postgresql/src/backend/libpq
Tom Lane 341996248e Raise fixed token-length limit in hba.c.
Historically, hba.c limited tokens in the authentication configuration
files (pg_hba.conf and pg_ident.conf) to less than 256 bytes.  We have
seen a few reports of this limit causing problems; notably, for
moderately-complex LDAP configurations.  Increase the limit to 10240
bytes as a low-risk stop-gap solution.

In v13 and earlier, this also requires raising MAX_LINE, the limit
on overall line length.  I'm hesitant to make this code consume
too much stack space, so I only raised that to 20480 bytes.

Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/1588937.1690221208@sss.pgh.pa.us
2023-07-27 12:07:48 -04:00
..
Makefile Introduce --with-ssl={openssl} as a configure option 2021-02-01 19:19:44 +09:00
README.SSL Move EDH support to common files 2018-01-23 07:11:38 -05:00
auth-scram.c Revert error handling improvements for cryptohashes 2022-01-14 11:25:39 +09:00
auth.c Revert error handling improvements for cryptohashes 2022-01-14 11:25:39 +09:00
be-fsstubs.c Fix snapshot reference leak if lo_export fails. 2021-11-03 10:54:33 +02:00
be-gssapi-common.c Don't assume GSSAPI result strings are null-terminated. 2021-06-23 14:01:32 -04:00
be-secure-common.c Remove misguided SSL key file ownership check in libpq. 2022-05-26 14:14:05 -04:00
be-secure-gssapi.c Update copyright for 2021 2021-01-02 13:06:25 -05:00
be-secure-openssl.c Fix handling of SCRAM-SHA-256's channel binding with RSA-PSS certificates 2023-02-15 10:12:33 +09:00
be-secure.c Allow matching the DN of a client certificate for authentication 2021-03-29 15:49:39 -04:00
crypt.c Revert error handling improvements for cryptohashes 2022-01-14 11:25:39 +09:00
hba.c Raise fixed token-length limit in hba.c. 2023-07-27 12:07:48 -04:00
ifaddr.c Update copyright for 2021 2021-01-02 13:06:25 -05:00
pg_hba.conf.sample pg_hba.conf.sample: Reword connection type section 2021-04-29 07:00:20 +02:00
pg_ident.conf.sample Reformat the comments in pg_hba.conf and pg_ident.conf 2010-01-26 06:58:39 +00:00
pqcomm.c Revert "graceful shutdown" changes for Windows, in back branches only. 2022-01-25 12:17:40 -05:00
pqformat.c Update copyright for 2021 2021-01-02 13:06:25 -05:00
pqmq.c Remove server and libpq support for old FE/BE protocol version 2. 2021-03-04 10:45:55 +02:00
pqsignal.c Use signalfd(2) for epoll latches. 2021-03-01 14:12:02 +13:00

README.SSL

src/backend/libpq/README.SSL

SSL
===

>From the servers perspective:


  Receives StartupPacket
           |
           |
 (Is SSL_NEGOTIATE_CODE?) -----------  Normal startup
           |                  No
           |
           | Yes
           |
           |
 (Server compiled with USE_SSL?) ------- Send 'N'
           |                       No        |
           |                                 |
           | Yes                         Normal startup
           |
           |
        Send 'S'
           |
           |
      Establish SSL
           |
           |
      Normal startup





>From the clients perspective (v6.6 client _with_ SSL):


      Connect
         |
         |
  Send packet with SSL_NEGOTIATE_CODE
         |
         |
  Receive single char  ------- 'S' -------- Establish SSL
         |                                       |
         | '<else>'                              |
         |                                  Normal startup
         |
         |
   Is it 'E' for error  ------------------- Retry connection
         |                  Yes             without SSL
         | No
         |
   Is it 'N' for normal ------------------- Normal startup
         |                  Yes
         |
   Fail with unknown

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Ephemeral DH
============

Since the server static private key ($DataDir/server.key) will
normally be stored unencrypted so that the database backend can
restart automatically, it is important that we select an algorithm
that continues to provide confidentiality even if the attacker has the
server's private key.  Ephemeral DH (EDH) keys provide this and more
(Perfect Forward Secrecy aka PFS).

N.B., the static private key should still be protected to the largest
extent possible, to minimize the risk of impersonations.

Another benefit of EDH is that it allows the backend and clients to
use DSA keys.  DSA keys can only provide digital signatures, not
encryption, and are often acceptable in jurisdictions where RSA keys
are unacceptable.

The downside to EDH is that it makes it impossible to use ssldump(1)
if there's a problem establishing an SSL session.  In this case you'll
need to temporarily disable EDH (see initialize_dh()).