mirror of
https://git.postgresql.org/git/postgresql.git
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842 lines
22 KiB
C
842 lines
22 KiB
C
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
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*
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* auth.c
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* Routines to handle network authentication
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*
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* Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2005, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
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* Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
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*
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*
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* IDENTIFICATION
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* $PostgreSQL: pgsql/src/backend/libpq/auth.c,v 1.122 2005/01/12 21:37:53 tgl Exp $
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*
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*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
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*/
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#include "postgres.h"
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#include <sys/param.h>
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#include <sys/socket.h>
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#if defined(HAVE_STRUCT_CMSGCRED) || defined(HAVE_STRUCT_FCRED) || defined(HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKCRED)
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#include <sys/uio.h>
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#include <sys/ucred.h>
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#include <errno.h>
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#endif
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#include <netinet/in.h>
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#include <arpa/inet.h>
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#include "libpq/auth.h"
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#include "libpq/crypt.h"
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#include "libpq/hba.h"
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#include "libpq/libpq.h"
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#include "libpq/pqcomm.h"
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#include "libpq/pqformat.h"
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#include "miscadmin.h"
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#include "storage/ipc.h"
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static void sendAuthRequest(Port *port, AuthRequest areq);
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static void auth_failed(Port *port, int status);
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static char *recv_password_packet(Port *port);
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static int recv_and_check_password_packet(Port *port);
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char *pg_krb_server_keyfile;
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#ifdef USE_PAM
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#ifdef HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H
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#include <pam/pam_appl.h>
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#endif
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#ifdef HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H
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#include <security/pam_appl.h>
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#endif
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#define PGSQL_PAM_SERVICE "postgresql" /* Service name passed to PAM */
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static int CheckPAMAuth(Port *port, char *user, char *password);
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static int pam_passwd_conv_proc(int num_msg, const struct pam_message ** msg,
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struct pam_response ** resp, void *appdata_ptr);
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static struct pam_conv pam_passw_conv = {
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&pam_passwd_conv_proc,
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NULL
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};
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static char *pam_passwd = NULL; /* Workaround for Solaris 2.6 brokenness */
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static Port *pam_port_cludge; /* Workaround for passing "Port *port"
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* into pam_passwd_conv_proc */
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#endif /* USE_PAM */
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#ifdef KRB4
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/*----------------------------------------------------------------
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* MIT Kerberos authentication system - protocol version 4
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*----------------------------------------------------------------
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*/
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#include "krb.h"
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/*
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* pg_krb4_recvauth -- server routine to receive authentication information
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* from the client
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*
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* Nothing unusual here, except that we compare the username obtained from
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* the client's setup packet to the authenticated name. (We have to retain
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* the name in the setup packet since we have to retain the ability to handle
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* unauthenticated connections.)
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*/
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static int
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pg_krb4_recvauth(Port *port)
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{
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long krbopts = 0; /* one-way authentication */
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KTEXT_ST clttkt;
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char instance[INST_SZ + 1],
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version[KRB_SENDAUTH_VLEN + 1];
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AUTH_DAT auth_data;
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Key_schedule key_sched;
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int status;
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strcpy(instance, "*"); /* don't care, but arg gets expanded
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* anyway */
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status = krb_recvauth(krbopts,
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port->sock,
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&clttkt,
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PG_KRB_SRVNAM,
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instance,
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&port->raddr.in,
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&port->laddr.in,
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&auth_data,
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pg_krb_server_keyfile,
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key_sched,
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version);
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if (status != KSUCCESS)
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{
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ereport(LOG,
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(errmsg("Kerberos error: %s", krb_err_txt[status])));
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return STATUS_ERROR;
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}
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if (strncmp(version, PG_KRB4_VERSION, KRB_SENDAUTH_VLEN) != 0)
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{
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ereport(LOG,
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(errmsg("unexpected Kerberos protocol version received from client (received \"%s\", expected \"%s\")",
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version, PG_KRB4_VERSION)));
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return STATUS_ERROR;
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}
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if (strncmp(port->user_name, auth_data.pname, SM_DATABASE_USER) != 0)
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{
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ereport(LOG,
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(errmsg("unexpected Kerberos user name received from client (received \"%s\", expected \"%s\")",
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port->user_name, auth_data.pname)));
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return STATUS_ERROR;
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}
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return STATUS_OK;
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}
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#else
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static int
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pg_krb4_recvauth(Port *port)
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{
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ereport(LOG,
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(errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
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errmsg("Kerberos 4 not implemented on this server")));
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return STATUS_ERROR;
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}
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#endif /* KRB4 */
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#ifdef KRB5
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/*----------------------------------------------------------------
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* MIT Kerberos authentication system - protocol version 5
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*----------------------------------------------------------------
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*/
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#include <krb5.h>
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/* Some old versions of Kerberos do not include <com_err.h> in <krb5.h> */
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#if !defined(__COM_ERR_H) && !defined(__COM_ERR_H__)
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#include <com_err.h>
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#endif
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/*
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* pg_an_to_ln -- return the local name corresponding to an authentication
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* name
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*
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* XXX Assumes that the first aname component is the user name. This is NOT
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* necessarily so, since an aname can actually be something out of your
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* worst X.400 nightmare, like
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* ORGANIZATION=U. C. Berkeley/NAME=Paul M. Aoki@CS.BERKELEY.EDU
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* Note that the MIT an_to_ln code does the same thing if you don't
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* provide an aname mapping database...it may be a better idea to use
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* krb5_an_to_ln, except that it punts if multiple components are found,
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* and we can't afford to punt.
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*/
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static char *
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pg_an_to_ln(char *aname)
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{
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char *p;
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if ((p = strchr(aname, '/')) || (p = strchr(aname, '@')))
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*p = '\0';
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return aname;
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}
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/*
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* Various krb5 state which is not connection specfic, and a flag to
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* indicate whether we have initialised it yet.
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*/
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static int pg_krb5_initialised;
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static krb5_context pg_krb5_context;
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static krb5_keytab pg_krb5_keytab;
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static krb5_principal pg_krb5_server;
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static int
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pg_krb5_init(void)
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{
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krb5_error_code retval;
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if (pg_krb5_initialised)
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return STATUS_OK;
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retval = krb5_init_context(&pg_krb5_context);
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if (retval)
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{
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ereport(LOG,
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(errmsg("Kerberos initialization returned error %d",
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retval)));
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com_err("postgres", retval, "while initializing krb5");
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return STATUS_ERROR;
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}
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retval = krb5_kt_resolve(pg_krb5_context, pg_krb_server_keyfile, &pg_krb5_keytab);
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if (retval)
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{
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ereport(LOG,
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(errmsg("Kerberos keytab resolving returned error %d",
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retval)));
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com_err("postgres", retval, "while resolving keytab file \"%s\"",
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pg_krb_server_keyfile);
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krb5_free_context(pg_krb5_context);
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return STATUS_ERROR;
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}
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retval = krb5_sname_to_principal(pg_krb5_context, NULL, PG_KRB_SRVNAM,
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KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &pg_krb5_server);
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if (retval)
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{
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ereport(LOG,
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(errmsg("Kerberos sname_to_principal(\"%s\") returned error %d",
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PG_KRB_SRVNAM, retval)));
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com_err("postgres", retval,
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"while getting server principal for service \"%s\"",
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PG_KRB_SRVNAM);
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krb5_kt_close(pg_krb5_context, pg_krb5_keytab);
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krb5_free_context(pg_krb5_context);
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return STATUS_ERROR;
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}
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pg_krb5_initialised = 1;
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return STATUS_OK;
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}
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/*
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* pg_krb5_recvauth -- server routine to receive authentication information
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* from the client
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*
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* We still need to compare the username obtained from the client's setup
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* packet to the authenticated name, as described in pg_krb4_recvauth. This
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* is a bit more problematic in v5, as described above in pg_an_to_ln.
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*
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* We have our own keytab file because postgres is unlikely to run as root,
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* and so cannot read the default keytab.
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*/
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static int
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pg_krb5_recvauth(Port *port)
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{
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krb5_error_code retval;
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int ret;
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krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL;
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krb5_ticket *ticket;
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char *kusername;
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ret = pg_krb5_init();
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if (ret != STATUS_OK)
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return ret;
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retval = krb5_recvauth(pg_krb5_context, &auth_context,
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(krb5_pointer) & port->sock, PG_KRB_SRVNAM,
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pg_krb5_server, 0, pg_krb5_keytab, &ticket);
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if (retval)
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{
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ereport(LOG,
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(errmsg("Kerberos recvauth returned error %d",
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retval)));
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com_err("postgres", retval, "from krb5_recvauth");
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return STATUS_ERROR;
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}
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/*
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* The "client" structure comes out of the ticket and is therefore
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* authenticated. Use it to check the username obtained from the
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* postmaster startup packet.
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*
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* I have no idea why this is considered necessary.
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*/
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#if defined(HAVE_KRB5_TICKET_ENC_PART2)
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retval = krb5_unparse_name(pg_krb5_context,
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ticket->enc_part2->client, &kusername);
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#elif defined(HAVE_KRB5_TICKET_CLIENT)
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retval = krb5_unparse_name(pg_krb5_context,
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ticket->client, &kusername);
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#else
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#error "bogus configuration"
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#endif
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if (retval)
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{
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ereport(LOG,
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(errmsg("Kerberos unparse_name returned error %d",
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retval)));
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com_err("postgres", retval, "while unparsing client name");
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krb5_free_ticket(pg_krb5_context, ticket);
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krb5_auth_con_free(pg_krb5_context, auth_context);
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return STATUS_ERROR;
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}
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kusername = pg_an_to_ln(kusername);
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if (strncmp(port->user_name, kusername, SM_DATABASE_USER))
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{
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ereport(LOG,
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(errmsg("unexpected Kerberos user name received from client (received \"%s\", expected \"%s\")",
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port->user_name, kusername)));
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ret = STATUS_ERROR;
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}
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else
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ret = STATUS_OK;
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krb5_free_ticket(pg_krb5_context, ticket);
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krb5_auth_con_free(pg_krb5_context, auth_context);
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free(kusername);
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return ret;
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}
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#else
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static int
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pg_krb5_recvauth(Port *port)
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{
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ereport(LOG,
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(errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
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errmsg("Kerberos 5 not implemented on this server")));
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return STATUS_ERROR;
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}
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#endif /* KRB5 */
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/*
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* Tell the user the authentication failed, but not (much about) why.
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*
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* There is a tradeoff here between security concerns and making life
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* unnecessarily difficult for legitimate users. We would not, for example,
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* want to report the password we were expecting to receive...
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* But it seems useful to report the username and authorization method
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* in use, and these are items that must be presumed known to an attacker
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* anyway.
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* Note that many sorts of failure report additional information in the
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* postmaster log, which we hope is only readable by good guys.
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*/
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static void
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auth_failed(Port *port, int status)
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{
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const char *errstr;
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/*
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* If we failed due to EOF from client, just quit; there's no point in
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* trying to send a message to the client, and not much point in
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* logging the failure in the postmaster log. (Logging the failure
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* might be desirable, were it not for the fact that libpq closes the
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* connection unceremoniously if challenged for a password when it
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* hasn't got one to send. We'll get a useless log entry for every
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* psql connection under password auth, even if it's perfectly
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* successful, if we log STATUS_EOF events.)
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*/
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if (status == STATUS_EOF)
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proc_exit(0);
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switch (port->auth_method)
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{
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case uaReject:
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errstr = gettext_noop("authentication failed for user \"%s\": host rejected");
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break;
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case uaKrb4:
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errstr = gettext_noop("Kerberos 4 authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
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break;
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case uaKrb5:
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errstr = gettext_noop("Kerberos 5 authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
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break;
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case uaTrust:
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errstr = gettext_noop("\"trust\" authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
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break;
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case uaIdent:
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errstr = gettext_noop("Ident authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
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break;
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case uaMD5:
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case uaCrypt:
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case uaPassword:
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errstr = gettext_noop("password authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
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break;
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#ifdef USE_PAM
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case uaPAM:
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errstr = gettext_noop("PAM authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
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break;
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#endif /* USE_PAM */
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default:
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errstr = gettext_noop("authentication failed for user \"%s\": invalid authentication method");
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break;
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}
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ereport(FATAL,
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(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
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errmsg(errstr, port->user_name)));
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/* doesn't return */
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}
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/*
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* Client authentication starts here. If there is an error, this
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* function does not return and the backend process is terminated.
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*/
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void
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ClientAuthentication(Port *port)
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{
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int status = STATUS_ERROR;
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/*
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* Get the authentication method to use for this frontend/database
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* combination. Note: a failure return indicates a problem with the
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* hba config file, not with the request. hba.c should have dropped
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* an error message into the postmaster logfile if it failed.
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*/
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if (hba_getauthmethod(port) != STATUS_OK)
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ereport(FATAL,
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(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
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errmsg("missing or erroneous pg_hba.conf file"),
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errhint("See server log for details.")));
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switch (port->auth_method)
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{
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case uaReject:
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/*
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* This could have come from an explicit "reject" entry in
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* pg_hba.conf, but more likely it means there was no matching
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* entry. Take pity on the poor user and issue a helpful
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* error message. NOTE: this is not a security breach,
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* because all the info reported here is known at the frontend
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* and must be assumed known to bad guys. We're merely helping
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* out the less clueful good guys.
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*/
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{
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char hostinfo[NI_MAXHOST];
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getnameinfo_all(&port->raddr.addr, port->raddr.salen,
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hostinfo, sizeof(hostinfo),
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NULL, 0,
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NI_NUMERICHOST);
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#ifdef USE_SSL
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ereport(FATAL,
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(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
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errmsg("no pg_hba.conf entry for host \"%s\", user \"%s\", database \"%s\", %s",
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hostinfo, port->user_name, port->database_name,
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port->ssl ? gettext("SSL on") : gettext("SSL off"))));
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#else
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ereport(FATAL,
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(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
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errmsg("no pg_hba.conf entry for host \"%s\", user \"%s\", database \"%s\"",
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hostinfo, port->user_name, port->database_name)));
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#endif
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break;
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}
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case uaKrb4:
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/* Kerberos 4 only seems to work with AF_INET. */
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if (port->raddr.addr.ss_family != AF_INET
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|| port->laddr.addr.ss_family != AF_INET)
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ereport(FATAL,
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(errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
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errmsg("Kerberos 4 only supports IPv4 connections")));
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sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_KRB4);
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status = pg_krb4_recvauth(port);
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break;
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case uaKrb5:
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sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_KRB5);
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status = pg_krb5_recvauth(port);
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break;
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case uaIdent:
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/*
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* If we are doing ident on unix-domain sockets, use SCM_CREDS
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* only if it is defined and SO_PEERCRED isn't.
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*/
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#if !defined(HAVE_GETPEEREID) && !defined(SO_PEERCRED) && \
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(defined(HAVE_STRUCT_CMSGCRED) || defined(HAVE_STRUCT_FCRED) || \
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(defined(HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKCRED) && defined(LOCAL_CREDS)))
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if (port->raddr.addr.ss_family == AF_UNIX)
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{
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#if defined(HAVE_STRUCT_FCRED) || defined(HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKCRED)
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/*
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* Receive credentials on next message receipt, BSD/OS,
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* NetBSD. We need to set this before the client sends the
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* next packet.
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*/
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int on = 1;
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if (setsockopt(port->sock, 0, LOCAL_CREDS, &on, sizeof(on)) < 0)
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ereport(FATAL,
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(errcode_for_socket_access(),
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errmsg("could not enable credential reception: %m")));
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#endif
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|
|
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_SCM_CREDS);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
status = authident(port);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case uaMD5:
|
|
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_MD5);
|
|
status = recv_and_check_password_packet(port);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case uaCrypt:
|
|
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_CRYPT);
|
|
status = recv_and_check_password_packet(port);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case uaPassword:
|
|
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_PASSWORD);
|
|
status = recv_and_check_password_packet(port);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef USE_PAM
|
|
case uaPAM:
|
|
pam_port_cludge = port;
|
|
status = CheckPAMAuth(port, port->user_name, "");
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif /* USE_PAM */
|
|
|
|
case uaTrust:
|
|
status = STATUS_OK;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (status == STATUS_OK)
|
|
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_OK);
|
|
else
|
|
auth_failed(port, status);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Send an authentication request packet to the frontend.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
sendAuthRequest(Port *port, AuthRequest areq)
|
|
{
|
|
StringInfoData buf;
|
|
|
|
pq_beginmessage(&buf, 'R');
|
|
pq_sendint(&buf, (int32) areq, sizeof(int32));
|
|
|
|
/* Add the salt for encrypted passwords. */
|
|
if (areq == AUTH_REQ_MD5)
|
|
pq_sendbytes(&buf, port->md5Salt, 4);
|
|
else if (areq == AUTH_REQ_CRYPT)
|
|
pq_sendbytes(&buf, port->cryptSalt, 2);
|
|
|
|
pq_endmessage(&buf);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Flush message so client will see it, except for AUTH_REQ_OK, which
|
|
* need not be sent until we are ready for queries.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (areq != AUTH_REQ_OK)
|
|
pq_flush();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef USE_PAM
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* PAM conversation function
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
pam_passwd_conv_proc(int num_msg, const struct pam_message ** msg,
|
|
struct pam_response ** resp, void *appdata_ptr)
|
|
{
|
|
if (num_msg != 1 || msg[0]->msg_style != PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF)
|
|
{
|
|
switch (msg[0]->msg_style)
|
|
{
|
|
case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
|
|
ereport(LOG,
|
|
(errmsg("error from underlying PAM layer: %s",
|
|
msg[0]->msg)));
|
|
return PAM_CONV_ERR;
|
|
default:
|
|
ereport(LOG,
|
|
(errmsg("unsupported PAM conversation %d/%s",
|
|
msg[0]->msg_style, msg[0]->msg)));
|
|
return PAM_CONV_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!appdata_ptr)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* Workaround for Solaris 2.6 where the PAM library is broken and
|
|
* does not pass appdata_ptr to the conversation routine
|
|
*/
|
|
appdata_ptr = pam_passwd;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Password wasn't passed to PAM the first time around - let's go ask
|
|
* the client to send a password, which we then stuff into PAM.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (strlen(appdata_ptr) == 0)
|
|
{
|
|
char *passwd;
|
|
|
|
sendAuthRequest(pam_port_cludge, AUTH_REQ_PASSWORD);
|
|
passwd = recv_password_packet(pam_port_cludge);
|
|
|
|
if (passwd == NULL)
|
|
return PAM_CONV_ERR; /* client didn't want to send password */
|
|
|
|
if (strlen(passwd) == 0)
|
|
{
|
|
ereport(LOG,
|
|
(errmsg("empty password returned by client")));
|
|
return PAM_CONV_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
appdata_ptr = passwd;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Explicitly not using palloc here - PAM will free this memory in
|
|
* pam_end()
|
|
*/
|
|
*resp = calloc(num_msg, sizeof(struct pam_response));
|
|
if (!*resp)
|
|
{
|
|
ereport(LOG,
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
|
|
errmsg("out of memory")));
|
|
return PAM_CONV_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
(*resp)[0].resp = strdup((char *) appdata_ptr);
|
|
(*resp)[0].resp_retcode = 0;
|
|
|
|
return ((*resp)[0].resp ? PAM_SUCCESS : PAM_CONV_ERR);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check authentication against PAM.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
CheckPAMAuth(Port *port, char *user, char *password)
|
|
{
|
|
int retval;
|
|
pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Apparently, Solaris 2.6 is broken, and needs ugly static variable
|
|
* workaround
|
|
*/
|
|
pam_passwd = password;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Set the application data portion of the conversation struct This is
|
|
* later used inside the PAM conversation to pass the password to the
|
|
* authentication module.
|
|
*/
|
|
pam_passw_conv.appdata_ptr = (char *) password; /* from password above,
|
|
* not allocated */
|
|
|
|
/* Optionally, one can set the service name in pg_hba.conf */
|
|
if (port->auth_arg && port->auth_arg[0] != '\0')
|
|
retval = pam_start(port->auth_arg, "pgsql@",
|
|
&pam_passw_conv, &pamh);
|
|
else
|
|
retval = pam_start(PGSQL_PAM_SERVICE, "pgsql@",
|
|
&pam_passw_conv, &pamh);
|
|
|
|
if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
|
|
{
|
|
ereport(LOG,
|
|
(errmsg("could not create PAM authenticator: %s",
|
|
pam_strerror(pamh, retval))));
|
|
pam_passwd = NULL; /* Unset pam_passwd */
|
|
return STATUS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
retval = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_USER, user);
|
|
|
|
if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
|
|
{
|
|
ereport(LOG,
|
|
(errmsg("pam_set_item(PAM_USER) failed: %s",
|
|
pam_strerror(pamh, retval))));
|
|
pam_passwd = NULL; /* Unset pam_passwd */
|
|
return STATUS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
retval = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_CONV, &pam_passw_conv);
|
|
|
|
if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
|
|
{
|
|
ereport(LOG,
|
|
(errmsg("pam_set_item(PAM_CONV) failed: %s",
|
|
pam_strerror(pamh, retval))));
|
|
pam_passwd = NULL; /* Unset pam_passwd */
|
|
return STATUS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
retval = pam_authenticate(pamh, 0);
|
|
|
|
if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
|
|
{
|
|
ereport(LOG,
|
|
(errmsg("pam_authenticate failed: %s",
|
|
pam_strerror(pamh, retval))));
|
|
pam_passwd = NULL; /* Unset pam_passwd */
|
|
return STATUS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
retval = pam_acct_mgmt(pamh, 0);
|
|
|
|
if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
|
|
{
|
|
ereport(LOG,
|
|
(errmsg("pam_acct_mgmt failed: %s",
|
|
pam_strerror(pamh, retval))));
|
|
pam_passwd = NULL; /* Unset pam_passwd */
|
|
return STATUS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
retval = pam_end(pamh, retval);
|
|
|
|
if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
|
|
{
|
|
ereport(LOG,
|
|
(errmsg("could not release PAM authenticator: %s",
|
|
pam_strerror(pamh, retval))));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pam_passwd = NULL; /* Unset pam_passwd */
|
|
|
|
return (retval == PAM_SUCCESS ? STATUS_OK : STATUS_ERROR);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* USE_PAM */
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Collect password response packet from frontend.
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns NULL if couldn't get password, else palloc'd string.
|
|
*/
|
|
static char *
|
|
recv_password_packet(Port *port)
|
|
{
|
|
StringInfoData buf;
|
|
|
|
if (PG_PROTOCOL_MAJOR(port->proto) >= 3)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Expect 'p' message type */
|
|
int mtype;
|
|
|
|
mtype = pq_getbyte();
|
|
if (mtype != 'p')
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* If the client just disconnects without offering a password,
|
|
* don't make a log entry. This is legal per protocol spec
|
|
* and in fact commonly done by psql, so complaining just
|
|
* clutters the log.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (mtype != EOF)
|
|
ereport(COMMERROR,
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
|
|
errmsg("expected password response, got message type %d",
|
|
mtype)));
|
|
return NULL; /* EOF or bad message type */
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
/* For pre-3.0 clients, avoid log entry if they just disconnect */
|
|
if (pq_peekbyte() == EOF)
|
|
return NULL; /* EOF */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
initStringInfo(&buf);
|
|
if (pq_getmessage(&buf, 1000)) /* receive password */
|
|
{
|
|
/* EOF - pq_getmessage already logged a suitable message */
|
|
pfree(buf.data);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Apply sanity check: password packet length should agree with length
|
|
* of contained string. Note it is safe to use strlen here because
|
|
* StringInfo is guaranteed to have an appended '\0'.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (strlen(buf.data) + 1 != buf.len)
|
|
ereport(COMMERROR,
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
|
|
errmsg("invalid password packet size")));
|
|
|
|
/* Do not echo password to logs, for security. */
|
|
ereport(DEBUG5,
|
|
(errmsg("received password packet")));
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Return the received string. Note we do not attempt to do any
|
|
* character-set conversion on it; since we don't yet know the
|
|
* client's encoding, there wouldn't be much point.
|
|
*/
|
|
return buf.data;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Called when we have sent an authorization request for a password.
|
|
* Get the response and check it.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
recv_and_check_password_packet(Port *port)
|
|
{
|
|
char *passwd;
|
|
int result;
|
|
|
|
passwd = recv_password_packet(port);
|
|
|
|
if (passwd == NULL)
|
|
return STATUS_EOF; /* client wouldn't send password */
|
|
|
|
result = md5_crypt_verify(port, port->user_name, passwd);
|
|
|
|
pfree(passwd);
|
|
|
|
return result;
|
|
}
|