postgresql/src/backend/libpq
Michael Paquier b8f2da0ac5 Refactor logic to remove trailing CR/LF characters from strings
b654714 has reworked the way trailing CR/LF characters are removed from
strings.  This commit introduces a new routine in common/string.c and
refactors the code so as the logic is in a single place, mostly.

Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Bruce Momjian
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20190801031820.GF29334@paquier.xyz
2019-08-09 11:05:14 +09:00
..
Makefile GSSAPI encryption support 2019-04-03 15:02:33 -04:00
README.SSL Move EDH support to common files 2018-01-23 07:11:38 -05:00
auth-scram.c Introduce safer encoding and decoding routines for base64.c 2019-07-04 16:08:09 +09:00
auth.c Remove superfluous newlines in function prototypes. 2019-07-31 00:05:21 -07:00
be-fsstubs.c Use consistent style for checking return from system calls 2019-07-07 15:28:49 +02:00
be-gssapi-common.c Move be-gssapi-common.h into src/include/libpq/ 2019-06-08 09:59:02 +09:00
be-secure-common.c Refactor logic to remove trailing CR/LF characters from strings 2019-08-09 11:05:14 +09:00
be-secure-gssapi.c Remove unnecessary header from be-secure-gssapi.c 2019-06-29 11:17:37 +09:00
be-secure-openssl.c Phase 2 pgindent run for v12. 2019-05-22 13:04:48 -04:00
be-secure.c GSSAPI encryption support 2019-04-03 15:02:33 -04:00
crypt.c Fix detection of passwords hashed with MD5 or SCRAM-SHA-256 2019-04-23 15:43:21 +09:00
hba.c Represent Lists as expansible arrays, not chains of cons-cells. 2019-07-15 13:41:58 -04:00
ifaddr.c Phase 2 pgindent run for v12. 2019-05-22 13:04:48 -04:00
pg_hba.conf.sample Rename "scram" to "scram-sha-256" in pg_hba.conf and password_encryption. 2017-04-18 14:50:50 +03:00
pg_ident.conf.sample Reformat the comments in pg_hba.conf and pg_ident.conf 2010-01-26 06:58:39 +00:00
pqcomm.c Fix inconsistencies and typos in the tree, take 9 2019-08-05 12:14:58 +09:00
pqformat.c Fix more typos and inconsistencies in the tree 2019-06-17 16:13:16 +09:00
pqmq.c Update copyright for 2019 2019-01-02 12:44:25 -05:00
pqsignal.c Update copyright for 2019 2019-01-02 12:44:25 -05:00

README.SSL

src/backend/libpq/README.SSL

SSL
===

>From the servers perspective:


  Receives StartupPacket
           |
           |
 (Is SSL_NEGOTIATE_CODE?) -----------  Normal startup
           |                  No
           |
           | Yes
           |
           |
 (Server compiled with USE_SSL?) ------- Send 'N'
           |                       No        |
           |                                 |
           | Yes                         Normal startup
           |
           |
        Send 'S'
           |
           |
      Establish SSL
           |
           |
      Normal startup





>From the clients perspective (v6.6 client _with_ SSL):


      Connect
         |
         |
  Send packet with SSL_NEGOTIATE_CODE
         |
         |
  Receive single char  ------- 'S' -------- Establish SSL
         |                                       |
         | '<else>'                              |
         |                                  Normal startup
         |
         |
   Is it 'E' for error  ------------------- Retry connection
         |                  Yes             without SSL
         | No
         |
   Is it 'N' for normal ------------------- Normal startup
         |                  Yes
         |
   Fail with unknown

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Ephemeral DH
============

Since the server static private key ($DataDir/server.key) will
normally be stored unencrypted so that the database backend can
restart automatically, it is important that we select an algorithm
that continues to provide confidentiality even if the attacker has the
server's private key.  Ephemeral DH (EDH) keys provide this and more
(Perfect Forward Secrecy aka PFS).

N.B., the static private key should still be protected to the largest
extent possible, to minimize the risk of impersonations.

Another benefit of EDH is that it allows the backend and clients to
use DSA keys.  DSA keys can only provide digital signatures, not
encryption, and are often acceptable in jurisdictions where RSA keys
are unacceptable.

The downside to EDH is that it makes it impossible to use ssldump(1)
if there's a problem establishing an SSL session.  In this case you'll
need to temporarily disable EDH (see initialize_dh()).