postgresql/src/backend/libpq
Michael Paquier 1b43743f11 Add description for new patterns supported in HBA and ident sample files
Support for regexps in database and role entries for pg_hba.conf has
been added in 8fea8683, and efb6f4a has extended support of pg-user in
pg_ident.conf, still both of them have missed a short description about
the new patterns supported in their respective sample files.

This commit closes the gap, by providing a short description of all the
new features supported for each entry type.

Reported-by: Pavel Luzanov
Reviewed-by: Jelte Fennema, Pavel Luzanov
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/e495112d-8741-e651-64a2-ecb5728f1a56@postgrespro.ru
2023-02-16 07:38:52 +09:00
..
Makefile Refactor SASL code with a generic interface for its mechanisms 2021-07-07 10:55:15 +09:00
README.SSL Move EDH support to common files 2018-01-23 07:11:38 -05:00
auth-sasl.c Update copyright for 2023 2023-01-02 15:00:37 -05:00
auth-scram.c Update copyright for 2023 2023-01-02 15:00:37 -05:00
auth.c Update copyright for 2023 2023-01-02 15:00:37 -05:00
be-fsstubs.c New header varatt.h split off from postgres.h 2023-01-10 05:54:36 +01:00
be-gssapi-common.c Update copyright for 2023 2023-01-02 15:00:37 -05:00
be-secure-common.c Common function for percent placeholder replacement 2023-01-11 10:42:35 +01:00
be-secure-gssapi.c Update copyright for 2023 2023-01-02 15:00:37 -05:00
be-secure-openssl.c Fix handling of SCRAM-SHA-256's channel binding with RSA-PSS certificates 2023-02-15 10:12:16 +09:00
be-secure.c Update copyright for 2023 2023-01-02 15:00:37 -05:00
crypt.c Update copyright for 2023 2023-01-02 15:00:37 -05:00
hba.c Support the same patterns for pg-user in pg_ident.conf as in pg_hba.conf 2023-01-20 11:21:55 +09:00
ifaddr.c Update copyright for 2023 2023-01-02 15:00:37 -05:00
meson.build Update copyright for 2023 2023-01-02 15:00:37 -05:00
pg_hba.conf.sample Add description for new patterns supported in HBA and ident sample files 2023-02-16 07:38:52 +09:00
pg_ident.conf.sample Add description for new patterns supported in HBA and ident sample files 2023-02-16 07:38:52 +09:00
pqcomm.c Use WaitEventSet API for postmaster's event loop. 2023-01-12 16:32:20 +13:00
pqformat.c Change argument type of pq_sendbytes from char * to void * 2023-02-14 13:32:19 +01:00
pqmq.c Perform apply of large transactions by parallel workers. 2023-01-09 07:52:45 +05:30
pqsignal.c Use WaitEventSet API for postmaster's event loop. 2023-01-12 16:32:20 +13:00

README.SSL

src/backend/libpq/README.SSL

SSL
===

>From the servers perspective:


  Receives StartupPacket
           |
           |
 (Is SSL_NEGOTIATE_CODE?) -----------  Normal startup
           |                  No
           |
           | Yes
           |
           |
 (Server compiled with USE_SSL?) ------- Send 'N'
           |                       No        |
           |                                 |
           | Yes                         Normal startup
           |
           |
        Send 'S'
           |
           |
      Establish SSL
           |
           |
      Normal startup





>From the clients perspective (v6.6 client _with_ SSL):


      Connect
         |
         |
  Send packet with SSL_NEGOTIATE_CODE
         |
         |
  Receive single char  ------- 'S' -------- Establish SSL
         |                                       |
         | '<else>'                              |
         |                                  Normal startup
         |
         |
   Is it 'E' for error  ------------------- Retry connection
         |                  Yes             without SSL
         | No
         |
   Is it 'N' for normal ------------------- Normal startup
         |                  Yes
         |
   Fail with unknown

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Ephemeral DH
============

Since the server static private key ($DataDir/server.key) will
normally be stored unencrypted so that the database backend can
restart automatically, it is important that we select an algorithm
that continues to provide confidentiality even if the attacker has the
server's private key.  Ephemeral DH (EDH) keys provide this and more
(Perfect Forward Secrecy aka PFS).

N.B., the static private key should still be protected to the largest
extent possible, to minimize the risk of impersonations.

Another benefit of EDH is that it allows the backend and clients to
use DSA keys.  DSA keys can only provide digital signatures, not
encryption, and are often acceptable in jurisdictions where RSA keys
are unacceptable.

The downside to EDH is that it makes it impossible to use ssldump(1)
if there's a problem establishing an SSL session.  In this case you'll
need to temporarily disable EDH (see initialize_dh()).