpq, by
computing SaltedPassword only once per authentication. (Computing
SaltedPassword is expensive by design.)
* Split scram_ClientOrServerKey() into two functions. Improves
readability, by making the calling code less verbose.
* Rename "server proof" to "server signature", to better match the
nomenclature used in RFC 5802.
* Rename SCRAM_SALT_LEN to SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN, to make it more clear
that the salt can be of any length, and the constant only specifies how
long a salt we use when we generate a new verifier. Also rename
SCRAM_ITERATIONS_DEFAULT to SCRAM_DEFAULT_ITERATIONS, for consistency.
These things caught my eye while working on other upcoming changes.
It doesn't make any immediate difference to PostgreSQL, but might as well
follow the standard, since one exists. (I looked at RFC 5803 earlier, but
didn't fully understand it back then.)
The new format uses Base64 instead of hex to encode StoredKey and
ServerKey, which makes the verifiers slightly smaller. Using the same
encoding for the salt and the keys also means that you only need one
encoder/decoder instead of two. Although we have code in the backend to
do both, we are talking about teaching libpq how to create SCRAM verifiers
for PQencodePassword(), and libpq doesn't currently have any code for hex
encoding.
Bump catversion, because this renders any existing SCRAM verifiers in
pg_authid invalid.
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/351ba574-85ea-d9b8-9689-8c928dd0955d@iki.fi
Per discussion, plain "scram" is confusing because we actually implement
SCRAM-SHA-256 rather than the original SCRAM that uses SHA-1 as the hash
algorithm. If we add support for SCRAM-SHA-512 or some other mechanism in
the SCRAM family in the future, that would become even more confusing.
Most of the internal files and functions still use just "scram" as a
shorthand for SCRMA-SHA-256, but I did change PASSWORD_TYPE_SCRAM to
PASSWORD_TYPE_SCRAM_SHA_256, as that could potentially be used by 3rd
party extensions that hook into the password-check hook.
Michael Paquier did this in an earlier version of the SCRAM patch set
already, but I didn't include that in the version that was committed.
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/fde71ff1-5858-90c8-99a9-1c2427e7bafb@iki.fi
This contains some protocol changes to SASL authentiation (which is new
in v10):
* For future-proofing, in the AuthenticationSASL message that begins SASL
authentication, provide a list of SASL mechanisms that the server
supports, for the client to choose from. Currently, it's always just
SCRAM-SHA-256.
* Add a separate authentication message type for the final server->client
SASL message, which the client doesn't need to respond to. This makes
it unambiguous whether the client is supposed to send a response or not.
The SASL mechanism should know that anyway, but better to be explicit.
Also, in the server, support clients that don't send an Initial Client
response in the first SASLInitialResponse message. The server is supposed
to first send an empty request in that case, to which the client will
respond with the data that usually comes in the Initial Client Response.
libpq uses the Initial Client Response field and doesn't need this, and I
would assume any other sensible implementation to use Initial Client
Response, too, but let's follow the SASL spec.
Improve the documentation on SASL authentication in protocol. Add a
section describing the SASL message flow, and some details on our
SCRAM-SHA-256 implementation.
Document the different kinds of PasswordMessages that the frontend sends
in different phases of SASL authentication, as well as GSS/SSPI
authentication as separate message formats. Even though they're all 'p'
messages, and the exact format depends on the context, describing them as
separate message formats makes the documentation more clear.
Reviewed by Michael Paquier and Álvaro Hernández Tortosa.
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqS-aFg0iM3AQOJwKDv_0WkAedRjs1W2X8EixSz+sKBXCQ@mail.gmail.com
Free each SASL message after sending it. It's not a lot of wasted memory,
and it's short-lived, but the authentication code in general tries to
pfree() stuff, so let's follow the example.
Adding the pfree() revealed a little bug in build_server_first_message().
It attempts to keeps a copy of the sent message, but it was missing a
pstrdup(), so the pointer started to dangle, after adding the pfree()
into CheckSCRAMAuth().
Reword comments and debug messages slightly, while we're at it.
Reviewed by Michael Paquier.
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/6490b975-5ee1-6280-ac1d-af975b19fb9a@iki.fi
This used to mean "Visual C++ except in those parts where Borland C++
was supported where it meant one of those". Now that we don't support
Borland C++ anymore, simplify by using _MSC_VER which is the normal way
to detect Visual C++.
An important step of SASLprep normalization, is to convert the string to
Unicode normalization form NFKC. Unicode normalization requires a fairly
large table of character decompositions, which is generated from data
published by the Unicode consortium. The script to generate the table is
put in src/common/unicode, as well test code for the normalization.
A pre-generated version of the tables is included in src/include/common,
so you don't need the code in src/common/unicode to build PostgreSQL, only
if you wish to modify the normalization tables.
The SASLprep implementation depends on the UTF-8 functions from
src/backend/utils/mb/wchar.c. So to use it, you must also compile and link
that. That doesn't change anything for the current users of these
functions, the backend and libpq, as they both already link with wchar.o.
It would be good to move those functions into a separate file in
src/commmon, but I'll leave that for another day.
No documentation changes included, because there is no details on the
SCRAM mechanism in the docs anyway. An overview on that in the protocol
specification would probably be good, even though SCRAM is documented in
detail in RFC5802. I'll write that as a separate patch. An important thing
to mention there is that we apply SASLprep even on invalid UTF-8 strings,
to support other encodings.
Patch by Michael Paquier and me.
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqSByyEmAVLtEf1KxTRh=PWNKiWKEKQR=e1yGehz=wbymQ@mail.gmail.com
It was not used for what the comment claimed, at all. It was actually used
as the 'base' argument to strtol(), when reading the iteration count. We
don't need a constant for base-10, so remove it.
The compiler is entitled to store a char[] local variable with no
particular alignment requirement. Our RADIUS code cavalierly took such
a local variable and cast its address to a struct type that does have
alignment requirements. On an alignment-picky machine this would lead
to bus errors. To fix, declare the local variable honestly, and then
cast its address to char * for use in the I/O calls.
Given the lack of field complaints, there must be very few if any
people affected; but nonetheless this is a clear portability issue,
so back-patch to all supported branches.
Noted while looking at a Coverity complaint in the same code.
Failure to free serveraddrs pointed out by Coverity, failure to close
socket noted by code-reading. These bugs seem to be quite old, but
given the low probability of taking these error-exit paths and the
minimal consequences of the leaks (since the process would presumably
exit shortly anyway), it doesn't seem worth back-patching.
Michael Paquier and Tom Lane
If a user has a SCRAM verifier in pg_authid.rolpassword, there's no reason
we cannot attempt to perform SCRAM authentication instead of MD5. The worst
that can happen is that the client doesn't support SCRAM, and the
authentication will fail. But previously, it would fail for sure, because
we would not even try. SCRAM is strictly more secure than MD5, so there's
no harm in trying it. This allows for a more graceful transition from MD5
passwords to SCRAM, as user passwords can be changed to SCRAM verifiers
incrementally, without changing pg_hba.conf.
Refactor the code in auth.c to support that better. Notably, we now have to
look up the user's pg_authid entry before sending the password challenge,
also when performing MD5 authentication. Also simplify the concept of a
"doomed" authentication. Previously, if a user had a password, but it had
expired, we still performed SCRAM authentication (but always returned error
at the end) using the salt and iteration count from the expired password.
Now we construct a fake salt, like we do when the user doesn't have a
password or doesn't exist at all. That simplifies get_role_password(), and
we can don't need to distinguish the "user has expired password", and
"user does not exist" cases in auth.c.
On second thoughts, also rename uaSASL to uaSCRAM. It refers to the
mechanism specified in pg_hba.conf, and while we use SASL for SCRAM
authentication at the protocol level, the mechanism should be called SCRAM,
not SASL. As a comparison, we have uaLDAP, even though it looks like the
plain 'password' authentication at the protocol level.
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/6425.1489506016@sss.pgh.pa.us
Reviewed-by: Michael Paquier
This changes all the RADIUS related parameters (radiusserver,
radiussecret, radiusport, radiusidentifier) to be plural and to accept a
comma separated list of servers, which will be tried in order.
Reviewed by Adam Brightwell
Logical replication no longer uses the "replication" keyword. It just
matches database entries in the normal way. The "replication" keyword
now only applies to physical replication.
Reviewed-by: Petr Jelinek <petr.jelinek@2ndquadrant.com>
This makes almost all core code follow the policy introduced in the
previous commit. Specific decisions:
- Text search support functions with char* and length arguments, such as
prsstart and lexize, may receive unaligned strings. I doubt
maintainers of non-core text search code will notice.
- Use plain VARDATA() on values detoasted or synthesized earlier in the
same function. Use VARDATA_ANY() on varlenas sourced outside the
function, even if they happen to always have four-byte headers. As an
exception, retain the universal practice of using VARDATA() on return
values of SendFunctionCall().
- Retain PG_GETARG_BYTEA_P() in pageinspect. (Page images are too large
for a one-byte header, so this misses no optimization.) Sites that do
not call get_page_from_raw() typically need the four-byte alignment.
- For now, do not change btree_gist. Its use of four-byte headers in
memory is partly entangled with storage of 4-byte headers inside
GBT_VARKEY, on disk.
- For now, do not change gtrgm_consistent() or gtrgm_distance(). They
incorporate the varlena header into a cache, and there are multiple
credible implementation strategies to consider.
This could only matter if the guessed_type variable had a value that wasn't
a member of the PasswordType enum; but just in case, let's be sure that
control falls out to reach the elog(ERROR) at the end of the function.
Per gripe from Coverity.
When one of the kernel calls in the socket()/bind()/listen() sequence
fails, include the specific address we're trying to bind to in the log
message. This greatly eases debugging of network misconfigurations.
Also, after successfully setting up a listen socket, report its address
in the log, to ease verification that the expected addresses were bound.
There was some debate about whether to print this message at LOG level or
only DEBUG1, but the majority of votes were for the former.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/9564.1489091245@sss.pgh.pa.us
initdb now initializes a pg_hba.conf that allows replication connections
from the local host, same as it does for regular connections. The
connecting user still needs to have the REPLICATION attribute or be a
superuser.
The intent is to allow pg_basebackup from the local host to succeed
without requiring additional configuration.
Michael Paquier <michael.paquier@gmail.com> and me
This introduces a new generic SASL authentication method, similar to the
GSS and SSPI methods. The server first tells the client which SASL
authentication mechanism to use, and then the mechanism-specific SASL
messages are exchanged in AuthenticationSASLcontinue and PasswordMessage
messages. Only SCRAM-SHA-256 is supported at the moment, but this allows
adding more SASL mechanisms in the future, without changing the overall
protocol.
Support for channel binding, aka SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS is left for later.
The SASLPrep algorithm, for pre-processing the password, is not yet
implemented. That could cause trouble, if you use a password with
non-ASCII characters, and a client library that does implement SASLprep.
That will hopefully be added later.
Authorization identities, as specified in the SCRAM-SHA-256 specification,
are ignored. SET SESSION AUTHORIZATION provides more or less the same
functionality, anyway.
If a user doesn't exist, perform a "mock" authentication, by constructing
an authentic-looking challenge on the fly. The challenge is derived from
a new system-wide random value, "mock authentication nonce", which is
created at initdb, and stored in the control file. We go through these
motions, in order to not give away the information on whether the user
exists, to unauthenticated users.
Bumps PG_CONTROL_VERSION, because of the new field in control file.
Patch by Michael Paquier and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed at different
stages by Robert Haas, Stephen Frost, David Steele, Aleksander Alekseev,
and many others.
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqRbR3GmFYdedCAhzukfKrgBLTLtMvENOmPrVWREsZkF8g%40mail.gmail.com
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/CAB7nPqSMXU35g%3DW9X74HVeQp0uvgJxvYOuA4A-A3M%2B0wfEBv-w%40mail.gmail.com
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/55192AFE.6080106@iki.fi
We had some AC_CHECK_HEADER tests that were really wastes of cycles,
because the code proceeded to #include those headers unconditionally
anyway, in all or a large majority of cases. The lack of complaints
shows that those headers are available on every platform of interest,
so we might as well let configure run a bit faster by not probing
those headers at all.
I suspect that some of the tests I left alone are equally useless, but
since all the existing #includes of the remaining headers are properly
guarded, I didn't touch them.
c.h #includes a number of core libc header files, such as <stdio.h>.
There's no point in re-including these after having read postgres.h,
postgres_fe.h, or c.h; so remove code that did so.
While at it, also fix some places that were ignoring our standard pattern
of "include postgres[_fe].h, then system header files, then other Postgres
header files". While there's not any great magic in doing it that way
rather than system headers last, it's silly to have just a few files
deviating from the general pattern. (But I didn't attempt to enforce this
globally, only in files I was touching anyway.)
I'd be the first to say that this is mostly compulsive neatnik-ism,
but over time it might save enough compile cycles to be useful.
The rule is that if pg_authid.rolpassword begins with "md5" and has the
right length, it's an MD5 hash, otherwise it's a plaintext password. The
idiom has been to use isMD5() to check for that, but that gets awkward,
when we add new kinds of verifiers, like the verifiers for SCRAM
authentication in the pending SCRAM patch set. Replace isMD5() with a new
get_password_type() function, so that when new verifier types are added, we
don't need to remember to modify every place that currently calls isMD5(),
to also recognize the new kinds of verifiers.
Also, use the new plain_crypt_verify function in passwordcheck, so that it
doesn't need to know about MD5, or in the future, about other kinds of
hashes or password verifiers.
Reviewed by Michael Paquier and Peter Eisentraut.
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/2d07165c-1793-e243-a2a9-e45b624c7580@iki.fi
next_token() oddly set its buffer space consumption limit to one before
the last char position in the buffer, not the last as you'd expect.
The reason is there was once an ugly kluge to mark keywords by appending
a newline to them, potentially requiring one more byte. Commit e5e2fc842
removed that kluge, but failed to notice that the length limit could be
increased.
Also, remove some vestigial handling of newline characters in the buffer.
That was left over from when this function read the file directly using
getc(). Commit 7f49a67f9 changed it to read from a buffer, from which
tokenize_file had already removed the only possible occurrence of newline,
but did not simplify this function in consequence.
Also, ensure that we don't return with *lineptr set to someplace past the
terminating '\0'; that would be catastrophic if a caller were to ask for
another token from the same line. This is just latent since no callers
actually do call again after a "false" return; but considering that it was
actually costing us extra code to do it wrong, we might as well make it
bulletproof.
Noted while reviewing pg_hba_file_rules patch.
This view is designed along the same lines as pg_file_settings, to wit
it shows what is currently in the file, not what the postmaster has
loaded as the active settings. That allows it to be used to pre-vet
edits before issuing SIGHUP. As with the earlier view, go out of our
way to allow errors in the file to be reflected in the view, to assist
that use-case.
(We might at some point invent a view to show the current active settings,
but this is not that patch; and it's not trivial to do.)
Haribabu Kommi, reviewed by Ashutosh Bapat, Michael Paquier, Simon Riggs,
and myself
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CAJrrPGerH4jiwpcXT1-46QXUDmNp2QDrG9+-Tek_xC8APHShYw@mail.gmail.com
tokenize_file() now returns a single list of TokenizedLine structs,
carrying the same information as before. We were otherwise going to grow a
fourth list to deal with error messages, and that was getting a bit silly.
Haribabu Kommi, revised a bit by me
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CAJrrPGfbgbKsjYp=bgZXhMcgxoaGSoBb9fyjrDoOW_YymXv1Kw@mail.gmail.com
Leave OpenSSL's default passphrase collection callback in place during
the first call of secure_initialize() in server startup. Although that
doesn't work terribly well in daemon contexts, some people feel we should
not break it for anyone who was successfully using it before. We still
block passphrase demands during SIGHUP, meaning that you can't adjust SSL
configuration on-the-fly if you used a passphrase, but this is no worse
than what it was before commit de41869b6. And we block passphrase demands
during EXEC_BACKEND reloads; that behavior wasn't useful either, but at
least now it's documented.
Tweak some related log messages for more readability, and avoid issuing
essentially duplicate messages about reload failure caused by a passphrase.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/29982.1483412575@sss.pgh.pa.us
Heikki Linnakangas
Tom Lane
Andres Freund
Bruce Momjian
Magnus Hagander
Peter Eisentraut
Noah Misch