ad6c52846f
The parsing of the authentication files for HBA and ident entries happens in two phases: - Tokenization of the files, creating a list of TokenizedAuthLines. - Validation of the HBA and ident entries, building a set of HbaLines or IdentLines. The second phase doing the validation provides already some error context about the configuration file and the line where a problem happens, but there is no such information in the first phase when tokenizing the files. This commit adds an ErrorContextCallback in tokenize_auth_file(), with a context made of the line number and the configuration file name involved in a problem. This is useful for files included in an HBA file for user and database lists, and it will become much more handy to track problems for files included via a potential @include[_dir,_if_exists]. The error context is registered so as the full chain of events is reported when using cascaded inclusions when for example tokenize_auth_file() recurses over itself on new files, displaying one context line for each file gone through when tokenizing things. Author: Michael Paquier Reviewed-by: Julien Rouhaud Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/Y2xUBJ+S+Z0zbxRW@paquier.xyz |
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|---|---|---|
| .. | ||
| Makefile | ||
| README.SSL | ||
| auth-sasl.c | ||
| auth-scram.c | ||
| auth.c | ||
| be-fsstubs.c | ||
| be-gssapi-common.c | ||
| be-secure-common.c | ||
| be-secure-gssapi.c | ||
| be-secure-openssl.c | ||
| be-secure.c | ||
| crypt.c | ||
| hba.c | ||
| ifaddr.c | ||
| meson.build | ||
| pg_hba.conf.sample | ||
| pg_ident.conf.sample | ||
| pqcomm.c | ||
| pqformat.c | ||
| pqmq.c | ||
| pqsignal.c | ||
README.SSL
src/backend/libpq/README.SSL
SSL
===
>From the servers perspective:
Receives StartupPacket
|
|
(Is SSL_NEGOTIATE_CODE?) ----------- Normal startup
| No
|
| Yes
|
|
(Server compiled with USE_SSL?) ------- Send 'N'
| No |
| |
| Yes Normal startup
|
|
Send 'S'
|
|
Establish SSL
|
|
Normal startup
>From the clients perspective (v6.6 client _with_ SSL):
Connect
|
|
Send packet with SSL_NEGOTIATE_CODE
|
|
Receive single char ------- 'S' -------- Establish SSL
| |
| '<else>' |
| Normal startup
|
|
Is it 'E' for error ------------------- Retry connection
| Yes without SSL
| No
|
Is it 'N' for normal ------------------- Normal startup
| Yes
|
Fail with unknown
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ephemeral DH
============
Since the server static private key ($DataDir/server.key) will
normally be stored unencrypted so that the database backend can
restart automatically, it is important that we select an algorithm
that continues to provide confidentiality even if the attacker has the
server's private key. Ephemeral DH (EDH) keys provide this and more
(Perfect Forward Secrecy aka PFS).
N.B., the static private key should still be protected to the largest
extent possible, to minimize the risk of impersonations.
Another benefit of EDH is that it allows the backend and clients to
use DSA keys. DSA keys can only provide digital signatures, not
encryption, and are often acceptable in jurisdictions where RSA keys
are unacceptable.
The downside to EDH is that it makes it impossible to use ssldump(1)
if there's a problem establishing an SSL session. In this case you'll
need to temporarily disable EDH (see initialize_dh()).