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postgresql/src/backend/commands/user.c

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/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*
* user.c
* Commands for manipulating roles (formerly called users).
*
* Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2023, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
* Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
*
* src/backend/commands/user.c
*
*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
#include "postgres.h"
#include "access/genam.h"
#include "access/htup_details.h"
#include "access/table.h"
#include "access/xact.h"
#include "catalog/binary_upgrade.h"
#include "catalog/catalog.h"
#include "catalog/dependency.h"
#include "catalog/indexing.h"
#include "catalog/objectaccess.h"
#include "catalog/pg_auth_members.h"
#include "catalog/pg_authid.h"
#include "catalog/pg_database.h"
#include "catalog/pg_db_role_setting.h"
#include "commands/comment.h"
#include "commands/dbcommands.h"
#include "commands/defrem.h"
#include "commands/seclabel.h"
#include "commands/user.h"
#include "libpq/crypt.h"
#include "miscadmin.h"
#include "storage/lmgr.h"
#include "utils/acl.h"
#include "utils/builtins.h"
#include "utils/catcache.h"
#include "utils/fmgroids.h"
#include "utils/syscache.h"
#include "utils/timestamp.h"
#include "utils/varlena.h"
/*
* Removing a role grant - or the admin option on it - might recurse to
* dependent grants. We use these values to reason about what would need to
* be done in such cases.
*
* RRG_NOOP indicates a grant that would not need to be altered by the
* operation.
*
* RRG_REMOVE_ADMIN_OPTION indicates a grant that would need to have
* admin_option set to false by the operation.
*
* Similarly, RRG_REMOVE_INHERIT_OPTION and RRG_REMOVE_SET_OPTION indicate
* grants that would need to have the corresponding options set to false.
*
* RRG_DELETE_GRANT indicates a grant that would need to be removed entirely
* by the operation.
*/
typedef enum
{
RRG_NOOP,
RRG_REMOVE_ADMIN_OPTION,
RRG_REMOVE_INHERIT_OPTION,
RRG_REMOVE_SET_OPTION,
RRG_DELETE_GRANT
} RevokeRoleGrantAction;
/* Potentially set by pg_upgrade_support functions */
Oid binary_upgrade_next_pg_authid_oid = InvalidOid;
typedef struct
{
unsigned specified;
bool admin;
bool inherit;
bool set;
} GrantRoleOptions;
#define GRANT_ROLE_SPECIFIED_ADMIN 0x0001
#define GRANT_ROLE_SPECIFIED_INHERIT 0x0002
#define GRANT_ROLE_SPECIFIED_SET 0x0004
/* GUC parameters */
int Password_encryption = PASSWORD_TYPE_SCRAM_SHA_256;
char *createrole_self_grant = "";
bool createrole_self_grant_enabled = false;
GrantRoleOptions createrole_self_grant_options;
/* Hook to check passwords in CreateRole() and AlterRole() */
check_password_hook_type check_password_hook = NULL;
static void AddRoleMems(Oid currentUserId, const char *rolename, Oid roleid,
List *memberSpecs, List *memberIds,
Oid grantorId, GrantRoleOptions *popt);
static void DelRoleMems(Oid currentUserId, const char *rolename, Oid roleid,
List *memberSpecs, List *memberIds,
Oid grantorId, GrantRoleOptions *popt,
DropBehavior behavior);
static void check_role_membership_authorization(Oid currentUserId, Oid roleid,
bool is_grant);
static Oid check_role_grantor(Oid currentUserId, Oid roleid, Oid grantorId,
bool is_grant);
static RevokeRoleGrantAction *initialize_revoke_actions(CatCList *memlist);
static bool plan_single_revoke(CatCList *memlist,
RevokeRoleGrantAction *actions,
Oid member, Oid grantor,
GrantRoleOptions *popt,
DropBehavior behavior);
static void plan_member_revoke(CatCList *memlist,
RevokeRoleGrantAction *actions, Oid member);
static void plan_recursive_revoke(CatCList *memlist,
RevokeRoleGrantAction *actions,
int index,
bool revoke_admin_option_only,
DropBehavior behavior);
static void InitGrantRoleOptions(GrantRoleOptions *popt);
/* Check if current user has createrole privileges */
static bool
have_createrole_privilege(void)
{
return has_createrole_privilege(GetUserId());
}
/*
* CREATE ROLE
*/
Oid
CreateRole(ParseState *pstate, CreateRoleStmt *stmt)
{
Relation pg_authid_rel;
TupleDesc pg_authid_dsc;
HeapTuple tuple;
Datum new_record[Natts_pg_authid] = {0};
bool new_record_nulls[Natts_pg_authid] = {0};
Oid currentUserId = GetUserId();
Oid roleid;
ListCell *item;
ListCell *option;
char *password = NULL; /* user password */
bool issuper = false; /* Make the user a superuser? */
bool inherit = true; /* Auto inherit privileges? */
bool createrole = false; /* Can this user create roles? */
bool createdb = false; /* Can the user create databases? */
bool canlogin = false; /* Can this user login? */
bool isreplication = false; /* Is this a replication role? */
bool bypassrls = false; /* Is this a row security enabled role? */
int connlimit = -1; /* maximum connections allowed */
List *addroleto = NIL; /* roles to make this a member of */
List *rolemembers = NIL; /* roles to be members of this role */
List *adminmembers = NIL; /* roles to be admins of this role */
char *validUntil = NULL; /* time the login is valid until */
Datum validUntil_datum; /* same, as timestamptz Datum */
bool validUntil_null;
DefElem *dpassword = NULL;
DefElem *dissuper = NULL;
DefElem *dinherit = NULL;
DefElem *dcreaterole = NULL;
DefElem *dcreatedb = NULL;
DefElem *dcanlogin = NULL;
DefElem *disreplication = NULL;
DefElem *dconnlimit = NULL;
DefElem *daddroleto = NULL;
DefElem *drolemembers = NULL;
DefElem *dadminmembers = NULL;
DefElem *dvalidUntil = NULL;
DefElem *dbypassRLS = NULL;
GrantRoleOptions popt;
/* The defaults can vary depending on the original statement type */
switch (stmt->stmt_type)
{
case ROLESTMT_ROLE:
break;
case ROLESTMT_USER:
canlogin = true;
/* may eventually want inherit to default to false here */
break;
case ROLESTMT_GROUP:
break;
}
/* Extract options from the statement node tree */
foreach(option, stmt->options)
{
DefElem *defel = (DefElem *) lfirst(option);
if (strcmp(defel->defname, "password") == 0)
{
if (dpassword)
errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate);
dpassword = defel;
}
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "sysid") == 0)
{
ereport(NOTICE,
(errmsg("SYSID can no longer be specified")));
}
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "superuser") == 0)
{
if (dissuper)
errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate);
dissuper = defel;
}
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "inherit") == 0)
{
if (dinherit)
errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate);
dinherit = defel;
}
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "createrole") == 0)
{
if (dcreaterole)
errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate);
dcreaterole = defel;
}
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "createdb") == 0)
{
if (dcreatedb)
errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate);
dcreatedb = defel;
}
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "canlogin") == 0)
{
if (dcanlogin)
errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate);
dcanlogin = defel;
}
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "isreplication") == 0)
{
if (disreplication)
errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate);
disreplication = defel;
}
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "connectionlimit") == 0)
{
if (dconnlimit)
errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate);
dconnlimit = defel;
}
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "addroleto") == 0)
{
if (daddroleto)
errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate);
daddroleto = defel;
}
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "rolemembers") == 0)
{
if (drolemembers)
errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate);
drolemembers = defel;
}
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "adminmembers") == 0)
{
if (dadminmembers)
errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate);
dadminmembers = defel;
}
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "validUntil") == 0)
{
if (dvalidUntil)
errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate);
dvalidUntil = defel;
}
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "bypassrls") == 0)
{
if (dbypassRLS)
errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate);
dbypassRLS = defel;
}
else
elog(ERROR, "option \"%s\" not recognized",
defel->defname);
}
if (dpassword && dpassword->arg)
password = strVal(dpassword->arg);
if (dissuper)
issuper = boolVal(dissuper->arg);
if (dinherit)
inherit = boolVal(dinherit->arg);
if (dcreaterole)
createrole = boolVal(dcreaterole->arg);
if (dcreatedb)
createdb = boolVal(dcreatedb->arg);
if (dcanlogin)
canlogin = boolVal(dcanlogin->arg);
if (disreplication)
isreplication = boolVal(disreplication->arg);
if (dconnlimit)
{
connlimit = intVal(dconnlimit->arg);
if (connlimit < -1)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
errmsg("invalid connection limit: %d", connlimit)));
}
if (daddroleto)
addroleto = (List *) daddroleto->arg;
if (drolemembers)
rolemembers = (List *) drolemembers->arg;
if (dadminmembers)
adminmembers = (List *) dadminmembers->arg;
if (dvalidUntil)
validUntil = strVal(dvalidUntil->arg);
if (dbypassRLS)
bypassrls = boolVal(dbypassRLS->arg);
/* Check some permissions first */
if (!superuser_arg(currentUserId))
{
if (!has_createrole_privilege(currentUserId))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
errmsg("permission denied to create role"),
errdetail("Only roles with the %s attribute may create roles.",
"CREATEROLE")));
if (issuper)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
errmsg("permission denied to create role"),
errdetail("Only roles with the %s attribute may create roles with %s.",
"SUPERUSER", "SUPERUSER")));
if (createdb && !have_createdb_privilege())
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
errmsg("permission denied to create role"),
errdetail("Only roles with the %s attribute may create roles with %s.",
"CREATEDB", "CREATEDB")));
if (isreplication && !has_rolreplication(currentUserId))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
errmsg("permission denied to create role"),
errdetail("Only roles with the %s attribute may create roles with %s.",
"REPLICATION", "REPLICATION")));
if (bypassrls && !has_bypassrls_privilege(currentUserId))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
errmsg("permission denied to create role"),
errdetail("Only roles with the %s attribute may create roles with %s.",
"BYPASSRLS", "BYPASSRLS")));
}
/*
* Check that the user is not trying to create a role in the reserved
* "pg_" namespace.
*/
if (IsReservedName(stmt->role))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_RESERVED_NAME),
errmsg("role name \"%s\" is reserved",
stmt->role),
errdetail("Role names starting with \"pg_\" are reserved.")));
/*
* If built with appropriate switch, whine when regression-testing
* conventions for role names are violated.
*/
#ifdef ENFORCE_REGRESSION_TEST_NAME_RESTRICTIONS
if (strncmp(stmt->role, "regress_", 8) != 0)
elog(WARNING, "roles created by regression test cases should have names starting with \"regress_\"");
#endif
/*
* Check the pg_authid relation to be certain the role doesn't already
* exist.
*/
pg_authid_rel = table_open(AuthIdRelationId, RowExclusiveLock);
pg_authid_dsc = RelationGetDescr(pg_authid_rel);
if (OidIsValid(get_role_oid(stmt->role, true)))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_DUPLICATE_OBJECT),
errmsg("role \"%s\" already exists",
stmt->role)));
/* Convert validuntil to internal form */
if (validUntil)
{
validUntil_datum = DirectFunctionCall3(timestamptz_in,
CStringGetDatum(validUntil),
ObjectIdGetDatum(InvalidOid),
Int32GetDatum(-1));
validUntil_null = false;
}
else
{
validUntil_datum = (Datum) 0;
validUntil_null = true;
}
/*
* Call the password checking hook if there is one defined
*/
if (check_password_hook && password)
(*check_password_hook) (stmt->role,
password,
get_password_type(password),
validUntil_datum,
validUntil_null);
/*
* Build a tuple to insert
*/
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolname - 1] =
DirectFunctionCall1(namein, CStringGetDatum(stmt->role));
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolsuper - 1] = BoolGetDatum(issuper);
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolinherit - 1] = BoolGetDatum(inherit);
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolcreaterole - 1] = BoolGetDatum(createrole);
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolcreatedb - 1] = BoolGetDatum(createdb);
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolcanlogin - 1] = BoolGetDatum(canlogin);
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolreplication - 1] = BoolGetDatum(isreplication);
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolconnlimit - 1] = Int32GetDatum(connlimit);
if (password)
{
char *shadow_pass;
const char *logdetail = NULL;
/*
* Don't allow an empty password. Libpq treats an empty password the
* same as no password at all, and won't even try to authenticate. But
* other clients might, so allowing it would be confusing. By clearing
* the password when an empty string is specified, the account is
* consistently locked for all clients.
*
* Note that this only covers passwords stored in the database itself.
* There are also checks in the authentication code, to forbid an
* empty password from being used with authentication methods that
* fetch the password from an external system, like LDAP or PAM.
*/
if (password[0] == '\0' ||
plain_crypt_verify(stmt->role, password, "", &logdetail) == STATUS_OK)
{
ereport(NOTICE,
(errmsg("empty string is not a valid password, clearing password")));
new_record_nulls[Anum_pg_authid_rolpassword - 1] = true;
}
else
{
/* Encrypt the password to the requested format. */
shadow_pass = encrypt_password(Password_encryption, stmt->role,
password);
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolpassword - 1] =
CStringGetTextDatum(shadow_pass);
}
}
else
new_record_nulls[Anum_pg_authid_rolpassword - 1] = true;
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolvaliduntil - 1] = validUntil_datum;
new_record_nulls[Anum_pg_authid_rolvaliduntil - 1] = validUntil_null;
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolbypassrls - 1] = BoolGetDatum(bypassrls);
/*
* pg_largeobject_metadata contains pg_authid.oid's, so we use the
* binary-upgrade override.
*/
if (IsBinaryUpgrade)
{
if (!OidIsValid(binary_upgrade_next_pg_authid_oid))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
errmsg("pg_authid OID value not set when in binary upgrade mode")));
roleid = binary_upgrade_next_pg_authid_oid;
binary_upgrade_next_pg_authid_oid = InvalidOid;
}
else
{
roleid = GetNewOidWithIndex(pg_authid_rel, AuthIdOidIndexId,
Anum_pg_authid_oid);
}
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_oid - 1] = ObjectIdGetDatum(roleid);
tuple = heap_form_tuple(pg_authid_dsc, new_record, new_record_nulls);
/*
* Insert new record in the pg_authid table
*/
CatalogTupleInsert(pg_authid_rel, tuple);
/*
* Advance command counter so we can see new record; else tests in
* AddRoleMems may fail.
*/
if (addroleto || adminmembers || rolemembers)
CommandCounterIncrement();
/* Default grant. */
InitGrantRoleOptions(&popt);
/*
* Add the new role to the specified existing roles.
*/
if (addroleto)
{
RoleSpec *thisrole = makeNode(RoleSpec);
List *thisrole_list = list_make1(thisrole);
List *thisrole_oidlist = list_make1_oid(roleid);
thisrole->roletype = ROLESPEC_CSTRING;
thisrole->rolename = stmt->role;
thisrole->location = -1;
foreach(item, addroleto)
{
RoleSpec *oldrole = lfirst(item);
HeapTuple oldroletup = get_rolespec_tuple(oldrole);
Form_pg_authid oldroleform = (Form_pg_authid) GETSTRUCT(oldroletup);
Oid oldroleid = oldroleform->oid;
char *oldrolename = NameStr(oldroleform->rolname);
/* can only add this role to roles for which you have rights */
check_role_membership_authorization(currentUserId, oldroleid, true);
AddRoleMems(currentUserId, oldrolename, oldroleid,
thisrole_list,
thisrole_oidlist,
InvalidOid, &popt);
ReleaseSysCache(oldroletup);
}
}
/*
* If the current user isn't a superuser, make them an admin of the new
* role so that they can administer the new object they just created.
* Superusers will be able to do that anyway.
*
* The grantor of record for this implicit grant is the bootstrap
* superuser, which means that the CREATEROLE user cannot revoke the
* grant. They can however grant the created role back to themselves with
* different options, since they enjoy ADMIN OPTION on it.
*/
if (!superuser())
{
RoleSpec *current_role = makeNode(RoleSpec);
GrantRoleOptions poptself;
List *memberSpecs;
List *memberIds = list_make1_oid(currentUserId);
current_role->roletype = ROLESPEC_CURRENT_ROLE;
current_role->location = -1;
memberSpecs = list_make1(current_role);
poptself.specified = GRANT_ROLE_SPECIFIED_ADMIN
| GRANT_ROLE_SPECIFIED_INHERIT
| GRANT_ROLE_SPECIFIED_SET;
poptself.admin = true;
poptself.inherit = false;
poptself.set = false;
AddRoleMems(BOOTSTRAP_SUPERUSERID, stmt->role, roleid,
memberSpecs, memberIds,
BOOTSTRAP_SUPERUSERID, &poptself);
/*
* We must make the implicit grant visible to the code below, else the
* additional grants will fail.
*/
CommandCounterIncrement();
/*
* Because of the implicit grant above, a CREATEROLE user who creates
* a role has the ability to grant that role back to themselves with
* the INHERIT or SET options, if they wish to inherit the role's
* privileges or be able to SET ROLE to it. The createrole_self_grant
* GUC can be used to make this happen automatically. This has no
* security implications since the same user is able to make the same
* grant using an explicit GRANT statement; it's just convenient.
*/
if (createrole_self_grant_enabled)
AddRoleMems(currentUserId, stmt->role, roleid,
memberSpecs, memberIds,
currentUserId, &createrole_self_grant_options);
}
/*
* Add the specified members to this new role. adminmembers get the admin
* option, rolemembers don't.
*
* NB: No permissions check is required here. If you have enough rights to
* create a role, you can add any members you like.
*/
AddRoleMems(currentUserId, stmt->role, roleid,
rolemembers, roleSpecsToIds(rolemembers),
InvalidOid, &popt);
popt.specified |= GRANT_ROLE_SPECIFIED_ADMIN;
popt.admin = true;
AddRoleMems(currentUserId, stmt->role, roleid,
adminmembers, roleSpecsToIds(adminmembers),
InvalidOid, &popt);
/* Post creation hook for new role */
InvokeObjectPostCreateHook(AuthIdRelationId, roleid, 0);
/*
* Close pg_authid, but keep lock till commit.
*/
table_close(pg_authid_rel, NoLock);
return roleid;
}
/*
* ALTER ROLE
*
* Note: the rolemembers option accepted here is intended to support the
* backwards-compatible ALTER GROUP syntax. Although it will work to say
* "ALTER ROLE role ROLE rolenames", we don't document it.
*/
Oid
AlterRole(ParseState *pstate, AlterRoleStmt *stmt)
{
Datum new_record[Natts_pg_authid] = {0};
bool new_record_nulls[Natts_pg_authid] = {0};
bool new_record_repl[Natts_pg_authid] = {0};
Relation pg_authid_rel;
TupleDesc pg_authid_dsc;
HeapTuple tuple,
new_tuple;
Form_pg_authid authform;
ListCell *option;
char *rolename;
char *password = NULL; /* user password */
int connlimit = -1; /* maximum connections allowed */
char *validUntil = NULL; /* time the login is valid until */
Datum validUntil_datum; /* same, as timestamptz Datum */
bool validUntil_null;
DefElem *dpassword = NULL;
DefElem *dissuper = NULL;
DefElem *dinherit = NULL;
DefElem *dcreaterole = NULL;
DefElem *dcreatedb = NULL;
DefElem *dcanlogin = NULL;
DefElem *disreplication = NULL;
DefElem *dconnlimit = NULL;
DefElem *drolemembers = NULL;
DefElem *dvalidUntil = NULL;
DefElem *dbypassRLS = NULL;
Oid roleid;
Oid currentUserId = GetUserId();
GrantRoleOptions popt;
check_rolespec_name(stmt->role,
_("Cannot alter reserved roles."));
/* Extract options from the statement node tree */
foreach(option, stmt->options)
{
DefElem *defel = (DefElem *) lfirst(option);
if (strcmp(defel->defname, "password") == 0)
{
if (dpassword)
errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate);
dpassword = defel;
}
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "superuser") == 0)
{
if (dissuper)
errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate);
dissuper = defel;
}
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "inherit") == 0)
{
if (dinherit)
errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate);
dinherit = defel;
}
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "createrole") == 0)
{
if (dcreaterole)
errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate);
dcreaterole = defel;
}
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "createdb") == 0)
{
if (dcreatedb)
errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate);
dcreatedb = defel;
}
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "canlogin") == 0)
{
if (dcanlogin)
errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate);
dcanlogin = defel;
}
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "isreplication") == 0)
{
if (disreplication)
errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate);
disreplication = defel;
}
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "connectionlimit") == 0)
{
if (dconnlimit)
errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate);
dconnlimit = defel;
}
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "rolemembers") == 0 &&
stmt->action != 0)
{
if (drolemembers)
errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate);
drolemembers = defel;
}
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "validUntil") == 0)
{
if (dvalidUntil)
errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate);
dvalidUntil = defel;
}
else if (strcmp(defel->defname, "bypassrls") == 0)
{
if (dbypassRLS)
errorConflictingDefElem(defel, pstate);
dbypassRLS = defel;
}
else
elog(ERROR, "option \"%s\" not recognized",
defel->defname);
}
if (dpassword && dpassword->arg)
password = strVal(dpassword->arg);
if (dconnlimit)
{
connlimit = intVal(dconnlimit->arg);
if (connlimit < -1)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
errmsg("invalid connection limit: %d", connlimit)));
}
if (dvalidUntil)
validUntil = strVal(dvalidUntil->arg);
/*
* Scan the pg_authid relation to be certain the user exists.
*/
pg_authid_rel = table_open(AuthIdRelationId, RowExclusiveLock);
pg_authid_dsc = RelationGetDescr(pg_authid_rel);
tuple = get_rolespec_tuple(stmt->role);
authform = (Form_pg_authid) GETSTRUCT(tuple);
rolename = pstrdup(NameStr(authform->rolname));
roleid = authform->oid;
/* To mess with a superuser in any way you gotta be superuser. */
if (!superuser() && authform->rolsuper)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
errmsg("permission denied to alter role"),
errdetail("Only roles with the %s attribute may alter roles with %s.",
"SUPERUSER", "SUPERUSER")));
if (!superuser() && dissuper)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
errmsg("permission denied to alter role"),
errdetail("Only roles with the %s attribute may change the %s attribute.",
"SUPERUSER", "SUPERUSER")));
/*
* Most changes to a role require that you both have CREATEROLE privileges
* and also ADMIN OPTION on the role.
*/
if (!have_createrole_privilege() ||
!is_admin_of_role(GetUserId(), roleid))
{
/* things an unprivileged user certainly can't do */
if (dinherit || dcreaterole || dcreatedb || dcanlogin || dconnlimit ||
dvalidUntil || disreplication || dbypassRLS)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
errmsg("permission denied to alter role"),
errdetail("Only roles with the %s attribute and the %s option on role \"%s\" may alter this role.",
"CREATEROLE", "ADMIN", rolename)));
/* an unprivileged user can change their own password */
if (dpassword && roleid != currentUserId)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
errmsg("permission denied to alter role"),
errdetail("To change another role's password, the current user must have the %s attribute and the %s option on the role.",
"CREATEROLE", "ADMIN")));
}
else if (!superuser())
{
/*
* Even if you have both CREATEROLE and ADMIN OPTION on a role, you
* can only change the CREATEDB, REPLICATION, or BYPASSRLS attributes
* if they are set for your own role (or you are the superuser).
*/
if (dcreatedb && !have_createdb_privilege())
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
errmsg("permission denied to alter role"),
errdetail("Only roles with the %s attribute may change the %s attribute.",
"CREATEDB", "CREATEDB")));
if (disreplication && !has_rolreplication(currentUserId))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
errmsg("permission denied to alter role"),
errdetail("Only roles with the %s attribute may change the %s attribute.",
"REPLICATION", "REPLICATION")));
if (dbypassRLS && !has_bypassrls_privilege(currentUserId))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
errmsg("permission denied to alter role"),
errdetail("Only roles with the %s attribute may change the %s attribute.",
"BYPASSRLS", "BYPASSRLS")));
}
/* To add members to a role, you need ADMIN OPTION. */
if (drolemembers && !is_admin_of_role(currentUserId, roleid))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
errmsg("permission denied to alter role"),
errdetail("Only roles with the %s option on role \"%s\" may add members.",
"ADMIN", rolename)));
/* Convert validuntil to internal form */
if (dvalidUntil)
{
validUntil_datum = DirectFunctionCall3(timestamptz_in,
CStringGetDatum(validUntil),
ObjectIdGetDatum(InvalidOid),
Int32GetDatum(-1));
validUntil_null = false;
}
else
{
/* fetch existing setting in case hook needs it */
validUntil_datum = SysCacheGetAttr(AUTHNAME, tuple,
Anum_pg_authid_rolvaliduntil,
&validUntil_null);
}
/*
* Call the password checking hook if there is one defined
*/
if (check_password_hook && password)
(*check_password_hook) (rolename,
password,
get_password_type(password),
validUntil_datum,
validUntil_null);
/*
* Build an updated tuple, perusing the information just obtained
*/
/*
* issuper/createrole/etc
*/
if (dissuper)
{
bool should_be_super = boolVal(dissuper->arg);
if (!should_be_super && roleid == BOOTSTRAP_SUPERUSERID)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
errmsg("permission denied to alter role"),
errdetail("The bootstrap user must have the %s attribute.",
"SUPERUSER")));
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolsuper - 1] = BoolGetDatum(should_be_super);
new_record_repl[Anum_pg_authid_rolsuper - 1] = true;
}
if (dinherit)
{
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolinherit - 1] = BoolGetDatum(boolVal(dinherit->arg));
new_record_repl[Anum_pg_authid_rolinherit - 1] = true;
}
if (dcreaterole)
{
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolcreaterole - 1] = BoolGetDatum(boolVal(dcreaterole->arg));
new_record_repl[Anum_pg_authid_rolcreaterole - 1] = true;
}
if (dcreatedb)
{
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolcreatedb - 1] = BoolGetDatum(boolVal(dcreatedb->arg));
new_record_repl[Anum_pg_authid_rolcreatedb - 1] = true;
}
if (dcanlogin)
{
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolcanlogin - 1] = BoolGetDatum(boolVal(dcanlogin->arg));
new_record_repl[Anum_pg_authid_rolcanlogin - 1] = true;
}
if (disreplication)
{
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolreplication - 1] = BoolGetDatum(boolVal(disreplication->arg));
new_record_repl[Anum_pg_authid_rolreplication - 1] = true;
}
if (dconnlimit)
{
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolconnlimit - 1] = Int32GetDatum(connlimit);
new_record_repl[Anum_pg_authid_rolconnlimit - 1] = true;
}
/* password */
if (password)
{
char *shadow_pass;
const char *logdetail = NULL;
/* Like in CREATE USER, don't allow an empty password. */
if (password[0] == '\0' ||
plain_crypt_verify(rolename, password, "", &logdetail) == STATUS_OK)
{
ereport(NOTICE,
(errmsg("empty string is not a valid password, clearing password")));
new_record_nulls[Anum_pg_authid_rolpassword - 1] = true;
}
else
{
/* Encrypt the password to the requested format. */
shadow_pass = encrypt_password(Password_encryption, rolename,
password);
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolpassword - 1] =
CStringGetTextDatum(shadow_pass);
}
new_record_repl[Anum_pg_authid_rolpassword - 1] = true;
}
/* unset password */
if (dpassword && dpassword->arg == NULL)
{
new_record_repl[Anum_pg_authid_rolpassword - 1] = true;
new_record_nulls[Anum_pg_authid_rolpassword - 1] = true;
}
/* valid until */
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolvaliduntil - 1] = validUntil_datum;
new_record_nulls[Anum_pg_authid_rolvaliduntil - 1] = validUntil_null;
new_record_repl[Anum_pg_authid_rolvaliduntil - 1] = true;
if (dbypassRLS)
{
new_record[Anum_pg_authid_rolbypassrls - 1] = BoolGetDatum(boolVal(dbypassRLS->arg));
new_record_repl[Anum_pg_authid_rolbypassrls - 1] = true;
}
new_tuple = heap_modify_tuple(tuple, pg_authid_dsc, new_record,
new_record_nulls, new_record_repl);
CatalogTupleUpdate(pg_authid_rel, &tuple->t_self, new_tuple);
InvokeObjectPostAlterHook(AuthIdRelationId, roleid, 0);
ReleaseSysCache(tuple);
heap_freetuple(new_tuple);
InitGrantRoleOptions(&popt);
/*
* Advance command counter so we can see new record; else tests in
* AddRoleMems may fail.
*/
if (drolemembers)
{
List *rolemembers = (List *) drolemembers->arg;
CommandCounterIncrement();
if (stmt->action == +1) /* add members to role */
AddRoleMems(currentUserId, rolename, roleid,
rolemembers, roleSpecsToIds(rolemembers),
InvalidOid, &popt);
else if (stmt->action == -1) /* drop members from role */
DelRoleMems(currentUserId, rolename, roleid,
rolemembers, roleSpecsToIds(rolemembers),
InvalidOid, &popt, DROP_RESTRICT);
}
/*
* Close pg_authid, but keep lock till commit.
*/
table_close(pg_authid_rel, NoLock);
return roleid;
}
/*
* ALTER ROLE ... SET
*/
Oid
AlterRoleSet(AlterRoleSetStmt *stmt)
{
HeapTuple roletuple;
Form_pg_authid roleform;
Oid databaseid = InvalidOid;
Oid roleid = InvalidOid;
if (stmt->role)
{
check_rolespec_name(stmt->role,
_("Cannot alter reserved roles."));
roletuple = get_rolespec_tuple(stmt->role);
roleform = (Form_pg_authid) GETSTRUCT(roletuple);
roleid = roleform->oid;
/*
* Obtain a lock on the role and make sure it didn't go away in the
* meantime.
*/
shdepLockAndCheckObject(AuthIdRelationId, roleid);
/*
* To mess with a superuser you gotta be superuser; otherwise you need
* CREATEROLE plus admin option on the target role; unless you're just
* trying to change your own settings
*/
if (roleform->rolsuper)
{
if (!superuser())
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
errmsg("permission denied to alter role"),
errdetail("Only roles with the %s attribute may alter roles with %s.",
"SUPERUSER", "SUPERUSER")));
}
else
{
if ((!have_createrole_privilege() ||
!is_admin_of_role(GetUserId(), roleid))
&& roleid != GetUserId())
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
errmsg("permission denied to alter role"),
errdetail("Only roles with the %s attribute and the %s option on role \"%s\" may alter this role.",
"CREATEROLE", "ADMIN", NameStr(roleform->rolname))));
}
ReleaseSysCache(roletuple);
}
/* look up and lock the database, if specified */
if (stmt->database != NULL)
{
databaseid = get_database_oid(stmt->database, false);
shdepLockAndCheckObject(DatabaseRelationId, databaseid);
if (!stmt->role)
{
/*
* If no role is specified, then this is effectively the same as
* ALTER DATABASE ... SET, so use the same permission check.
*/
if (!object_ownercheck(DatabaseRelationId, databaseid, GetUserId()))
aclcheck_error(ACLCHECK_NOT_OWNER, OBJECT_DATABASE,
stmt->database);
}
}
if (!stmt->role && !stmt->database)
{
/* Must be superuser to alter settings globally. */
if (!superuser())
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
errmsg("permission denied to alter setting"),
errdetail("Only roles with the %s attribute may alter settings globally.",
"SUPERUSER")));
}
AlterSetting(databaseid, roleid, stmt->setstmt);
return roleid;
}
/*
* DROP ROLE
*/
void
DropRole(DropRoleStmt *stmt)
{
Relation pg_authid_rel,
pg_auth_members_rel;
ListCell *item;
List *role_addresses = NIL;
if (!have_createrole_privilege())
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
errmsg("permission denied to drop role"),
errdetail("Only roles with the %s attribute and the %s option on the target roles may drop roles.",
"CREATEROLE", "ADMIN")));
/*
* Scan the pg_authid relation to find the Oid of the role(s) to be
* deleted and perform preliminary permissions and sanity checks.
*/
pg_authid_rel = table_open(AuthIdRelationId, RowExclusiveLock);
pg_auth_members_rel = table_open(AuthMemRelationId, RowExclusiveLock);
foreach(item, stmt->roles)
{
RoleSpec *rolspec = lfirst(item);
char *role;
HeapTuple tuple,
tmp_tuple;
Form_pg_authid roleform;
ScanKeyData scankey;
SysScanDesc sscan;
Oid roleid;
ObjectAddress *role_address;
if (rolspec->roletype != ROLESPEC_CSTRING)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
errmsg("cannot use special role specifier in DROP ROLE")));
role = rolspec->rolename;
tuple = SearchSysCache1(AUTHNAME, PointerGetDatum(role));
if (!HeapTupleIsValid(tuple))
{
if (!stmt->missing_ok)
{
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_UNDEFINED_OBJECT),
errmsg("role \"%s\" does not exist", role)));
}
else
{
ereport(NOTICE,
(errmsg("role \"%s\" does not exist, skipping",
role)));
}
continue;
}
roleform = (Form_pg_authid) GETSTRUCT(tuple);
roleid = roleform->oid;
if (roleid == GetUserId())
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_OBJECT_IN_USE),
errmsg("current user cannot be dropped")));
if (roleid == GetOuterUserId())
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_OBJECT_IN_USE),
errmsg("current user cannot be dropped")));
if (roleid == GetSessionUserId())
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_OBJECT_IN_USE),
errmsg("session user cannot be dropped")));
/*
* For safety's sake, we allow createrole holders to drop ordinary
* roles but not superuser roles, and only if they also have ADMIN
* OPTION.
*/
if (roleform->rolsuper && !superuser())
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
errmsg("permission denied to drop role"),
errdetail("Only roles with the %s attribute may drop roles with %s.",
"SUPERUSER", "SUPERUSER")));
if (!is_admin_of_role(GetUserId(), roleid))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
errmsg("permission denied to drop role"),
errdetail("Only roles with the %s attribute and the %s option on role \"%s\" may drop this role.",
"CREATEROLE", "ADMIN", NameStr(roleform->rolname))));
/* DROP hook for the role being removed */
InvokeObjectDropHook(AuthIdRelationId, roleid, 0);
/* Don't leak the syscache tuple */
ReleaseSysCache(tuple);
/*
* Lock the role, so nobody can add dependencies to her while we drop
* her. We keep the lock until the end of transaction.
*/
LockSharedObject(AuthIdRelationId, roleid, 0, AccessExclusiveLock);
/*
* If there is a pg_auth_members entry that has one of the roles to be
* dropped as the roleid or member, it should be silently removed, but
* if there is a pg_auth_members entry that has one of the roles to be
* dropped as the grantor, the operation should fail.
*
* It's possible, however, that a single pg_auth_members entry could
* fall into multiple categories - e.g. the user could do "GRANT foo
* TO bar GRANTED BY baz" and then "DROP ROLE baz, bar". We want such
* an operation to succeed regardless of the order in which the
* to-be-dropped roles are passed to DROP ROLE.
*
* To make that work, we remove all pg_auth_members entries that can
* be silently removed in this loop, and then below we'll make a
* second pass over the list of roles to be removed and check for any
* remaining dependencies.
*/
ScanKeyInit(&scankey,
Anum_pg_auth_members_roleid,
BTEqualStrategyNumber, F_OIDEQ,
ObjectIdGetDatum(roleid));
sscan = systable_beginscan(pg_auth_members_rel, AuthMemRoleMemIndexId,
true, NULL, 1, &scankey);
while (HeapTupleIsValid(tmp_tuple = systable_getnext(sscan)))
{
Form_pg_auth_members authmem_form;
authmem_form = (Form_pg_auth_members) GETSTRUCT(tmp_tuple);
deleteSharedDependencyRecordsFor(AuthMemRelationId,
authmem_form->oid, 0);
CatalogTupleDelete(pg_auth_members_rel, &tmp_tuple->t_self);
}
systable_endscan(sscan);
ScanKeyInit(&scankey,
Anum_pg_auth_members_member,
BTEqualStrategyNumber, F_OIDEQ,
ObjectIdGetDatum(roleid));
sscan = systable_beginscan(pg_auth_members_rel, AuthMemMemRoleIndexId,
true, NULL, 1, &scankey);
while (HeapTupleIsValid(tmp_tuple = systable_getnext(sscan)))
{
Form_pg_auth_members authmem_form;
authmem_form = (Form_pg_auth_members) GETSTRUCT(tmp_tuple);
deleteSharedDependencyRecordsFor(AuthMemRelationId,
authmem_form->oid, 0);
CatalogTupleDelete(pg_auth_members_rel, &tmp_tuple->t_self);
}
systable_endscan(sscan);
/*
* Advance command counter so that later iterations of this loop will
* see the changes already made. This is essential if, for example,
* we are trying to drop both a role and one of its direct members ---
* we'll get an error if we try to delete the linking pg_auth_members
* tuple twice. (We do not need a CCI between the two delete loops
* above, because it's not allowed for a role to directly contain
* itself.)
*/
CommandCounterIncrement();
/* Looks tentatively OK, add it to the list. */
role_address = palloc(sizeof(ObjectAddress));
role_address->classId = AuthIdRelationId;
role_address->objectId = roleid;
role_address->objectSubId = 0;
role_addresses = lappend(role_addresses, role_address);
}
/*
* Second pass over the roles to be removed.
*/
foreach(item, role_addresses)
{
ObjectAddress *role_address = lfirst(item);
Oid roleid = role_address->objectId;
HeapTuple tuple;
Form_pg_authid roleform;
char *detail;
char *detail_log;
/*
* Re-find the pg_authid tuple.
*
* Since we've taken a lock on the role OID, it shouldn't be possible
* for the tuple to have been deleted -- or for that matter updated --
* unless the user is manually modifying the system catalogs.
*/
tuple = SearchSysCache1(AUTHOID, ObjectIdGetDatum(roleid));
if (!HeapTupleIsValid(tuple))
elog(ERROR, "could not find tuple for role %u", roleid);
roleform = (Form_pg_authid) GETSTRUCT(tuple);
/*
* Check for pg_shdepend entries depending on this role.
*
* This needs to happen after we've completed removing any
* pg_auth_members entries that can be removed silently, in order to
* avoid spurious failures. See notes above for more details.
*/
if (checkSharedDependencies(AuthIdRelationId, roleid,
&detail, &detail_log))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_DEPENDENT_OBJECTS_STILL_EXIST),
errmsg("role \"%s\" cannot be dropped because some objects depend on it",
NameStr(roleform->rolname)),
errdetail_internal("%s", detail),
errdetail_log("%s", detail_log)));
/*
* Remove the role from the pg_authid table
*/
CatalogTupleDelete(pg_authid_rel, &tuple->t_self);
ReleaseSysCache(tuple);
/*
* Remove any comments or security labels on this role.
*/
DeleteSharedComments(roleid, AuthIdRelationId);
DeleteSharedSecurityLabel(roleid, AuthIdRelationId);
/*
* Remove settings for this role.
*/
DropSetting(InvalidOid, roleid);
}
/*
* Now we can clean up; but keep locks until commit.
*/
table_close(pg_auth_members_rel, NoLock);
table_close(pg_authid_rel, NoLock);
}
/*
* Rename role
*/
ObjectAddress
RenameRole(const char *oldname, const char *newname)
{
HeapTuple oldtuple,
newtuple;
TupleDesc dsc;
Relation rel;
Datum datum;
bool isnull;
Datum repl_val[Natts_pg_authid];
bool repl_null[Natts_pg_authid];
bool repl_repl[Natts_pg_authid];
int i;
Oid roleid;
ObjectAddress address;
Form_pg_authid authform;
rel = table_open(AuthIdRelationId, RowExclusiveLock);
dsc = RelationGetDescr(rel);
oldtuple = SearchSysCache1(AUTHNAME, CStringGetDatum(oldname));
if (!HeapTupleIsValid(oldtuple))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_UNDEFINED_OBJECT),
errmsg("role \"%s\" does not exist", oldname)));
/*
* XXX Client applications probably store the session user somewhere, so
* renaming it could cause confusion. On the other hand, there may not be
* an actual problem besides a little confusion, so think about this and
* decide. Same for SET ROLE ... we don't restrict renaming the current
* effective userid, though.
*/
authform = (Form_pg_authid) GETSTRUCT(oldtuple);
roleid = authform->oid;
if (roleid == GetSessionUserId())
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
errmsg("session user cannot be renamed")));
if (roleid == GetOuterUserId())
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
errmsg("current user cannot be renamed")));
/*
* Check that the user is not trying to rename a system role and not
* trying to rename a role into the reserved "pg_" namespace.
*/
if (IsReservedName(NameStr(authform->rolname)))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_RESERVED_NAME),
errmsg("role name \"%s\" is reserved",
NameStr(authform->rolname)),
errdetail("Role names starting with \"pg_\" are reserved.")));
if (IsReservedName(newname))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_RESERVED_NAME),
errmsg("role name \"%s\" is reserved",
newname),
errdetail("Role names starting with \"pg_\" are reserved.")));
/*
* If built with appropriate switch, whine when regression-testing
* conventions for role names are violated.
*/
#ifdef ENFORCE_REGRESSION_TEST_NAME_RESTRICTIONS
if (strncmp(newname, "regress_", 8) != 0)
elog(WARNING, "roles created by regression test cases should have names starting with \"regress_\"");
#endif
/* make sure the new name doesn't exist */
if (SearchSysCacheExists1(AUTHNAME, CStringGetDatum(newname)))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_DUPLICATE_OBJECT),
errmsg("role \"%s\" already exists", newname)));
/*
* Only superusers can mess with superusers. Otherwise, a user with
* CREATEROLE can rename a role for which they have ADMIN OPTION.
*/
if (authform->rolsuper)
{
if (!superuser())
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
errmsg("permission denied to rename role"),
errdetail("Only roles with the %s attribute may rename roles with %s.",
"SUPERUSER", "SUPERUSER")));
}
else
{
if (!have_createrole_privilege() ||
!is_admin_of_role(GetUserId(), roleid))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
errmsg("permission denied to rename role"),
errdetail("Only roles with the %s attribute and the %s option on role \"%s\" may rename this role.",
"CREATEROLE", "ADMIN", NameStr(authform->rolname))));
}
/* OK, construct the modified tuple */
for (i = 0; i < Natts_pg_authid; i++)
repl_repl[i] = false;
repl_repl[Anum_pg_authid_rolname - 1] = true;
repl_val[Anum_pg_authid_rolname - 1] = DirectFunctionCall1(namein,
CStringGetDatum(newname));
repl_null[Anum_pg_authid_rolname - 1] = false;
datum = heap_getattr(oldtuple, Anum_pg_authid_rolpassword, dsc, &isnull);
if (!isnull && get_password_type(TextDatumGetCString(datum)) == PASSWORD_TYPE_MD5)
{
/* MD5 uses the username as salt, so just clear it on a rename */
repl_repl[Anum_pg_authid_rolpassword - 1] = true;
repl_null[Anum_pg_authid_rolpassword - 1] = true;
ereport(NOTICE,
(errmsg("MD5 password cleared because of role rename")));
}
newtuple = heap_modify_tuple(oldtuple, dsc, repl_val, repl_null, repl_repl);
CatalogTupleUpdate(rel, &oldtuple->t_self, newtuple);
InvokeObjectPostAlterHook(AuthIdRelationId, roleid, 0);
ObjectAddressSet(address, AuthIdRelationId, roleid);
ReleaseSysCache(oldtuple);
/*
* Close pg_authid, but keep lock till commit.
*/
table_close(rel, NoLock);
return address;
}
/*
* GrantRoleStmt
*
* Grant/Revoke roles to/from roles
*/
void
GrantRole(ParseState *pstate, GrantRoleStmt *stmt)
{
Relation pg_authid_rel;
Oid grantor;
List *grantee_ids;
ListCell *item;
GrantRoleOptions popt;
Oid currentUserId = GetUserId();
/* Parse options list. */
InitGrantRoleOptions(&popt);
foreach(item, stmt->opt)
{
DefElem *opt = (DefElem *) lfirst(item);
char *optval = defGetString(opt);
if (strcmp(opt->defname, "admin") == 0)
{
popt.specified |= GRANT_ROLE_SPECIFIED_ADMIN;
if (parse_bool(optval, &popt.admin))
continue;
}
else if (strcmp(opt->defname, "inherit") == 0)
{
popt.specified |= GRANT_ROLE_SPECIFIED_INHERIT;
if (parse_bool(optval, &popt.inherit))
continue;
}
else if (strcmp(opt->defname, "set") == 0)
{
popt.specified |= GRANT_ROLE_SPECIFIED_SET;
if (parse_bool(optval, &popt.set))
continue;
}
else
ereport(ERROR,
errcode(ERRCODE_SYNTAX_ERROR),
errmsg("unrecognized role option \"%s\"", opt->defname),
parser_errposition(pstate, opt->location));
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
errmsg("unrecognized value for role option \"%s\": \"%s\"",
opt->defname, optval),
parser_errposition(pstate, opt->location)));
}
/* Lookup OID of grantor, if specified. */
if (stmt->grantor)
grantor = get_rolespec_oid(stmt->grantor, false);
else
grantor = InvalidOid;
grantee_ids = roleSpecsToIds(stmt->grantee_roles);
/* AccessShareLock is enough since we aren't modifying pg_authid */
pg_authid_rel = table_open(AuthIdRelationId, AccessShareLock);
/*
* Step through all of the granted roles and add, update, or remove
* entries in pg_auth_members as appropriate. If stmt->is_grant is true,
* we are adding new grants or, if they already exist, updating options on
* those grants. If stmt->is_grant is false, we are revoking grants or
* removing options from them.
*/
foreach(item, stmt->granted_roles)
{
AccessPriv *priv = (AccessPriv *) lfirst(item);
char *rolename = priv->priv_name;
Oid roleid;
/* Must reject priv(columns) and ALL PRIVILEGES(columns) */
if (rolename == NULL || priv->cols != NIL)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_GRANT_OPERATION),
errmsg("column names cannot be included in GRANT/REVOKE ROLE")));
roleid = get_role_oid(rolename, false);
check_role_membership_authorization(currentUserId,
roleid, stmt->is_grant);
if (stmt->is_grant)
AddRoleMems(currentUserId, rolename, roleid,
stmt->grantee_roles, grantee_ids,
grantor, &popt);
else
DelRoleMems(currentUserId, rolename, roleid,
stmt->grantee_roles, grantee_ids,
grantor, &popt, stmt->behavior);
}
/*
* Close pg_authid, but keep lock till commit.
*/
table_close(pg_authid_rel, NoLock);
}
/*
* DropOwnedObjects
*
* Drop the objects owned by a given list of roles.
*/
void
DropOwnedObjects(DropOwnedStmt *stmt)
{
List *role_ids = roleSpecsToIds(stmt->roles);
ListCell *cell;
/* Check privileges */
foreach(cell, role_ids)
{
Oid roleid = lfirst_oid(cell);
if (!has_privs_of_role(GetUserId(), roleid))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
errmsg("permission denied to drop objects"),
errdetail("Only roles with privileges of role \"%s\" may drop objects owned by it.",
GetUserNameFromId(roleid, false))));
}
/* Ok, do it */
shdepDropOwned(role_ids, stmt->behavior);
}
/*
* ReassignOwnedObjects
*
* Give the objects owned by a given list of roles away to another user.
*/
void
ReassignOwnedObjects(ReassignOwnedStmt *stmt)
{
List *role_ids = roleSpecsToIds(stmt->roles);
ListCell *cell;
Oid newrole;
/* Check privileges */
foreach(cell, role_ids)
{
Oid roleid = lfirst_oid(cell);
if (!has_privs_of_role(GetUserId(), roleid))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
errmsg("permission denied to reassign objects"),
errdetail("Only roles with privileges of role \"%s\" may reassign objects owned by it.",
GetUserNameFromId(roleid, false))));
}
/* Must have privileges on the receiving side too */
newrole = get_rolespec_oid(stmt->newrole, false);
if (!has_privs_of_role(GetUserId(), newrole))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
errmsg("permission denied to reassign objects"),
errdetail("Only roles with privileges of role \"%s\" may reassign objects to it.",
GetUserNameFromId(newrole, false))));
/* Ok, do it */
shdepReassignOwned(role_ids, newrole);
}
/*
* roleSpecsToIds
*
* Given a list of RoleSpecs, generate a list of role OIDs in the same order.
*
* ROLESPEC_PUBLIC is not allowed.
*/
List *
roleSpecsToIds(List *memberNames)
{
List *result = NIL;
ListCell *l;
foreach(l, memberNames)
{
RoleSpec *rolespec = lfirst_node(RoleSpec, l);
Oid roleid;
roleid = get_rolespec_oid(rolespec, false);
result = lappend_oid(result, roleid);
}
return result;
}
/*
* AddRoleMems -- Add given members to the specified role
*
* currentUserId: OID of role performing the operation
* rolename: name of role to add to (used only for error messages)
* roleid: OID of role to add to
* memberSpecs: list of RoleSpec of roles to add (used only for error messages)
* memberIds: OIDs of roles to add
* grantorId: OID that should be recorded as having granted the membership
* (InvalidOid if not set explicitly)
* popt: information about grant options
*/
static void
AddRoleMems(Oid currentUserId, const char *rolename, Oid roleid,
List *memberSpecs, List *memberIds,
Oid grantorId, GrantRoleOptions *popt)
{
Relation pg_authmem_rel;
TupleDesc pg_authmem_dsc;
ListCell *specitem;
ListCell *iditem;
Assert(list_length(memberSpecs) == list_length(memberIds));
/* Validate grantor (and resolve implicit grantor if not specified). */
grantorId = check_role_grantor(currentUserId, roleid, grantorId, true);
pg_authmem_rel = table_open(AuthMemRelationId, RowExclusiveLock);
pg_authmem_dsc = RelationGetDescr(pg_authmem_rel);
/*
* Only allow changes to this role by one backend at a time, so that we
* can check integrity constraints like the lack of circular ADMIN OPTION
* grants without fear of race conditions.
*/
LockSharedObject(AuthIdRelationId, roleid, 0,
ShareUpdateExclusiveLock);
/* Preliminary sanity checks. */
forboth(specitem, memberSpecs, iditem, memberIds)
{
RoleSpec *memberRole = lfirst_node(RoleSpec, specitem);
Oid memberid = lfirst_oid(iditem);
/*
* pg_database_owner is never a role member. Lifting this restriction
* would require a policy decision about membership loops. One could
* prevent loops, which would include making "ALTER DATABASE x OWNER
* TO proposed_datdba" fail if is_member_of_role(pg_database_owner,
* proposed_datdba). Hence, gaining a membership could reduce what a
* role could do. Alternately, one could allow these memberships to
* complete loops. A role could then have actual WITH ADMIN OPTION on
* itself, prompting a decision about is_admin_of_role() treatment of
* the case.
*
* Lifting this restriction also has policy implications for ownership
* of shared objects (databases and tablespaces). We allow such
* ownership, but we might find cause to ban it in the future.
* Designing such a ban would more troublesome if the design had to
* address pg_database_owner being a member of role FOO that owns a
* shared object. (The effect of such ownership is that any owner of
* another database can act as the owner of affected shared objects.)
*/
if (memberid == ROLE_PG_DATABASE_OWNER)
ereport(ERROR,
errmsg("role \"%s\" cannot be a member of any role",
get_rolespec_name(memberRole)));
/*
* Refuse creation of membership loops, including the trivial case
* where a role is made a member of itself. We do this by checking to
* see if the target role is already a member of the proposed member
* role. We have to ignore possible superuserness, however, else we
* could never grant membership in a superuser-privileged role.
*/
if (is_member_of_role_nosuper(roleid, memberid))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_GRANT_OPERATION),
errmsg("role \"%s\" is a member of role \"%s\"",
rolename, get_rolespec_name(memberRole))));
}
/*
* Disallow attempts to grant ADMIN OPTION back to a user who granted it
* to you, similar to what check_circularity does for ACLs. We want the
* chains of grants to remain acyclic, so that it's always possible to use
* REVOKE .. CASCADE to clean up all grants that depend on the one being
* revoked.
*
* NB: This check might look redundant with the check for membership loops
* above, but it isn't. That's checking for role-member loop (e.g. A is a
* member of B and B is a member of A) while this is checking for a
* member-grantor loop (e.g. A gave ADMIN OPTION on X to B and now B, who
* has no other source of ADMIN OPTION on X, tries to give ADMIN OPTION on
* X back to A).
*/
if (popt->admin && grantorId != BOOTSTRAP_SUPERUSERID)
{
CatCList *memlist;
RevokeRoleGrantAction *actions;
int i;
/* Get the list of members for this role. */
memlist = SearchSysCacheList1(AUTHMEMROLEMEM,
ObjectIdGetDatum(roleid));
/*
* Figure out what would happen if we removed all existing grants to
* every role to which we've been asked to make a new grant.
*/
actions = initialize_revoke_actions(memlist);
foreach(iditem, memberIds)
{
Oid memberid = lfirst_oid(iditem);
if (memberid == BOOTSTRAP_SUPERUSERID)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_GRANT_OPERATION),
errmsg("%s option cannot be granted back to your own grantor",
"ADMIN")));
plan_member_revoke(memlist, actions, memberid);
}
/*
* If the result would be that the grantor role would no longer have
* the ability to perform the grant, then the proposed grant would
* create a circularity.
*/
for (i = 0; i < memlist->n_members; ++i)
{
HeapTuple authmem_tuple;
Form_pg_auth_members authmem_form;
authmem_tuple = &memlist->members[i]->tuple;
authmem_form = (Form_pg_auth_members) GETSTRUCT(authmem_tuple);
if (actions[i] == RRG_NOOP &&
authmem_form->member == grantorId &&
authmem_form->admin_option)
break;
}
if (i >= memlist->n_members)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_GRANT_OPERATION),
errmsg("%s option cannot be granted back to your own grantor",
"ADMIN")));
ReleaseSysCacheList(memlist);
}
/* Now perform the catalog updates. */
forboth(specitem, memberSpecs, iditem, memberIds)
{
RoleSpec *memberRole = lfirst_node(RoleSpec, specitem);
Oid memberid = lfirst_oid(iditem);
HeapTuple authmem_tuple;
HeapTuple tuple;
Datum new_record[Natts_pg_auth_members] = {0};
bool new_record_nulls[Natts_pg_auth_members] = {0};
bool new_record_repl[Natts_pg_auth_members] = {0};
/* Common initialization for possible insert or update */
new_record[Anum_pg_auth_members_roleid - 1] =
ObjectIdGetDatum(roleid);
new_record[Anum_pg_auth_members_member - 1] =
ObjectIdGetDatum(memberid);
new_record[Anum_pg_auth_members_grantor - 1] =
ObjectIdGetDatum(grantorId);
/* Find any existing tuple */
authmem_tuple = SearchSysCache3(AUTHMEMROLEMEM,
ObjectIdGetDatum(roleid),
ObjectIdGetDatum(memberid),
ObjectIdGetDatum(grantorId));
/*
* If we found a tuple, update it with new option values, unless there
* are no changes, in which case issue a WARNING.
*
* If we didn't find a tuple, just insert one.
*/
if (HeapTupleIsValid(authmem_tuple))
{
Form_pg_auth_members authmem_form;
bool at_least_one_change = false;
authmem_form = (Form_pg_auth_members) GETSTRUCT(authmem_tuple);
if ((popt->specified & GRANT_ROLE_SPECIFIED_ADMIN) != 0
&& authmem_form->admin_option != popt->admin)
{
new_record[Anum_pg_auth_members_admin_option - 1] =
BoolGetDatum(popt->admin);
new_record_repl[Anum_pg_auth_members_admin_option - 1] =
true;
at_least_one_change = true;
}
if ((popt->specified & GRANT_ROLE_SPECIFIED_INHERIT) != 0
&& authmem_form->inherit_option != popt->inherit)
{
new_record[Anum_pg_auth_members_inherit_option - 1] =
BoolGetDatum(popt->inherit);
new_record_repl[Anum_pg_auth_members_inherit_option - 1] =
true;
at_least_one_change = true;
}
if ((popt->specified & GRANT_ROLE_SPECIFIED_SET) != 0
&& authmem_form->set_option != popt->set)
{
new_record[Anum_pg_auth_members_set_option - 1] =
BoolGetDatum(popt->set);
new_record_repl[Anum_pg_auth_members_set_option - 1] =
true;
at_least_one_change = true;
}
if (!at_least_one_change)
{
ereport(NOTICE,
(errmsg("role \"%s\" has already been granted membership in role \"%s\" by role \"%s\"",
get_rolespec_name(memberRole), rolename,
GetUserNameFromId(grantorId, false))));
ReleaseSysCache(authmem_tuple);
continue;
}
tuple = heap_modify_tuple(authmem_tuple, pg_authmem_dsc,
new_record,
new_record_nulls, new_record_repl);
CatalogTupleUpdate(pg_authmem_rel, &tuple->t_self, tuple);
ReleaseSysCache(authmem_tuple);
}
else
{
Oid objectId;
Oid *newmembers = palloc(sizeof(Oid));
/*
* The values for these options can be taken directly from 'popt'.
* Either they were specified, or the defaults as set by
* InitGrantRoleOptions are correct.
*/
new_record[Anum_pg_auth_members_admin_option - 1] =
BoolGetDatum(popt->admin);
new_record[Anum_pg_auth_members_set_option - 1] =
BoolGetDatum(popt->set);
/*
* If the user specified a value for the inherit option, use
* whatever was specified. Otherwise, set the default value based
* on the role-level property.
*/
if ((popt->specified & GRANT_ROLE_SPECIFIED_INHERIT) != 0)
new_record[Anum_pg_auth_members_inherit_option - 1] =
popt->inherit;
else
{
HeapTuple mrtup;
Form_pg_authid mrform;
mrtup = SearchSysCache1(AUTHOID, memberid);
if (!HeapTupleIsValid(mrtup))
elog(ERROR, "cache lookup failed for role %u", memberid);
mrform = (Form_pg_authid) GETSTRUCT(mrtup);
new_record[Anum_pg_auth_members_inherit_option - 1] =
mrform->rolinherit;
ReleaseSysCache(mrtup);
}
/* get an OID for the new row and insert it */
objectId = GetNewOidWithIndex(pg_authmem_rel, AuthMemOidIndexId,
Anum_pg_auth_members_oid);
new_record[Anum_pg_auth_members_oid - 1] = objectId;
tuple = heap_form_tuple(pg_authmem_dsc,
new_record, new_record_nulls);
CatalogTupleInsert(pg_authmem_rel, tuple);
/* updateAclDependencies wants to pfree array inputs */
newmembers[0] = grantorId;
updateAclDependencies(AuthMemRelationId, objectId,
0, InvalidOid,
0, NULL,
1, newmembers);
}
/* CCI after each change, in case there are duplicates in list */
CommandCounterIncrement();
}
/*
* Close pg_authmem, but keep lock till commit.
*/
table_close(pg_authmem_rel, NoLock);
}
/*
* DelRoleMems -- Remove given members from the specified role
*
* rolename: name of role to del from (used only for error messages)
* roleid: OID of role to del from
* memberSpecs: list of RoleSpec of roles to del (used only for error messages)
* memberIds: OIDs of roles to del
* grantorId: who is revoking the membership
* popt: information about grant options
* behavior: RESTRICT or CASCADE behavior for recursive removal
*/
static void
DelRoleMems(Oid currentUserId, const char *rolename, Oid roleid,
List *memberSpecs, List *memberIds,
Oid grantorId, GrantRoleOptions *popt, DropBehavior behavior)
{
Relation pg_authmem_rel;
TupleDesc pg_authmem_dsc;
ListCell *specitem;
ListCell *iditem;
CatCList *memlist;
RevokeRoleGrantAction *actions;
int i;
Assert(list_length(memberSpecs) == list_length(memberIds));
/* Validate grantor (and resolve implicit grantor if not specified). */
grantorId = check_role_grantor(currentUserId, roleid, grantorId, false);
pg_authmem_rel = table_open(AuthMemRelationId, RowExclusiveLock);
pg_authmem_dsc = RelationGetDescr(pg_authmem_rel);
/*
* Only allow changes to this role by one backend at a time, so that we
* can check for things like dependent privileges without fear of race
* conditions.
*/
LockSharedObject(AuthIdRelationId, roleid, 0,
ShareUpdateExclusiveLock);
memlist = SearchSysCacheList1(AUTHMEMROLEMEM, ObjectIdGetDatum(roleid));
actions = initialize_revoke_actions(memlist);
/*
* We may need to recurse to dependent privileges if DROP_CASCADE was
* specified, or refuse to perform the operation if dependent privileges
* exist and DROP_RESTRICT was specified. plan_single_revoke() will figure
* out what to do with each catalog tuple.
*/
forboth(specitem, memberSpecs, iditem, memberIds)
{
RoleSpec *memberRole = lfirst(specitem);
Oid memberid = lfirst_oid(iditem);
if (!plan_single_revoke(memlist, actions, memberid, grantorId,
popt, behavior))
{
ereport(WARNING,
(errmsg("role \"%s\" has not been granted membership in role \"%s\" by role \"%s\"",
get_rolespec_name(memberRole), rolename,
GetUserNameFromId(grantorId, false))));
continue;
}
}
/*
* We now know what to do with each catalog tuple: it should either be
* left alone, deleted, or just have the admin_option flag cleared.
* Perform the appropriate action in each case.
*/
for (i = 0; i < memlist->n_members; ++i)
{
HeapTuple authmem_tuple;
Form_pg_auth_members authmem_form;
if (actions[i] == RRG_NOOP)
continue;
authmem_tuple = &memlist->members[i]->tuple;
authmem_form = (Form_pg_auth_members) GETSTRUCT(authmem_tuple);
if (actions[i] == RRG_DELETE_GRANT)
{
/*
* Remove the entry altogether, after first removing its
* dependencies
*/
deleteSharedDependencyRecordsFor(AuthMemRelationId,
authmem_form->oid, 0);
CatalogTupleDelete(pg_authmem_rel, &authmem_tuple->t_self);
}
else
{
/* Just turn off the specified option */
HeapTuple tuple;
Datum new_record[Natts_pg_auth_members] = {0};
bool new_record_nulls[Natts_pg_auth_members] = {0};
bool new_record_repl[Natts_pg_auth_members] = {0};
/* Build a tuple to update with */
if (actions[i] == RRG_REMOVE_ADMIN_OPTION)
{
new_record[Anum_pg_auth_members_admin_option - 1] =
BoolGetDatum(false);
new_record_repl[Anum_pg_auth_members_admin_option - 1] =
true;
}
else if (actions[i] == RRG_REMOVE_INHERIT_OPTION)
{
new_record[Anum_pg_auth_members_inherit_option - 1] =
BoolGetDatum(false);
new_record_repl[Anum_pg_auth_members_inherit_option - 1] =
true;
}
else if (actions[i] == RRG_REMOVE_SET_OPTION)
{
new_record[Anum_pg_auth_members_set_option - 1] =
BoolGetDatum(false);
new_record_repl[Anum_pg_auth_members_set_option - 1] =
true;
}
else
elog(ERROR, "unknown role revoke action");
tuple = heap_modify_tuple(authmem_tuple, pg_authmem_dsc,
new_record,
new_record_nulls, new_record_repl);
CatalogTupleUpdate(pg_authmem_rel, &tuple->t_self, tuple);
}
}
ReleaseSysCacheList(memlist);
/*
* Close pg_authmem, but keep lock till commit.
*/
table_close(pg_authmem_rel, NoLock);
}
/*
* Check that currentUserId has permission to modify the membership list for
* roleid. Throw an error if not.
*/
static void
check_role_membership_authorization(Oid currentUserId, Oid roleid,
bool is_grant)
{
/*
* The charter of pg_database_owner is to have exactly one, implicit,
* situation-dependent member. There's no technical need for this
* restriction. (One could lift it and take the further step of making
* object_ownercheck(DatabaseRelationId, ...) equivalent to
* has_privs_of_role(roleid, ROLE_PG_DATABASE_OWNER), in which case
* explicit, situation-independent members could act as the owner of any
* database.)
*/
if (is_grant && roleid == ROLE_PG_DATABASE_OWNER)
ereport(ERROR,
errmsg("role \"%s\" cannot have explicit members",
GetUserNameFromId(roleid, false)));
/* To mess with a superuser role, you gotta be superuser. */
if (superuser_arg(roleid))
{
if (!superuser_arg(currentUserId))
{
if (is_grant)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
errmsg("permission denied to grant role \"%s\"",
GetUserNameFromId(roleid, false)),
errdetail("Only roles with the %s attribute may grant roles with %s.",
"SUPERUSER", "SUPERUSER")));
else
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
errmsg("permission denied to revoke role \"%s\"",
GetUserNameFromId(roleid, false)),
errdetail("Only roles with the %s attribute may revoke roles with %s.",
"SUPERUSER", "SUPERUSER")));
}
}
else
{
/*
* Otherwise, must have admin option on the role to be changed.
*/
if (!is_admin_of_role(currentUserId, roleid))
{
if (is_grant)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
errmsg("permission denied to grant role \"%s\"",
GetUserNameFromId(roleid, false)),
errdetail("Only roles with the %s option on role \"%s\" may grant this role.",
"ADMIN", GetUserNameFromId(roleid, false))));
else
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
errmsg("permission denied to revoke role \"%s\"",
GetUserNameFromId(roleid, false)),
errdetail("Only roles with the %s option on role \"%s\" may revoke this role.",
"ADMIN", GetUserNameFromId(roleid, false))));
}
}
}
/*
* Sanity-check, or infer, the grantor for a GRANT or REVOKE statement
* targeting a role.
*
* The grantor must always be either a role with ADMIN OPTION on the role in
* which membership is being granted, or the bootstrap superuser. This is
* similar to the restriction enforced by select_best_grantor, except that
* roles don't have owners, so we regard the bootstrap superuser as the
* implicit owner.
*
* If the grantor was not explicitly specified by the user, grantorId should
* be passed as InvalidOid, and this function will infer the user to be
* recorded as the grantor. In many cases, this will be the current user, but
* things get more complicated when the current user doesn't possess ADMIN
* OPTION on the role but rather relies on having SUPERUSER privileges, or
* on inheriting the privileges of a role which does have ADMIN OPTION. See
* below for details.
*
* If the grantor was specified by the user, then it must be a user that
* can legally be recorded as the grantor, as per the rule stated above.
* This is an integrity constraint, not a permissions check, and thus even
* superusers are subject to this restriction. However, there is also a
* permissions check: to specify a role as the grantor, the current user
* must possess the privileges of that role. Superusers will always pass
* this check, but for non-superusers it may lead to an error.
*
* The return value is the OID to be regarded as the grantor when executing
* the operation.
*/
static Oid
check_role_grantor(Oid currentUserId, Oid roleid, Oid grantorId, bool is_grant)
{
/* If the grantor ID was not specified, pick one to use. */
if (!OidIsValid(grantorId))
{
/*
* Grants where the grantor is recorded as the bootstrap superuser do
* not depend on any other existing grants, so always default to this
* interpretation when possible.
*/
if (superuser_arg(currentUserId))
return BOOTSTRAP_SUPERUSERID;
/*
* Otherwise, the grantor must either have ADMIN OPTION on the role or
* inherit the privileges of a role which does. In the former case,
* record the grantor as the current user; in the latter, pick one of
* the roles that is "most directly" inherited by the current role
* (i.e. fewest "hops").
*
* (We shouldn't fail to find a best grantor, because we've already
* established that the current user has permission to perform the
* operation.)
*/
grantorId = select_best_admin(currentUserId, roleid);
if (!OidIsValid(grantorId))
elog(ERROR, "no possible grantors");
return grantorId;
}
/*
* If an explicit grantor is specified, it must be a role whose privileges
* the current user possesses.
*
* It should also be a role that has ADMIN OPTION on the target role, but
* we check this condition only in case of GRANT. For REVOKE, no matching
* grant should exist anyway, but if it somehow does, let the user get rid
* of it.
*/
if (is_grant)
{
if (!has_privs_of_role(currentUserId, grantorId))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
errmsg("permission denied to grant privileges as role \"%s\"",
GetUserNameFromId(grantorId, false)),
errdetail("Only roles with privileges of role \"%s\" may grant privileges as this role.",
GetUserNameFromId(grantorId, false))));
if (grantorId != BOOTSTRAP_SUPERUSERID &&
select_best_admin(grantorId, roleid) != grantorId)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
errmsg("permission denied to grant privileges as role \"%s\"",
GetUserNameFromId(grantorId, false)),
errdetail("The grantor must have the %s option on role \"%s\".",
"ADMIN", GetUserNameFromId(roleid, false))));
}
else
{
if (!has_privs_of_role(currentUserId, grantorId))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
errmsg("permission denied to revoke privileges granted by role \"%s\"",
GetUserNameFromId(grantorId, false)),
errdetail("Only roles with privileges of role \"%s\" may revoke privileges granted by this role.",
GetUserNameFromId(grantorId, false))));
}
/*
* If a grantor was specified explicitly, always attribute the grant to
* that role (unless we error out above).
*/
return grantorId;
}
/*
* Initialize an array of RevokeRoleGrantAction objects.
*
* 'memlist' should be a list of all grants for the target role.
*
* This constructs an array indicating that no actions are to be performed;
* that is, every element is initially RRG_NOOP.
*/
static RevokeRoleGrantAction *
initialize_revoke_actions(CatCList *memlist)
{
RevokeRoleGrantAction *result;
int i;
if (memlist->n_members == 0)
return NULL;
result = palloc(sizeof(RevokeRoleGrantAction) * memlist->n_members);
for (i = 0; i < memlist->n_members; i++)
result[i] = RRG_NOOP;
return result;
}
/*
* Figure out what we would need to do in order to revoke a grant, or just the
* admin option on a grant, given that there might be dependent privileges.
*
* 'memlist' should be a list of all grants for the target role.
*
* Whatever actions prove to be necessary will be signalled by updating
* 'actions'.
*
* If behavior is DROP_RESTRICT, an error will occur if there are dependent
* role membership grants; if DROP_CASCADE, those grants will be scheduled
* for deletion.
*
* The return value is true if the matching grant was found in the list,
* and false if not.
*/
static bool
plan_single_revoke(CatCList *memlist, RevokeRoleGrantAction *actions,
Oid member, Oid grantor, GrantRoleOptions *popt,
DropBehavior behavior)
{
int i;
/*
* If popt.specified == 0, we're revoking the grant entirely; otherwise,
* we expect just one bit to be set, and we're revoking the corresponding
* option. As of this writing, there's no syntax that would allow for an
* attempt to revoke multiple options at once, and the logic below
* wouldn't work properly if such syntax were added, so assert that our
* caller isn't trying to do that.
*/
Assert(pg_popcount32(popt->specified) <= 1);
for (i = 0; i < memlist->n_members; ++i)
{
HeapTuple authmem_tuple;
Form_pg_auth_members authmem_form;
authmem_tuple = &memlist->members[i]->tuple;
authmem_form = (Form_pg_auth_members) GETSTRUCT(authmem_tuple);
if (authmem_form->member == member &&
authmem_form->grantor == grantor)
{
if ((popt->specified & GRANT_ROLE_SPECIFIED_INHERIT) != 0)
{
/*
* Revoking the INHERIT option doesn't change anything for
* dependent privileges, so we don't need to recurse.
*/
actions[i] = RRG_REMOVE_INHERIT_OPTION;
}
else if ((popt->specified & GRANT_ROLE_SPECIFIED_SET) != 0)
{
/* Here too, no need to recurse. */
actions[i] = RRG_REMOVE_SET_OPTION;
}
else
{
bool revoke_admin_option_only;
/*
* Revoking the grant entirely, or ADMIN option on a grant,
* implicates dependent privileges, so we may need to recurse.
*/
revoke_admin_option_only =
(popt->specified & GRANT_ROLE_SPECIFIED_ADMIN) != 0;
plan_recursive_revoke(memlist, actions, i,
revoke_admin_option_only, behavior);
}
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
/*
* Figure out what we would need to do in order to revoke all grants to
* a given member, given that there might be dependent privileges.
*
* 'memlist' should be a list of all grants for the target role.
*
* Whatever actions prove to be necessary will be signalled by updating
* 'actions'.
*/
static void
plan_member_revoke(CatCList *memlist, RevokeRoleGrantAction *actions,
Oid member)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < memlist->n_members; ++i)
{
HeapTuple authmem_tuple;
Form_pg_auth_members authmem_form;
authmem_tuple = &memlist->members[i]->tuple;
authmem_form = (Form_pg_auth_members) GETSTRUCT(authmem_tuple);
if (authmem_form->member == member)
plan_recursive_revoke(memlist, actions, i, false, DROP_CASCADE);
}
}
/*
* Workhorse for figuring out recursive revocation of role grants.
*
* This is similar to what recursive_revoke() does for ACLs.
*/
static void
plan_recursive_revoke(CatCList *memlist, RevokeRoleGrantAction *actions,
int index,
bool revoke_admin_option_only, DropBehavior behavior)
{
bool would_still_have_admin_option = false;
HeapTuple authmem_tuple;
Form_pg_auth_members authmem_form;
int i;
/* If it's already been done, we can just return. */
if (actions[index] == RRG_DELETE_GRANT)
return;
if (actions[index] == RRG_REMOVE_ADMIN_OPTION &&
revoke_admin_option_only)
return;
/* Locate tuple data. */
authmem_tuple = &memlist->members[index]->tuple;
authmem_form = (Form_pg_auth_members) GETSTRUCT(authmem_tuple);
/*
* If the existing tuple does not have admin_option set, then we do not
* need to recurse. If we're just supposed to clear that bit we don't need
* to do anything at all; if we're supposed to remove the grant, we need
* to do something, but only to the tuple, and not any others.
*/
if (!revoke_admin_option_only)
{
actions[index] = RRG_DELETE_GRANT;
if (!authmem_form->admin_option)
return;
}
else
{
if (!authmem_form->admin_option)
return;
actions[index] = RRG_REMOVE_ADMIN_OPTION;
}
/* Determine whether the member would still have ADMIN OPTION. */
for (i = 0; i < memlist->n_members; ++i)
{
HeapTuple am_cascade_tuple;
Form_pg_auth_members am_cascade_form;
am_cascade_tuple = &memlist->members[i]->tuple;
am_cascade_form = (Form_pg_auth_members) GETSTRUCT(am_cascade_tuple);
if (am_cascade_form->member == authmem_form->member &&
am_cascade_form->admin_option && actions[i] == RRG_NOOP)
{
would_still_have_admin_option = true;
break;
}
}
/* If the member would still have ADMIN OPTION, we need not recurse. */
if (would_still_have_admin_option)
return;
/*
* Recurse to grants that are not yet slated for deletion which have this
* member as the grantor.
*/
for (i = 0; i < memlist->n_members; ++i)
{
HeapTuple am_cascade_tuple;
Form_pg_auth_members am_cascade_form;
am_cascade_tuple = &memlist->members[i]->tuple;
am_cascade_form = (Form_pg_auth_members) GETSTRUCT(am_cascade_tuple);
if (am_cascade_form->grantor == authmem_form->member &&
actions[i] != RRG_DELETE_GRANT)
{
if (behavior == DROP_RESTRICT)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_DEPENDENT_OBJECTS_STILL_EXIST),
errmsg("dependent privileges exist"),
errhint("Use CASCADE to revoke them too.")));
plan_recursive_revoke(memlist, actions, i, false, behavior);
}
}
}
/*
* Initialize a GrantRoleOptions object with default values.
*/
static void
InitGrantRoleOptions(GrantRoleOptions *popt)
{
popt->specified = 0;
popt->admin = false;
popt->inherit = false;
popt->set = true;
}
/*
* GUC check_hook for createrole_self_grant
*/
bool
check_createrole_self_grant(char **newval, void **extra, GucSource source)
{
char *rawstring;
List *elemlist;
ListCell *l;
unsigned options = 0;
unsigned *result;
/* Need a modifiable copy of string */
rawstring = pstrdup(*newval);
if (!SplitIdentifierString(rawstring, ',', &elemlist))
{
/* syntax error in list */
GUC_check_errdetail("List syntax is invalid.");
pfree(rawstring);
list_free(elemlist);
return false;
}
foreach(l, elemlist)
{
char *tok = (char *) lfirst(l);
if (pg_strcasecmp(tok, "SET") == 0)
options |= GRANT_ROLE_SPECIFIED_SET;
else if (pg_strcasecmp(tok, "INHERIT") == 0)
options |= GRANT_ROLE_SPECIFIED_INHERIT;
else
{
GUC_check_errdetail("Unrecognized key word: \"%s\".", tok);
pfree(rawstring);
list_free(elemlist);
return false;
}
}
pfree(rawstring);
list_free(elemlist);
result = (unsigned *) guc_malloc(LOG, sizeof(unsigned));
*result = options;
*extra = result;
return true;
}
/*
* GUC assign_hook for createrole_self_grant
*/
void
assign_createrole_self_grant(const char *newval, void *extra)
{
unsigned options = *(unsigned *) extra;
createrole_self_grant_enabled = (options != 0);
createrole_self_grant_options.specified = GRANT_ROLE_SPECIFIED_ADMIN
| GRANT_ROLE_SPECIFIED_INHERIT
| GRANT_ROLE_SPECIFIED_SET;
createrole_self_grant_options.admin = false;
createrole_self_grant_options.inherit =
(options & GRANT_ROLE_SPECIFIED_INHERIT) != 0;
createrole_self_grant_options.set =
(options & GRANT_ROLE_SPECIFIED_SET) != 0;
}
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