Improve description of the vacuum_freeze_table_age bug (it's much more
serious than we realized at the time the fix was committed), and correct
attribution of pg_upgrade -O/-o fix (Marti Raudsepp contributed that,
but Bruce forgot to credit him in the commit log).
No need to back-patch right now, it'll happen when the next set of
release notes are prepared.
This function was misdeclared to take cstring when it should take internal.
This at least allows crashing the server, and in principle an attacker
might be able to use the function to examine the contents of server memory.
The correct fix is to adjust the system catalog contents (and fix the
regression tests that should have caught this but failed to). However,
asking users to correct the catalog contents in existing installations
is a pain, so as a band-aid fix for the back branches, install a check
in enum_recv() to make it throw error if called with a cstring argument.
We will later revert this in HEAD in favor of correcting the catalogs.
Our thanks to Sumit Soni (via Secunia SVCRP) for reporting this issue.
Security: CVE-2013-0255
format.
Modify PQescapeStringConn() docs to be consisent with other escaping
functions.
Add mention problems with pre-9.0 versions of libpq using not understanding
bytea hex format to the 9.0 release notes.
Backpatch to 9.0 docs.
This patch adds the server infrastructure to support extensions.
There is still one significant loose end, namely how to make it play nice
with pg_upgrade, so I am not yet committing the changes that would make
all the contrib modules depend on this feature.
In passing, fix a disturbingly large amount of breakage in
AlterObjectNamespace() and callers.
Dimitri Fontaine, reviewed by Anssi Kääriäinen,
Itagaki Takahiro, Tom Lane, and numerous others
There are numerous methods by which a Perl or Tcl function can subvert
the behavior of another such function executed later; for example, by
redefining standard functions or operators called by the target function.
If the target function is SECURITY DEFINER, or is called by such a
function, this means that any ordinary SQL user with Perl or Tcl language
usage rights can do essentially anything with the privileges of the target
function's owner.
To close this security hole, create a separate Perl or Tcl interpreter for
each SQL userid under which plperl or pltcl functions are executed within
a session. However, all plperlu or pltclu functions run within a session
still share a single interpreter, since they all execute at the trust
level of a database superuser anyway.
Note: this change results in a functionality loss when libperl has been
built without the "multiplicity" option: it's no longer possible to call
plperl functions under different userids in one session, since such a
libperl can't support multiple interpreters in one process. However, such
a libperl already failed to support concurrent use of plperl and plperlu,
so it's likely that few people use such versions with Postgres.
Security: CVE-2010-3433
