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Overly tight coding caused the password transformation loop to stop examining input once it had processed a byte equal to 0x80. Thus, if the given password string contained such a byte (which is possible though not highly likely in UTF8, and perhaps also in other non-ASCII encodings), all subsequent characters would not contribute to the hash, making the password much weaker than it appears on the surface. This would only affect cases where applications used DES crypt() to encode passwords before storing them in the database. If a weak password has been created in this fashion, the hash will stop matching after this update has been applied, so it will be easy to tell if any passwords were unexpectedly weak. Changing to a different password would be a good idea in such a case. (Since DES has been considered inadequately secure for some time, changing to a different encryption algorithm can also be recommended.) This code, and the bug, are shared with at least PHP, FreeBSD, and OpenBSD. Since the other projects have already published their fixes, there is no point in trying to keep this commit private. This bug has been assigned CVE-2012-2143, and credit for its discovery goes to Rubin Xu and Joseph Bonneau.
775 lines
19 KiB
C
775 lines
19 KiB
C
/*
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* FreeSec: libcrypt for NetBSD
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*
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* contrib/pgcrypto/crypt-des.c
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*
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* Copyright (c) 1994 David Burren
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* Adapted for FreeBSD-2.0 by Geoffrey M. Rehmet
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* this file should now *only* export crypt(), in order to make
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* binaries of libcrypt exportable from the USA
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*
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* Adapted for FreeBSD-4.0 by Mark R V Murray
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* this file should now *only* export crypt_des(), in order to make
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* a module that can be optionally included in libcrypt.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. Neither the name of the author nor the names of other contributors
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* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
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* without specific prior written permission.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* $FreeBSD: src/secure/lib/libcrypt/crypt-des.c,v 1.12 1999/09/20 12:39:20 markm Exp $
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*
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* This is an original implementation of the DES and the crypt(3) interfaces
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* by David Burren <davidb@werj.com.au>.
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*
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* An excellent reference on the underlying algorithm (and related
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* algorithms) is:
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*
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* B. Schneier, Applied Cryptography: protocols, algorithms,
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* and source code in C, John Wiley & Sons, 1994.
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*
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* Note that in that book's description of DES the lookups for the initial,
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* pbox, and final permutations are inverted (this has been brought to the
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* attention of the author). A list of errata for this book has been
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* posted to the sci.crypt newsgroup by the author and is available for FTP.
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*
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* ARCHITECTURE ASSUMPTIONS:
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* It is assumed that the 8-byte arrays passed by reference can be
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* addressed as arrays of uint32's (ie. the CPU is not picky about
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* alignment).
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*/
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#include "postgres.h"
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#include "px-crypt.h"
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/* for ntohl/htonl */
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#include <netinet/in.h>
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#include <arpa/inet.h>
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#define _PASSWORD_EFMT1 '_'
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static const char _crypt_a64[] =
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"./0123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz";
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static uint8 IP[64] = {
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58, 50, 42, 34, 26, 18, 10, 2, 60, 52, 44, 36, 28, 20, 12, 4,
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62, 54, 46, 38, 30, 22, 14, 6, 64, 56, 48, 40, 32, 24, 16, 8,
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57, 49, 41, 33, 25, 17, 9, 1, 59, 51, 43, 35, 27, 19, 11, 3,
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61, 53, 45, 37, 29, 21, 13, 5, 63, 55, 47, 39, 31, 23, 15, 7
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};
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static uint8 inv_key_perm[64];
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static uint8 u_key_perm[56];
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static uint8 key_perm[56] = {
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57, 49, 41, 33, 25, 17, 9, 1, 58, 50, 42, 34, 26, 18,
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10, 2, 59, 51, 43, 35, 27, 19, 11, 3, 60, 52, 44, 36,
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63, 55, 47, 39, 31, 23, 15, 7, 62, 54, 46, 38, 30, 22,
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14, 6, 61, 53, 45, 37, 29, 21, 13, 5, 28, 20, 12, 4
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};
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static uint8 key_shifts[16] = {
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1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1
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};
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static uint8 inv_comp_perm[56];
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static uint8 comp_perm[48] = {
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14, 17, 11, 24, 1, 5, 3, 28, 15, 6, 21, 10,
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23, 19, 12, 4, 26, 8, 16, 7, 27, 20, 13, 2,
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41, 52, 31, 37, 47, 55, 30, 40, 51, 45, 33, 48,
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44, 49, 39, 56, 34, 53, 46, 42, 50, 36, 29, 32
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};
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/*
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* No E box is used, as it's replaced by some ANDs, shifts, and ORs.
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*/
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static uint8 u_sbox[8][64];
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static uint8 sbox[8][64] = {
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{
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14, 4, 13, 1, 2, 15, 11, 8, 3, 10, 6, 12, 5, 9, 0, 7,
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0, 15, 7, 4, 14, 2, 13, 1, 10, 6, 12, 11, 9, 5, 3, 8,
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4, 1, 14, 8, 13, 6, 2, 11, 15, 12, 9, 7, 3, 10, 5, 0,
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15, 12, 8, 2, 4, 9, 1, 7, 5, 11, 3, 14, 10, 0, 6, 13
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},
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{
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15, 1, 8, 14, 6, 11, 3, 4, 9, 7, 2, 13, 12, 0, 5, 10,
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3, 13, 4, 7, 15, 2, 8, 14, 12, 0, 1, 10, 6, 9, 11, 5,
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0, 14, 7, 11, 10, 4, 13, 1, 5, 8, 12, 6, 9, 3, 2, 15,
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13, 8, 10, 1, 3, 15, 4, 2, 11, 6, 7, 12, 0, 5, 14, 9
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},
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{
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10, 0, 9, 14, 6, 3, 15, 5, 1, 13, 12, 7, 11, 4, 2, 8,
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13, 7, 0, 9, 3, 4, 6, 10, 2, 8, 5, 14, 12, 11, 15, 1,
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13, 6, 4, 9, 8, 15, 3, 0, 11, 1, 2, 12, 5, 10, 14, 7,
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1, 10, 13, 0, 6, 9, 8, 7, 4, 15, 14, 3, 11, 5, 2, 12
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},
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{
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7, 13, 14, 3, 0, 6, 9, 10, 1, 2, 8, 5, 11, 12, 4, 15,
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13, 8, 11, 5, 6, 15, 0, 3, 4, 7, 2, 12, 1, 10, 14, 9,
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10, 6, 9, 0, 12, 11, 7, 13, 15, 1, 3, 14, 5, 2, 8, 4,
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3, 15, 0, 6, 10, 1, 13, 8, 9, 4, 5, 11, 12, 7, 2, 14
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},
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{
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2, 12, 4, 1, 7, 10, 11, 6, 8, 5, 3, 15, 13, 0, 14, 9,
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14, 11, 2, 12, 4, 7, 13, 1, 5, 0, 15, 10, 3, 9, 8, 6,
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4, 2, 1, 11, 10, 13, 7, 8, 15, 9, 12, 5, 6, 3, 0, 14,
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11, 8, 12, 7, 1, 14, 2, 13, 6, 15, 0, 9, 10, 4, 5, 3
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},
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{
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12, 1, 10, 15, 9, 2, 6, 8, 0, 13, 3, 4, 14, 7, 5, 11,
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10, 15, 4, 2, 7, 12, 9, 5, 6, 1, 13, 14, 0, 11, 3, 8,
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9, 14, 15, 5, 2, 8, 12, 3, 7, 0, 4, 10, 1, 13, 11, 6,
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4, 3, 2, 12, 9, 5, 15, 10, 11, 14, 1, 7, 6, 0, 8, 13
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},
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{
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4, 11, 2, 14, 15, 0, 8, 13, 3, 12, 9, 7, 5, 10, 6, 1,
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13, 0, 11, 7, 4, 9, 1, 10, 14, 3, 5, 12, 2, 15, 8, 6,
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1, 4, 11, 13, 12, 3, 7, 14, 10, 15, 6, 8, 0, 5, 9, 2,
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6, 11, 13, 8, 1, 4, 10, 7, 9, 5, 0, 15, 14, 2, 3, 12
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},
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{
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13, 2, 8, 4, 6, 15, 11, 1, 10, 9, 3, 14, 5, 0, 12, 7,
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1, 15, 13, 8, 10, 3, 7, 4, 12, 5, 6, 11, 0, 14, 9, 2,
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7, 11, 4, 1, 9, 12, 14, 2, 0, 6, 10, 13, 15, 3, 5, 8,
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2, 1, 14, 7, 4, 10, 8, 13, 15, 12, 9, 0, 3, 5, 6, 11
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}
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};
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static uint8 un_pbox[32];
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static uint8 pbox[32] = {
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16, 7, 20, 21, 29, 12, 28, 17, 1, 15, 23, 26, 5, 18, 31, 10,
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2, 8, 24, 14, 32, 27, 3, 9, 19, 13, 30, 6, 22, 11, 4, 25
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};
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static uint32 _crypt_bits32[32] =
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{
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0x80000000, 0x40000000, 0x20000000, 0x10000000,
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0x08000000, 0x04000000, 0x02000000, 0x01000000,
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0x00800000, 0x00400000, 0x00200000, 0x00100000,
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0x00080000, 0x00040000, 0x00020000, 0x00010000,
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0x00008000, 0x00004000, 0x00002000, 0x00001000,
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0x00000800, 0x00000400, 0x00000200, 0x00000100,
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0x00000080, 0x00000040, 0x00000020, 0x00000010,
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0x00000008, 0x00000004, 0x00000002, 0x00000001
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};
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static uint8 _crypt_bits8[8] = {0x80, 0x40, 0x20, 0x10, 0x08, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01};
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static uint32 saltbits;
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static long old_salt;
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static uint32 *bits28,
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*bits24;
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static uint8 init_perm[64],
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final_perm[64];
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static uint32 en_keysl[16],
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en_keysr[16];
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static uint32 de_keysl[16],
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de_keysr[16];
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static int des_initialised = 0;
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static uint8 m_sbox[4][4096];
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static uint32 psbox[4][256];
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static uint32 ip_maskl[8][256],
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ip_maskr[8][256];
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static uint32 fp_maskl[8][256],
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fp_maskr[8][256];
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static uint32 key_perm_maskl[8][128],
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key_perm_maskr[8][128];
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static uint32 comp_maskl[8][128],
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comp_maskr[8][128];
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static uint32 old_rawkey0,
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old_rawkey1;
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static inline int
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ascii_to_bin(char ch)
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{
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if (ch > 'z')
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return (0);
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if (ch >= 'a')
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return (ch - 'a' + 38);
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if (ch > 'Z')
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return (0);
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if (ch >= 'A')
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return (ch - 'A' + 12);
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if (ch > '9')
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return (0);
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if (ch >= '.')
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return (ch - '.');
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return (0);
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}
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static void
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des_init(void)
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{
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int i,
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j,
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b,
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k,
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inbit,
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obit;
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uint32 *p,
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*il,
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*ir,
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*fl,
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*fr;
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old_rawkey0 = old_rawkey1 = 0L;
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saltbits = 0L;
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old_salt = 0L;
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bits24 = (bits28 = _crypt_bits32 + 4) + 4;
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/*
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* Invert the S-boxes, reordering the input bits.
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*/
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for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
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for (j = 0; j < 64; j++)
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{
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b = (j & 0x20) | ((j & 1) << 4) | ((j >> 1) & 0xf);
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u_sbox[i][j] = sbox[i][b];
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}
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/*
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* Convert the inverted S-boxes into 4 arrays of 8 bits. Each will handle
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* 12 bits of the S-box input.
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*/
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for (b = 0; b < 4; b++)
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for (i = 0; i < 64; i++)
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for (j = 0; j < 64; j++)
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m_sbox[b][(i << 6) | j] =
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(u_sbox[(b << 1)][i] << 4) |
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u_sbox[(b << 1) + 1][j];
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/*
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* Set up the initial & final permutations into a useful form, and
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* initialise the inverted key permutation.
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*/
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for (i = 0; i < 64; i++)
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{
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init_perm[final_perm[i] = IP[i] - 1] = i;
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inv_key_perm[i] = 255;
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}
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/*
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* Invert the key permutation and initialise the inverted key compression
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* permutation.
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*/
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for (i = 0; i < 56; i++)
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{
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u_key_perm[i] = key_perm[i] - 1;
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inv_key_perm[key_perm[i] - 1] = i;
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inv_comp_perm[i] = 255;
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}
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/*
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* Invert the key compression permutation.
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*/
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for (i = 0; i < 48; i++)
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inv_comp_perm[comp_perm[i] - 1] = i;
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/*
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* Set up the OR-mask arrays for the initial and final permutations, and
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* for the key initial and compression permutations.
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*/
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for (k = 0; k < 8; k++)
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{
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for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
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{
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*(il = &ip_maskl[k][i]) = 0L;
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*(ir = &ip_maskr[k][i]) = 0L;
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*(fl = &fp_maskl[k][i]) = 0L;
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*(fr = &fp_maskr[k][i]) = 0L;
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for (j = 0; j < 8; j++)
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{
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inbit = 8 * k + j;
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if (i & _crypt_bits8[j])
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{
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if ((obit = init_perm[inbit]) < 32)
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*il |= _crypt_bits32[obit];
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else
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*ir |= _crypt_bits32[obit - 32];
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if ((obit = final_perm[inbit]) < 32)
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*fl |= _crypt_bits32[obit];
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else
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*fr |= _crypt_bits32[obit - 32];
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}
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}
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}
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for (i = 0; i < 128; i++)
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{
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*(il = &key_perm_maskl[k][i]) = 0L;
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*(ir = &key_perm_maskr[k][i]) = 0L;
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for (j = 0; j < 7; j++)
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{
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inbit = 8 * k + j;
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if (i & _crypt_bits8[j + 1])
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{
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if ((obit = inv_key_perm[inbit]) == 255)
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continue;
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if (obit < 28)
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*il |= bits28[obit];
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else
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*ir |= bits28[obit - 28];
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}
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}
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*(il = &comp_maskl[k][i]) = 0L;
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*(ir = &comp_maskr[k][i]) = 0L;
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for (j = 0; j < 7; j++)
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{
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inbit = 7 * k + j;
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if (i & _crypt_bits8[j + 1])
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{
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if ((obit = inv_comp_perm[inbit]) == 255)
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continue;
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if (obit < 24)
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*il |= bits24[obit];
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else
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*ir |= bits24[obit - 24];
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}
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}
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}
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}
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/*
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* Invert the P-box permutation, and convert into OR-masks for handling
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* the output of the S-box arrays setup above.
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*/
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for (i = 0; i < 32; i++)
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un_pbox[pbox[i] - 1] = i;
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for (b = 0; b < 4; b++)
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for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
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{
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*(p = &psbox[b][i]) = 0L;
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for (j = 0; j < 8; j++)
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{
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if (i & _crypt_bits8[j])
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*p |= _crypt_bits32[un_pbox[8 * b + j]];
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}
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}
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des_initialised = 1;
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}
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static void
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setup_salt(long salt)
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{
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uint32 obit,
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saltbit;
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int i;
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if (salt == old_salt)
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return;
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old_salt = salt;
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saltbits = 0L;
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saltbit = 1;
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obit = 0x800000;
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for (i = 0; i < 24; i++)
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{
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if (salt & saltbit)
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saltbits |= obit;
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saltbit <<= 1;
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obit >>= 1;
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}
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}
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static int
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des_setkey(const char *key)
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{
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uint32 k0,
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k1,
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rawkey0,
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rawkey1;
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int shifts,
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round;
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if (!des_initialised)
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des_init();
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rawkey0 = ntohl(*(const uint32 *) key);
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rawkey1 = ntohl(*(const uint32 *) (key + 4));
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if ((rawkey0 | rawkey1)
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&& rawkey0 == old_rawkey0
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&& rawkey1 == old_rawkey1)
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{
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/*
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* Already setup for this key. This optimisation fails on a zero key
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* (which is weak and has bad parity anyway) in order to simplify the
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* starting conditions.
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*/
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return (0);
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}
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old_rawkey0 = rawkey0;
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old_rawkey1 = rawkey1;
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/*
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* Do key permutation and split into two 28-bit subkeys.
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*/
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k0 = key_perm_maskl[0][rawkey0 >> 25]
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| key_perm_maskl[1][(rawkey0 >> 17) & 0x7f]
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| key_perm_maskl[2][(rawkey0 >> 9) & 0x7f]
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| key_perm_maskl[3][(rawkey0 >> 1) & 0x7f]
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| key_perm_maskl[4][rawkey1 >> 25]
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| key_perm_maskl[5][(rawkey1 >> 17) & 0x7f]
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| key_perm_maskl[6][(rawkey1 >> 9) & 0x7f]
|
|
| key_perm_maskl[7][(rawkey1 >> 1) & 0x7f];
|
|
k1 = key_perm_maskr[0][rawkey0 >> 25]
|
|
| key_perm_maskr[1][(rawkey0 >> 17) & 0x7f]
|
|
| key_perm_maskr[2][(rawkey0 >> 9) & 0x7f]
|
|
| key_perm_maskr[3][(rawkey0 >> 1) & 0x7f]
|
|
| key_perm_maskr[4][rawkey1 >> 25]
|
|
| key_perm_maskr[5][(rawkey1 >> 17) & 0x7f]
|
|
| key_perm_maskr[6][(rawkey1 >> 9) & 0x7f]
|
|
| key_perm_maskr[7][(rawkey1 >> 1) & 0x7f];
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Rotate subkeys and do compression permutation.
|
|
*/
|
|
shifts = 0;
|
|
for (round = 0; round < 16; round++)
|
|
{
|
|
uint32 t0,
|
|
t1;
|
|
|
|
shifts += key_shifts[round];
|
|
|
|
t0 = (k0 << shifts) | (k0 >> (28 - shifts));
|
|
t1 = (k1 << shifts) | (k1 >> (28 - shifts));
|
|
|
|
de_keysl[15 - round] =
|
|
en_keysl[round] = comp_maskl[0][(t0 >> 21) & 0x7f]
|
|
| comp_maskl[1][(t0 >> 14) & 0x7f]
|
|
| comp_maskl[2][(t0 >> 7) & 0x7f]
|
|
| comp_maskl[3][t0 & 0x7f]
|
|
| comp_maskl[4][(t1 >> 21) & 0x7f]
|
|
| comp_maskl[5][(t1 >> 14) & 0x7f]
|
|
| comp_maskl[6][(t1 >> 7) & 0x7f]
|
|
| comp_maskl[7][t1 & 0x7f];
|
|
|
|
de_keysr[15 - round] =
|
|
en_keysr[round] = comp_maskr[0][(t0 >> 21) & 0x7f]
|
|
| comp_maskr[1][(t0 >> 14) & 0x7f]
|
|
| comp_maskr[2][(t0 >> 7) & 0x7f]
|
|
| comp_maskr[3][t0 & 0x7f]
|
|
| comp_maskr[4][(t1 >> 21) & 0x7f]
|
|
| comp_maskr[5][(t1 >> 14) & 0x7f]
|
|
| comp_maskr[6][(t1 >> 7) & 0x7f]
|
|
| comp_maskr[7][t1 & 0x7f];
|
|
}
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
do_des(uint32 l_in, uint32 r_in, uint32 *l_out, uint32 *r_out, int count)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* l_in, r_in, l_out, and r_out are in pseudo-"big-endian" format.
|
|
*/
|
|
uint32 l,
|
|
r,
|
|
*kl,
|
|
*kr,
|
|
*kl1,
|
|
*kr1;
|
|
uint32 f,
|
|
r48l,
|
|
r48r;
|
|
int round;
|
|
|
|
if (count == 0)
|
|
return (1);
|
|
else if (count > 0)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* Encrypting
|
|
*/
|
|
kl1 = en_keysl;
|
|
kr1 = en_keysr;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* Decrypting
|
|
*/
|
|
count = -count;
|
|
kl1 = de_keysl;
|
|
kr1 = de_keysr;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Do initial permutation (IP).
|
|
*/
|
|
l = ip_maskl[0][l_in >> 24]
|
|
| ip_maskl[1][(l_in >> 16) & 0xff]
|
|
| ip_maskl[2][(l_in >> 8) & 0xff]
|
|
| ip_maskl[3][l_in & 0xff]
|
|
| ip_maskl[4][r_in >> 24]
|
|
| ip_maskl[5][(r_in >> 16) & 0xff]
|
|
| ip_maskl[6][(r_in >> 8) & 0xff]
|
|
| ip_maskl[7][r_in & 0xff];
|
|
r = ip_maskr[0][l_in >> 24]
|
|
| ip_maskr[1][(l_in >> 16) & 0xff]
|
|
| ip_maskr[2][(l_in >> 8) & 0xff]
|
|
| ip_maskr[3][l_in & 0xff]
|
|
| ip_maskr[4][r_in >> 24]
|
|
| ip_maskr[5][(r_in >> 16) & 0xff]
|
|
| ip_maskr[6][(r_in >> 8) & 0xff]
|
|
| ip_maskr[7][r_in & 0xff];
|
|
|
|
while (count--)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* Do each round.
|
|
*/
|
|
kl = kl1;
|
|
kr = kr1;
|
|
round = 16;
|
|
while (round--)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* Expand R to 48 bits (simulate the E-box).
|
|
*/
|
|
r48l = ((r & 0x00000001) << 23)
|
|
| ((r & 0xf8000000) >> 9)
|
|
| ((r & 0x1f800000) >> 11)
|
|
| ((r & 0x01f80000) >> 13)
|
|
| ((r & 0x001f8000) >> 15);
|
|
|
|
r48r = ((r & 0x0001f800) << 7)
|
|
| ((r & 0x00001f80) << 5)
|
|
| ((r & 0x000001f8) << 3)
|
|
| ((r & 0x0000001f) << 1)
|
|
| ((r & 0x80000000) >> 31);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Do salting for crypt() and friends, and XOR with the permuted
|
|
* key.
|
|
*/
|
|
f = (r48l ^ r48r) & saltbits;
|
|
r48l ^= f ^ *kl++;
|
|
r48r ^= f ^ *kr++;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Do sbox lookups (which shrink it back to 32 bits) and do the
|
|
* pbox permutation at the same time.
|
|
*/
|
|
f = psbox[0][m_sbox[0][r48l >> 12]]
|
|
| psbox[1][m_sbox[1][r48l & 0xfff]]
|
|
| psbox[2][m_sbox[2][r48r >> 12]]
|
|
| psbox[3][m_sbox[3][r48r & 0xfff]];
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Now that we've permuted things, complete f().
|
|
*/
|
|
f ^= l;
|
|
l = r;
|
|
r = f;
|
|
}
|
|
r = l;
|
|
l = f;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Do final permutation (inverse of IP).
|
|
*/
|
|
*l_out = fp_maskl[0][l >> 24]
|
|
| fp_maskl[1][(l >> 16) & 0xff]
|
|
| fp_maskl[2][(l >> 8) & 0xff]
|
|
| fp_maskl[3][l & 0xff]
|
|
| fp_maskl[4][r >> 24]
|
|
| fp_maskl[5][(r >> 16) & 0xff]
|
|
| fp_maskl[6][(r >> 8) & 0xff]
|
|
| fp_maskl[7][r & 0xff];
|
|
*r_out = fp_maskr[0][l >> 24]
|
|
| fp_maskr[1][(l >> 16) & 0xff]
|
|
| fp_maskr[2][(l >> 8) & 0xff]
|
|
| fp_maskr[3][l & 0xff]
|
|
| fp_maskr[4][r >> 24]
|
|
| fp_maskr[5][(r >> 16) & 0xff]
|
|
| fp_maskr[6][(r >> 8) & 0xff]
|
|
| fp_maskr[7][r & 0xff];
|
|
return (0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
des_cipher(const char *in, char *out, long salt, int count)
|
|
{
|
|
uint32 buffer[2];
|
|
uint32 l_out,
|
|
r_out,
|
|
rawl,
|
|
rawr;
|
|
int retval;
|
|
|
|
if (!des_initialised)
|
|
des_init();
|
|
|
|
setup_salt(salt);
|
|
|
|
/* copy data to avoid assuming input is word-aligned */
|
|
memcpy(buffer, in, sizeof(buffer));
|
|
|
|
rawl = ntohl(buffer[0]);
|
|
rawr = ntohl(buffer[1]);
|
|
|
|
retval = do_des(rawl, rawr, &l_out, &r_out, count);
|
|
|
|
buffer[0] = htonl(l_out);
|
|
buffer[1] = htonl(r_out);
|
|
|
|
/* copy data to avoid assuming output is word-aligned */
|
|
memcpy(out, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
|
|
|
|
return (retval);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
char *
|
|
px_crypt_des(const char *key, const char *setting)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
uint32 count,
|
|
salt,
|
|
l,
|
|
r0,
|
|
r1,
|
|
keybuf[2];
|
|
char *p;
|
|
uint8 *q;
|
|
static char output[21];
|
|
|
|
if (!des_initialised)
|
|
des_init();
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Copy the key, shifting each character up by one bit and padding with
|
|
* zeros.
|
|
*/
|
|
q = (uint8 *) keybuf;
|
|
while (q - (uint8 *) keybuf - 8)
|
|
{
|
|
*q++ = *key << 1;
|
|
if (*key != '\0')
|
|
key++;
|
|
}
|
|
if (des_setkey((char *) keybuf))
|
|
return (NULL);
|
|
|
|
#ifndef DISABLE_XDES
|
|
if (*setting == _PASSWORD_EFMT1)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* "new"-style: setting - underscore, 4 bytes of count, 4 bytes of
|
|
* salt key - unlimited characters
|
|
*/
|
|
for (i = 1, count = 0L; i < 5; i++)
|
|
count |= ascii_to_bin(setting[i]) << (i - 1) * 6;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 5, salt = 0L; i < 9; i++)
|
|
salt |= ascii_to_bin(setting[i]) << (i - 5) * 6;
|
|
|
|
while (*key)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* Encrypt the key with itself.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (des_cipher((char *) keybuf, (char *) keybuf, 0L, 1))
|
|
return (NULL);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* And XOR with the next 8 characters of the key.
|
|
*/
|
|
q = (uint8 *) keybuf;
|
|
while (q - (uint8 *) keybuf - 8 && *key)
|
|
*q++ ^= *key++ << 1;
|
|
|
|
if (des_setkey((char *) keybuf))
|
|
return (NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
strncpy(output, setting, 9);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Double check that we weren't given a short setting. If we were, the
|
|
* above code will probably have created weird values for count and
|
|
* salt, but we don't really care. Just make sure the output string
|
|
* doesn't have an extra NUL in it.
|
|
*/
|
|
output[9] = '\0';
|
|
p = output + strlen(output);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif /* !DISABLE_XDES */
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* "old"-style: setting - 2 bytes of salt key - up to 8 characters
|
|
*/
|
|
count = 25;
|
|
|
|
salt = (ascii_to_bin(setting[1]) << 6)
|
|
| ascii_to_bin(setting[0]);
|
|
|
|
output[0] = setting[0];
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If the encrypted password that the salt was extracted from is only
|
|
* 1 character long, the salt will be corrupted. We need to ensure
|
|
* that the output string doesn't have an extra NUL in it!
|
|
*/
|
|
output[1] = setting[1] ? setting[1] : output[0];
|
|
|
|
p = output + 2;
|
|
}
|
|
setup_salt(salt);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Do it.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (do_des(0L, 0L, &r0, &r1, count))
|
|
return (NULL);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Now encode the result...
|
|
*/
|
|
l = (r0 >> 8);
|
|
*p++ = _crypt_a64[(l >> 18) & 0x3f];
|
|
*p++ = _crypt_a64[(l >> 12) & 0x3f];
|
|
*p++ = _crypt_a64[(l >> 6) & 0x3f];
|
|
*p++ = _crypt_a64[l & 0x3f];
|
|
|
|
l = (r0 << 16) | ((r1 >> 16) & 0xffff);
|
|
*p++ = _crypt_a64[(l >> 18) & 0x3f];
|
|
*p++ = _crypt_a64[(l >> 12) & 0x3f];
|
|
*p++ = _crypt_a64[(l >> 6) & 0x3f];
|
|
*p++ = _crypt_a64[l & 0x3f];
|
|
|
|
l = r1 << 2;
|
|
*p++ = _crypt_a64[(l >> 12) & 0x3f];
|
|
*p++ = _crypt_a64[(l >> 6) & 0x3f];
|
|
*p++ = _crypt_a64[l & 0x3f];
|
|
*p = 0;
|
|
|
|
return (output);
|
|
}
|